Hoose et al v. Monroe County

Filing 53

-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP- DECISION AND ORDER granting 45 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. (Clerk to close case.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 8/21/14. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________________
JENNIFER HOOSE and KATRESE LOCKETT,
Plaintiffs,

09-CV-6080T
DECISION
and ORDER

v.
MONROE COUNTY,
Defendant,
________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs

Jennifer

Hoose

(“Hoose”)

and

Katrese

Lockett

(“Lockett”), bring this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e),
claiming that they were discriminated against on the basis of their
gender when they were terminated from their employment with the
defendant County of Monroe (“the County”).

Specifically, the

plaintiffs, both of whom are female, claim that they were fired
from their jobs as Monroe County Child Protective Services case
workers for engaging in activity that was allowed for similarly
situated male employees.
allege

that

they

were

In support of this claim, plaintiffs
fired

for

improperly

accessing

and

disseminating confidential information, and that male co-employees
were not disciplined or fired for engaging in the same activity.
Defendant

Monroe

County

now

moves

for

summary

judgment

claiming that the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action
for discrimination under Title VII.
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Specifically, the defendant

contends that plaintiffs have failed to establish that gender was
a motivating factor in the decision to fire them, or that similarly
situated male employees were treated more favorably than they were.
Plaintiffs oppose the defendant’s motion.
For the reasons set forth below, I grant defendant’s motion
for summary judgment, and dismiss plaintiffs complaint in its
entirety.
BACKGROUND
The following facts were set forth in my June 6, 2012 Decision
and Order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiffs Katrese Lockett and Jennifer

Hoose began their employment with the County of Monroe in 2003 and
2004 respectively.

According to the defendant, Hoose and Lockett

were employed as Child Protective Services caseworkers.

According

to the Complaint, both Hoose and Lockett were accused of improperly
accessing
computers.

confidential

information

contained

in

the

County’s

According to the County, the plaintiffs not only

accessed confidential information that they were not authorized to
view, they disclosed the contents of that information to thirdparties.
Hoose admits that she improperly used the defendant’s computer
system to look up private, confidential information for persons who
were

not

her

clients,

and

improperly

information to her child’s father.

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disseminated

private

See Defendant’s Statement of

Undisputed Facts at ¶¶ 8-9.4.

Similarly, Lockett admits that she

improperly used the defendant’s computer system to obtain private,
confidential information in violation of defendant’s policies. Id.
at ¶¶ 23-23.6.
Although the plaintiffs admit that they engaged in improper
conduct which warranted termination from employment, they claim
that they were discriminated against on the basis of their gender
because male employees who accessed confidential information were
allegedly not fired. The defendant contends that of the three male
employees who improperly accessed confidential information, two
resigned in lieu of termination from employment, and one received
a letter of reprimand. Defendant further contends that of the four
women (including the plaintiffs) who were found to have accessed
private information without authorization, two were suspended, and
two

were

fired.

improperly

Defendant

accessed

contends

information

and

that

all

disseminated

employees
it

to

who

third

parties were either fired, or resigned before they were fired,
regardless of whether or not they were male or female.
further

assert

that

those

employees

who

Defendants

improperly

accessed

information but did not disseminate the information to third
parties received less severe punishment, regardless of gender.

Page -3-

DISCUSSION
I.

The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that

summary

judgment

shall

be

granted

if

the

moving

party

demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
When considering a motion for summary judgment, all genuinely
disputed facts must be resolved in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought. Tolan v. Cotton,
S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014).

, U.S.,

134

If, after considering the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds
that no rational jury could find in favor of that party, a grant of
summary judgment is appropriate.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

380 (2007)(citing Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-587 (1986)).
II.

Plaintiffs have
Discrimination

Failed

to

State

a

Claim

of

Gender

Plaintiffs allege that they were discriminated against on the
basis of their gender because they were fired for accessing and
disseminating confidential information whereas male employees were
not fired for engaging in the same activity.
As I stated in my June 26, 2012 Decision and Order, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibits an employer from
"hir[ing] or . . . discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise . . .
discriminat[ing]

against

any

individual

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with

respect

to

his

compensation,
because

of

terms,

such

conditions,

individual’s

or

race,

privileges
color,

national origin". 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
discrimination

are

analyzed

under

of

employment,

religion,

sex,

or

Claims of employment

the

well-recognized

burden

shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) and later refined in Texas Dep’t of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and St. Mary’s Honor Center
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

Under the McDonnell Douglas test,

the plaintiff bears the burden proving a prima facie case of
discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in stating a prima facie
case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to state a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for taking the employment
action at issue.

Should the employer meet that burden, the burden

of production then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
reasons proffered by the employer were not the true reasons for the
adverse

employment

action,

but

instead

were

a

pretext

for

discrimination, and that discrimination was the real reason.

See

Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981); St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502-06 (1993).
A.
To

Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.
establish

a

prima

facie

case

of

unlawful

employment

discrimination based on gender under Title VII, a plaintiff must
establish that she is a member of a protected class, was qualified
for the position she held, was subjected to an adverse employment
Page -5-

action, and that the adverse action occurred under circumstances
giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

See McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
In the instant case, plaintiffs have failed to establish that
they were fired under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination.

There is no allegation, or suggestion in the

record, that the defendant had any negative attitude towards women,
or that women were subjected to a hostile or discriminatory working
environment.

There is no allegation or suggestion in the record

that the plaintiff’s were replaced by male employees.

Rather, the

sole basis for plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination is their
contention that male employees who were caught improperly accessing
private information were treated more favorably than women.
only

evidence

submitted

in

support

of

this

contention

The
is

plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations that although they were fired
for having violated the defendant’s confidentiality policy, two
male employees who violated the policy were allowed to resign, and
one male employee was not fired despite violating the defendant’s
policy.
Plaintiffs’

allegations

fail

discrimination for several reasons.

to

raise

an

inference

of

Initially, it is uncontested

that the two male employees who resigned rather than be terminated
from their employment faced the same exact disciplinary action that
the plaintiffs did: to wit, the male employees were subjected to

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termination from employment.

Unlike the plaintiffs, however, the

male employees decided to resign rather than be fired.

Plaintiffs

have failed to allege, or present any evidence that they offered to
resign from employment, or that they were prohibited from offering
to resign in lieu of termination.

Accordingly, plaintiffs have

failed to establish that they were treated differently than male
employees

accused

of

serious

confidentiality provisions.

violations

of

the

defendant’s

In all instances where an employee,

whether male or female, accessed and disseminated confidential
information,

that

employee

was

subject

to

termination

from

employment, and was in fact separated from employment.
With respect to the male employee who was not fired despite
accessing private information, it is uncontroverted that the male
employee who was not fired had not disclosed the information he
accessed to anyone outside of the Department.

Accordingly, the

employee’s violation was determined by the defendant to be less
serious than the violations committed by the plaintiffs and the two
male employees who chose to resign.
Finally, plaintiffs ignore the evidence submitted by the
defendant establishing that of the four women who were found to
have accessed private information without authorization, two were
suspended, and two (the plaintiffs) were fired.

This evidence

demonstrates that not all women were fired as a result of violating
the defendant’s confidentiality policies, and that women were not

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treated differently than men. Of the seven people who had violated
the policy (four of whom were women, and three of whom were men)
two men and two women were fired (or chose to resign), two women
were suspended, and one man was given a letter of reprimand.
Accordingly,

plaintiffs

have

failed

to

establish

that

female

employees were treated differently than male employees.
B.

Defendants have stated a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for terminating plaintiffs’ employment.

Even if the plaintiffs could establish a prima facie of gender
discrimination, I find that the defendant has stated a legitimate,
non-discriminatory

reason

for

terminating

their

employment.

Specifically, the defendant has established that the plaintiffs
were

fired

because

they

improperly

obtained

confidential

information, and disseminated that information to third parties for
personal gain.

Such an explanation states a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for firing the plaintiffs.
C.

Plaintiffs have failed to rebut the defendant’s proffered
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating
their employment.

To rebut the defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
offered for terminating their employment, plaintiffs must present
evidence

that

motivated

the

a

discriminatory

employer”

or

reason

that

“the

explanation is unworthy of belief.”
Corp.,

958

F.2d

1176

(2nd

Cir.

“more

likely

employer’s

than

not

proffered

See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel
1992)(citations

omitted).

A

plaintiff rebutting the defendant’s position may not simply rely on
Page -8-

“some” evidence of pretext, but instead must produce “sufficient
evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by the [defendant] were false, and
that more likely than not [discrimination] was the real reason for
the [employment action].”

Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105,

110 (2nd Cir. 1994).
In the instant case, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate
that discrimination was more likely than not the real reason they
were terminated from their employment.

Of the seven employees

disciplined for improperly accessing private information, two women
and two men were terminated, and two women and one man received
lesser forms of discipline.
were

not

treated

Such evidence demonstrates that women

differently

than

men

with

respect

to

the

application of discipline for violating defendant’s policies. That
the two men who were terminated chose to resign prior to being
fired fails to establish discrimination, as there is no evidence
that the defendant somehow prevented the plaintiffs from choosing
to

resign.

There

is

no

suggestion

in

the

record

that

the

plaintiffs could not have resigned prior to being fired. See e.g.
Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 183, 199 (1989)(just
as employer may fire an employee, an employee has the right to quit
employment at any time).

The fact that the two male employees who

were subject to termination chose to resign does not indicate that
men who obtained and disseminated confidential information were

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treated more favorably than female employees who committed the same
offense.

Accordingly, I find that plaintiffs have failed to rebut

the defendant’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
terminating their employment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I grant defendant’s motion
for

summary

judgment

and

dismiss

plaintiffs’

Complaint

prejudice.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
S/ Michael A.

Telesca

MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:

Rochester, New York
August 21, 2014

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with