Spencer v. Holley Central School District et al

Filing 45

ORDER denying defendants' 33 Motion for Sanctions; granting defendants' 34 Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the complaint, with prejudice. ***CLERK TO FOLLOW UP. Signed by Hon. David G. Larimer on 11/29/12. (EMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________________
KAREN SPENCER,

Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
09-CV-6351L
v.
HOLLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
SUPERVISOR JEFF HELSDON, also known
as Jeff Halstead,
DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT
ROBERT C. D’ANGELO,
Defendant.
________________________________________________
Plaintiff, Karen Spencer (“plaintiff” or “Spencer”), was formerly employed by the Holley
Central School District (“District” or “defendant”) as a school bus driver. On December 5, 2005,
Spencer was involved in an accident while she was driving a school bus loaded with students on their
way home from school. Spencer rear-ended another school bus which had stopped to discharge
passengers. The School District pursued disciplinary actions and eventually Spencer was granted
a hearing pursuant to § 75 of the New York Civil Service Law. An independent hearing officer was
selected who took testimony and later authored a report finding Spencer to have been at fault for the
accident, and recommended that Spencer be terminated from employment.
The report was presented to the Board, which adopted the hearing officer’s findings and
voted to terminate Spencer’s employment with the District. Spencer failed to appeal from either the
hearing officer’s determination or the Board’s decision adopting the report and recommendations.

Thereafter, Spencer commenced this action against the Holley Central School District, her
former supervisor Jeff Helsdon, and District Superintendent Robert C. D’Angelo. Plaintiff asserted
several different causes of action.
The defendants duly moved to dismiss the complaint and by decision and order (Dkt. #12)
filed August 31, 2010, this Court granted the motion in part and dismissed plaintiff’s second, third
and fourth causes of action along with her demand for punitive damages. The only claim remaining
was Spencer’s first cause of action alleging a violation of equal protection. Familiarity with that
decision is assumed.
The parties engaged in a period of discovery and, thereafter, defendants filed the pending
motions including a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #34) and a motion for sanctions (Dkt. #33)
against Spencer and her counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Both sides have submitted legal
memoranda and affidavits relative to both motions.
Upon review, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint
dismissed. As a matter of discretion, I decline to impose sanctions and deny defendants’ motion for
sanctions (Dkt. #33).
First of all, this Court was troubled as to whether Spencer had even properly pleaded the
Equal Protection claim. In the Court’s decision (Dkt. #12) granting the defendant’s motion to
dismiss, in part, the Court noted that the claim, though poorly drafted, confusingly pleaded, and
borderline insufficient, nonetheless, met -- albeit barely -- the pleading standard. Now, of course,
the parties are well beyond the pleading stage and Spencer must do more than rely on pleadings.
The matter is before the Court on summary judgment, and thus the issue is whether there are
any genuine issues of material fact. If not, the Court may rule as a matter of law on the motion. The
Court must determine if there is sufficient evidence such that a jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff. Plaintiff must rely on more than pleadings or conclusory allegations. See Gottlieb v.
County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996).

-2-

Defendants have moved for judgment claiming that plaintiff has failed to meet the test for
the denial of equal protection based on gender discrimination. Defendants claim first that Spencer
cannot make a prima facie case because, based on the findings of the hearing officer, Spencer is not
qualified for the position of school bus driver. I agree. But, equally persuasive is defendants’
argument that there is no proof upon which a jury might determine that Spencer’s termination was
caused under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. The facts of the matter are
simple and straightforward: Spencer was involved in an accident, and it was determined that she was
at fault and that she failed to take responsibility for it. Such a charge against a person driving a
school bus is serious indeed. Spencer was given the appropriate hearing to which she was entitled
as a municipal employee. After that process, rulings were made against her. She declined to
challenge or appeal either those findings or the ultimate determination by the School Board to
terminate her employment.
Based on the submissions to the Court and a review of Spencer’s deposition, it appears that
Spencer has conceded that she had no direct evidence that either defendant Helsdon or D’Angelo
engaged in any form of gender-based discrimination against her. Furthermore, it is clear then that
the School District had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for taking action against Spencer. In
addition, there is no proof that either defendant Helsdon or D’Angelo made the decision to terminate
Spencer. That decision was made by the School District’s Board alone. In fact, defendant Helsdon
was not even employed by the District when the Board made the decision to terminate Spencer’s
employment.
Spencer has also failed to establish what this Court indicated she needed to establish on an
Equal Protection claim. In sum, plaintiff has failed to establish or provide credible evidence for a
jury to consider concerning whether she was truly similarly situated to other individuals, and whether
she was treated any differently. The proof seems uncontradicted that Spencer has produced no
evidence that other bus drivers were “similarly situated.” At her deposition, Spencer admitted that
no male bus driver was involved in a factually similar accident while on the job during either of the
-3-

defendants’ employment with the District. It appears that the accident involving plaintiff was the
only accident that occurred while defendant Helsdon was employed by the District. Therefore,
although Spencer may have adequately pleaded an Equal Protection claim, I find that she has failed
to bring forth evidence upon which a jury could find that she was denied equal protection under the
circumstances of her case. She has failed to establish others were similarly situated, and she has
failed to introduce evidence upon which a juror could find otherwise or that the reason for her
termination was pretextual.
Although the discipline imposed could have been different, the matter was certainly serious
and the District was well within its authority to accept the report of the hearing examiner and impose
the discipline of termination.
Concerning defendants’ motion for sanctions, I do recognize that plaintiff’s counsel has been
sanctioned on numerous occasions by Judges of this Court. Sanctions are clearly not warranted just
because a complaint is dismissed. The standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is rigorous. Although
plaintiff’s counsel’s arguments were without merit, such a finding does not necessarily warrant
sanctions. The purpose of § 1927 is to impose discipline where an attorney has multiplied
proceedings or proceeded in an unreasonable and vexatious manner which constitutes acting in bad
faith or engaging in intentional misconduct. I am not convinced, based on what has proceeded so
far in this action, that imposition of sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel is warranted. Therefore, I
decline to do so at this time.
Spencer raises other issues concerning claims and grievances she had against another female
bus driver and other matters which are irrelevant in light of the undisputed facts that Spencer was
involved in a serious accident and was sanctioned for it after an independent hearing. None of the
extraneous matters complained-of erode the conclusions that the School District took the action it
believed was appropriate, and that there is no evidence that Helsdon, who is not even employed by
the District, or D’Angelo, took any adverse action against plaintiff.

-4-

CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s first cause of action (Dkt. #33)
is granted, and the complaint is dismissed, with prejudice.
Defendants’ motion for sanctions (Dkt. #34) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________________________
DAVID G. LARIMER
United States District Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
November 29, 2012.

-5-