Rahman v. Goord et al
Filing
101
DECISION AND ORDER. Plaintiffs letter application for injunctive relief is denied. The Court hereby certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that any appeal from this Decision and Order would not be taken in good faith and leave to appeal t o the Court of Appeals as a poor person is denied. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). Further requests to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis should be directed on motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Signed by Hon. Charles J. Siragusa on 8/2/11. (KAP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________
SHA-HEED RAHMAN, 90-A-0409,
Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
04-CV-6368 CJS
-vGLENN S. GOORD, et. al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
On January 28, 2010, this action was terminated by stipulation of settlement
(Docket No. [#97]).1 Eighteen months later, on July 27, 2011, the Court received a
letter from Plaintiff, requesting injunctive relief concerning problems that he is
experiencing at Clinton Correctional Facility (“Clinton”). The application is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a Shi’ite Muslim prison inmate, sued officials of the New York State
Department of Corrections (“DOCS”) for alleged violations of his right of religious
freedom, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., and the Constitution of the State of New York.
Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to a Shiite Muslim Jumah service that
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Due to an administrative oversight, the action was not terminated by the Clerk of the
Court until January 24, 2011.
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was separate from the Sunni Muslim Jumah service. In January 2010, the parties
executed a settlement agreement, and on January 21, 2011, the Court dismissed the
action as settled. Recently, Plaintiff moved to reopen this action, and the Court denied
that application. Consequently, this action remains closed.
On July 27, 2011, the Court received a letter from Plaintiff, who is currently
housed at Clinton. Plaintiff asks that his letter be treated as a motion for injunctive
relief. Plaintiff states that Lieutenant Kelly (“Kelly”) is retaliating against him by “denying
him a chance to program,” and by preventing him from working in Clinton’s law library.
Plaintiff further states that Corrections Officer Mahuta (“Mahuta”) suspects that he is the
leader of a Shia Muslim group, and is investigating him and accusing him of various
misconduct. Plaintiff claims to be afraid that Muhuta is going to plant contraband in his
cell. Neither Kelly nor Mahuta were parties to this action. Additionally, Plaintiff claims
that he is not being given the chance to complete certain programming that he needs in
order to obtain parole. Plaintiff contends that all of the problems he is experiencing are
in retaliation for his prior lawsuit and settlement agreement.
ANALYSIS
To the extent that Plaintiff is asking the Court to reopen this action, that request
has already been denied by a separate Decision and Order. To the extent that he is
seeking injunctive relief, his request is also denied.
At the outset, it is clear that the submissions of a pro se litigant “must be
construed liberally,” to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See, McKithen
v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The standard for
considering an application for a preliminary injunction is well settled:
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In general, to secure a preliminary injunction, the moving party must
demonstrate: (1) irreparable harm, and (2) either (a) a likelihood of
success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits of the case to make it a fair ground for litigation, and a balance of
hardships tipping decidedly in its favor. A party moving for a mandatory
injunction that alters the status quo by commanding a positive act must
meet a higher standard, however. That is, in addition to demonstrating
irreparable harm, the moving party must make a clear or substantial
showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, a standard especially
appropriate when a preliminary injunction is sought against government.
D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 465 F.3d 503, 510 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
Moreover, the injunctive relief requested must relate to the subject matter of the
lawsuit. Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (“A court issues a
preliminary injunction in a lawsuit to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable
harm until the court has an opportunity to rule on the lawsuit's merits. Thus, a party
moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between
the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.”)
(citations omitted); see also, Grullon v. Reid, No. 97 CIV. 7616 (RWS), 2000 WL
648891at *1 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2000) (“[The inmate plaintiff] has . . . submitted a
letter motion in which he seeks preliminary injunctive relief ordering the Bureau of
Prisons to cease various forms of retaliation against him for his pending litigations
against the government. However, there is no relationship between the injury claimed in
[plaintiff’s] letter motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint in this action.
Preliminary injunctive relief is therefore improper.”) (citing Devose v. Herrington), aff’d,
22 Fed.Appx. 70 (2nd Cir. Nov. 28, 2001).
Here, even crediting plaintiff’s contentions concerning Kelly and Mahuta, his
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request for injunctive relief has little connection to his claims of religious discrimination
concerning Jumah services. In any event, the specific injunctive relief that Plaintiff is
seeking is a re-opening of this action, which has already been denied by the Court.
Moreover, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Kelly or Mahuta. In re
Rationis Enterprises, Inc. of Panama, 261 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A court may
not grant a final, or even an interlocutory, injunction over a party over whom it does not
have personal jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted). Consequently, plaintiff is not entitled to
injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s letter application for injunctive relief is denied. The Court hereby
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that any appeal from this Decision and Order
would not be taken in good faith and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor
person is denied. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). Further requests to
proceed on appeal in forma pauperis should be directed on motion to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
So Ordered.
Dated: Rochester, New York
August 2, 2011
ENTER:
/s/ Charles J. Siragusa
CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA
United States District Judge
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