Wentworth et al v. Central School District et al
Filing
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ORDER granting defendants' motions to dismiss 11 12 and dismissing the complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. ***CLERK TO FOLLOW UP. Signed by Hon. David G. Larimer on 9/18/12. (EMA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________________
T.W. Individually and as Parents on behalf of
H.W. also known as Todd Wentworth,
P.W. also known as Pamela Wentworth,
Plaintiffs,
DECISION AND ORDER
11-CV-6362L
v.
SPENCERPORT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
SPENCERPORT CSD BOARD OF EDUCATION,
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendants.
________________________________________________
This action is brought by plaintiffs on behalf of their infant daughter, H.W., and asserts
claims pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq.
(“IDEA”), several other federal statutes, and the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law
§§290 et seq. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants, the Spencerport Central School District, the
District’s Board of Education (collectively the “District”), and the New York State Department of
Education (“NYSED”), failed to provide H.W. with a free appropriate public education. Both
NYSED (Dkt. #11) and the District defendants (Dkt. #12) have moved to dismiss the action pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6).
For the reasons that follow, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted, and the complaint
is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are the parents of H.W., a student who attended school in the District from the fall
of 2004 through the spring of 2009. H.W. was classified by the District’s Committee on Special
Education as a student with a disability for purposes of the IDEA, due to her diagnosis of PraderWilli Syndrome, a rare disorder associated with a variety of physical and cognitive symptoms,
including learning and attention difficulties. In September 2009, plaintiffs unilaterally removed
H.W. from the District and enrolled her at Hope Hall School, a private institution.
Plaintiffs thereafter requested tuition reimbursement from the District. Following a due
process hearing, the impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) found that the District had offered a free
appropriate public education for H.W., and denied plaintiffs’ tuition reimbursement request.
The IHO’s decision was issued and served by mail on the plaintiffs on November 20, 2010.
Thus, any appeal of the IHO’s decision by a State Review Officer (“SRO”) was required to be served
on the District or before December 29, 2010 (the 35-day statute of limitations under 8 N.Y.C.R.R.
§279.2(b), plus four days to account for service by mail).
At some point thereafter, plaintiffs’ counsel apparently concluded that plaintiffs would be
unable to timely serve the appeal, as she contacted the District’s counsel to request whether it would
consent to plaintiffs’ untimely service of the petition, if it was served on or before January 11, 2011.
(Because the applicable regulations do not provide a mechanism for appellants to request an
extension of time from the SRO to file their petition, the District’s “consent” for plaintiffs to file an
untimely petition presumably meant that the District was agreeing not to thereafter oppose the
petition on untimeliness grounds). (Dkt. #15 at ¶¶ 4, 5). The District assented.
On or about January 10, 2011, plaintiffs’ counsel asked the District to consent to untimely
service of the petition until January 12, 2011. This time, the District declined. Plaintiffs ultimately
did not serve the District with the petition until January 25, 2011, 66 days after the IHO’s decision
was issued, and 27 days after the December 29, 2010 appeal deadline had expired.
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On March 23, 2011, a SRO dismissed plaintiffs’ appeal sua sponte as untimely, and in excess
of the applicable page limitations. In so doing, the SRO concluded that plaintiffs’ proffered reasons
for the late filing of the petition –a holiday vacation and relocation of plaintiffs’ counsel’s solo
practice during the period between December 17, 2010 and January 3, 2011 – did not constitute
“good cause” for the late filing, and declined to excuse its untimeliness. (Dkt. #1 at Exh. 2, Dkt.
#15-1).
Plaintiffs now bring this action on H.W.’s behalf, alleging that they have sustained economic
injuries in their efforts to secure an appropriate education for H.W. The defendants have separately
moved (Dkt. #11, #12) to dismiss the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), primarily on the
grounds that plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. For the reasons that follow,
those motions are granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard for Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) Motion
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), the Court’s review is
limited to the complaint, and those documents attached to the complaint or incorporated therein by
reference. See Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Court must “accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-movant.” Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1994).
However, “a plaintiff’s obligation . . . requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007).
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II.
Plaintiffs’ Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
It is well settled that the “IDEA requires an aggrieved party to exhaust all administrative
remedies before bringing a civil action in federal [court] . . .” J.S. v. Attica Central Schools, 386
F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)). In order to exhaust their administrative
remedies, plaintiffs are required to first seek review by an IHO, and then appeal the IHO’s decision
to the SRO. See N.Y.C.R.R. §200.5; Kelly v. Saratoga Springs City Sch. Dist., 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88412 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). A party’s failure to bring a timely appeal renders the IHO’s
decision final. Id. at *10.
No statutory means is provided by which appellants may seek or be granted an extension of
time by the SRO to serve a petition outside of the 35-day limitation period. However, the SRO may,
in his discretion, choose to excuse the untimeliness of a late-filed appeal, upon a showing of good
cause. See 8. N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 179.2(b), 279.13. A party whose appeal is dismissed as untimely will
be deemed to have failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies, and the courts will be
deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. See Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of the Newburgh
Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 2002).
As such, the Court’s review of this matter is initially confined to whether the SRO’s
dismissal of plaintiffs’ untimely appeal was proper. Where an appeal to the SRO has been dismissed
as untimely, the SRO’s decision must be upheld unless it is arbitrary and capricious. See Kelly, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88412 at *11-*12; Grenon v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 91450 at *13 (N.D.N.Y. 2006). In considering whether the decision was arbitrary and
capricious, the Court “must determine whether the agency’s decision was based on a consideration
of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” State of New York
Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 485, 492 (2d Cir. 1994).
Here, plaintiffs do not dispute that their appeal to the SRO was filed 66 days after the
deadline to do so, or that at 67 pages in length, their petition exceeded the applicable 20-page limit.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs contend that the SRO’s refusal to accept their petition was “arbitrary and
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capricious,” because the SRO failed to explain in detail why the plaintiffs’ proffered reasons did not
constitute good cause, and/or because the SRO is generally biased in favor of school districts and
against parents with respect to the acceptance of late filings.
Upon review of the pleadings and submissions on this motion, I find that plaintiffs have
failed to show that the SRO acted improperly in exercising his discretion to deny plaintiffs’ request
to excuse the untimeliness of their petition, sua sponte. Generally, “[g]ood cause for late filing
would be something like postal service error, or in other words, an event that the filing party had no
control over.” Grenon, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91450 at *15-*16. Here, the SRO set forth relevant
case law wherein good cause was not found (e.g., attorney error or computer difficulties do not
comprise good cause), and concluded that the events alleged to have precipitated the plaintiffs’
untimely filing – the temporary closure of plaintiffs’ counsel’s office for the holidays and/or for a
contemporaneous relocation to her home, which commenced mid-way through the limitations period
– did not satisfy the good cause standard. While the plaintiffs are correct that the SRO did not
provide an in-depth discussion of why conflicting obligations largely within the scheduling control
of their counsel did not comprise “good cause” for their untimely filing, the SRO’s decision appears
to have considered the pertinent factors and cited appropriate law with regard to them. His finding
that “a scheduled vacation and other commitments” (Dkt. #1-2) did not constitute good cause for
plaintiffs’ 66-days-overdue appeal did not require a more detailed explanation, and I find no error
of law or fact in his determination.
Indeed, it is apparent that at all times, plaintiffs’ counsel was fully aware of the applicable
time limitations (which were explicitly set forth in documentation provided with the IHO’s decision),
that the scheduling difficulties she encountered were largely within her control, and that an
examination of pertinent SRO decisions would have informed her that delays due to scheduling
difficulties or lack of availability on the part of parties or counsel are not typically found to be “good
cause” for untimely petitions. See e.g., Application of a Child with a Disability 04-103 (N.Y. State
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Educ. Dep’t January 5, 2005); Application of a Child with a Disability, App. No. 05-048 (N.Y. State
Educ. Dep’t June 17, 2005).
In light of these circumstances, the SRO’s determination that plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate “good cause” for their substantial delay in appealing the IHO’s decision, and in the
alternative, that plaintiffs’ 67-page submission was properly rejected as failing to comply with the
applicable 20-page limit, cannot be said to be arbitrary or capricious. See generally 8 N.Y.C.R.R.
§279.8(a)(petition shall not exceed 20 pages in length, and non-compliant petitions “may be rejected
in the sole discretion of the State Review Officer”); 8 N.Y.C.R.R. §279.13 (SRO may dismiss a late
petition sua sponte, of may, in his sole discretion, excuse a failure to timely serve or file a petition
for good cause shown).
Having concluded that the SRO’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ appeal was not arbitrary and
capricious, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ IDEA claims, as well as
plaintiffs’ claims under other federal statutes – all of which I find could have been remedied through
resolution of their IDEA claims – and those claims are dismissed. See generally Cave v. E. Meadow
Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 245-246 (2d Cir. 2008) (federal claims under other statutes
seeking relief available under the IDEA are subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements); Polera,
288 F.3d 478 at 483 (same); Fennell v. Cortines, 69 F.3d 687, 688 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); MC v.
Arlington Central Sch. Dist., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103064 at *30 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same).
To the extent that plaintiffs purport to allege distinct bias claims against the NYSED based
on statistical evidence, and/or argue that the SRO’s decision should be subjected to a more rigorous
standard of review because it was tainted by bias, they have failed to plead a statutory basis for
pursuing such claims, or to allege facts that would render their bias allegations plausible. Indeed,
similarly-unsupported bias claims have been consistently and repeatedly dismissed by district courts
in this Circuit. See e.g., H.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free Sch. Dist., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97870 at *53 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (collecting cases dismissing SRO bias claims based on speculation
and/or statistical evidence, and noting that such claims “have been rejected repeatedly in this
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district”); R.E. & M.E. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 785 F. Supp. 2d 28, 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(dismissing bias allegation based on statistical analysis of SRO decision). See generally United
States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[i]t seems evident that
statistics alone, no matter how computed, cannot establish extrajudicial bias. There is no authority
for, and no logic in, assuming that either party to a litigation is entitled to a certain percentage of
favorable decisions. The inquiry to be at all meaningful would necessarily require this court to
examine each and every ruling to determine whether it was, initially, legally valid. If we determined
that some adverse rulings were correctly made, obviously they could not be tainted by bias. Even
if they were deemed to be incorrect, it of course does not follow that they were motivated by personal
bias”).
Finally, I observe that plaintiffs’ mere allegation that administrative bias and inexpediency
made the entire “administrative hearing process . . . an exercise in futility” (Dkt. #1 at ¶¶2, 31) is an
insufficient basis to excuse their failure to exhaust their administrative remedies on the grounds of
futility. Again, plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the SRO harbored any unlawful bias, or that
the SRO lacked the authority or ability to grant the relief they sought. See Heldman v. Sobol, 962
F.2d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1992) (exhaustion of administrative remedies will be excused as futile only
where: (1) the agency was acting in violation of the law; or (2) the agency was unable to remedy the
alleged injury). See generally B.J.S. v. State Educ. Dep’t, 815 F. Supp. 2d 601, 613 (W.D.N.Y.
2011). Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief, both in their appeal to the SRO and in the instant complaint, is
specific to the agency proceedings concerning their daughter, seeks no redress on behalf of others,
and does not purport to address or rectify “systemic issues.” See e.g., Handberry v. Thompson, 446
F.3d 335, 343-344 (2d Cir. 2006). I therefore find that plaintiffs have failed to show that the
exhaustion of their administrative remedies would have been futile.
Having dismissed all of plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction
over plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367. I have considered the remainder of
plaintiffs’ arguments, and find them to be without merit.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies, or to plausibly allege that such exhaustion would have been futile, and
have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants’ motions to dismiss
the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. #11, #12) are granted, and the
complaint is dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________________
DAVID G. LARIMER
United States District Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
September 18, 2012.
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