Hogan v. Fischer et al
Filing
123
ORDER denying 119 Motion for Miscellaneous Relief. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 4/7/16. (Copy of Decision and Order sent by first class mail to Plaintiff.) (JMC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOHN HOGAN,
DECISION AND ORDER
No. 6:09-CV-6225(MAT)
Plaintiff,
-vsBRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner D.O.C.S.
et al.,
Defendants.
I.
Introduction
John
Hogan (“Plaintiff”)
has
filed
a
pro
se
Motion
for
Miscellaneous Relief (Dkt #119) in which he requests an Order
directing Defendants to pay interest allegedly due to him “starting
from
the
date
of
121
days
of
the
STIPULATION
AND
ORDER
OF
SETTLEMENT dated September 12, 2014, through January 19, 2016.”
Dkt #119, p. 2. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is
denied.
II.
Background
The Stipulation and Order of Settlement dated September 12,
2014, signed by the parties and this Court, ordered Defendants to
pay the settlement funds ($7,000) to Plaintiff within 120 days
(i.e., Saturday, January 10, 2015), along with interest starting on
the 121st day, if the settlement funds were not paid by that date.
Plaintiff states that he did not receive payment of the $7,000
until January 19, 2016. He alleges that he is entitled to interest
on that amount, calculated from the 121st day (i.e., Sunday,
January 11, 2015), until January 19, 2016.
Plaintiff filed the instant motion on February 10, 2016. The
Court set a scheduling order stating that responses were due by
March 10, 2016, and that the motion would be submitted on March 16,
2016.
On
March
14,
2016,
Defendants
filed
a
declaration
in
opposition.
That same day, Plaintiff mailed his reply requesting the Court
grant the relief he seeks by default, due to Defendants’ failure to
file a timely response. The Court recognizes that Defendants’
response was four days late and reminds Defendants’ attorney to pay
careful
attention
to
the
dates
in
future
scheduling
orders.
Regardless of whether the Court considers Defendants’ response, the
Court
has
an
adequate
basis
to
deny
Plaintiff’s
motion,
as
discussed further below.
III. Discussion
A.
Failure to Retain Jurisdiction over Stipulation
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” that
“possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994)
(citation omitted). Thus, a district court “‘does not automatically
retain jurisdiction to hear a motion to enforce’ a settlement
agreement simply by virtue of having disposed of the original
case.” Hendrickson v. United States, 791 F.3d 354, 358 (2d Cir.
2015) (quotation omitted). Because a motion to enforce a settlement
agreement is, at its core, “a claim for breach of a contract, part
of the consideration of which was dismissal of an earlier federal
-2-
suit,” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381, it “requires its own basis for
jurisdiction,” id. at 378; accord Hendrickson, 791 F.3d at 358.
The Second Circuit has clarified that “there are only two ways
in which
a district court may retain ancillary jurisdiction to
enforce the terms of a settlement agreement: it may ‘expressly
retain jurisdiction over enforcement of the agreement’ in an order
of the court, or it may ‘incorporate . . . the terms of that
agreement’ in such an order.” Hendrickson, 791 F.3d at 359-60
(quotations omitted). Here, the Court did not expressly retain
jurisdiction over enforcement of the Stipulation and Order of
Settlement.
Nor
did
the
Court
incorporate
the
terms
of
the
Stipulation and Order of Settlement in an separate order retaining
jurisdiction. Therefore, under Hendrickson and Kokkonen, the Court
does not have ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the
Stipulation and Order of Settlement.
Where, as here, a district court lacks ancillary jurisdiction
over the enforcement of a settlement agreement, “‘enforcement of
the settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is some
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.’”•Hendrickson, 791 F.3d
at 362 (quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 382). There is no diversity
jurisdiction
citizens;
because
thus,
diversity—that
Plaintiff
the
there
and
statutory
be
no
overlap
Defendants
are
requirement
of
between
any
New
York
complete
plaintiffs’
citizenship and any defendants’ citizenship—is not met. See, e.g.,
-3-
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) (outlining the
complete diversity requirement).
The Court also lacks federal question jurisdiction over the
Stipulation and Order of Settlement, because the claim raised by
Plaintiff based on the Stipulation is in the nature of a breach of
contract—specifically, that Defendants failed to comply with the
provision regarding calculation and payment of interest on the
settlement funds. Furthermore, the United States is not a party to
the contract. See, e.g., Pedroza v. Lomas Auto Mall, Inc., 304
F.R.D.
307,
333
(D.
N.M.
2014)
(district
court
lacked
federal-question jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement
that dismissed dealerships’ cross-claims against a truck’s previous
titleholder
and
obligated
previous
titleholder
to
indemnify
dealerships against purchasers’ claims in connection with sale of
truck, where all claims arising from settlement agreement were in
nature of breach of contract, and United States was not a party to
agreement). The only possible federal question raised in connection
with Plaintiff’s motion is that dismissal of a federal lawsuit, as
outlined in the Stipulation and Order of Settlement, served as its
contractual consideration.
However, Kokkonen precludes using this
as a “jurisdictional hook.” Pedroza, 304 F.R.D. at 333 (citing
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380 (“No case of ours asserts, nor do we
think the concept of limited federal jurisdiction permits us to
assert, ancillary jurisdiction over any agreement that has as part
-4-
of its consideration the dismissal of a case before a federal
court.”)).
In sum, when Plaintiff and Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s
federal claims by the Stipulation and Order of Settlement, and did
not actively preserve the jurisdictional nexus in the Stipulation
and Order of Settlement, or by means of a separate order, the
jurisdictional nexus evaporated. Pedroza, 304 F.R.D. at 335 (noting
that Kokkonen “makes continuous reference to [Federal] [R]ule [of
Civil Procedure] 41, the subtypes of dismissals, and the technical
steps to which parties or courts must go to vest the court with
continuing
ancillary
jurisdiction—never
once
mentioning
final
judgment”).
The only remaining question is whether the Court may amend the
Stipulation to add a jurisdiction-retention clause, which requires
determining
under
which
provision
of
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) 41(a) (Voluntary Dismissal) the Stipulation
was entered. Here, although the Stipulation and Order of Settlement
bears the Court’s signature, it also bears the signature of all
parties. “Because all parties stipulated to the dismissal, it was
effective before the Court signed it, and would have been effective
regardless whether the Court had signed it, as the Court lacks
authority to deny dismissal if the [F.R.C.P.] 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)’s
requisites are met.” Pedroza, 304 F.R.D. at 336 (citing Hester
Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 160 F.3d 911, 916 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“[F.R.C.P.] 41(a)(1) provides two means by which a plaintiff may
-5-
voluntarily dismiss a federal court action without obtaining the
consent
of
the
district
court.
The
action
may
be
dismissed
(I) prior to the service of an answer or of a motion for summary
judgment if the plaintiff files a notice of dismissal with the
court; or (ii) at any time by stipulation of all parties.”); other
citations
omitted).
The
Court
accordingly
concludes
that
the
Stipulation operates by way of F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), rather
than F.R.C.P. 41(a)(2).
Because
the
41(a)(1)(A)(ii),
Stipulation
the
operates
Court
cannot
pursuant
amend
it
to
F.R.C.P.
to
add
a
jurisdiction-retention clause because the parties here have not
agreed
that
the
Court
should
retain
jurisdiction
over
the
settlement. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381–82, (“[W]hen . . . the
dismissal is pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) (which does not by its
terms empower a district court to attach conditions to the parties’
stipulation of dismissal) we think the court is authorized to . .
. retain jurisdiction over the settlement contract[ ] if the
parties agree.”) (emphasis added).
As noted above, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants is in the
nature
of
appropriate
breach
method
of
contract
for
under
Plaintiff
to
New
seek
York
State
law.
enforcement
of
The
the
Stipulation appears to be commencement of a plenary (new) action in
the appropriate court of New York State. See, e.g., DiBella v.
Martz, 58 A.D.3d 935, 937, 871 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (3d Dept. 2009)
(“[T]he filing of the stipulation effectively discontinuing the
-6-
action, as so ordered by [New York State] Supreme Court, was
tantamount to the filing of a judgment terminating it. Accordingly,
the appropriate method for plaintiffs to enforce the stipulation
was the commencement of a plenary action[.]”) (citations omitted).
This Court lacks authority to transfer the matter to a court
of New York State. See, e.g., Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. of
St. Thomas, V.I. v. Rawlins, 70 F.3d 270, 274 (3d Cir. 1995)
(“Because [28 U.S.C.] §§ 1631 and 610 clearly demonstrate that
Congress intended to limit the authority of the federal courts to
transfer cases only to other federal courts, we have held that
§ 1631 provides no authority for a federal court to transfer a case
over which it lacks jurisdiction to a state court.”) (citing
McLaughlin v. ARCO Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426, 429 (3d Cir.
1983)).
IV.
Conclusion
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
Plaintiff’s
Motion
Miscellaneous Relief (Dkt #119) is denied.
SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
DATED:
April 7, 2016
Rochester, New York
-7-
for
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?