Barnhart v. Town of Parma et al
Filing
54
DECISION AND ORDER denying plaintiff's request that this Court reconsider its Decision and Order of 9/22/10 and dismissing the action. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 6/28/11. (JMC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_________________________________________
BRUCE BARNHART, PAUL EICHAS,
Plaintiffs,
07-CV-6056
DECISION
and ORDER
v.
TOWN OF PARMA,
Defendant.
_________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs,
Bruce
Barnhart
(“Barnhart”)
and
Paul
Eichas
(“Eichas”), timely filed this Motion for Reconsideration pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“Rule 59(e)”), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
(“Rule 60(b)”), on September 22, 2010, asking for this Court to
reconsider its decision granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
claim.
This Court entered a Decision and Order on September 22,
2010, granting the Town of Parma’s (“Defendant” or “Town”) motion
for summary judgment, and dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint.
For
the
reasons
set
forth
below,
this
Court
denies
the
Plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to Rules 59(e)and 60(b), because the
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the existence of exceptional
circumstances to warrant reconsideration, or show that this Court
overlooked controlling decisions or data that might reasonably be
expected to alter the September 22, 2010 Decision and Order.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs brought an action pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the New York State Human
Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on January 27, 2007,
claiming they were discriminated against on the basis of their
gender, and retaliated against for filing claims of discrimination.
On March 29, 2010, Defendant Town of Parma filed a motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to establish
a
claim
for
discrimination
or
retaliation.
In
response
to
Defendant’s motion, Plaintiffs filed a declaration withdrawing all
claims related to gender discrimination, but reasserting their
retaliation claims.
In a Decision and Order entered September 22, 2010, this Court
granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed
Plaintiffs’ remaining retaliation claims.
Judgment was entered by
the Clerk of the Court on September 23, 2010.
Plaintiffs now seek
reconsideration of this Court’s decision.
DISCUSSION
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
relevant part that a court may relieve a party from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for any of the following reasons:
(1)
mistake,
inadvertence,
surprise,
or
excusable
neglect;
(2)
newly
discovered
evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether
previously
called
intrinsic
or
extrinsic),
misrepresentation,
or
other
misconduct of an opposing party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been
reversed
or
vacated;
or
applying
it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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A motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
is
addressed
to
the
"sound
discretion of the district court and . . . [is] generally granted
only upon the showing of exceptional circumstances."
Mendell v.
Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added), aff'd,
501 U.S. 115 (1991).
"The standard for granting such a motion is
strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the
moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the
court overlooked--matters, in other words, that might reasonably be
expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v.
CSX Transportation, Inc., 70 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 1995).
A motion
pursuant to Rule 60(b) cannot be used to relitigate the issues of
the
case.
Sevenson
Environmental
Services,
Inc.
v.
Shaw
Environmental, Inc., 246 F.R.D. 151, 153 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).
Rule 59(e) states that “A motion to alter or amend a judgment
must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the
judgment.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
Here, Plaintiffs filed a timely motion for reconsideration.
Plaintiffs argue that this Court erred in dismissing their claims
on
summary
judgment
because
Defendant
did
not
Plaintiffs’ Title VII or NYSHRL retaliation claims.
2).
move
against
(Pl. Mem. at
Plaintiff further argues that this Court applied the wrong
standard of law in deciding Plaintiffs’ Title VII retaliation
claims.
(Pl. Mem. at 3).
-3-
This Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not pointed to any
controlling decisions that the Court overlooked, and have not
provided any new, material evidence that could affect this Court’s
judgment. As such, Plaintiffs have failed to meet the standard for
this Court’s reconsideration.
The
Plaintiffs
argue
that
this
Court
improperly
granted
summary judgment to the Town, because the Town did not seek
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Title VII retaliation claims, and the
merits of their Title VII retaliation claims were not before the
Court.
(Pl. Mem. at 2).
However, the Town’s motion for summary
judgment clearly requested “judgment in Defendant’s favor and
against the Plaintiffs.”
(Def. Motion at 1).
Further, the Town’s
Notice of Motion specifically stated the Town sought “... an Order,
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint; and for such other and further
relief as the Court deems just and proper.”
(Dkt. No. 43).
Hence,
Plaintiffs’ argument is unpersuasive, as Defendants indeed moved
this Court for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims, and
this Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ entire complaint accordingly.
Further, Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to support
their claims at the time of the Town’s motion, and have now again
failed to submit any new or material evidence to support their
claims that summary judgment was improperly granted.
Plaintiffs next argue that this Court applied the wrong
standard of law to Plaintiffs’ Title VII retaliation claims.
-4-
Here
too, Plaintiffs’ argument is unpersuasive.
The Decision and Order
dismissing the complaint lays out the following standard for a
prima facie Title VII retaliation claim: Plaintiff must establish
(1) participation in a protected activity known to the defendant;
(2) an employment action disadvantaging the plaintiff or action
that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination; and (3) a causal connection between the
protected activity and adverse action. See Decision and Order
citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 68 (2006). (Decision and Order at 4).
But Plaintiffs argue that this Court applied the standard
incorrectly.
(Pl. Mem. at 4).
Specifically, Plaintiffs cite the
Court’s language describing the lack of evidence showing any
“negative job action” suffered by Plaintiffs.
Id.
In noting the
lack of “negative job action” evidence, the Court was speaking
directly
to
the
adverse
employment
element
of
Title
VII’s
retaliation framework.
An adverse employment action for the purposes of a retaliation
claim must be “materially adverse,” meaning actions that might
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.
(2006).
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. at 126
The record revealed that Plaintiffs did not suffer any
adverse employment action after filing their NYSHRL or Title VII
claims, and the Court correctly noted this fact in its analysis of
Plaintiffs’
case
within
the
Title
-5-
VII
retaliation
framework.
Indeed, the menial tasks Plaintiffs cited as retaliation were
common jobs regularly assigned to and performed by all of the
highway department’s road workers.
Thus, such work could not be
considered an employment action that would dissuade a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.
Hence, this Court did not err in applying the correct standard of
law to Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims, and Plaintiffs’ second
argument must fail.
Thus, Plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) seeking to reconsider the September 22, 2010
Decision and Order of this Court is denied.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ request that this Court reconsider its Decision
and Order of September 22, 2010 is denied in accordance with this
decision.
This action is hereby dismissed.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
s/Michael A. Telesca
MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
Rochester, New York
June 28, 2011
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