Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County, New York
Filing
23
DECISION AND ORDER granting 4 Motion for preliminary injunction. The Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the subject foreclosure actions are barred by the Tribes sovereign immunity from suit, and that it is therefore entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.. Signed by Hon. Charles J. Siragusa on 8/20/12. (KAP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CAYUGA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK,
Plaintiff,
-v-
DECISION AND ORDER
SENECA COUNTY, NEW YORK,
11-CV-6004 CJS
Defendant.
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Daniel J. French, Esq.
Lee Alcott, Esq.
French-Alcott, PLLC
300 South State Street
Syracuse, New York 13202
For Defendant:
Phillip G. Spellane, Esq.
Harris Beach PLLC
99 Garnsey Road
Pittsford, New York 14534
INTRODUCTION
This action presents the question whether Seneca County (“Defendant”) may
foreclose on real property owned by the Cayuga Indian Nation of New York (“Plaintiff”) for
failure to pay ad valorem property taxes. Now before the Court is Plaintiff's application for
preliminary injunctive relief, enjoining Defendant from foreclosing on the subject parcels,
on the grounds of tribal sovereign immunity. (Docket No. 4). For the reasons that follow,
the application is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a federally-recognized Indian Tribe which owns real property in Seneca
County. The subject dispute involves land that was formerly part of the 64,000-acre
Cayuga Reservation acknowledged by the Treaty of Canandaigua in 1794. Shortly after
1794, the Cayuga Nation sold large portions of the Reservation lands to the State of New
York. Plaintiff maintains that such sales were illegal and void ab initio, since they did not
comply with the requirements of the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177. Plaintiff
contends, therefore, that the entire 64,000-acre Cayuga Reservation remains intact to this
day. Amended Complaint [#9] at ¶ 10. Defendant disagrees.
Approximately two centuries after selling off the Reservation land to the State of
New York, Plaintiff began purchasing parcels of property on the open market that lie within
the geographic area of the aforementioned Reservation. Plaintiff contends that such
properties are now Reservation land and are “Indian Country” within the meaning of federal
law. See, Amended Complaint [#9] at ¶ ¶ 7-10. Defendant again disagrees.
The subject action involves five1 such parcels of property located in Seneca County,
which were originally included in the Reservation, but which were later sold to third parties,
and then re-purchased by Plaintiff. Defendant has attempted to collect ad valorem
property taxes on the parcels, and Plaintiff has denied any obligation to pay them. As a
result, Defendant initiated foreclosure proceedings, pursuant to Article Eleven of the New
York State Real Property Tax Law.
The Amended Complaint indicates that there are five parcels. Amended Complaint [#9] at ¶ 7.
However, an affidavit submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel indicates that there are four properties. Alcott Aff. [#6]
at ¶ 3.
1
2
On January 5, 2011, Plaintiff commenced this action, seeking permanent
declaratory and injunctive relief. At the same time, Plaintiff made the subject application
for preliminary injunctive relief, enjoining the County from foreclosing on the properties.
Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to injunctive relief because the foreclosure actions are
barred by sovereign immunity. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that “[a]s a federallyrecognized Indian nation, [it] possess[es] tribal sovereign immunity [from suit], which bars
administrative and judicial proceedings against the [Indian] Nation,” even if the taxes are
properly owed.2 In that regard, Plaintiff relies, in large part, on the Second Circuit’s
decision in Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County and Oneida County, 605
F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Oneida”).
The Court granted Plaintiff’s request for an expedited hearing, and scheduled the
matter to be heard on January 13, 2011. However, the parties agreed to stay the
foreclosure proceedings, and stipulated to a briefing schedule, thereby mooting the request
for an expedited hearing.
On February 3, 2011, Defendant filed opposing papers. Defendant observes that
after Plaintiff’s application was filed, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
Second Circuit’s Oneida decision, and argues that such decision now “has no precedential
value whatsoever.” Spellane Aff. [#12-1] at 2. Defendant contends, inter alia, that the
2
Plaintiff maintains that in this action it is not claiming that the property is “immune from taxation.” Pl.
Reply Memo [#21] at 1 (“The Nation does not claim the parcels at issue here are immune from taxation as
a matter of federal law.”) (emphasis added). Instead, Plaintiff contends that while the County may impose
taxes, it has no right to collect them. Id. (“It is well-established that, even where there is no immunity from
taxation, sovereign immunity from suit may bar a state from resorting to a judicial remedy to enforce its tax.”).
Although, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint indicates that under New York State law, “an Indian tribe’s property
[is exempt] from taxation if located within an Indian reservation.” Amended Complaint [#9] at ¶ 1 (emphasis
added); see also, id. at ¶ 21 (citing New York Real Property Tax Law § 454).
3
Second Circuit’s opinion was incorrectly decided in any event, since it was contrary to
Supreme Court precedent, most notably County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S.Ct. 683 (1992) (“Yakima”) and
and City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197, 125 S.Ct. 1478
(2005) (“Sherrill”). According to Defendant, Yakima established that tribal sovereign
immunity does not bar in rem property tax foreclosure proceedings against property owned
by an Indian tribe, while Sherrill held that an Indian tribe cannot revive its sovereign
authority over land by purchasing it after years of inaction.3
On May 5, 2011, counsel for the parties appeared before the undersigned for oral
argument.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks an injunction enjoining the state-court tax foreclosure proceeding,
pursuant to the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (Providing that federal courts “may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law.”); see also, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (A federal court may grant
an injunction to stay state court proceedings “where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments.”). The parties dispute whether tribal sovereign
immunity applies, and therefore disagree as to whether the Court should enjoin the state
3
Defendant also maintains that the subject foreclosure actions are not barred by the Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1834, also known as the Non-Intercourse Act. Plaintiff had argued, in its moving papers,
that the foreclosure actions violated the Non-Intercourse Act, which prompted Defendant to devote a large
part of its responding brief to that issue. See, Def. Memo of Law [#12] at pp. 19-33. However, Plaintiff’s reply
brief disclaims reliance on the Non-Intercourse Act as a basis for the subject motion. See, Pl. Reply Memo
of Law [#21] at p. 2, n. 2 (Indicating that tribal sovereign immunity provides a sufficient basis for granting the
motion, without regard to the Non-Intercourse Act). Accordingly, the Court need not address the NonIntercourse Act at this time.
4
court proceedings.
A lengthy discussion is unnecessary, since, according to the Second Circuit’s
Oneida decision, Supreme Court precedent clearly determines the outcome of this motion,
and holds as follows: Even assuming that Seneca County has the right to impose property
taxes on the subject parcels owned by the Cayuga Indian Nation, it does not have the right
to collect those taxes by suing to foreclose on the properties, unless Congress authorizes
it to do so, or unless the Cayuga Indian Nation waives its sovereign immunity from suit.
Congress has not authorized Seneca County to sue the Cayugas, and the Cayugas have
not waived their sovereign immunity. Consequently, the Cayugas’ motion for an order
enjoining the foreclosure actions must be granted.
The cases upon which the foregoing paragraph rests are well-known to the litigants
and to the courts that will undoubtedly be called upon to review this Court’s ruling. For the
benefit of anyone reading this decision who is not familiar with them, and who may be
understandably perplexed by this ruling, the Court will briefly review the controlling law.
In Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 118 S.Ct.
1700, 1702 (1998), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the federal common law doctrine that
Indian tribes cannot be sued unless Congress authorizes the suit or unless the tribes waive
their immunity. Significantly, the Supreme Court held that even if a state has the authority
to tax or otherwise regulate an Indian tribe in a particular instance, it does not have the
ability to sue the tribe to enforce the tax or regulation, unless Congress authorizes the suit,
or unless the tribe waives its sovereign immunity:
As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where
Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity. . . .
5
Our cases allowing States to apply their substantive laws to tribal activities
are not to the contrary. We have recognized that a State may have authority
to tax or regulate tribal activities occurring within the State but outside Indian
country. To say substantive state laws apply to off-reservation conduct,
however, is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit. In
[Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla.,
498 U.S. 505, 111 S.Ct. 905 (1991)], for example, we reaffirmed that while
Oklahoma may tax cigarette sales by a Tribe's store to nonmembers, the
Tribe enjoys immunity from a suit to collect unpaid state taxes. There is a
difference between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the
means available to enforce them.
Id., 118 S.Ct. at 1702-1703 (emphasis added, citations omitted). In doing so, the Supreme
Court questioned “the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine” of Tribal sovereign immunity,
but deferred to Congress to make any changes in that regard. Id., 118 S.Ct. at 1704-1705
(“The capacity of the Legislative Branch to address the issue by comprehensive legislation
counsels some caution by us in this area. . . . [W]e decline to revisit our case law and
choose to defer to Congress.”). To date, Congress has declined that invitation.
In Sherrill, the Supreme Court rejected the Oneida Indian Nation’s claim to have
sovereign authority, in the form of exemption from property taxation, over real property
which had been part of the Oneida’s reservation, but which had been sold, and then repurchased by the Oneidas on the open market:
In this action, [the Oneida Indian Nation] seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief recognizing its present and future sovereign immunity from local
taxation on parcels of land the Tribe purchased in the open market,
properties that had been subject to state and local taxation for generations.
We now reject th[at] unification theory . . . and hold that standards of federal
Indian law and federal equity practice preclude the Tribe from rekindling
6
embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold.4
Id., 125 S.Ct. at 1489-1490. Although the Supreme Court held that the Oneidas’ property
was subject to taxation, as well as to “local zoning or other regulatory controls,” it did not
explicitly hold that the City of Sherrill could sue the Oneidas to collect unpaid taxes.
Approximately five years later, in Oneida, the Second Circuit addressed a dispute
that flowed from the Supreme Court’s decision in Sherrill.
Specifically, in the wake of
Sherrill’s holding that the property recently purchased by the Oneidas was subject to
taxation, Madison County and Oneida County attempted to collect unpaid taxes from the
Oneidas, by foreclosing on the properties. The Oneidas responded by seeking an
injunction in federal district court, enjoining the foreclosure actions, on the grounds of tribal
sovereign immunity from suit. The district court granted summary judgment on that basis
for the Oneidas, and the Second Circuit Panel affirmed that ruling, stating: “We affirm on
the ground that the [Oneida Indian Nation] is immune from suit under the long-standing
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The remedy of foreclosure is therefore not available
to the Counties.” Id., 605 F.3d at 151.
In that regard, the Second Circuit discussed the difference between “two distinct
doctrines: tribal sovereign authority over reservation lands and tribal sovereign immunity
from suit.” Oneida, 605 F.3d at 156. The Court specifically stated that Sherrill involved only
the former doctrine, and not the latter. That is, the Circuit Panel held that Sherrill merely
authorized the imposition of taxes on the Oneida’s properties, but did not authorize the
4
The Supreme Court observed, however, that the Oneidas could seek to have the land taken into
federal trust, and thus exempted from State and local taxation, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 465. Id., 125 S.Ct. at
1495 (“Section 465 provides the proper avenue for [the Oneidas] to reestablish sovereign authority over
territory last held by the Oneidas 200 years ago.”).
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taxing counties to take legal action to collect the taxes:
[W]e do not read Sherrill as implicitly abrogating the [Oneidas’] immunity
from suit. No such statement of abrogation was made by the Sherrill Court,
nor does the opinion call into question the Kiowa Court’s approach, that any
such abrogation should be left to Congress. Sherrill dealt with the right to
demand compliance with state laws. It did not address the means available
to enforce those laws.
Id. at 157-159 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Second
Circuit Panel agreed with the Counties, “that the notion that they may tax but not foreclose
is inconsistent and contradictory,” it nevertheless concluded that the foreclosure actions
had to be enjoined, since Congress had not authorized them, and since the Oneidas had
not waived their sovereign immunity. Id. at 159.
In a concurring opinion in Oneida, Judge Cabranes removed any possible doubt as
to the meaning of the Panel’s decision:
The holding in this case comes down to this: an Indian tribe can purchase
land (including land that was never part of a reservation); refuse to pay
lawfully-owed taxes; and suffer no consequences because the taxing
authority cannot sue to collect the taxes owed. This rule of decision defies
common sense. But absent action by our highest Court, or by Congress, it
is the law.
Id. at 163 (footnote omitted); see also, id. at 164 (Indicating that the Panel’s ruling was
required by “unambiguous guidance from the Supreme Court,” but calling upon the
Supreme Court, or Congress, to correct the “anomalous” result and “reunite” “law and
logic.”).
The county defendants in Oneida petitioned for writ of certiorari, and the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the appeal. However, in an eleventh-hour tactical move, the Oneidas
8
avoided review by belatedly agreeing to waive sovereign immunity. Consequently, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the action to the Second Circuit for further action
in light of the Oneidas’ waiver. See, Madison County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New
York, 131 S.Ct. 704 (2011) (Mem). On remand, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions,
on grounds unrelated to the issue of sovereign immunity from suit. Oneida Indian Nation
of New York v. Madison County, 665 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2011).
Against the backdrop of these cases, Defendant maintains that it is entitled to
foreclose on the Cayugas’ properties, and asks this Court to issue a ruling that is directly
contrary to the Second Circuit’s ruling in Oneida. Defendant maintains that the Oneida
decision has no force, since it was vacated by the Supreme Court. However, the Court
disagrees. Although the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s ruling, it did not do
so on the merits, and there is no reason to believe that the Second Circuit would reach a
different decision today. To the contrary, Judges Cabranes’ concurring opinion, which
Judge Hall joined, indicated that the Panel’s ruling was necessitated by “unambiguous
guidance from the Supreme Court,” which has not changed.
Defendant nevertheless insists that Oneida was wrongly decided. According to
Defendant, Sherrill necessarily held that the Oneidas could not invoke sovereign immunity
from suit to avoid the collection of the disputed property taxes. On this point, in Sherrill,
the Supreme Court stated:
[G]iven the longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of the area and its
inhabitants, the regulatory authority constantly exercised by New York State
and its counties and towns, and the Oneida’s long delay in seeking judicial
relief against parties other than the United States, we hold that the Tribe
9
cannot unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the
parcels at issue.
Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. at 1483 (emphasis added). Defendant argues that pursuant to Sherrill,
an Indian tribe that purchases real property that may have previously been Reservation
land is treated no differently than any non-Indian land owner with regard to that property.
At least one district court in this Circuit has agreed with Defendant on this point. In
New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 523 F.Supp.2d 185, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), which
did not involve property taxes, the district court interpreted Sherrill as permitting a lawsuit
against the Oneidas to collect the unpaid taxes:
[I]t is clear from the Supreme Court's decision in Sherrill that a tribe can be
prevented from invoking a defense of sovereign immunity where equitable
doctrines preclude the tribe from asserting sovereignty over a particular
parcel of land. In other words, the Sherrill Court held that the [Oneidas] could
not invoke sovereign immunity to defend against local real property tax
enforcement proceedings, including eviction proceedings. 544 U.S. at 211,
125 S.Ct. 1478. Specifically, . . . Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that
tribal immunity could be raised “as a defense against a state collection
proceeding.” Id. at 225, 125 S.Ct. 1478. However, the majority opinion
specifically rejected that reasoning. See id. at 214 n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 1478 (“The
dissent suggests that, compatibly with today's decision, the Tribe may assert
tax immunity defensively in the eviction proceeding against Sherrill. We
disagree.”); see also id. at 221, 125 S.Ct. 1478 (Souter, J., concurring)
(rejecting claim of territorial sovereign status whether affirmative or
defensive). Thus, Sherrill allows a tribe to be sued by a state or town, such
as the instant case, to enforce its laws with respect to a parcel of land if
equitable principles prevent the tribe from asserting sovereignty with respect
to that land. To hold otherwise would completely undermine the holding of
Sherrill because, if defendants are immune from suit, plaintiffs here would be
left utterly powerless to utilize the courts to avoid the disruptive impact that
the Supreme Court clearly stated they have the equitable right to prevent.
(emphasis added). However, the Second Circuit subsequently vacated the district court’s
10
decision in Shinnecock for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, without addressing the merits
of the ruling. See, New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. Jun. 25,
2012).
The New York Court of Appeals has also seemingly interpreted Sherrill as permitting
lawsuits against the Oneidas, and, by extension, the Cayugas, to collect property taxes on
properties that were recently bought on the open market. In that regard, in Cayuga Indian
Nation v. Gould, 14 N.Y.3d 614, 640, 642-643, 930 N.E.2d 233 (2010), the Court of
Appeals made the following observation about the Sherrill decision:
In City of Sherrill, the Supreme Court applied the doctrines of laches,
acquiescence and impossibility to bar a claim by the Oneida Indian Nation
that its repurchase of aboriginal lands resulted in the reassertion of that
tribe’s sovereign authority relieving the tribe of the obligation to pay real
property taxes on the reacquired parcels.
***
City of Sherrill certainly would preclude the Cayuga Nation from attempting
to assert sovereign power over its convenience store properties for the
purpose of avoiding real property taxes[.]
(emphasis added).
Consequently, if this Court were writing without the benefit of guidance from the
Second Circuit, it might well have been inclined to agree that Sherrill’s broad language bars
the Cayugas from asserting any sovereign authority involving the recently-purchased
parcels, including sovereign immunity from suit. See, Sherrill, 125 S.Ct. at 1483 (“[T]he
tribe cannot unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the parcels
at issue.”). On this point, the Court finds one of Plaintiff’s statements at oral argument to
be particularly interesting. Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that the Tribe does not
11
claim to have sovereign immunity against tax foreclosure proceedings on all real property
that it owns, regardless of location, but instead, only claims such immunity with regard to
its property within the geographic boundary of the Cayuga Reservation as established by
the Treaty of Canandaigua. In other words, Plaintiff maintains that it has sovereign
immunity from suit as to foreclosure actions against properties within the Reservation,
which it maintains has never been disestablished, but not as to properties outside the
Reservation.5 This argument seems to admit that the Cayugas’ ability to claim sovereign
immunity from suit is inherently tied to its ability to exercise at least some amount of
sovereign authority over the land. This position, though, does not appear helpful to
Plaintiff, since, according to Sherrill, the Cayugas cannot assert any sovereign authority
over the recently-purchased land, “in whole or in part,” due to equitable considerations,
even though it may lie within the Reservation.
Accordingly, there is some persuasive force to Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff
cannot assert sovereign immunity from suit involving the subject properties, based upon
the same practical and equitable considerations that drove the Sherrill decision. However,
for the reasons stated above, the Court will follow the Second Circuit’s ruling in Oneida,
which, although technically without effect after being vacated, clearly rejects Defendant’s
argument.
5
On this point, Plaintiff curiously seems to claim less sovereign immunity from suit than it could have,
pursuant to Oneida, since in that case, the Second Circuit indicated that sovereign immunity from suit applied
even to foreclosure actions involving property that was never part of an Indian reservation. See, Oneida, 605
F.3d at 163 (“[A]n Indian tribe can purchase land (including land that was never part of a reservation); refuse
to pay lawfully-owed taxes; and suffer no consequences because the taxing authority cannot sue to collect
the taxes owed.”) (emphasis added) (Cabranes, J., concurring opinion). Plaintiff ‘s position also seems
inconsistent with the statement in Oneida that the doctrines of tribal sovereign authority over tribal land and
sovereign immunity from suit are entirely distinct.
12
Defendant nevertheless argues that the Second Circuit’s Oneida decision is
erroneous because it failed to consider that the subject foreclosure actions are in rem
proceedings, to which, Defendant argues, tribal sovereign immunity from suit does not
apply. However, in the district court decision that was on appeal in Oneida, Judge Hurd
expressly rejected the same argument by Madison County, that tribal sovereign immunity
from suit did not apply to in rem foreclosure actions: “The County cannot circumvent Tribal
sovereign immunity by characterizing the suit as in rem, when it is, in actuality, a suit to
take the tribe's property.” Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County, 401
F.Supp.2d 219, 229 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). On appeal to the Second Circuit, the county
defendants again argued that the Oneidas’ tribal immunity from suit did not apply in an in
rem tax foreclosure proceeding. See, Brief and Special Appendix for DefendantsCounterclaimants-Appellants, 2007 WL 6432637 at pp. 58 (“Yakima and other cases make
it clear that any sovereignty possessed by a tribe qua tribe is irrelevant in an in rem tax
foreclosure proceeding.”) & 60 (“It is clear from Sherrill and Yakima that different standards
govern Indian claims of sovereign immunity, depending on whether there is a claim against
the tribe itself, or a claim against land owned by the tribe that is not sovereign Indian
country. This central distinction is rooted in the limited nature of an in rem action, which
looks only to the property for relief.”) (footnote omitted).
As already discussed, though, the Second Circuit disagreed with the Counties’
arguments, and specifically found that the foreclosure actions were barred by the doctrine
of tribal sovereign immunity from suit. See, Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison
County and Oneida County, 605 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2010). Although the Panel did not
13
discuss Defendant’s argument about in rem proceedings in the decision, it obviously
considered and rejected it. Accordingly, the Court need not revisit that issue.
To the extent that Defendant’s argument on this point relies upon the Supreme
Court’s decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S.Ct 683 (1992), the Court disagrees that the case stands for
the proposition that tribal sovereign immunity from suit is inapplicable to in rem
proceedings. Yakima involved the State of Washington’s ability to tax certain “fee patent”
parcels of land, located within the Yakima Reservation, that had become alienable under
the General Allotment Act. Yakima’s use of the terms in rem and in personam pertained
to the difference between the imposition, not collection, of taxes on a piece of land, as
opposed to an individual. The Supreme Court concluded that Yakima County had the
power to impose an ad valorem tax on the land, pursuant to an express grant from
Congress, but not the ability to impose an excise tax on sellers of the land. Admittedly,
the Yakima decision did refer in passing to the “power to assess and collect a tax on
certain real estate.” Id., 112 S.Ct. at 692 (emphasis added). However, that statement
appears to be dicta, since the Yakima decision did not involve tribal sovereign immunity
from suit.
Defendant next contends that the Cayuga Nation waived any sovereign immunity
from suit to which it may be entitled, by paying taxes on some properties. However, a
waiver of tribal sovereign immunity must be “clear.” Oklahoma Tax Com'n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 909 (1991)
(“Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver
14
by the tribe or congressional abrogation.”) (citation omitted). The Cayugas’ payment of
taxes on certain parcels of property does not amount to such a waiver.
Finally, Defendant argues that the Cayugas should be estopped from claiming
sovereign immunity from suit, since, in a separate action before the New York Court of
Appeals, they indicated that they were paying property taxes on their lands. See, Cayuga
Indian Nation of New York v. Gould, 14 N.Y.3d at 642, n. 11 (“The Cayuga Indian Nation
acknowledges its obligation to pay real property taxes and comply with local zoning and
land use laws on these parcels and it is undisputed that the Nation has, to date, fulfilled
those obligations.”). However, that language from the Gould decision referred specifically
to the two “convenience store properties,” one in Cayuga County and one in Seneca
County, that were the subject of that decision, not to all tribe-owned parcels that had been
purchased on the open market. Accordingly, the Cayugas are not estopped from claiming
sovereign immunity from suit merely because they acknowledged that they were paying
taxes on parcels unrelated to this action.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the
subject foreclosure actions are barred by the Tribe’s sovereign immunity from suit, and that
it is therefore entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s application for preliminary injunctive relief [#4] is granted.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
August 20, 2012
Rochester, New York
/s/ Charles J. Siragusa
CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA
United States District Judge
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