Miles v. Warden Atttica Corrections et al
Filing
17
-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-DECISION AND ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss.Defendants motion for summary judgment is granted as to the Eighth Amendment claims against Diehl and Kingsbury, and this action is dismissed. The Court hereby certifies, pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person is denied. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). Further requests to proceed on a ppeal in forma pauperis should be directed on motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this action. Signed by Hon. Charles J. Siragusa on 5/28/13. (KAP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________
DESHAWN MILES,
Plaintiff
DECISION AND ORDER
-vs10-CV-6598 CJS
JAMES DIEHL, PETER KINGSBURY, PARTY
THAT HIT THE VAN and THEIR INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants
__________________________________________
Deshaw n Miles (“ Plaintiff” ) is an inmate currently in the custody of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons w ho commenced this action proceeding pro se. Now before the
Court is a summary judgment motion (Docket No. [#12]) by defendants James Diehl
(“ Diehl” ) and Peter Kingsbury (“ Kingsbury” ). The application is granted and this action
is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Unless otherw ise noted the follow ing are the facts of the case view ed in the
light most-favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. This action arose w hen Plaintiff
w as previously confined in the custody of the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision (“ DOCCS” ). At all relevant times Diehl and
Kingsbury w ere employed by DOCCS as corrections officers at Attica Correctional
Facility (“ Attica” ). On September 14, 2010, Diehl and Kingsbury w ere transporting
Plaintiff from Attica to Sing Sing Correctional Facilit y (“ Sing Sing” ) in a prison
passenger van. During the trip, the van w as st ruck from behind by another vehicle,
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causing minimal damage to the van. How ever, Plaintiff maintains t hat he sustained
an injury to his low er back during the collision.
Shortly thereafter, on October 22, 2010, Plaintiff commenced this action. The
Complaint [#1] purports to assert state-law negligence claims against Diehl, Kingsbury,
the driver of the second vehicle, and the driver’ s insurance company. The Complaint
also purports to state an Eighth Amendment “ deliberate indifference” claim against
Diehl and Kingsbury pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection w ith the accident.
Along w ith the Complaint, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis.
The Court granted the application to proceed in forma pauperis and review ed the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). Liberally construing the
pro se pleading, the Court determined that the Complaint stated an Eighth Amendment
claim against Diehl and Kingsbury, since Plaintiff alleged in the pleading that he was
handcuffed and not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the accident. See, Complaint [#1] at
p. 6 (“I didn’t have any seatbelts on.”). The Court interpreted that statement to possibly
mean that Diehl and Kingsbury were responsible for Plaintiff being unrestrained during the
accident, in disregard to his safety. See, Decision and Order [#3] (“ Plaintiff’ s allegations
. . . that he w as cuffed and shackled and not w earing a seat belt at the time of the
accident are sufficient to allow his Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference
against the transporting officers to proceed.
These fact s allege more than mere
negligence or an ordinary lack of due care. See, Graham v. Poole, 476 F.Supp.2d at
259-60.” ). The Court also permitted supplemental state-law negligence claims to go
forw ard against Diehl, Kingsbury, the driver of the second vehicle and the driver’ s
insurance company. How ever, the driver and the insurance company have never been
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served in this action.
On May 17, 2012, Diehl and Kingsbury filed the subject motion [#12] for
summary judgment in lieu of answ ering the Complaint. 1 In support of the motion,
Diehl and Kingsbury submitted affidavits in w hich they maintain, inter alia, that they
w ere not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’ s safety by failing to restrain him during the
ride.
Specifically, they indicate that w hen t hey placed Plaintiff in the van, they
secured him w ith a seatbelt. See, Kingsbury Aff. [#12-4] at ¶ 9. They further contend
that Plaintiff w as able to remove the seatbelt, w hich he apparently did, despite being
handcuffed, though such fact w ould not have been evident to them, since Plaintiff w as
sitting behind them and behind the security screen. 2 Defendants indicate that Plaintiff
never told them that he w as unbuckled, and that they w ere unaw are that he w as
unbuckled until after the accident.
Plaintiff responded by requesting an enlargement of time to file responsive
papers, w hich the Court granted. On November 8, 2012, Plaintiff filed his opposition
papers [#16],3 w hich consist primarily of eighty-one pages of medical records,
purporting t o show t hat Plaintiff had a painful low er back condition follow ing the
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Defendant provided Plaintiff w ith the “ Irby” Notice to Pro Se Litigants as required by Local
Rule of Civil Procedure 56.2. (Docket No. [#12-2] ).
2
Defendants’ motion also argues that they are entitled to summary judgment on a supposed
“ denial of medical treatment” claim against them. How ever, Defendants have misunderstood the
Court’ s prior Decision and Order [#3]. In that Decision and Order, the Court observed that Plaintiff
appeared to be attempting to assert a denial of medical treatment claim against medical staff at
Attica, not against Diehl or Kingsbury. How ever, the Court indicated that such claim w as deficient
as pleaded, and that Plaintiff w ould need to amend his complaint in order to assert such a claim.
Plaintiff never did, and consequently there is no claim in this action for denial of medical treatment.
Accordingly, Defendants’ argument on that point w as unnecessary.
3
Plaintiff’ s response w as incorrectly designated as a “ motion for miscellaneous relief” on the
docket sheet.
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accident. Now here, though, does Plaintiff challenge Defendants’ contention regarding
the circumstances under w hich Plaintiff came to be unrestrained during the accident.
DISCUSSION
Summary
judgment may not be granted unless "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A party seeking summary judgment
bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See, Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). “[T]he movant must make a prima facie
showing that the standard for obtaining summary judgment has been satisfied.” 11
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 56.11[1][a] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.).
The underlying facts contained in affidavits, attached exhibits, and depositions, must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369
U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Summary judgment is appropriate only where, "after drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, no
reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party." Leon v. Murphy, 988
F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir.1993). Moreover, since Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court is
required to construe his submissions liberally, “to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994).
Although Plaint if f has not raised the issue, the Court is mindful that no
discovery has yet taken place in t his action, since “ [o]nly in the rarest of cases may
summary judgment be granted against a plaintiff w ho has not been afforded the
opportunity to conduct discovery.” Young v. Benjamin Development Inc., 395
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Fed.Appx. 721, 722-723, 2010 WL 3860498 at * 1 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2010) (citation
omitted).
How ever, summary judgment may be considered in this action since
discovery w ould have no bearing on the crucial issue of w hether Defendants w ere
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’ s safety by intentionally placing him the van
unrestrained. That is, sw orn statement s on t hat point from the only persons w ith
know ledge are already before the Court, and Plaintiff has not contested Defendants’
version of events. The only reason the Court permitted the Eighth Amendment claim
to go forw ard initially w as because it appeared possible that Diehl and Kingsbury had
placed Plaintiff in the van unrestrained, under circumstances in w hich he could not
attend to his ow n safety. How ever, it now appears clear that w as not the case, and
that Plaintiff un-fastened his ow n seatbelt.
In any event, it is undisputed that
Defendants w ere not aw are that Plaintiff w as not w earing his seatbelt prior to the
accident. On such facts, Diehl and Kingsbury are entitled to summary judgment on the
Eighth Amendment “ deliberate indifference” claim. See, Nunez v. Goord, 172
F.Supp.2d 417, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“ Deliberate indifference exists w here the official
know s of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must
both be aw are of fact from w hich the inference could be draw n that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” ) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Having made that determination, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining supplemental state-law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c).
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CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as t o the Eighth
Amendment claims against Diehl and Kingsbury, and this action is dismissed. The
Court hereby certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that any appeal from this Order
w ould not be taken in good faith and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor
person is denied. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). Further requests
to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis should be directed on motion to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance w ith Rule 24 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate
this action.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
Rochester, New York
May 28, 2013
ENTER:
/s/ Charles J. Siragusa
CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA
United States District Judge
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