Rodas v. Town of Farmington

Filing 20

-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP- DECISION AND ORDER granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety with prejudice. (Clerk to close case.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 1/16/13. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________________
STEPHEN C. RODAS,

v.

DECISION
and ORDER

TOWN OF FARMINGTON,

11-CV-6095T

Plaintiff,

Defendant.
______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff
pursuant

to

Stephen
Title

Rodas,

VII

of

(“Rodas”),
the

Civil

brings
Rights

this
Act

of

action
1964

(“Title VII”), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq.), the
New York State Human Rights Law, and 42 U.S.C. § 19831 against his
employer Town of Farmington, (“Farmington” or “the Town”) claiming
that he was retaliated against for complaining of discrimination
based upon sex. Specifically, Rodas claims that after he complained
to his supervisor of discriminatory treatment, he was subjected to
retaliatory behavior.
Defendant denies plaintiff’s allegations and moves for summary
judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Complaint on grounds that plaintiff
has failed to state a prima facie case of retaliation.

Defendant

claims that Rodas cannot establish that he engaged in any protected
activity prior

to

filing

a

charge

with the

Equal

Employment

Opportunity Commission, that he suffered any retaliatory conduct
1

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege any facts supporting
a claim under this section, and therefore, I find that Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

whatsoever, or that any alleged retaliatory conduct by the Town was
causally connected to Rodas’s protected activity.

For the reasons

set forth below, I grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment
and dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Stephen Rodas is a full-time employee of the Town of
Farmington as a Maintenance Assistant for the Town’s Water and
Sewer Department.

Plaintiff claims that because he complained to

the Town and filed a charge of harassment with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, he was retaliated against, inter alia, by
having Town-owned work tools removed from the Town-owned truck
which he used, by being assigned a labor intensive job, and by
having

his

firearm

confiscated

by

Ontario

County

Sheriff’s

deputies.
Rodas has been employed by the Town since 1996 and has worked
as a Water and Sewer Maintenance Assistant since 1998. Affidavit of
Jim Crane at ¶ 11, 12.2

In the performance of this job, Rodas was

supervised by Jim Crane, the Superintendent of the District.
Affidavit of Jim Crane at ¶ 12; see also Deposition Transcript of

2

This Court notes that Plaintiff does not dispute a vast
majority of the material facts as set forth by the Town. Of 104
material facts submitted by the Town, Plaintiff takes issue with
only 19. Fifteen of those disputed facts concern whether or not
the Town investigated Plaintiff’s complaints, which for the case
at hand is irrelevant, since Plaintiff’s claims are not premised
on any alleged failure to investigate his complaints, but rather
whether he was retaliated against for making them. Of all the
material facts cited herein, none were disputed by Plaintiff.
Page -2-

Stephen

Rodas

at

p.

27.

As

a

Water

and

Sewer

Maintenance

Assistant, Rodas’s job description included, among other things:
installation,

maintenance

hydrants

associated

and

and

repair

of

infrastructure;

water
the

mains,

gates,

investigation

of

complaints concerning water and sewer operation or use; and the
maintenance

of

records

and

reporting

of

water

and

sewer

infrastructure concerns to his supervisor. Affidavit of Jim Crane
at ¶ 11; see also Exhibit G (Job description for a Water and
Wastewater Maintenance Assistant) attached to Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment.
Rodas’s assignments were determined by Superintendent Crane,
who retained the discretion to allocate the District’s resources
and labor to various functions and projects. Affidavit of Jim Crane
at ¶ 5-6.

His assignments would periodically vary based upon the

needs of the District and factors such as the weather, season, and
budget. Affidavit of Jim Crane at ¶ 5-6. Some assignments required
Rodas to operate heavy machinery and vehicles belonging to the
Town. Affidavit of Jim Crane at ¶ 11.

Additionally, if tools were

needed in the maintenance of his job assignments, Rodas simply had
to request that Superintendent Crane provide them. Deposition
Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 125.
In

the

instant

case,

Rodas

has

asserted

that

he

made

complaints about a number of incidents that he characterized as
sexual harassment. Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 34-

Page -3-

42, 65-70.

Among these incidents, Rodas cited a cartoon that

briefly hung in a common area of the Sewer Plant depicting two men,
one of whom was characterized as the Plaintiff, with the words,
“you want to make out.” Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at
p. 36-40.

Rodas admitted that in the absence of the words, “you

want to make out,” the cartoon would not be considered offensive.
Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 39.

Rodas also

claimed that the appearance of the words “Steve’s gay” written in
the dirt on a Town fuel tank was an act of sexual harassment.
Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 43-44.
Rodas alleges that he verbally complained to Superintendent
Crane about the existence of the cartoon and the writing on the
fuel

tank

in

September

2009

and

January

2010,

respectively.

Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 38-40, 42-45.

Rodas

also mailed a letter dated February 9, 2010 to Town Supervisor Ted
Fafinski and members of the Town Board, stating that he had
complained to Superintendent Crane in September 2009 and January
2010, about the aforementioned cartoon and writing in the dirt on
the fuel tank. Exhibit Q (Written complaint by Plaintiff to Ted
Fafinski) to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

The letter

also raised a number of issues unrelated to sexual harassment
including that Rodas was not issued a Town cell phone, that Rodas
had not been invited to the “water department clam bake,” and that

Page -4-

Rodas had been subjected to slander. See Exhibit Q to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Rodas also submitted written complaints to the Town in the
form of two charges of retaliation filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission on April 23, 2010 and in June 2010. See
Exhibit R (Plaintiff’s charge of retaliation filed with the EEOC)
to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; see also Deposition
Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 54.
Rodas alleges a series of retaliatory actions by the Town
based upon his purported verbal complaints to Superintendent Crane
in September 2009 and January 2010.

See Deposition Transcript of

Stephen Rodas; Exhibit V (Plaintiff’s Complaint) to Defendants’
Motion for
Responses

Summary
to

Judgment

Defendant’s

at

¶

First

16;
Set

Exhibit
of

W

(Plaintiff’s

Interrogatories)

to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 7-11.
Rodas alleges that in March 2010, the Town retaliated against
him for his complaints by removing some tools from the truck that
he typically used in the performance of one of his assignments.
Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 120-21.

The tools in

question were typically stored in a different truck other than the
one that Rodas was using. Affidavit of Jim Crane at ¶ 39-41.

Rodas

had “accumulated [them] through time” in the truck he typically
used, although they were not his personal tools. Affidavit of Jim

Page -5-

Crane at ¶ 40;

Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 122-

23.
Rodas

alleges

that

he

was

reassigned

to

fire

hydrant

maintenance duties in April 2010 in retaliation for his complaints.
Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 71.

Rodas admitted

that these duties could fall within his job description, that he
knew of other District employees who had done the same work in the
past, and that the maintenance was necessary work. Deposition
Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 80-84.

Rodas stated that he had

a problem with the reassignment because of “the knowledge that [he]
had in construction,” although he admitted that he had no such
distaste for his other assignments, most of which did not involve
construction or heavy equipment.

Deposition Transcript of Stephen

Rodas at p. 88, 90-91, 93-94.
Rodas also alleges that in May 2010, the Town retaliated
against

him

when

the

Ontario

County

Sheriff’s

Department

confiscated his pistol and revoked his pistol permit. See Exhibit V
to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at ¶¶ 20-26; Exhibit W
to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 8-9.

Rodas concedes

that his permit was revoked as the result of hearings conducted by
a judge at the Ontario County Courthouse and that no individual
from the Town was involved in the hearings. Deposition Transcript
of Stephen Rodas at p. 98-99, 112-13.

Rodas also admitted at his

deposition that his pistols were physically confiscated by the

Page -6-

Ontario County Sheriff’s Department (not the Town), that the
confiscation of his pistols and revocation of his permit was never
discussed with him by any Town official, and that neither had any
effect on his job. Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at
p. 115-20.

Additionally, Rodas alleges that the denial of several

of his Freedom of Information requests made to the Ontario County
Sheriff’s

Department

in

connection

revocation, was retaliatory.

with

the

pistol

permit

Deposition Transcript of Stephen

Rodas at p. 158-59.
Rodas alleges that the Town also retaliated against him by
excluding him from what he characterized as a heavy-equipment
“rodeo” or a “fun day” that took place on September 16, 2010,
shortly after he returned to work from medical leave. Deposition
Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 127-30. He also alleges that the
display of pictures from this event in the Town break room was
retaliatory. Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 127-30,
141-44.

This event was a trade show-style event that permitted

some District employees to inspect and operate different pieces of
heavy machinery associated with the water industry, but it was not
a training event. See

Affidavit of Jim Crane at ¶ 49; Deposition

Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 129.

With regard to the picture

of the event that Rodas claims was hung in the workplace as a
measure of retaliation, Rodas admits that he has no idea who posted
the picture, and he admits that he was not referred to in the

Page -7-

picture,

stating

only

that

the

presence

of

the

picture

was

offensive to him. Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 14344.
Plaintiff also alleges that his January 31, 2011 suspension
without pay was retaliation for his complaints to the Town.

On

January 31, 2011, the Ontario County Sheriff’s Department was
called to the Sewer Plant after an employee reported that Rodas had
called her and had spoken to her in an intimidating manner.
Affidavit of Jim Crane at ¶ 21.

A police report was made, and

Superintendent Crane escorted Rodas off the premises, suspending
him with pay pending the outcome of the investigation. See Exhibit
L (Police Report by Deputy Drake, dated January 31, 2011) to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Affidavit of Jim Crane at
¶ 22.

Rodas concedes that he was never disciplined for his

conversation with the employee and that during his period of
suspension, he never suffered the loss of any wages. Deposition
Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 149, 152.
Rodas alleges that in retaliation for his complaints, he was
not assigned to work on water main breaks in March and November
2011. Exhibit W to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 1011. Rodas concedes that he was engaged in other assignments at the
time and that his wages were not affected.
of Stephen Rodas at p. 131-37.

Page -8-

Deposition Transcript

Rodas also alleges that he had been subject to retaliation for
his complaints by the appearance of a machete in a windowsill of
the employee break room at the Sewer Plant.
of Stephen Rodas at p. 155.

Deposition Transcript

Rodas testified that he did not know

who owned the machete, nor who had placed it in the windowsill, or
why the machete had been placed there.
Stephen Rodas at p. 155-56.
mention

the

presence

of

Deposition Transcript of

Rodas also testified that he did not
the

machete

to

anyone.

Deposition

Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 156-57.
Finally, Rodas alleges that in retaliation for the complaints
he made in 2010, he had received “little to no overtime” since
2003, a period nearly seven years before his alleged protected
activity.

Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 161-62.

Despite all of his allegations of retaliation, Rodas admitted
that

he

had

not

lost

discrimination complaints.

any

wages

in

retaliation

for

his

Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas

at p. 162. In fact, since his complaints, his pay had increased, he
was never disciplined or subject to an administrative hearing, and
he remained in the same job position without any loss of benefits.
Deposition Transcript of Stephen Rodas at p. 160-61.
DISCUSSION
I.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the

Page -9-

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant

is

entitled

to

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law."

When

considering a motion for summary judgment, all genuinely disputed
facts must be resolved in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

If, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, the court finds that no rational jury could
find in favor of that party, a grant of summary judgment is
appropriate.
Industrial

Co.

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (citing Matsushita Elec.
v.

Zenith

Radio

Corp.,

475

U.S.

574,

586-587

(1986)).
II.

Plaintiff has failed to establish a Prima Facie Case of
Retaliation
Plaintiff

claims

that

he

was

retaliated

against

by

the

defendant for complaining of gender discrimination. He claims that
after he complained of a hostile work environment based on sex,
tools were removed from his work truck and that he was assigned to
what he believed was demeaning and labor-intensive work, that he
had his personal firearm confiscated from him and his pistol permit
revoked, that he was not invited to a heavy equipment “rodeo,” and
that he was suspended with pay pending an investigation concerning
a reported dispute with a co-employee.
To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) participation in a protected activity known to the defendant;
Page -10-

(2) an employment action disadvantaging the plaintiff or action
that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination; and (3) a causal connection between the
protected activity and adverse action. Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railway Co. V. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); Holt v. KMIContinental, 95 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 1997 WL
71191 (May 19, 1997); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1308
(2nd Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

Should the plaintiff state a

claim for retaliation, the defendant may then articulate a nondiscriminatory, legitimate reason for taking the action complained
of, and then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
employer’s articulated reason is both untrue and a pretext for the
true retaliatory motive. Id.
A.

Plaintiff has failed to allege that he engaged in a
protected activity under Title VII, prior to filing a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
in April 2010.

Title VII prohibits retaliation by an employer against an
employee in cases where the employee has engaged in protected
activity under the statute. “Protected activity” includes opposing
employment practices that are prohibited under Title VII (such as
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin), or making a charge of discrimination, or participating in
any investigation, proceeding, or hearing arising under Title VII.
42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). See also, Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202
F.3d 560, 566 (2nd Cir., 2000)(“The term ‘protected activity’
Page -11-

refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited
discrimination.”)

Specifically, Title VII provides that:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees . . . because [the employee] has
opposed
any
practice
made
an
unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a).
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to establish that he
engaged in a protected activity under Title VII, until he filed a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April
23, 2010.

Although plaintiff claims that he complained to his

supervisor, Jim Crane, in September 2009 about an offensive cartoon
that was allegedly placed in full view near the employee time clock
and that in January 2010 about the words “Steve’s Gay” written in
the dirt accumulated on the town fuel tank, neither of these
complaints suggest that the plaintiff complained of discrimination
based upon his sex(or upon any other protected characteristic under
Title VII). The same is also true of plaintiff’s written complaint
to Ted Fafinski in February 2010 that summarized all of his alleged
prior discriminatory complaints.
Although a plaintiff need not explicitly allege a violation of
Title VII in making a complaint about working conditions to be
considered protected activity, (See Kelley, 520 F.Supp.2d at 403

Page -12-

(employee not required to use “legal terms or buzzwords” when
complaining of discrimination)) the plaintiff must complain of
discrimination in sufficiently specific terms to put the employer
on

notice

that

the

plaintiff

believes

he

or

she

is

being

discriminated against on the basis of race, gender, national
origin,

or

any

other

characteristic

protected

by

Title

VII.

International Healthcare Exchange, Inc., 470 F.Supp.2d at 357.
Participation

in

a

protected

activity

occurs

only

where

the

plaintiff has a “good faith, reasonable belief that he was opposing
an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII.” Kessler v.
Westchester County Dep’t of Social Services, 461 F.3d 199, 210
(2d Cir. 2006) (quoting McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279
(2d Cir. 2001)).
As a matter of law, a reasonable, objective belief that an
employee is complaining of sex discrimination cannot arise simply
because the behavior in question touches on the issue of sex.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998); see also
Dottolo v. Byrne Dairy, Inc., 2010 WL 2560551 (N.D.N.Y., June 22,
2010)(where the court found that the plaintiff could not have had
a good-faith and objectively reasonable belief that he had been
harassed where he had been subject to a single incident with sexual
overtones).
Here, Rodas claims that he complained of being sexually
harassed, however neither Rodas’s complaints to his supervisor, nor

Page -13-

his written complaint to the Town constitute protected activity.
At no time did Rodas allege that he was being treated differently
because he was a man, or that Crane treated him or other men
differently because of their gender.

Under an objective standard,

Rodas could not have had a good-faith, objectively reasonable
belief that he was opposing discrimination based upon his sex by
complaining about isolated incidents that (at best) had sexual
undertones. Abeln v. Ultra Life Batteries, 2009 WL 857497, at 1-3
(W.D.N.Y., Mar. 30, 2009)(Larimer, J.).
Absent a claim of unlawful discrimination, general complaints
about employment concerns do not constitute protected activity
under Title VII.
(D.C.Cir.,

See

Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232

2006)(employee

embarrassing,

humiliating

complaint
and

that

insulting

she

suffered

treatment

failed

from
to

establish that she engaged in protected activity where there was no
allegation that the treatment was motivated by a discriminatory
animus).
F.Supp.2d

See also, Ochei v. Coler/Goldwater Memorial Hosp., 450
275,

287

(plaintiff’s

general

complaints

about

her

working conditions did not constitute engaging in a protected
activity where plaintiff did not allege that she was a victim of
discrimination); McMillan v. Powell, 526 F.Supp.2d 51, 55 (D.D.C.,
2007)(employee’s

complaints

attitude

her

towards

was

regarding
not

supervisor’s

protected

activity

negative
where

the

complaints failed to allege that discrimination was the basis for

Page -14-

supervisor’s attitude); International Healthcare Exchange, Inc. v.
Global Healthcare Exchange, LLC, 470 F.Supp.2d 345, 357 (S.D.N.Y.,
2007)(to be considered protected activity, the employee’s complaint
must put the employer on notice that discrimination prohibited by
Title VII is occurring);

Holt v. Roadway Package Systems, Inc.,

506 F.Supp.2d 194, 206 (W.D.N.Y., 2007)(Larimer, J.)(employee’s
claim that supervisor was “out to get him” did not constitute
protected activity as complaint did not allege discriminatory
animus for supervisor’s actions).
It is uncontroverted that Plaintiff’s filing of a charge of
retaliation

with

the

Equal

Employment

Opportunity

Commission

constitutes a protected activity. See Defendant’s Reply Memorandum
of Law in Further Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2; see
also

Monroe

v.

Xerox

Corp.,

664

F.Supp.2d

235

(W.D.N.Y.

2009)(Siragusa, J.).
Because plaintiff has failed to establish that he engaged in
any protected activity with respect to his employment complaints,
plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
for any actions that took place before filing his charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in April 2010.
B.

Plaintiff has failed to establish that he was subjected
to an adverse employment action or actions which would
dissuade a similarly-situated reasonable employee from
making a charge of discrimination.

To state a prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination, in
addition to establishing that he or she engaged in protected
Page -15-

activity, a plaintiff must also establish that he or she suffered
an adverse employment action, or was subjected to action that would
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. V.

White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). In the instant case, plaintiff has
failed to establish that any adverse employment action was taken
against him or that any action that would dissuade a reasonable
employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination was
taken against him.
I find that the plaintiff has failed to establish that he
engaged in any protected activity with respect to his employment
complaints made in September of 2009 and January and February of
2010.

Even assuming that the plaintiff could establish that he

engaged in a protected activity, I find that for both the periods
before

and

after

his

Equal

Employment

Opportunity

Commission

charge, he has failed to establish that he was subjected to any
adverse employment action, or that he was subject to any act that
would dissuade

a

reasonable employee

from

making

a

claim of

discrimination, as a result of engaging in protected activity.
Here, numerous employment actions, bearing directly on the
case at hand, have been found as a matter of law not to rise to the
level of “adversity” required for a retaliation claim. Generally
speaking, ostracism, “shunning,” or the exclusion of an employee
from non-essential office functions, cannot rise to the level of

Page -16-

“material adversity” required by Burlington. See Davis v. Verizon
Wireless,

389

F.Supp.2d

458,

478

(W.D.N.Y.

2005)(Larimer,

J.)(“Menacing looks, name calling, or being shunned by coworkers
does

not

constitute

an

adverse

employment

action.

Nor

does

exclusion from meetings); see also Mabry v. Neighborhood Defender
Service, 769 F.Supp.2d 381, 399(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (exclusion from
management meetings); Chan v. NYU Downtown Hosp., 2006 WL 345853,
at **8-9 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 14, 2006) (exclusion from meetings and
office “social events”).
The Southern District of New York has held that contacting the
police in response to an employee’s actions is not an adverse
employment

action,

even

if

it

may

cause

a

plaintiff

“embarrassment.” Uddin v. City of New York, 2009 WL 2496270, at *17
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 13, 2009). Additionally, suspension of an employee
with pay pending an investigation, without more, does not amount to
an adverse action. See Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90-91
(2d Cir. 2006) (collecting similar Circuit Courts of Appeals
holdings);

Brown

v.

City

of

Syracuse,

673

F.3d

141,

150-51

(2d Cir.2012).
The Plaintiff has failed to allege that any adverse employment
action was taken against him at any time.

He has failed to allege

that he was transferred, demoted, fired, or that his pay or any
benefits were reduced in any way.
that

plaintiff

complains

of,

Moreover, several of the acts
including

Page -17-

denial

of

overtime

opportunities, occurred prior to his complaints, and therefore
cannot be construed as retaliatory actions.

For the remaining

claims, Plaintiff fails to raise any issues of fact as to the
absence of any injury resulting from the actions. This is true for
the removal of the town-owned tools, the reassignment to hydrant
duty (a duty found within his job description), the confiscation of
his pistol permit by a separate entity from the Town, his exclusion
from

the

heavy

equipment

“fun

day,”

his

January

31,

2011

suspension, his exclusion from working on water main breaks, and
the appearance of a machete in the windowsill of an employee break
room.
Even

under

the

broad

standard

in

Burlington,

the

acts

complained of here are not “adverse,” and therefore, Rodas cannot
premise a prima facie claim of retaliation on them.
III. State Law Claims
Claims

brought

under

the

New

York

Human Rights

Law

are

analytically identical to claims brought under Title VII. Van Zant
v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708 (2nd Cir. 1996).

See

Haywood v. Heritage Christian Home, Inc., 977 F.Supp. 611, 613
(W.D.N.Y. 1997)(Larimer, C.J.)(Noting that both claims are governed
by McDonnell Douglas standard.).
stated

above,

I

hereby

grant

Accordingly, for the reasons
defendant’s

motion

to

dismiss

plaintiff’s state law retaliatory discrimination claims under the
New York Human Rights Law.

Page -18-

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I grant defendant’s motion
for summary judgment and dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint in its
entirety with prejudice.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
_____________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
DATED:

January 16, 2013
Rochester, New York

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