Klein v. J.P.Morgan Chase

Filing 8

DECISION AND ORDER granting 3 Motion to Dismiss. Oral argument of this motion, which had been scheduled for 7/22/10,is cancelled as moot.Signed by Hon. Charles J. Siragusa on 6/1/10. (KAP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT W E S T E R N DISTRICT OF NEW YORK D E A N A. KLEIN, P la in t if f , -vJ .P . MORGAN CHASE, D e fe n d a n t. D E C IS IO N AND ORDER 0 9 -C V -6 5 9 4 CJS

IN T R O D U C T IO N T h is is an action in which Plaintiff alleges that Defendant wrongfully terminated his e m p lo ym e n t and deprived him of certain property and benefits. Now before the Court is D e f e n d a n ts ' motion to dismiss the complaint (Docket No. [#3]). For the reasons that follow, the a p p lic a t io n is granted and this action is dismissed. BACKGROUND O n October 16, 2009, Plaintiff commenced this action in New York State Supreme Court, M o n ro e County. Plaintiff's verified complaint ("Complaint") indicates that Defendant terminated h is employment on September 21, 2005, more than four years prior to the commencement of th e action. The Complaint states that Plaintiff was 48 years of age when Defendant terminated h is employment, though there is no allegation that Plaintiff was fired because of his age. The C o m p l a i n t indicates that Plaintiff was an "at will" employee (Complaint ¶ 23), and does not id e n t if y any contractual right to continued employment. The Complaint indicates that Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment because D e f e n d a n t believed that Plaintiff and others were taking Defendant's ink cartridges "and r e c y c l i n g them for their own benefit." (Complaint ¶ 10). The Complaint indicates that such a c c u s a t io n was "false." (Id. at ¶ 12). The Complaint indicates that it is asserting claims for " b r e a c h of contract, . . . conversion, fraud, and unjust enrichment." (Id. at ¶ 1). The Complaint

p u rp o rt s to state five separate causes of action, but the third numbered cause of action really ju s t provides additional information concerning the first and second causes of action.1 The C o u rt reads the Complaint as stating the following causes of action: 1) termination without just c a u s e /b re a c h of contract; 2) conversion of Plaintiff's property; 3) unjust enrichment; and 4) f ra u d . The fraud claim alleges that Defendant terminated Plaintiff for the purpose of denying h im employee benefits. (Id. ¶ 23) ("Defendant produced allegations for the sole purpose of d e n yin g the Plaintiff his rightfully-entitled severance package, stock options and retirement that a p p lie s . ") . O n November 23, 2009, Defendant removed the action to this court. On December 1, 2 0 0 9 , Defendant moved [#3] to dismiss the entire Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil P r o c e d u re ("FRCP") 12(b)(6). Defendant maintains that the first and second causes of action a re barred by New York's "at-will employee doctrine." Defendant states that under such

d o c trin e , Defendant was entitled to terminate Plaintiff's employment "for any lawful reason or f o r no reason." Defendant further states that to the extent that Plaintiff was attempting to allege d is c rim in a tio n , any such claim would be barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. As for P la in tif f 's claim that Defendant fired him to avoid having to pay him severance or other benefits, D e f e n d a n t maintains that such claim is preempted by ERISA, and that such claim would be tim e -b a rre d under the two-year statute of limitations for claims brought under ERISA § 510. On January 29, 2010, the Court issued a Motion Scheduling Order [#6], which directed P la in tif f to file and serve any responsive papers on or before March 5, 2010. Plaintiff did not file o p p o s itio n papers. On April 16, 2010, Defendant filed a request [#7] for dismissal, indicating

The third num b e r e d cause of action alleges that in term in a tin g Plaintiff's em p lo y m e n t and in w ith h o ld in g his property, Defendant relied on false inform a tio n provided by one of Plaintiff's co-workers who w a s attem p t in g to advance her own career. (Com p la in t ¶ ¶ 18-19).

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th a t the Motion to Dismiss [#3] was unopposed. To date, Plaintiff has filed nothing with the C o u r t. DISCUSSION In ruling upon a motion to dismiss made pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6), the Court must c o n s tru e th e complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and d ra win g all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Although the pleading s ta n da rd is a liberal one, bald assertions and conclusions of law will not suffice. To s u rviv e dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which her claim rests th ro u gh factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative lev e l. R e d d in g to n v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 511 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations and internal q u ota tio n marks omitted). In that regard, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement o f the grounds for the court's jurisdiction," as well as "a short and plain statement of the claim, s h o w ing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FRCP 8(a). The Complaint fails to plausibly allege the existence of any employment contract, and to th e contrary, it indicates that Plaintiff was an at-will employee. Consequently Plaintiff has not s tate d a claim for breach of contract.2 3 Nor does the Complaint allege that Plaintiff was terminated

See, De Petris v. Union Settlement Ass'n, Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 406, 410, 657 N.E.2d 269 (1995) ("Absent a n agreem e n t establishing a fixed duration, an em p lo ym e n t relationship is presum e d to be a hiring at will, te r m in a b le at any tim e by either party (Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 506 N .E .2 d 919). This State neither recognizes a tort of wrongful discharge nor requires good faith in an at-will e m p lo y m e n t relationship ( Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 297, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 4 4 8 N.E.2d 86; Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, 73 N.Y.2d 183, 188, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771, 535 N.E.2d 1311). An e m p lo ye e m a y recover, however, by establishing that the em p lo ye r m a d e the em p lo ye e aware of its express w r itte n policy lim itin g its right of discharge and that the em p lo ye e detrim e n ta lly relied on that policy in accepting t h e em p lo ym e n t (see, W e in e r v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465-466, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 4 4 1 ) . W h e r e these elem e n ts are proved, the em p lo y e e in effect has a contract claim against the em p lo y e r . M e r e existence of a written policy, without the additional elem e n ts identified in W e in e r , does not lim it an e m p lo ye r 's right to discharge an at-will em p lo ye e or give rise to a legally enforceable claim by the em p lo ye e a g a in s t the em p lo y e r . " ) P la in tif f alleges that Defendant has refused to provide him with a copy of "any em p lo ym e n t m a n u a l a n d any existing code of conduct m a n u a l that m a y exist." (Com p la in t ¶ 13). However, there is no allegation th a t Plaintiff was aware of any particular policy and relied on such policy to his detrim e n t, as would be required ( c o n t in u e d . . . )
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b e ca u se of his membership in a protected class. Any claim for conversion or unjust enrichment w ou ld be time-barred under New York's applicable statute of limitations, which is three years for b o th claims. See, Daisley v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., No. 09-0011-cv, 2010 W L 1 8 38 6 67 at *1 (2d Cir. May 10, 2010) ("The New York statute of limitations is . . . three years for c o n v e rsio n claims, see [N.Y. C.P.L.R.] § 214(3).") (unpublished); Ingrami v. Rovner, 45 A.D.3d 8 0 6, 808, 847 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept. 2007) (Holding that for unjust enrichment claim, "the th re e - ye a r statute of limitations of CPLR 214(3) governs here, since the plaintiff is seeking m o n eta ry, as opposed to equitable, relief.") (citations omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff's claim that he w as fraudulently fired in order to deprive him of employment benefits is barred by the two-year s ta tu te of limitations for claims under ERISA § 510.4 C O N C L U S IO N D e f e n d a n ts ' motion to dismiss [#3] is granted and this action is dismissed with prejudice. O r a l argument of the motion, which had been scheduled for July 22, 2010, is cancelled as moot. S O ORDERED. D a te d : J u n e 1, 2010 R o c h e s t e r , New York /s/ Charles J. Siragusa CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA United States District Judge

(...continued) t o establish a breach of contract claim . See, Bernhardt v. Tradition North America, 676 F.Supp.2d 301, 305 ( S . D .N .Y . 2009) ("To establish that such policies are a part of the em p lo ym e n t contract, an em p lo ye e alleging a breach of im p lie d contract m u s t prove that (1) an express written policy lim itin g the em p lo ye r 's right of d is c h a r g e exists, (2) the em p lo ye r (or one of its authorized representatives) m a d e the em p lo ye e aware of this p o lic y, and (3) the em p lo y e e detrim e n ta lly relied on the policy in accepting or continuing em p lo y m e n t." ) ( c ita t io n s and internal quotation m a r k s om itte d ) .

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D o w n e s v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 03 Civ.8991(GEL), 2004 W L 1277991 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 8 , 2004)("The parties agree that the statute of lim ita t io n s for ERISA § 510 claim s is two years.")(citing S a n d b e r g v. KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P., 111 F.3d 331, 336 (2d Cir.1997)).

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