Wright v. Monroe Community Hospital
DECISION AND ORDER granting defendant's motion to dismiss and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 7/28/11. (JMC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MONROE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL,
Plaintiff, Jacqueline Wright (“Plaintiff”), brings this action
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(“Section 1981"); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e); the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (as amended to Title VII); and the New York State Human Rights
Law (“NYSHRL”), Executive Law § 290, against Defendant Monroe
discrimination based on sex, race, and retaliation.
(Dkt. No. 1
¶ 1). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant subjected her
to an ongoing discriminatory and hostile work environment because
of her identity as an African-American woman, who was also pregnant
at the time of the alleged events.
See id. at ¶¶ 5, 32-6.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the pleadings
pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on
the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for any of
her causes of action.
See generally, Dkt. No. 12-10.
discrimination claim because her claim is based on the alleged acts
of an elderly resident of the Hospital, and not on an act of the
Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie claim for sex
Pregnancy Discrimination Act must also fail.
Id. at 9-12.
Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim of hostile work environment because she has failed to
establish that there was a pattern of severe or pervasive hostility
in the workplace.
Id. at 12-3.
Finally, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims fail because she never alleged that
she complained of unlawful discrimination to her employer or that
she engaged in some other protected activity that would serve as
the basis for her employer’s alleged retaliation.
Id. at 15.
Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion and asks that this Court
deny Defendant’s motion in its entirety.1
For the reasons set
Plaintiff argues in her reply memorandum that this Court
should strike Defendant’s motion to dismiss because Defendant
“violate[d] Local Rule 10(a)” by failing to double-space its
memorandum of law in support of the instant motion. (Dkt. No. 14
at 9). While Defendant did not double space its brief, I do not
find the mistake warrants the harsh sanction of striking its
memorandum. However, Defendant should double-space future
submissions in accordance with Local Rule 10(a). See Mills v.
Luplow, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79028 (W.D.N.Y., June 30,
2008)(McCarthy, J)(finding that Defendant’s failure to paginate
its documents according to Local Rule 10(a) did not warrant the
sanction of striking the pleadings).
forth below, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not established a
Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby dismissed.
The following facts are taken from the plaintiff’s complaint,
and are not findings of fact by the Court, but rather assumed to be
true for the purposes of deciding this motion and are construed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the non-moving party.
The Court notes that, in addition to a memorandum of law, Defendant
has submitted various documents which Plaintiff “quotes and/or
makes reference to” in her Complaint.
(Dkt. No. 12-10 at 4).
Although Plaintiff did not attach to her Complaint any of the
documents her Complaint referenced, Defendant argues that the Court
may consider “any ... statements or documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference ... and documents possessed or known to the
plaintiff and upon which it relied in bringing the suit.” (Id. at
5)(quoting ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d
supplied by Defendant).
While the Court may include documents
incorporated by reference and information from public records, this
Court’s discussion will not give consideration to the documents
attached by the Defendant and will instead limit its consideration
Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 776
(2d Cir. 2002); see also Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42,
54 (2d Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff is an African-American woman, who was at all times
(Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 5).
Monroe Community Hospital is a non-
profit residential health care facility in Rochester, New York that
houses a number of skilled nursing units that provide long-term
care to people of all ages, including those with Alzheimer’s and
(Dkt. No. 12-10 at 2).
Plaintiff began working as a
Certified Nursing Assistant (“CNA”) for Monroe Community Hospital
in October of 1997.
(Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 7).
In January 2008, Plaintiff informed the Hospital that she
claiming the patient emitted “strong odors that smelled like
Id. at ¶ 8.
Plaintiff reported this incident (based
upon instructions from one of the Hospital’s nurse managers, Brad
Hughes (“Nurse Manager Hughes”)) to notify the charge nurse of any
Plaintiff subsequently reported her
suspicions concerning the patient’s drug use to the evening charge
nurse, Doug Mason, LPN (“Charge Nurse Mason”), who reportedly
Facts concerning Defendant’s identity are taken from both
Plaintiff’s complaint and Defendant’s memorandum of law.
followed up on Plaintiff’s report and removed “a bag” from the
Id. at ¶ 10-1.
Plaintiff states that on February 24, 2008, she again reported
of the patient’s alleged drug use.
Id. at ¶ 12-3.
confronted by the patient’s assigned nurse who “aggressively swore
at Plaintiff,” questioning Plaintiff’s motives for interfering with
the patient and telling Plaintiff she “should just leave [that]
patient ... alone.”
Id. at ¶ 13.
After the second report, Plaintiff was reassigned from the
patient she suspected of drug use to another patient, an elderly
woman with dementia.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant “purposely” reassigned her to this patient because it was
well-known that (this patient) “made intolerable racist comments
complaints and accusations against them....” Id. at ¶ 17.
Plaintiff alleges that this patient “repeatedly denigrated”
her by describing Plaintiff with a derogatory racial slur.
Plaintiff complained about this patient’s behavior, but was
told that the patient “had dementia” and that “sometimes you just
have to deal with it.”
Id. at ¶ 23.
Around this time, Plaintiff received notices of discipline for
violating the Defendant’s time and attendance policy, and received
Plaintiff and her reassigned patient.
Id. at ¶ 18-9.
On April 1, 2008, Plaintiff attended an investigatory hearing
for the alleged incident with the patient.
Id. at ¶ 25.
Manager Hughes, Nurse Administrator Jeff Schwertfeger, and several
staff members who wrote notices of concern were also in attendance.
After the hearing, on April 4, 2008, Plaintiff received
another notice of discipline for allegedly failing to provide safe
and compassionate care to the Hospital’s residents.
Id. at ¶ 26.
Then, on July 1, 2008, Plaintiff attended another investigatory
hearing, reportedly due to a different resident’s complaint.
at ¶ 29.
Plaintiff alleges that the next day, on July 2, 2008, coworker Patricia Hill (“Hill”) approached her and asked her to
assist with a room change.
Id. at ¶ 30.
Plaintiff informed Hill
that she could not assist with the room change because she had just
come back from a pulled abdominal muscle injury.
Id. at ¶ 31.
Hill allegedly became “belligerent” and screamed at Plaintiff,
saying “if you can’t do anything, why don’t you have your doctor
take you out” and “I’m just sick of your attitude, just because
your [sic] pregnant doesn’t mean your [sic] handicap [sic].”
at ¶ 32.
Defendant then held an emergency meeting with Plaintiff,
wherein a hospital representative told Plaintiff that “pregnancy is
a condition, not a disability,” and that if she had a limitation
she needed a doctor’s note.
Id. at ¶ 35.
On July 14, 2008, Plaintiff received a note from her physician
stating that, due to her pregnancy, she was advised not to move
“continued to harass the Plaintiff, increase her workload and
scrutinize[d] her work to the point that she was taken out on
Id. at 37.
Then again, on July 24, 2008,
Plaintiff received another notice of discipline, this time as a
result of the July 1, 2008 investigative hearing.
Id. at 38.
In September 2008, Plaintiff filed charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against the Hospital,
alleging racial and gender discrimination.
Id. at ¶¶ 4, 39.
received a call from Nurse Administrator Schwertfeger
Schwertfeger that her doctor told her to remain on leave through
the end of the month.
Id. at ¶ 42.
Plaintiff to contact Human Resources representative Robert Bilsky
(“Bilsky”), who informed Plaintiff that she had to report to work
and then “hung up on her.”
Id. at ¶ 43.
Bilsky then contacted
Plaintiff shortly afterwards and “simply told Plaintiff to forward
her medical information.”
Id. at ¶ 44.
Plaintiff filed this action on November 23, 2009.
generally Dkt. No. 1).
The Defendant responded by filing the
instant motion to dismiss.
Standard of Review under Rule 12(c)
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that
“After the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay
trial--a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
Civ. P. 12(c).
In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, courts apply the
same standard applicable to a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).
Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1999).
withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint
must plead facts sufficient “to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Thus, “[w]here a complaint
liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.”
Id. (internal citation
“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
whether a complaint meets the plausibility standard is “contextspecific”
experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950.
Plaintiff has Failed to State a Claim of Hostile Work
Plaintiff’s first and fourth causes of action allege
race-based claims of hostile work environment.
(Dkt. No. 1 at 8,
Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that Defendant
subjected her to harassment from supervisors, which was condoned by
management, and motivated by Plaintiff’s race and national origin
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Id. at ¶ 46.
Plaintiff’s fourth cause of
While Plaintiff’s supervisors and management are named
“Individually” within her Complaint (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 46), these
named individuals do not appear in the Caption of her Complaint,
nor were they named in her EEOC charge. Plaintiff lists her 3rd,
4th, 5th, and 6th causes of action “As and Against Defendant Monroe
Community Hospital Only,” while not adding that limitation to her
1st, 2nd, 7th, 8th, and 9th causes of action. (See generally Dkt.
No. 1). Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims against these named
employees should be dismissed; however, Plaintiff concedes in her
reply that “Neither Nurse Manager Hughes, Nurse Administrator
Schwartzfegger [sic], nor Human Resource Representative Bilksy,
Individually, are named defendants in Plaintiff’s lawsuit, nor
are they intended to be.” (Dkt. No. 14 at 10). As such, all of
Plaintiff’s causes of action will be considered “As and Against
Defendant Monroe Community Hospital only,” and will not address
any of the named managers or supervisors individually.
action alleges state law claims of a hostile work environment under
NYSHRL, Executive Law § 290.
Id. at ¶ 79.
Because claims under
NYSHRL are governed by the same federal standards as those under 42
U.S.C. § 1981, this Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s hostile work
environment claims will apply concurrently to both her federal and
state law claims.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Executive Law § 290, et
See McDowell v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., 10-
cv-3534, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58653 at *12 (E.D.N.Y, June 1,
2011)(stating that claims under Section 1981 and the NYSHRL are
analyzed under the same framework and, therefore, will have the
same outcome); see also Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 946 F.
Supp. 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(Scheindlin, J.)("New York State
Human Rights Law is applied in a fashion consistent with the
federal civil rights laws.").
Claims under Section 1981 are governed by the same standards
as those brought under Title VII.
See Ifill v. UPS, No. 04 Civ.
5963, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5230 at *14, n. 3 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 29,
2005)(stating “Courts ‘commonly analyze the sufficiency of [claims
under Section 1981] in the same manner as Title VII claims,
reaching the same result.’”)(citing Pagan v. New York State Div. of
Parole, 98 Civ. 5840, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4236 at *14 (S.D.N.Y.,
Mar. 13, 2002)).
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race with respect to, inter alia, the “terms” and “conditions”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
One form of such
discrimination is the imposition of a discriminatorily hostile or
abusive work environment.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21-3, 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993).
environment claims require scrutiny of the “workplace environment
as a whole to discover whether it is ‘abusive.’” Raniola v.
Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 617 (2d Cir. 2001)(quoting Harris, 510 U.S.
at 22 (1993)).
To prevail on a hostile work environment claim
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show: (1) that her workplace was
“permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult
that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
and (2) that “a specific basis exists for imputing
the objectionable conduct to the employer.”
Alfano v. Costello,
294 F.3d 365, 373-4 (2d Cir. 2002)(internal citation omitted); see
also Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (1993).
This test has both objective and subjective elements.
plaintiff must show the employer’s conduct was “severe or pervasive
environment,” and the plaintiff must also “subjectively perceive
that environment to be abusive.”
Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374 (2002).
A plaintiff can show this by establishing either the extraordinary
severity of a single incident, or the existence of a series of
incidents that were “sufficiently continuous and concerted” to be
Id.; see also Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc.,
115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997).
The incidents of which a
plaintiff complains “must be more than episodic; they must be
pervasive.” Carrero v. New York City Housing Auth., 890 F.2d 569,
578 (2d Cir. 1989).
The Court must look at the totality of the
threatening or humiliating, and whether such conduct unreasonably
interferes with the plaintiff’s work performance. See Harris 510
U.S. at 23.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant subjected her to a hostile
work environment on the basis of her race.
I find that Plaintiff
has failed to sufficiently allege such a claim.
At no point in her
Complaint does Plaintiff allege that Defendant harassed her in
race-specific or derogatory terms, nor does she show that any of
Defendant’s decisions were specifically motivated by a racial
employer had a discriminatory intent or discriminatory motive).
Plaintiff attempts to relate her assignment to this resident with
the Defendant’s alleged discriminatory motive, however, Plaintiff’s
Plaintiff clearly relates her patient re-assignment to the reports
she made concerning a well-liked patient’s suspected drug use.
Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 16.
Plaintiff states that, after her second report
of the patient’s alleged drug use, she was confronted by the
patient’s assigned nurse who “aggressively swore at Plaintiff,” and
told Plaintiff she “should just leave [that] patient ... alone.”
Id. at ¶ 13.
Plaintiff claims she was then re-assigned to the
elderly female patient with dementia.
Such allegations do not
support a finding of racially motivated animus in Defendant’s
decision-making, nor are they indicative of a workplace “permeated
Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 227 (2d Cir. 2004).
Additionally, the relevant portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint
merely recite elements of the claim without pleading specific
factual allegations against Defendant.
While a complaint attacked
by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a race-based hostile
work environment claim,
her first and fourth causes of action are
Plaintiff has Failed to Sufficiently State a Claim for
Plaintiff alleges retaliation claims in five of her causes of
Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges retaliation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action alleges
retaliation under Title VII “As and Against Defendant Monroe
Community Hospital, only;” Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action claims
retaliation under the NYSHRL “As and Against Defendant Monroe
Community Hospital, only;” Plaintiff’s eighth Cause of action
Against...Hospital...only” limitation); and Plaintiff’s ninth cause
of action alleges retaliation under the NYSHRL, this claim also
without the “As and Against” limitation.
Hospital’s employees “Individually” within her Complaint, Plaintiff
has denied filing suit against those individual employees of Monroe
Community Hospital and states that all of her causes of action are
against Monroe Community Hospital “only.”
As such, Plaintiff’s
designations of her fifth and sixth causes of action as “...Against
Monroe Community Hospital only” are unnecessary, and her eighth and
ninth causes of action are redundant and merely re-allege the same
claims as her fifth and sixth.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must
show: (1) participation in a protected activity known to the
Defendant; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal
connection between the protected activity and adverse action.
Dixon v. Int’l Fed’n of Accountants, No. 10-1924-cv, U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6116 at *4-5 (2d Cir., Mar. 25, 2011)(citing Gorzynski v.
JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir., 2010)).
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.
Plaintiff did not engage in a “protected activity.”
Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee who has
engaged in a protected activity as that term is defined under the
statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
A protected activity includes
opposing or participating in, inter alia, an investigation or
proceeding to oppose an employment practice made unlawful under
Title VII. Id.
An unlawful employment practice under Title VII
national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
There is no allegation that Plaintiff complained of unlawful
discrimination to her supervisors or other co-workers. Plaintiff’s
Complaint shows that, while she may have complained about certain
issues she was having at work (e.g., her concerns regarding a
patient’s alleged drug use), there is no allegation that she
complained that she was suffering discrimination because of her
race, sex, or pregnancy.
Nor did she engage in any other activity
warranting protection under Title VII.
Further, even if Plaintiff had alleged participation in a
protected activity, she would still fail to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination under the retaliation framework, because she
does not allege that she suffered an adverse employment action.
The action would have to be “materially adverse,” meaning the
employer’s action would be capable of dissuading a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination could
constitute retaliation. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
While Plaintiff originally attempted to show that she met this
Plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge on March 29th, 2007" (Dkt. No. 1
at ¶ 87), Plaintiff now admits that she was never discharged from
the Hospital (Dkt. No. 14 at 15, n. 2).4
Plaintiff claims that she
response to her complaints about “what she perceived to be a
hostile environment” (Dkt. No. 14 at 17), however, Plaintiff’s
Complaint simply does not support her argument.
Defendant states that Plaintiff continued to work full-time
at Monroe Community Hospital through July 16, 2010, before she
voluntarily resigned and took up employment at another hospital.
(Dkt. No. 12-10 at 16).
that the complaints she made concerning the Hospital’s patients
(specifically the alleged derogatory remarks of an elderly woman
However, complaints about an elderly patient’s independent comments
are different from complaints about a discriminatory “hostile work
environment” concerning co-workers and supervisors.
See Wimmer v.
1999)(finding that “A claim is not cognizable under Title VII
unless the plaintiff’s opposition was “directed at an unlawful
employment practice of his employer.”)(emphasis in original).
Additionally, even if Plaintiff’s complaints concerned the
actions of her co-workers or supervisors, her complaints did not
cite any discriminatory motive.
“Absent a claim of unlawful
discrimination, general complaints about employment concerns do not
constitute protected activity under Title VII.”
Webster Cent. Sch. Dist., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7644 at *13
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2009)(citing Broderick v. Donaldson, 369 U.S.
App. D.C. 374, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also
Duckett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31624 at
*24 (W.D.N.Y. April 14, 2009)(citing Broderick, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232
establish that she engaged in protected activity where there was no
allegation that the treatment was motivated by a discriminatory
discipline or other forms of scrutiny from Defendant does not show
investigations, unwanted scrutiny from supervisors, and negative
deprivation of position/opportunity, do not sufficiently constitute
adverse employment actions under Title VII.
Lee v. New York State
Dept. of Health, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11287 at *45-6 (S.D.N.Y.
sufficiently plead a claim for retaliation under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Title VII, or the NYSHRL.
retaliation claims are hereby dismissed.
Plaintiff has Failed to Sufficiently Plead a Claim of
Racial Discrimination under Title VII.
Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges that Defendant
unlawfully subjected Plaintiff to racial discrimination under Title
VII. As noted above, Plaintiff’s Complaint is absent of any claims
that Monroe Community Hospital or its employees ever directed
racially charged comments at Plaintiff or acted against her with a
racially motivated animus.
While Plaintiff complains of racial
hostility from an elderly patient of Monroe Community Hospital,
such a complaint does not satisfy Title VII standards.
is not a general bad acts statute.
As noted above, a claim is not
cognizable under Title VII unless the plaintiff’s opposition was
directed at an unlawful employment practice of his employer.
Wimmer, 176 F.3d at 134-5 (2d Cir. 1999).
For this reason, and the
reasons noted above, I find that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently
plead a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII.
her third cause of action is dismissed.
Discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“The Act”)amends Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act to provide that discrimination “on the
basis of sex” includes discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
The Act requires employers to treat women “affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions” the same as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability
Like other Title VII claims, discrimination claims
McDonnell Douglas framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Plaintiff must prove 1) membership in a
protected group; 2) qualification for a position; 3) an adverse
employment action; and 4) that the adverse employment action
To establish that the adverse employment action occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, a
plaintiff may demonstrate that “similarly situated” employees who
do not share the plaintiff’s protected characteristics were treated
See Shumway v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 118
F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege
any facts suggesting that she was discriminated against on the
basis of sex or pregnancy.
Her claims concerning an argument she
discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
approached Plaintiff to ask if she could assist with a room change.
After Plaintiff refused because she had just returned
abdominal injury, the co-worker allegedly “became belligerent” and
screamed “if you can’t do anything, why don’t you have your doctor
take you out” and “I’m just sick of your attitude, just because
your [sic] pregnant doesn’t mean your [sic] handicap [sic].” While
the co-worker’s alleged outburst was no doubt unpleasant, it does
not give rise to a discrimination claim under Title VII or the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
Plaintiff does not allege that this
behavior was encouraged or perpetuated by her employer.
Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 692 at n. 3 (2d Cir. 2001)(finding
that for liability to attach in a Title VII discrimination case,
the employer must also be responsible for the conduct at issue).
Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint clearly states that, after the
incident with her co-worker, an “emergency meeting” was held where
Defendant asked Plaintiff to obtain a note from her doctor listing
her limitations, which Plaintiff obtained.
In fact, Defendant’s
actions are consistent with the requirements under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (requiring employers to treat women affected by
pregnancy the same as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work), and Plaintiff does not allege
that Defendant treated her unfairly because of her pregnancy.5
such, I find that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a
Accordingly, her seventh cause of action is dismissed.
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss
is granted. Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby dismissed.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
s/Michael A. Telesca
MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Rochester, New York
July 28, 2011
While Plaintiff alleges that a supervisor and a Human
Resources representative “demanded” that she return to work while
on medical leave, she closes that series of allegations by noting
that she was then simply asked to forward her medical forms to
the Human Resources office, without noting any further demands or
repercussions. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 41-4).
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