Craft v. Kirkpatrick
DECISION AND ORDER denying petition for a writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the petition. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 7/5/11. (JMC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DECISION AND ORDER
-vsROBERT A. KIRKPATRICK,
Petitioner pro se Shane Craft (“Craft” or “Petitioner”),
currently incarcerated for his conviction for first degree gang
assault, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Also pending before the Court is Craft’s motion to stay the
petition in order to return to state court to exhaust claims of
ineffective appellate and trial counsel. For the reasons that
follow, the petition is dismissed and the motion to stay is denied
Petitioner and his codefendants (James Reed (“Reed”), Paul
indifference murder and gang assault in connection with the death
of Nicholas Kwasniewski (“Kwasniewski” or “the victim”) in the City
of Niagara Falls on June 4, 2005.
Reed, Dawson, and Magaddino
elected to plead guilty and cooperated with the district attorney’s
office with regard to Petitioner’s prosecution. The trial court
dismissed the depraved indifference murder count against Petitioner
before his trial began.
The prosecution argued that the Krasniewski murder was done in
retaliation for injuries Craft sustained in March 2005, during a
drug-deal. While Petitioner was consummating a marijuana sale to
four men, his skull was fractured when struck with a metal pipe and
he was robbed of a gold chain. One of the four alleged assailants
was Nick Payne (“Payne”), a former friend of Petitioner’s. The
incident was reported to the police, who concluded that the robbery
was a drug-deal gone bad; no arrests were made.
About two months later, Petitioner was interviewed by a
victim’s assistance advocate. Upset about the lack of any arrests,
Petitioner stated that if something was not done soon he would take
matters into his own hands. Petitioner repeated his threats of
retaliation against Payne to one of his teachers and his guidance
counselor. When his teacher asked Petitioner not to do anything, he
replied that he would not have to do it, and that he had friends
who would take care of it for him. This conversation occurred on
June 2nd, two days before the victim was killed.
On June 4, 2005, Petitioner’s friend Amanda Fero (“Fero”)
thought she saw Payne at a gray house about a block and a half from
her own house. Fero called Petitioner and told him that she had
just seen Payne.
Petitioner and Kennerknecht traveled in Petitioner’s Cadillac
to Reed’s house. Dawson and Magaddino were also there. Petitioner
told the group that Fero had called and told him where Payne was
living. Petitioner also told the group that “he wanted [them] to go
with him so he could – he could fuck Nick up.”
The five men then traveled in Petitioner’s Cadillac and drove
to Fero’s house. On the way, everyone but Dawson took their shirt
off, leaving their white T-shirt on. According to Magaddino,
“whenever somebody gets in a fight or plans on fighting, it’s habit
– habit to take off your overshirt so you don’t ruin it.”
They all walked several blocks down 19th Street to where Fero
had last seen Payne. During the walk, there was conversation to the
Reed and Magaddino stopped in front of the house and the rest
of the group walked past three more houses. Magaddino screamed out,
“Nick!” A man later identified as Kwasniewski came out, walked off
the porch onto a concrete sidewalk that led to the front sidewalk,
and talked with Magaddino. The victim asked Magaddino if he had
lost his dog. Magaddino told him no, but he would like to talk to
him. The victim said sure and walked off the porch and down the
sidewalk towards the fence that bordered the street sidewalk and
the front yard of the house. The victim was about 5 to 10 feet away
from the fence when Petitioner put his right hand on the fence and
After Petitioner jumped the fence, he said, “[C]lose enough
or this will do, something along them [sic] lines.” The victim
said, “[Y]ou don’t know me or I don’t know you, something like
that”. After that exchange, Petitioner punched the victim several
times in the face. The victim stumbled back after the blows and
threw no punches.
After Petitioner threw the first several punches, Magaddino
opened the gate, entered the yard and began punching the victim.
Magaddino testified that he threw the punches because he “took that
to be the person that hit [Petitioner] with a lead pipe.” When
Magaddino started to hit the victim, Magaddino was to the side of
the victim and Petitioner was in front of the victim. Reed and
Kennerkneckt also entered the yard and began hitting and punching
the victim. Having thrown the first two punches, Petitioner stepped
back and stood either on one side of the gate or the other. The
victim slumped to the ground with his back to the fence and
Magaddino and Reed kicked him.
Dawson then yelled “let’s go” and everybody ran out of the
yard and back to Petitioner’s Cadillac. Petitioner did not drive
because “he didn’t want to be seen.”
During the drive to Reed’s house, Petitioner was “gloating”
about what happened and was “saying stuff like ‘we got him.’”
Dawson asked Petitioner if the victim was one of the guys who had
jumped him and Petitioner said no. When Dawson asked Petitioner why
he had just attacked Krasniewski, Petitioner replied that the
victim “obviously” knew Payne and deserved everything he got. When
Dawson asked Petitioner what would happen if the person was really
hurt, Petitioner replied “no one cared when they beat me in the
head with a lead pipe so why would they care about this.”
At Reed’s house, Petitioner was complaining that he had cut
his hand when he jumped the fence. His friends suggested that he go
to the hospital to get stitches, but Petitioner just wrapped his
hand in a gauze bandage. Petitioner admitted to Matthew Fickes, who
was present at Reed’s house, that he had hopped the fence, cut his
hand, and hit the victim two or three times.
DNA evidence established that Petitioner’s blood was at the
crime scene. The medical examiner testified that the victim’s death
was caused by blunt force trauma with ten separate areas of head
The jury returned a verdict convicting Petitioner of first
degree gang assault. He was sentenced to the maximum term of 25
years to life in prison.
Legal Insufficiency of the Evidence
Petitioner argues there was insufficient evidence to convict
testimony allegedly was coerced and uncorroborated, and failed to
state that Petitioner actually participated in the gang assault.
When reviewing a state court conviction on these grounds, a
federal habeas court considers “whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Where, as here, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
petitioner's burden becomes insurmountable because section 2254
“gives federal habeas courts no license to redetermine credibility
of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial
court, but not by them.” Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434
(1983). The weight given to a witness's testimony is a question of
fact to be determined by the jury, Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 116 (1977), and a district court sitting in habeas review must
resolve all credibility issues in the verdict's favor and cannot
second-guess the jury's determinations. United States v. Strauss,
999 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1993).
witnesses testified that Petitioner sought a confrontation with the
victim; he was wounded when he returned to his house after the
murder; and his blood was found at the crime scene.
Petitioner also contends that his conviction was based on a
misinterpretation of his statement to his teacher that “if I can’t
do it my friends will” and thus was not supported by legally
sufficient evidence. It is jury's exclusive responsibility to
determine ultimate questions of fact, including the meaning to be
ascribed to this statement. E.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 509-510 (1995); People v. Grutz, 212 N.Y. 72, 82, 105 N.E.
843, 847 (N.Y. 1914).
To the extent that Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence generally, the Court finds this request for habeas
corpus relief equally unavailing. Under New York State law, “[a]
person commits first degree gang assault when, with the intent to
cause serious physical injury to another person and when aided by
two or more other persons actually present, he causes serious
physical injury to such person or to a third person.” N.Y. Penal
Law § 120.07.
When viewing the trial proof, summarized above in
Section II of this Decision and Order, in the light most favorable
to the prosecution in this case, a rational trier of fact easily
could have found that Petitioner committed essential elements of
first degree gang assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
Erroneous Admission of Petitioner’s Statements to the
The Appellate Division held that the trial court properly
refused to suppress statements that Petitioner made to the police,
since the evidence presented at suppression hearing established
that the police lawfully stopped defendant's vehicle and that
defendant's statements made to the police at that time were not in
response to custodial interrogation. People v. Craft, 57 A.D.3d at
1389 (citations omitted). Rather, the statements were made in
response to inquiry necessary to provide for defendant's physical
condition and needs. Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the hearing
testimony established that Craft’s subsequent statements were made
after defendant had waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). Id. (citation omitted). These rulings were correct
applications of Federal law.
Statement Obtained During the Stop of Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s argument that his statements were inadmissible
because they were based on an illegal stop is precluded under Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976)(federal habeas courts cannot
consider a claim that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment should have been excluded at trial when the prisoner has
had an opportunity for full and fair litigation of that claim in
the state courts) and Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571, 572-73
(1983)(applying the Stone v. Powell doctrine to seizures).
Also, Petitioner’s argument that his statement to the police
officer who stopped his vehicle was admitted into evidence in
violation of Miranda is without merit because Petitioner was not in
“discrete inquiries [which] are essential to the determination” of
purposes. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). First, the
court must look at the objective circumstances surrounding the
interrogation. Second, the court must determine whether, in light
of those circumstances, “a reasonable person would have felt he or
she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”
Id. at 113 (footnote omitted). If a “reasonable person” would not
have felt free to leave, then the reviewing court must proceed to
the second step of the custody analysis and determine whether this
“reasonable person would have understood his freedom of action to
have been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” Id.
“Only if the answer to this second question is yes was the person
‘in custody for practical purposes' and ‘entitled to the full
panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.’” Id.
The police stopped Petitioner's gray Cadillac on 19th Street
the day after the crime based upon information that a gray Cadillac
had been seen at a recent homicide on 19th Street and that the
plates may have been switched. A computer inquiry revealed that the
plates on Petitioner's Cadillac should have been on a 1990 Mercury.
Switched plates is a violation of
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 402-1,
Petitioner's Cadillac. Although the
police officer learned, after
registration and the plates were correct, that did not vitiate his
initial authority to stop the vehicle.
As part of the frisking
procedure, the police officer asked Petitioner to put his hands
behind his head. At that point the officer observed a large gauze
bandage on his right hand and asked him what was wrong with his
hand. Petitioner replied that he had cut his hand on speaker wire
at about 1 p.m. the prior day.
The state courts correctly ruled that the question and answer
concerning Petitioner's injured hand was admissible because they
were not the product of custodial interrogation. As the suppression
court correctly pointed out, under New York and Federal law, even
questioning following a frisk, in the absence of other factors
equivalent to a formal arrest, does not constitute custodial
People v. Morales, 65 N.Y.2d 997, 998 (N.Y. 1985)
(citing Berkermer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); United
States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291 (2d Cir. 1982)). In this
case, there were no other factors equivalent to a formal arrest:
The police had not drawn their weapons and Petitioner was not
handcuffed. Because Petitioner was not in custody, no Miranda
warnings were required prior to the officer’s question about the
Statement to the Police Officer During Booking
The police officer who had stopped Petitioner’s car arrested
him for illegally possessing brass knuckles. At the police station,
photographing him in the booking area. (As part of the booking
procedure, the police were required to take photographs of any
injuries Petitioner had at the time.) The officer remarked that it
was a pretty bad cut. Petitioner replied that he had gotten it
while installing speaker wire in his car.
At that point, Petitioner was in custody. In Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the Supreme Court held that custodial
interrogation requiring the issuance of the Miranda warnings occurs
whenever an individual is “subjected to either express questioning
or its functional equivalent.” Id. at 300-01. Interrogation “refers
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id.
at 301. Here, the officer’s comment about Petitioner’s injury was
not “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response[,]” id.
Moreover, because Petitioner had already made the same statement to
the officer who frisked him, the statement made in response to the
second officer was cumulative. Thus, any error would have been
Failure to Disclose Evidence Favorable to the Defense
obligation of the prosecution to produce evidence that is “material
either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963). Evidence is considered material only if “there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Mere speculation
that exculpatory evidence was withheld is insufficient to establish
a viable Brady claim. E.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 286
(1999) (“Mere speculation that some exculpatory material may have
been withheld is unlikely to establish good cause for a discovery
request on collateral review.”).
Tape-Recording of a 911 Call
Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to disclose a
tape of a 911 call that allegedly was favorable to the defense. In
his petition, he did not provide any further details.
In one of his later filings, Petitioner submitted a transcript
of the tape, which includes numerous other calls made around the
time of the assault. Petitioner has not explained how it was
favorable to the defense. The Court has reviewed the transcript in
its entirety in an attempt to discern this. One of the witnesses
who communicated with the 911 operator said that there were six
white males who were involved, but only three of them actually
attacked the victim. This is the only portion of the report that
However, there were no descriptions given regarding the assailants,
and Petitioner could not be excluded as one the individuals who
this witness saw beating the victim.
A Brady violation occurs only where the evidence suppressed “
‘could reasonably [have been] taken to put the whole case in such
a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’”
United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (footnote omitted)).
Even assuming that this report had some exculpatory value, it was
not “material” for Brady purposes because it could reasonably have
been taken “to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict[,]” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. In
other words, “disclosure of the suppressed evidence to competent
probable[,]” id. at 441; see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (“The
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.”).
Autopsy Report of the Victim
Petitioner alleges that the prosecution failed to turn over
the autopsy report of the victim. This contention is not supported
by the record. Moreover, Petitioner has not demonstrated how the
report was favorable to the defense.
Photographs of the Crime Scene
Petitioner states that the prosecution failed to disclose
favorable crime scene photographs. This argument has never been
raised before and is not exhausted. Furthermore, Petitioner has not
identified which photographs alleged were not disclosed; nor has he
explained how they would have aided the defense.
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must
satisfy both prongs of the two-part test articulated in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984). Petitioner must show
(1) “that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness;” and (2) “that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
[sentencing] proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688; see also id. at 694.
Failure to Argue that Petitioner Should Be Accorded
Youthful Offender Status
Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to request that he be afforded youthful offender (“YO”)
Petitioner was eligible for YO status. As a result, the sentencing
court was aware of the issue. Although it may have been better
practice for defense counsel to have advanced this argument,
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how any statements by his
attorney on this point would have resulted in a different outcome.
Failure to Argue that the Gang Assault Offense
Merged with the Murder Charge
failing to argue that the count charging him with gang assault
merged with the count charging him with depraved indifference
murder. The point is moot, however, since the trial court dismissed
Failure to Properly Advise Petitioner Regarding the
Right to Testify
The ultimate decision regarding whether to testify belongs to
the defendant, and his attorney’s professional duty is to advise
him of the benefits and pitfalls of the decision. Brown v. Artuz,
124 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1997). According to Petitioner, he did not
testify because trial counsel said that did not have to because the
burden was on the prosecution to prove his guilt to the jury.
important, Petitioner has wholly failed to demonstrate how his
testimony would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. Thus, he
cannot show how he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance.
Failure to Challenge a Juror
failing to move to excuse a juror who was arrested for driving
while intoxicated during the trial.
As a general matter, a defendant who seeks a new trial based
on allegations of juror misconduct faces a very high hurdle. As the
Supreme Court explained, “full and frank discussion in the jury
room, jurors' willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the
community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of
laypeople would all be undermined by a barrage of postverdict
scrutiny of juror conduct.” Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,
120-21(1987). Accordingly, “courts are, and should be, hesitant to
haul jurors in after they have reached a verdict in order to probe
influences.” United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir.
Even where a juror, during voir dire, has failed to disclose
prior arrests, appellate courts have not reversed on the basis of
juror misconduct. E.g., United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65 (2d
Cir. 1993). In that case, the defendant learned after a guilty
verdict had been returned that a juror had deliberately concealed
several arrests and criminal convictions. However, the district
court found no evidence that the juror lied from a desire to sit on
the jury, or from some prejudice against the defendant-rather, she
had simply wished to avoid embarrassment and the possible public
exposure of her criminal history. The Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of the defendant's motion. See id. at
Here, inasmuch as the juror had not been convicted, he was not
subject to a challenge for cause upon the basis that he was
unqualified to serve pursuant to N.Y. Judiciary Law § 510(3), which
provides that in order to qualify as a juror a person must, inter
alia, not have been convicted of a felony.
Furthermore, Craft has
not demonstrated that the juror was subject to a challenge for
cause under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 270.20(1)(b), which requires
showing that the juror had “state of mind . . . likely to preclude
him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence
adduced at the trial.”
challenging the juror, or that the juror’s presence on the jury
prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
Failure to Challenge the Verdict as Being Against
the Weight of the Evidence
A “weight of the evidence” argument is a pure State law claim
grounded in New York Criminal Procedure Law § 470.15(1) and (5).
“Upon an appeal to an intermediate appellate court from a judgment,
sentence or order of a criminal court, such intermediate appellate
court may consider and determine any . . . issue of fact involving
error or defect in the criminal court proceedings which may have
§ 470.15(1). A determination that a verdict of conviction resulting
in a judgment was, in whole or in part, against the weight of the
evidence is statutorily deemed to be a reversal or modification on
the facts. Id., § 470.15(5). Thus, a challenge to the weight of the
evidence is properly made by appellate counsel to the intermediate
appellate court, not by trial counsel to the trial court.
Failure to Object to a Witness’ Testimony
Petitioner next contends that trial counsel was ineffective by
not objecting to testimony of the girlfriend of one of the men who
assaulted him in the drug-deal gone bad (the incident that led to
Petitioner seeking to retaliate against “Nick”). Again, Petitioner
has not supplied a colorable basis for such the objection he claims
counsel should have made; nor has he demonstrated how he was
Constitutional Vagueness of N.Y. Penal Law § 120.07
Petitioner argues that the first degree gang assault statute
is unconstitutionally vague.
The Appellate Division held that the
phrase ‘aided by two or more persons actually present’ contained in
presence, and the statute is not vague as applied to defendant.
People v. Craft, 57 A.D.3d 1388, 1389 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 2008)
(citing, inter alia, People v. Hedgeman, 70 N.Y.2d 533, 538 (N.Y.
1987) (holding, in context of N.Y. Penal Law § 160.10(1), that the
term “actually present” did not encompass the presence of the
getaway driver for a robbery; “[g]iving the term its natural and
obvious meaning, ‘actual’ refers to that which is ‘[o]pposed to
potential, possible, virtual, theoretical, hypothetical, or nominal
. . . in opposition to constructive or speculative . . . in
contradistinction to virtual or constructive’) (internal citation
and quotation omitted; ellipses in original). This was a correct
application of Federal law.
The United States Constitution requires that a penal law
“define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
(citations omitted). A two-part test is used to determine whether
a statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied: “[T]he court must
first determine whether the statute ‘give[s] the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited’
and then consider whether the law ‘provide[s] explicit standards
for those who apply [it].’” United States v. Schneiderman, 968 F.2d
1564, 1568 (2d Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted)), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 921 (1993).
difficulty understanding the plain meaning of the statute, which
makes it clear that in order to be guilty of gang assault, a person
must possess the intent to seriously physically injure someone, and
to commit that injury while aided by two or more persons.
one of the constitutional vagueness test is therefore satisfied.
The “mere presence” argument that Petitioner made on direct
appeal to the Appellate Division also fails here because the
statute clearly requires intent, aid, and actual (rather than
A person of ordinary intelligence would
conclude that the statute requires a person to be present and to
participate during the collective assault on a victim, and it is
clear that the statute does not make a person liable for just
standing there or, in Petitioner’s words, being “merely present.”
The record clearly establishes that Petitioner was not only present
at the beating, but he also instigated and participated in the
assault. Petitioner’s level of involvement thus satisfied the
required level of “actual presence” and “aiding” as described in
The second prong of the vagueness analysis requires the court
to determine whether the statute provides sufficient guidance to
law enforcement personnel such as police officers, prosecutors, and
juries who must enforce and apply the law. Kolender, 461 U.S. at
constitutionally tolerable.” United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d
600, 605 (2d Cir. 1999). Courts have routinely rejected vagueness
challenges to language that is not capable of precise application
but rather calls for judgment in interpreting it. E.g., Parker v.
officer”). The discretion granted to jurors here is no greater than
in other criminal statutes that have been upheld despite vagueness
arbitrary enforcement,” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 503 (1982), and Craft has not
made such a showing with regard to the first degree gang assault
Harshness and Excessiveness of the Sentence
A habeas challenge to the sentencing judge’s exercise of
discretion does not present a cognizable constitutional issue if
the sentence falls within the statutory range. E.g., Glover v.
Burge, 652 F. Supp.2d 373, 378 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); White v. Keane, 969 F.2d 1381,
1383 (2d Cir. 1992)). Although Petitioner received the maximum
sentence allowable, it was within the applicable statutory range.
Motion to Stay
Petitioner has filed a motion to stay the petition in order to
exhaust unspecified claims of ineffective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel. Petitioner states that he was just recently
informed by his inmate legal assistant that he was prejudiced by
counsels’ performance. The Court has found no cases supporting the
proposition that a petitioner’s ignorance of the law constitutes
“good cause” for the failure to exhaust. A lack of “good cause” is
fatal to Petitioner’s motion for a stay. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.
269, 277-78 (2005).
For the reasons stated above, Shane Craft’s Petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is denied, and
the Petition is dismissed. Craft’s Motion for a Stay (Docket No.
19) is denied with prejudice. Because Petitioner has failed to make
a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, the
Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. See 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The Court hereby certifies, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this judgment would not
be taken in good faith and therefore denies leave to appeal in
S/Michael A. Telesca
MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
July 5, 2011
Rochester, New York
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