Davis Payne v. Galie et al

Filing 74

-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-DECISION AND ORDER denying Police Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 68] Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Claim and directing Clerk to link Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [Dkt. 67] with [Dkt. 73] Declaration filed by Chanikka Davis Payne which will now together constitute the operative pleading in this matter. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 11/25/15. (Copy of Decision and Order sent by first class mail to Plaintiff.)(JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CHANIKKA DAVIS-PAYNE,
DECISION AND ORDER
No. 6:09-cv-06363(MAT)

Plaintiff,

-vsJOHN GALIE, THOMAS FOURNIER, THEODORE
WEED, JOHN FASO, JOSEPH GIANQUINTO,
NIAGARA FALLS POLICE DEPARTMENT, DOROTHY
JONES, COUNTY CRIME TASK FORCE,
Defendants.

I.

Introduction
This action was instituted by pro se plaintiff Chanikka Davis-

Payne (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)
on the basis that Defendants violated her constitutional rights by
entering another person’s apartment without a warrant in order to
arrest her on March 6, 2007, in the City of Niagara Falls.
II.

Factual Background and Procedural History
On March 6, 2007, Plaintiff was arrested at a residence which

was not her own as a result of her February 21, 2007, sale of a
controlled

substance

Investigator,

Dorothy

to

an

undercover

Jones.

Plaintiff

New
was

York

State

charged

Police

with

two

felonies. These charges were dismissed as part of a plea bargain
entered

into

by

Plaintiff

on

an

unrelated

matter

that

was

prosecuted by the New York State Attorney General’s Organized Crime
Task Force. Plaintiff then instituted this Section 1983 action,

alleging various constitutional violations in connection with the
March 6, 2007, arrest and other incidents.
The State of New York (“the State”), New York State Police
Investigator Dorothy Jones (“Inv. Jones”), and New York State
Assistant Attorney General Robert Lee (“AAG Lee”) (hereinafter,
collectively,

“the

State

Defendants”)

moved

to

dismiss

the

complaint, as did the Niagara Falls Police Department (“the NFPD”),
John Galie, Thomas Fournier, Theodore Weed, John Faso, and Joseph
Gianquinto

(collectively,

“the

Police Defendants”).

The

Court

entered judgment on the pleadings on October 25, 2012, dismissing
Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed, and on
September 10, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit vacated in part this Court’s judgment dismissing
Plaintiff’s complaint. Construing Plaintiff’s complaint as raising
a Fourth Amendment “unreasonable search and seizure” claim, the
Second Circuit sua sponte granted her belated leave to amend her
complaint in order to augment her allegations regarding this claim.
See Payne v. Galie, No. 12-4743-cv, 574 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir.
2014) (summary order). Specifically, the Second Circuit held that
Plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that she herself had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment where she was
arrested, and but that she should be allowed to plead further facts
showing that she had such a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.

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The Second Circuit affirmed the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s
other claims. See id.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Dkt #67), essentially
alleging that she was an “overnight guest” at the apartment in
question. The State Defendants moved for dismissal for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (“Rule 12(b)(6)”), or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment (Dkt #69). The NFPD and the Police Defendants also
moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim (Dkt #68).
Plaintiff did not file any papers in opposition to either motion.
The Court issued a Decision and Order (Dkt #72) granting the State
Defendants’ motion (Dkt #69) in its entirety, and granting in part
and deny in part the NFPD’s and the Police Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt #68). In particular, the Court terminated the NFPD as
a defendant, and reserved decision on the Police Defendants’
argument that Plaintiff had failed to state a warrantless entry
claim because she again failed to sufficiently plead a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the apartment where she was arrested.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court allowed her
another opportunity to cure the deficiency in her Amended Complaint
by submitting an affidavit or declaration alleging facts that
plausibly support her assertion that she had “overnight guest”
status at the apartment where she was arrested.

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Plaintiff timely filed a Declaration (Dkt #73) as directed by
the Court. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the apartment, and therefore the Court denies the Police
Defendants’

Motion

to

Dismiss

(Dkt

#68)

Plaintiff’s

Fourth

Amendment claim.
III. The Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
The function of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
is “merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to
assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support
thereof.” Ryder Energy Distrib. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc.,
748

F.2d

omitted).
[Rule

774,
In

779

order

12(b)(6)],

a

(2d

Cir.

“[t]o

1984)

survive

complaint

must

(internal
a

motion

contain

quotation
to

dismiss

sufficient

marks
under

factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). In assessing a claim’s plausibility, the district court
must

“assume

[the]

veracity”

of

all

well-pleaded

factual

allegations contained in the complaint, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679, and
draw every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff, Zinermon
v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990). “The plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than

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a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
IV.

The Fourth Amendment and Warrantless Seizures
A.

Legal Principles

“Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and may be enforced
only by persons whose own protection under the Amendment has been
violated.” United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 320 (2d Cir.
1997) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978),
abrogated in part by Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998). The
United

States

Supreme

Court

“uniformly

has

held

that

the

application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person
invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’
or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy[.]’” Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citations omitted). This inquiry usually
involves two separate questions: (1) “whether the individual, by
[her] conduct, has ‘exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy,’ that has been invaded by government action[,]” Smith, 442
U.S. at 740 (quotation omitted), and (2) whether the “individual’s
[subjective] expectation,

viewed objectively, is ‘justifiable’

under the circumstances.” Id. (quotation and citations omitted). It
is well-settled that an individual may have a “sufficient interest
in a place other than [her] own home so that the Fourth Amendment
protects

[her].”

Rakas,

439

U.S.

at

142;

see

also

Jones

v.

United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960) (guest had Fourth Amendment
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standing where he had permission to use an apartment, but no
property interest therein; was given a key; and used the apartment
in owner’s absence), overruled on other grounds, United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
B.

Application

In her Declaration (Dkt #73), Plaintiff asserts that she and
her children “were always staying overnight” at the apartment, and
that she was “trusted to be in the home alone on numerous occasions
and was assured it was a safe place.” Plaintiff and her children
“cooked, showered, played, relaxed and stayed [at the apartment]
for multiple days and nights at a time” and “also dressed there and
had clothing in the closets and drawers.” Id. Moreover, during the
alleged unlawful entry and arrest, “the officer and detective
allowed [Plaintiff] to turn off the chicken she was cooking for the
children and go into the bedroom and remove her pajamas into
regular clothes, and put on sneakers and [a] leather jacket (it was
winter time) she had hanging in the bedroom closet.” Id. Plaintiff
points out that her children “were left there as well” when the
police took her to the station, presumably because she “felt safe
enough to bring her children there to eat, sleep, shower and play.
. . .” Id.
“Where it has been shown that an individual was an overnight
guest in a home, that fact alone is enough to demonstrate that the
individual

had

a

legitimate

expectation
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of

privacy

in

the

premises.” United States v. Pena Ontiveros, 547 F. Supp.2d 323, 329
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing, inter alia, Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S.
91, 96–97 (1990) (“[D]efendant]’s status as an overnight guest is
alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the
home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”); United
States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 2006) (“As an overnight
guest in Bean’s apartment, [the defendant] shared in his host’s
legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises.”) (citations
omitted)).
A claim is facially plausible for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6)
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, Plaintiff has
come forward with non-conclusory allegations that support plausible
inferences that the Police Defendants effected a warrantless entry
into an apartment in which Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation
of privacy, that they arrested her in that apartment without a
warrant, and that, in doing so, they violated her Fourth Amendment
right

to

be

free

from

unreasonable

searches

and

seizures.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated a Fourth Amendment claim that is
plausible on its face, and the Police Defendants’ motion to dismiss
this claim is denied.

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V.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently

alleged a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment where
she was

arrested

for purposes

of

stating

a

plausible

Fourth

Amendment claim. Therefore, the Court denies the Police Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt #68) Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim
based on the warrantless entry and arrest.
The

Clerk

of

the

Court

is directed

to

link

Plaintiff’s

Declaration (Dkt #73) with Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (#67).
These two documents together now constitute the operative pleading
in this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Michael A. Telesca
_________________________________
HON. MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:

November 25, 2015
Rochester, New York

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