Hoose et al v. Monroe County
Filing
24
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 18 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 6/26/2012. (BMB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________________
JENNIFER HOOSE and KATRESE LOCKETT,
Plaintiffs,
09-CV-6080T
DECISION
and ORDER
v.
MONROE COUNTY,
Defendant,
________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs
Jennifer
Hoose
(“Hoose”)
and
Katrese
Lockett
(“Lockett”), bring this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e),
et seq., 42 U.S.C. §
1983, and the New York State Human Rights Law
claiming that
their
discriminated
against
rights
were
when
they
violated
were
and
that
terminated
they
from
were
their
employment with the defendant County of Monroe (“the County”).
Specifically, the plaintiffs, both of whom are female, claim that
they were fired from their jobs as Monroe County child protective
services case workers for engaging in activity that was allowed for
similarly situated male employees.
In support of this claim,
plaintiffs allege that they were fired for improperly accessing and
disseminating confidential information, and that male co-employees
were not disciplined or fired for engaging in the same activity.
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Defendant
Monroe
County
now
moves
for
judgment
on
the
pleadings claiming that the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause
of action for discrimination under Title VII, are barred from
bringing a cause of action under the New York State Human Rights
Law because they have failed to satisfy the statutory prerequisites
for filing such a claim, and have failed to establish the violation
of
a
constitutional
right
that
would
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
subject
the
County
to
Plaintiffs concede that they
have failed to timely serve a notice of claim on the county with
respect to their Human Rights Law claim, and have withdrawn that
claim.
With respect to plaintiffs’ remaining claims, they allege
that they have satisfied the pleading requirements for establishing
Title VII and Section 1983 liability.
For the reasons set forth below, I grant defendant’s motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims, and deny defendant’s
motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title VII claims.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged in the Complaint.
Plaintiffs
Jennifer Hoose and Katrese Lockett began their employment with the
County of Monroe in July, 2004.
Although the Complaint fails to
identify the positions held by the plaintiffs, according to the
defendant, Hoose and Lockett were employed as Child Protective
Services caseworkers.
According to the Complaint, both Hoose and
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Lockett
were
accused
of
improperly
accessing
information contained in the County’s computers.
confidential
According to the
County, the plaintiffs not only accessed confidential information
that they were not authorized to view, they disclosed the contents
of that information to third-parties. Plaintiffs contend that they
were fired for accessing the confidential information.
Although
the
plaintiffs
do
not
admit
or
deny
that
they
accessed confidential information, they claim that male employees
who accessed confidential information were not fired. As a result,
they claim that they were discriminated against on the basis of
their gender, in that they were treated differently than male
employees who accessed confidential information.
The defendant
asserts that it is “not aware” of any instances in which male
employees that were found to have accessed confidential information
were treated differently than female employees found to have
engaged in the same conduct.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
relevant part that upon the close of pleadings, any party may move
for judgment upon the pleadings.
A motion for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is evaluated under the same
standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
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failure to state a claim. Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly
Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2nd Cir. 2001).
In reviewing a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court must “accept...all factual allegations in the
complaint and draw...all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor.” See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d
Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to withstand
dismissal, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (disavowing the
oft-quoted statement from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957),
that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief”).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires
more
than
labels
and
conclusions,
and
a
formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” See
id. at 1965 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “at a bare
minimum,
the
operative
standard
requires
the
‘plaintiff
[to]
provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual
allegations
sufficient
to
raise
a
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right
to
relief
above
the
speculative level.’” See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56-57
(2d Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974).
In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
court may consider only the pleadings, and not additional evidence
submitted by the parties.
Keywell L.L.C. v. Pavilion Building
Installation, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2012 WL 914998 at * 5 (W.D.N.Y.,
March 12, 2012)(Skretny, C.J.)(citing Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57,
66–67 (2d Cir.2004). “A complaint is deemed to include any written
instrument attached to it as an exhibit, materials incorporated in
it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by
reference, are ‘integral’ to the complaint.” Sira, 380 F.3d at 67.
In cases where a defendant has moved for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but
has submitted evidence outside the scope of the pleadings for the
court’s consideration, the court may, in its discretion, either
consider the additional evidence and convert the defendant’s motion
to a motion for summary judgment (on notice to the plaintiff) or
exclude the evidence and consider the motion as it is filed by the
defendant.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
In the instant case, despite the fact that discovery has been
conducted and closed, defendant has moved for judgment on the
pleadings, but has not moved for summary judgment. I defer to the
defendant’s choice, and decline to convert its motion to one for
summary judgment.
As a result, I exclude that evidence submitted
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by the defendant that is not incorporated by reference in the
plaintiff’s Complaint.
II.
Title VII Claims
Plaintiffs allege that they were discriminated against on the
basis of their gender on grounds that they were fired for accessing
and disseminating confidential information whereas male employees
were not fired for engaging in the same activity.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibits an
employer from
"hir[ing] or . . . discharg[ing] any individual, or
otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin". 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
To establish a
prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination based on
gender under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish that she is a
member of a protected class, was qualified for the position she
held, was subjected to an adverse employment action, and that the
adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
In the instant case, plaintiffs allege that they are members
of a protected class, that they were qualified for their positions,
that
they
were
subject
to
the
adverse
employment
action
of
termination from their employment, and that their firing raises an
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inference of gender discrimination because male employees who
engaged in the same alleged conduct were not fired.
Such allegations state a claim for gender discrimination under
Title VII.
Although defendant argues that the plaintiffs have not
submitted proof that male employees were treated differently than
the plaintiffs, such a claim is inapposite as the defendant has
sought dismissal of these claims based on the pleadings alone.
At
the pleading stage, a plaintiff is not required to prove her
claims, but instead, as set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, need only set forth a “short, plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Moreover, even if this court were to convert defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings to a motion for summary
judgment, defendant’s claims that it “is not aware of any instances
where men have improperly accessed confidential records without
investigation and sanction” and that the plaintiffs were “obviously
[terminated]
due
to
their
violations”
of
State
and
local
regulations woefully fail to establish any basis for granting the
defendant’s motion.
Defendant fails to cite any facts to support
these claims, and the mere fact that the County may be unaware of
discrimination fails to establish that no discrimination occurred.
Similarly, while the reason for the termination of plaintiffs’
employment may be “obvious” to the County, but where the County has
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failed to submit evidence to the court that similarly situated
males were treated similarly to the plaintiffs, the court can not
make such a determination of fact.
III. Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiffs allege that they were denied equal protection under
the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution because they were fired from their jobs for
having
improperly
accessed
and
disseminated
confidential
information whereas male employees were not fired despite engaging
in the same behavior. Plaintiffs name only the County of Monroe as
a defendant with respect to this claim.
To state a cause of action against a municipality for a
violation of civil rights under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
"plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom
that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a
constitutional right." Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685
(2d Cir. 1995); see also, Monell v. Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
A plaintiff may establish the existence
of a policy or custom by submitting evidence of the policy itself,
or
by
“establishing
acquiesced
in
subordinates.”
a
that
responsible
pattern
of
supervisory
unconstitutional
officials
conduct
by
Dove v. Fordham University, 56 F.Supp.2d 330, 336
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Accordingly, to establish municipal liability in
a
action,
Section
1983
the
plaintiff
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must
“first
prove
the
existence of a municipal policy or custom . . . [and] [s]econd, .
. . must establish a causal connection–an affirmative link–between
the policy and the deprivation of his constitutional rights.”
Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2nd Cir.
1985)(citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 n. 8).
As
stated by the Supreme Court in Monell, to state a claim against a
municipality,
a
plaintiff
must
establish
that
the
identified
municipal policy or practice was the “moving force [behind] the
constitutional violation.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to identify any
policy or custom practiced by the County of Monroe that resulted in
a deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and as a
result, has failed to state a claim for municipal liability under
Section 1983.
See Dean v. New York City Transit Authority, 297
F.Supp.2d 549, 555 (E.D.N.Y., 2004)(dismissing claim of Section
1983 municipal liability where plaintiff had “failed to allege that
. . disparate treatment . . .resulted from any municipal policy,
practice, or custom . . . .”).
An allegation that a plaintiff
suffered disparate treatment, standing alone, fails to implicate a
municipality’s liability for discrimination.
Rather, a plaintiff
must allege, and ultimately prove, that the disparate treatment
resulted from a municipal policy or custom. See Dawson v. County of
Westchester, 351 F.Supp.2d 176. 195-96 (S.D.N.Y., 2004)(holding as
a matter of law that even where individual defendants could be
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found to have engaged in discriminatory behavior, plaintiff failed
to allege or establish that the discriminatory behavior resulted
from a municipal policy or custom, and as a result, plaintiff
failed to adequately allege municipal liability under Section
1983.)
Because plaintiff has failed to allege or identify a
municipal policy or custom that resulted in the deprivation of
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, I grant defendant’s motion to
dismiss plaintiffs Third Cause of Action.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I grant defendant’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiffs’ Section
1983 claims, and dismiss those claims.
I deny defendant’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiffs’ Title VII
claims.
Plaintiffs have withdrawn their Human Rights law claims
and therefore I need not address defendants’ motion to dismiss
these claims.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
S/ Michael A.
Telesca
MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
Rochester, New York
June 26, 2012
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