Vincent v. Yelich et al
Filing
56
DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 51 on liability is granted, and defendant's cross motion for summary judgment 54 is denied. The Court will schedule a prompt hearing if necessary to determine an appropriate compensatory damages award. Signed by Hon. David G. Larimer on 9/15/2020. (KAH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________________
SHAWN MICHAEL VINCENT,
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
08-CV-6570L
v.
SUPERINTENDENT BRUCE S. YELICH, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________________________
Plaintiff Shawn Michael Vincent (“Vincent”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§1983 (“Section 1983”). He seeks compensation from defendant Anthony J. Annucci, former
Counsel and later Executive Deputy Commissioner and Counsel for the New York State
Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”), for Annucci’s role in the unconstitutional
administrative imposition and enforcement of post release supervision (“PRS”) on plaintiff.
Familiarity with the lengthy factual and procedural history of this matter is presumed. On
August 29, 2011, this Court granted a motion by defendants (which then included multiple
individuals, including several officials employed by DOCS, the New York State Division of
Parole, and Bare Hill Correctional Facility) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim,
finding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Vincent v. Yelich (“Vincent I”),
812 F. Supp. 2d 276 (W.D.N.Y. 2011).
On June 4, 2013, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision in part, insofar
as it had dismissed plaintiff’s claims against Annucci, finding that “the district courts erred in
ruling that Annucci was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.” Vincent v. Yelich
(“Vincent II”), 718 F.3d 157, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment (Dkt. #51) finding Annucci liable for the
violation of his rights under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution to due process and freedom from unlawful imprisonment, and assessing
compensatory damages. Annucci has cross moved for summary judgment dismissing the
complaint, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity, and/or that plaintiff’s recovery, if any,
should be limited to nominal damages. (Dkt. #54). For the reasons that follow, plaintiff’s motion
is granted, and defendant’s cross motion is denied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2001, Vincent pled guilty to violations of New York Penal Law pursuant to a plea
agreement promising a sentence of no more than 5 years. On September 17, 2001, Vincent
appeared in Chautauqua County Court, where he was sentenced to a term of 5 years imprisonment.
The sentence by the County Court did not include any period of PRS. Vincent was thereafter
remanded to DOCS custody, with a maximum expiration date of October 4, 2005, or with good
time, a conditional release date of January 14, 2005. In fact, Vincent was conditionally released
on January 14, 2005, at which point a 5-year period of PRS, set to conclude January 14, 2010, was
administratively imposed not by a court but by DOCS.1
On October 14, 2005, Vincent was arrested and taken into custody and charged with failure
to comply with certain conditions of the terms of PRS. While Vincent was awaiting adjudication
of those charges, on June 9, 2006, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Earley v. Murray
1
Defendant, in his Statement of Undisputed Facts, disputes the expiration date of Vincent’s sentence. However, as
defendant offers no alternative date and no proof that plaintiff’s statement is incorrect on this point, the Court defers
to the date set forth by plaintiff.
2
(“Earley I”), 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006), ruling that it was unconstitutional for individuals to be
subjected to administratively-imposed PRS where no judge had sentenced them to it. It is this
decision that is at the heart of Vincent’s present action.
On August 29, 2006, an administrative law judge determined that Vincent had violated the
conditions of his administratively-imposed PRS. Vincent remained incarcerated until March 21,
2007, when he was released to additional term of PRS administratively imposed by a DOCS
official. Two weeks later, on April 5, 2007, Vincent was charged for a second time with failure to
comply with PRS conditions, and was again incarcerated, this time with a two-year sentence.
Vincent thereafter filed a habeas corpus petition in New York State Supreme Court,
Franklin County, alleging that his continued incarceration was unconstitutional. That petition was
granted on July 23, 2008, and Vincent was released on July 31, 2008.
As the Second Circuit has observed, Annucci was aware of and understood the holding in
Earley I at least as early as June 20, 2006 when he purported to explain it to an Office of Court
Administration official in an e-mail, but “could reasonably have waited to take action until after
August 31, 2006,” when the Second Circuit denied rehearing. Betances v. Fischer (“Betances II”),
837 F.3d 162, 170-72 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Earley v. Annucci (“Earley II”), 462 F.3d 147, 148
(2d Cir. 2006)). See also Earley v. Annucci (“Earley III”), 810 Fed. Appx. 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2020)
(“our prior cases have properly placed on Annucci the obligation of beginning efforts to
expeditiously implement the holding of Earley I as soon as rehearing of that case was denied”).
Nonetheless, Annucci “did not take objectively reasonable steps” to conform DOCS policy
to Earley I and Earley II until at least April 2008. Betances II, 837 F.3d 162 at 168, 171-72. See
also Reyes v. Fischer, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218777 at *15-*19 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)(describing
Annucci’s role in formulating DOCS’s response to Earley I, which included advising DOCS
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officials that they were not bound by Earley I, and taking no action to conform DOCS policy and
conduct to its holding until 2008). As a result, Vincent was incarcerated for 686 days for violating
the terms of unconstitutional, administratively-imposed PRS, after the Second Circuit’s August
31, 2006 decision in Earley II, denying rehearing.
DISCUSSION
I.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment will be granted if the record demonstrates that “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). In
determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court’s role is not “to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe all inferences in the
light most favorable to the non-movant. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986), citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
II.
Annucci’s Liability and Qualified Immunity
In order to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a state actor, or a
private party acting under color of law, “deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the
Constitution of the United States.” Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted). In order for a defendant to be held individually liable in an action under Section 1983,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged deprivation. Such
involvement can be established through proof that the defendant created a “policy or custom under
which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom.”
Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). While an official may be found to be protected
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by qualified immunity where the violation concerned a right that was not “clearly established” at
the time of the disputed actions, where the official’s actions violated clearly established rights of
which a reasonable official would have been aware, qualified immunity is unavailable. Vincent II,
718 F.3d 157 at 166.
Here, Annucci’s personal involvement in formulating DOCS’s policies concerning the
imposition and enforcement of administratively-imposed PRS is already well-settled. In the matter
of Betances, a pending class action in which Vincent is also a party, the Second Circuit
conclusively determined that Annucci was liable for his personal involvement in creating the
policies and customs by which the constitutional violations against Vincent, and other individuals
upon whom PRS was administratively imposed or enforced, occurred. Betances II, 837 F.3d 162
at 165. See also Earley III, 810 Fed. Appx. 60 at 63 (“Betances concluded that Annucci
unreasonably delayed the development and launch of large-scale initiatives to implement Earley
across the entire population affected by administratively imposed PRS . . . Annucci immediately
understood Earley I’s holding but deliberately refused to change DOCS procedures to bring them
into compliance”)(unpublished decision).
Nor is Annucci entitled to qualified immunity for his post-Earley II inaction. As the Second
Circuit has determined, the unconstitutionality of DOCS’s administrative imposition of PRS was
“clearly established” with the Second Circuit’s decisions in Earley I and II, and Annucci was aware
of those decisions and their meaning almost immediately after they were issued. Id. Nonetheless,
Annucci failed and refused to act. Annucci’s years-long delay in bringing about constitutional
compliance thereafter – a delay that resulted in no action ever being taken to release or resentence
Vincent, whose PRS-related incarceration continued through July 31, 2008 and presumably would
have lasted even longer had a state court not granted him habeas corpus relief – was, as the Second
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Circuit Court of Appeals held, “objectively unreasonable.” Betances II, 837 F.3d 162, 172-73. See
generally Vincent II, 718 F.3d 157 at 173-74. Annucci had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
each of these issues in Earley and Betances (the latter of which included the instant plaintiff as a
party), and the Second Circuit’s holdings in those matters are thus controlling here.
For the foregoing reasons, construing all facts in Annucci’s favor and granting him every
favorable inference, I find that the undisputed facts and controlling case law establish that he is
personally liable for his acts and omissions in failing to promptly end or cure the unconstitutional
imposition and enforcement of PRS against plaintiff after Earley II made it clear that such
imposition and enforcement of PRS was unconstitutional, and I further conclude that Annucci is
not entitled to qualified immunity for such acts and omissions.
III.
Compensatory Damages
Plaintiff has requested an award of compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000,000.00,
based solely on his instant submissions. In support of his request, Vincent has submitted a sworn
affidavit addressing the length of his incarceration for the PRS violations, as well as the mental
anguish that this period of additional incarceration caused him. See generally Kerman v. City of
New York, 374 F.3d 93, 122-26 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing factors relevant to an award of
compensatory damages for false imprisonment, even where the unlawful detention lasted only a
few hours).
Annucci contends that to the extent plaintiff was subjected to administratively-imposed
PRS in violation of his constitutional right to due process, such error was harmless and caused no
injury. Annucci claims that plaintiff is therefore entitled only to nominal damages. I disagree.
Annucci contends that in and after July 2008, inmates who had been subjected to
administratively-imposed PRS were, in many cases, referred to the Court for resentencing so that
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PRS could be judicially re-imposed. Annucci argues that even if he had acted more promptly to
cure the constitutional violation against Vincent, the outcome would have been the same: Vincent
would simply have been referred for resentencing, and the new sentence would have included the
same term of PRS, nunc pro tunc. Annucci thus asks the Court to follow the holding in Hassell v.
Fischer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195311 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d in part, 879 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018),
in which a plaintiff who challenged the delay in his resentencing was found entitled only to
nominal damages, since his post-Earley judicial resentencing resulted in the same sentence and
the same PRS term that had initially been administratively imposed.
Annucci’s contention is without merit and flawed in several respects. Initially, Hassell is
entirely distinguishable, and Annucci’s attempts to apply its holding in cases factually similar to
the instant one have, predictably, “found little success.” Santiago v. Cuomo, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 230492 at *22 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)(finding that “Hassell is an inapt comparison” to cases
involving plaintiffs whose terms of incarceration were never retroactively rendered constitutional
by resentencing).
Unlike the Hassell plaintiff, Vincent was never resentenced, and it would be folly for this
Court to engage in baseless speculation as to what another court might have done had resentencing
taken place. Indeed, it is entirely possible that resentencing might have resulted in no PRS at all.
See e.g., Betances v. Fischer (“Betances III”), 403 F.Supp.3d 212, 229 (2d Cir. 2019) (denying
motion by defendants to limit incarcerated plaintiffs to nominal damages and distinguishing
Hassell, noting that when many of the Betances plaintiffs were referred for resentencing, judges
imposed shorter PRS periods than what had been administratively imposed, or declined to impose
any PRS at all). See also Aponte v. Fischer, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69426 at *33-*34 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (denying motion by defendants to limit plaintiff to nominal damages, and distinguishing
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Hassell, where plaintiff suffered a loss of liberty as a result of unlawful detention); Santiago, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230491 at *23-*24 (defendants “have not established, because they cannot, that
Plaintiff would have been resentenced to a term of PRS nunc pro tunc had he been referred for
resentencing during the period of their liability”). It is clear that on resentencing, the judge could
have imposed a lesser term of PRS or, with the consent of the District Attorney (N.Y. Penal Law
70.85), no PRS term at all.
While what might have happened if Vincent had been promptly referred for resentencing
will forever remain a mystery, what did happen to him is clear and undisputed, and it is those
events upon which the Court must focus in assessing an appropriate damages award. Vincent’s
judicially-imposed determinate sentence and his period of conditional release were wholly
concluded prior to the time he was initially taken into custody for violating the terms of the PRS
that was administratively imposed. Vincent thereafter served approximately 1,006 days of
incarceration for violating the terms of PRS, 768 of which were imposed and/or served after Earley
I declared administrative imposition of PRS to be unconstitutional, and 686 of which were imposed
and/or served after the Second Circuit’s decision in Earley II deprived Annucci of any excuse to
further delay efforts to remedy the constitutional violation. In short, but for Annucci’s failure to
promptly excise Vincent’s PRS or to refer him for curative resentencing after Earley II, Vincent
might have been spared a significant portion of the 686 days of incarceration he served after August
31, 2006.2 See Vincent II, 718 F.3d 157 at 171-72 (after Earley I, “the State was required either to
have [persons upon whom PRS had been administratively imposed] resentenced by the court . . .
2
The parties’ statements of undisputed facts differ slightly as to the relevant number of days Vincent was incarcerated.
The Court has endeavored to reach its own calculations based on the undisputed facts. The record indicates that
Vincent served 202 days for PRS violations between September 1, 2006 (the date after the Second Circuit’s decision
in Earley II) and his release on March 21, 2007, and an additional 484 days for PRS violations between April 5, 2007,
and his release following the grant of habeas corpus relief on July 31, 2008. These two periods add up to 686 days –
nearly 23 months.
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or to excise the PRS conditions from their records and relieve them off those conditions”). He
could have had no term of PRS.
A successful plaintiff in a Section 1983 action is entitled to compensatory damages, where
properly pleaded and proved. Damages intended to compensate for a period of imprisonment are
generally comprised of two types: those associated with pain, physical injury, mental suffering,
etc., and those related to the loss of liberty. In determining damages in the first category, courts
generally consider lost wages and other economic damages, in addition to emotional distress,
mental anguish, and pain and suffering. In fixing damages intended to compensate for the
deprivation of liberty, the Second Circuit has noted that an award of thousands of dollars is
appropriate for even short periods of confinement. See Kerman, 374 F.3d 93 at 125.
“The case law on damages is limited and the purview of the awards is not formulaic.”
Henry v. State of New York, 2018-032-006 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. March 19, 2018)(slip op.). As such, the
determination of damages arising from unconstitutional incarceration “is ordinarily ‘left to a
[factfinder’s] common sense and judgment in light of its common knowledge and experience and
with due regard to the evidence presented.’” Id. (quoting Sanabria v. State of New York, 29 Misc.
3d 988, 995 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2010)).
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which testifies to the high degree of anger, frustration
and depression he experienced during his incarceration for PRS violations (1,015 days total, 686
of which post-dated Earley II), due to his belief that PRS had been wrongfully imposed in violation
of his plea agreement and his right to due process. (Dkt. #51-2). While Annucci does not
meaningfully dispute the facts alleged in Vincent’s damages application and plaintiff urges the
Court to award damages solely based on his affidavit, the Court concludes that in order to gain a
thorough understanding of the facts relevant to the assessment of compensatory damages for
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plaintiff’s loss of liberty, and for the pain and suffering and mental anguish associated with that
detention, a damages inquest is appropriate.
Unless the parties can reach an agreement as to the amount of compensatory damages or
agree to submit the matter to the Court on the existing filings or otherwise, the Court’s
courtroom deputy will contact counsel to schedule an inquest on damages.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #51) on liability
is granted, and defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #54) is denied. The Court
will schedule a prompt hearing if necessary to determine an appropriate compensatory damages
award.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________________
DAVID G. LARIMER
United States District Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
September 15, 2020.
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