Young v. Graham
Filing
9
DECISION AND ORDER denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the petition. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 7/9/12. (JMC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________
MATTHEW YOUNG,
DECISION AND ORDER
No. 6:11-CV-6481(MAT)
Petitioner,
-vsHAROLD D. GRAHAM, Superintendent,
Respondent.
_______________________________
Matthew Young (“Young” or “Petitioner”), proceeding pro se,
has filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that he is being held in state custody
in violation of his federal constitutional rights. Petitioner’s
state custody arises from a judgment of conviction entered on
September 25, 2007 in Wayne County Court of the New York State,
convicting him, after a jury trial, of two counts of Assault in the
First Degree (N.Y. Penal Law (“P.L.”) § 120.10(1), (2)), and one
count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree (P.L.
§ 265.02(1)).
II.
Factual Background and Procedural History
The convictions here at issue stem from an incident that
occurred on January 12, 2007, at the Déjà Vu bar in Ontario,
New York, in which Petitioner beat Christopher Crouch (“Crouch”)
about the head and shoulders with a pool cue so hard that the stick
snapped into three pieces. One eyewitness described Crouch as
“mangled”
and
was
only
able
to
-1-
identify
him
based
on
his
distinctive haircut. T.237.1 At the center of the dispute was
Petitioner’s girlfriend, Jennifer Peacock (“Peacock”).
Petitioner, accompanied by Peacock, was apprehended shortly
after the incident in his van by a police sergeant who had known
Petitioner for about ten years. When the sergeant asked him if he
had been involved in a fight, Petitioner replied, “‘Yeah. I was,’
and [Petitioner] said that he was out at the Déjà vu and some guy
was kissing his girlfriend.” T.400. Petitioner told the sergeant,
“I fucked him up.” Id. When the officer responded that the fight
could not have been too bad, Petitioner said, “no, it was like–I
fucked his face up good.” Id. On the ride back to the bar, the
officers allowed Petitioner to use his cell phone. They overheard
Petitioner say, “I beat the fuck out of him. I caught her making
out with a guy and I tattooed his ass. It is pretty bad. I am
probably
going
to
prison.”
T.599.
Petitioner
repeated
the
“tattooed” remark several times. T.599, 606. Once at the bar, the
troopers transferred Petitioner to Deputy Sheriff Baker, to whom
Petitioner said, “I am sorry but when I tap you on the shoulder and
ask you what the fuck, you tell me, fuck you, you deserve to get
tattooed.” T.566, 569.
Outside the back of the bar, Investigator Kuntz found a pool
of blood, a tooth lying in the blood, and two pieces of a pool cue
1
Numerals preceded by “T.__” refer to the transcript of Petitioner’s
trial.
-2-
in the snow. A third piece of the cue lay inside the bar. T.420-21,
424. Investigator Kuntz collected the pieces and sent the thickest
piece, which
appeared
to be
bloodied, to
the
laboratory.
No
fingerprints appeared on any of the pieces. T.432. Later that
morning, Investigator Kuntz sent Petitioner’s right sneaker to the
laboratory
for
testing.
T.439-44.
The
forensic
biologists
determined that the pool cue and Petitioner’s sneaker bore human
blood containing Crouch’s DNA. T.571-76, 584-92. To rebut this
evidence, the defense called former police officer Robert Dillman
who testified that if the cue in this matter were used in the
assault, fingerprints would have been left on it. T.619, 631.
The paramedics who treated Crouch’s injuries testified that
his face was swollen and he was bleeding heavily, his jaw did not
move
evenly,
and
his
forehead
protruded
over
his
eyebrows.
T.343-44. Crouch had sustained lacerations under his right eye and
on his upper lip as well as a one- to one and-one-half inch
circular contusion on his shoulder, which was consistent with a
strike from an object. T.347-49.
The craniofacial surgeon, Dr. Girotto, who treated Crouch
testified that Crouch had sustained multiple, severe fractures. His
right globe was badly damaged, his face was split, and his right
cheek bone was no longer attached to the skull base. T.468-80. To
a
reasonable
degree
of
medical
certainty,
the
injuries
were
consistent with a “high velocity blunt trauma” caused by multiple
-3-
blows from either a “pool cue, a baseball bat, or something
similar”. T.485-86, 488. Dr. Chung, the ophthalmologist who treated
Crouch, noted that his right eye was lacerated and so deformed that
he had lost sight in it. She determined that injuries must have
caused by “severe blunt trauma” from an object “such as a pool
cue”. T.541-46.
Crouch was in a medically induced coma for a week. When he
regained consciousness, he was dependent on a respirator and a
nasogastric feeding tube. T.406, 413-14. He was discharged after
two weeks but his fractured jaw remained wired shut for six weeks.
Crouch had lost a front tooth and was going to lose two more.
Crouch now has a prosthetic right eye, and no peripheral vision on
that side. T.415. At trial, Crouch testified that his upper jaw and
teeth were numb and that it hurt to lean on his face because of the
metal plates in his cheeks. T.416.
On July 26, 2007, the jury found Petitioner guilty of two
counts of first degree assault and one count of third degree
weapons possession, as charged in the indictment. T.716-17. On
September 25, 2007, the court sentenced Petitioner as a second
felony offender to determinate prison terms of twenty-two years,
plus five years of post-release supervision on each assault count,
and an indeterminate prison term of from three to seven and onehalf years on the weapons possession conviction.
-4-
On
December
30,
2009,
the
Appellate
Division,
Fourth
Department, of New York State Supreme Court, unanimously affirmed
Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. People v. Young, 68
A.D.3d 1761 (4th Dept. 2009). The New York Court of Appeals denied
leave to appeal. People v. Young, 15 N.Y.3d 780 (2010).
On September 14, 2011, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for a
writ of
error
coram
nobis.
Petitioner
did
not
challenge his
appellate counsel’s representation but instead argued that the
Appellate Division, in rejecting Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment
claims, deprived him of a fair appeal and of equal protection of
the laws. On November 10, 2011, the Appellate Division summarily
denied the motion.
This timely habeas petition followed in which Petitioner
raises the following grounds for relief: (1) he was denied a fair
appeal and equal protection because the Appellate Division rejected
his claim that the police illegally stopped his van; (2) improper
expert testimony was admitted in the grand jury; (3) the court’s
Sandoval2 ruling was improper; and (4) the evidence was legally
insufficient
petitioner
because
caused
the
Crouch’s
prosecution
injuries
failed
with
the
to
prove
pool
cue.
that
See
2
Prior to the start of trial, the trial court conducted a hearing
pursuant to People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371 (1974), to determine
whether the prosecutor would be permitted to impeach Petitioner’s
testimony with evidence of his prior criminal convictions and bad acts.
-5-
Petition, ¶ 12 (Grounds One through Four) (Dkt. #1). Respondent
opposed the petition. Petitioner did not file a traverse.
For the reasons that follow, the request for a writ of habeas
corpus is denied, and the petition is dismissed.
III. Discussion
A.
Denial of a Fair Trial Based Upon the Appellate
Division’s Ruling that the Police Properly Stopped His
Van
Petitioner argues, as he did in his coram nobis application,
that the Appellate Division deprived him of a fair appeal and equal
protection of the laws when it upheld the suppression court’s
ruling that the police legally stopped him and that the physical
evidence and Petitioner’s statements to the police were admissible.
Although Petitioner has couched his claim in terms of a fair
trial violation and a denial of equal protection, it essentially
raises a Fourth Amendment issue which is barred from habeas review
unless the state denied Petitioner a full and fair opportunity to
litigate that claim. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82
(1976); accord Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1992).
Such is not the case here. Petitioner fully availed himself of
New York’s corrective procedures for litigating Fourth Amendment
claims, presenting them to the trial court at a suppression hearing
and again on direct appeal. His mere disagreement with the outcome
of the litigation is an insufficient basis for circumventing the
doctrine of Stone v. Powell. See Capellan, 975 F.2d at 70; see also
-6-
Graham v. Costello,
299 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[O]nce it
is established that a petitioner has had an opportunity to litigate
his or her Fourth Amendment claim (whether or not he or she took
advantage of the state’s procedure), the court’s denial of the
claim is a conclusive determination that the claim will never
present a valid basis for federal habeas relief. . . . [T]he bar to
federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims is permanent and
incurable absent a showing that the state failed to provide a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the claim . . . .”).
Beyond arguing simply that the Appellate Division’s conclusion
was incorrect,
Petitioner
makes
no
attempt
to
show
that his
disagreement with the Appellate Division amounts to an equal
protection
violation.
The
Equal
Protection
Clause
requires
government actors to treat similarly situated persons alike. City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985). Here, Petitioner apparently proceeds under the “class of
one” theory, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000),
which requires him to show (1) that he has been treated differently
from others similarly situated, Demuria v. Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704,
707 (2d Cir. 2003); (2) that the conduct was “irrational and wholly
arbitrary”;
and
(3)
that
there
existed
intentional
disparate
treatment, Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 751 (2d Cir.
2001). Petitioner has not shown and cannot show any of the elements
-7-
required to state a prima facie claim under the Equal Protection
Clause.
B.
Improper Consideration of Expert Testimony by the Grand
Jury
Petitioner argues, as he did in the Appellate Division, that
an investigator improperly testified before the grand jury that one
of the pool cue pieces had blood on it. The Appellate Division held
in pertinent part that “the testimony concerning blood evidence was
not improper because even [l]ay witnesses are competent to identify
blood from its appearance[.]” People v. Young, 68 A.D.3d at 1762,
2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 09866, at **2 (internal citation omitted;
quotation and quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).
Even if there were error, which the Appellate Division did not find
to be the case, it was rendered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
by Young’s conviction by the petit jury at his trial. See Lopez v.
Riley, 865 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that “if federal grand
jury rights are not cognizable on direct appeal where rendered
harmless by a petit jury, similar claims concerning a state grand
jury proceedings are a fortiori foreclosed in a collateral attack
brought in a federal court”) (citation omitted).
C.
Erroneous Sandoval Ruling
Petitioner argues, as he did on direct appeal, that the trial
court’s Sandoval ruling was erroneous. The Appellate Division held
that the claim was unpreserved for appellate review and declined to
review it in the interests of justice. People v. Young, 68 A.D.3d
-8-
at 1762,
2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 09866, at **2 (citations omitted).
Respondent argues that the claim is procedurally defaulted pursuant
to the adequate and independent state ground doctrine and is, in
any event, not cognizable on habeas review.
The Court need not resolve the procedural default issue
because, as Respondent correctly notes, the Sandoval claim does not
present a constitutional question amenable to review on federal
habeas because Petitioner did not take the stand and testify at his
trial. See Oakes v. Conway, 10-CV-318, 2011 WL 3236201, at *6
(W.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011) (“Petitioner’s claim that the trial
court’s Sandoval ruling was improper is not cognizable on federal
habeas review because he did not testify at trial.”) (citing, inter
alia, Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1984) (holding
that trial court’s ruling on defendant’s in limine motion regarding
the admissibility of his prior convictions was not reviewable where
the defendant did not testify because “a reviewing court cannot
assume that the adverse ruling motivated a defendant’s decision not
to testify”); see also, e.g., Carroll v. Hoke, 695 F. Supp. 1435,
1439-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that Sandoval claim not cognizable
on federal habeas review where petitioner did not testify at
trial), aff’d mem., 880 F.2d 1318 (2d Cir. 1989).
D.
Legal Insufficiency of the Evidence
Petitioner claims that his conviction does not comport with
due process because the evidence was legally insufficient. On
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direct appeal, however, Petitioner contended that the verdict was
against the weight of the credible evidence and asked the Appellate
Division to exercise its statutory authority to review the factual
sufficiency of the evidence. Petitioner argued that the prosecution
had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the pool cue was the
instrument used to assault Crouch. The Appellate Division summarily
concluded that the verdict was not against the weight of the
evidence. People v. Young, 68 A.D.3d at 1762,
2009 N.Y. Slip Op.
09866, at **2 (citations omitted).
Respondent argues that the legal insufficiency claim asserted
here is unexhausted because Petitioner presented only a weight-ofthe-evidence claim to the Appellate Division, and cited only to
state cases employing the weight-of-the-evidence standard and the
statutory authority for conducting such a review. E.g., People v.
Acosta, 80 N.Y.2d 665, 672 (1993); People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d
490, 495 (1992); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.15(5). The Appellate
Division, in turn, cited only a weight-of-the-evidence case in
rejecting the issue, People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349 (2007).
See Cephas v. Ercole, No. 07 Civ. 6048(NRB), 2008 WL 1944837, at *4
n.5 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2008) (“A fair reading of his submissions to
the Appellate Division does not support this assertion [that he
exhausted the claim], as the language used and the legal precedent
cited remain grounded in the state law weight-of-evidence theory.
. . . Thus, this claim remains unexhausted.”). Respondent argues
-10-
that
Petitioner’s
legal
insufficiency
claim
must
be
deemed
exhausted but procedurally defaulted because no avenues remain
available to Petitioner to exhaust the claim in state court.
Because the claim is so clearly without merit, the Court proceeds
to address its substance rather than resolve the procedural issues.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant from conviction
in the absence of sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. E.g., Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 229 (2001)
(citations omitted). The pertinent standard asks “whether, after
viewing
the
evidence
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).
First degree assault requires proof of an intent to cause
serious physical injury “by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous
instrument.” N.Y. Penal Law § 120.10(1). A “dangerous instrument”
is “any instrument, article, or substance . . . which, under the
circumstances in which it is used . . . is readily capable of
causing death or other serious physical injury.” N.Y. Penal Law
§ 10.00(13). Petitioner does not argue that a pool cue could not be
used as a “dangerous instrument” within the meaning of New York’s
Penal Law but instead contends that prosecution failed to adduce
sufficient proof to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Petitioner used a pool cue to cause Crouch’s injuries.
-11-
Although no one witnessed the assault, the circumstantial
evidence that petitioner used the cue stick to strike Crouch
repeatedly in the face was more than sufficient to sustain the
conviction.
Indeed,
“‘[c]ircumstantial
evidence
can
be
as
compelling as direct evidence and a conviction can rest solely on
circumstantial evidence.’” Calderon v. Perez, 10 Civ. 2562, 2011 WL
293709, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2011) (quoting United States v.
Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2002); other citations omitted)),
report and recommendation adopted, 10 CV. 2562 GBDAJP, 2011 WL
1405029 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2011).
The assault occurred outside, near the back of the bar, where
Crouch and his girlfriend had been playing pool. T.235, 326, 354,
373-74. The bar patrons found Crouch on the bar patio, near a large
pool of his blood. Lying nearby was a pool stick that had been
broken into three pieces. T.236, 239, 326, 329, 354, 375, 420-21.
Crouch’s
blood
Petitioner’s
noticed
a
and
DNA
sneaker.
circular
were
found
T.571-76,
contusion
on
on
584-92.
the
pool
Paramedic
Crouch’s
cue
and
Joan
shoulder
on
Stark
that
was
consistent with a strike from a blunt, round-ended object, such as
a
pool
cue.
T.347-49. Drs.
Girotto
and
Chung
testified
that
Crouch’s multiple fractures and other injuries were caused by high
velocity blunt trauma, possibly a pool cue or stick. T.485-86, 488,
546. A wood engineering expert testified that the pool stick
snapped into three pieces simultaneously while bending. T.521, 529.
-12-
Petitioner made several admissions that he had “tattooed”3 Crouch
because Crouch had made advances at his (Petitioner’s) girlfriend.
T.599, 606. The circumstantial physical evidence, the medical
evidence, and Petitioner’s inculpatory statements, viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the prosecution’s favor, led inexorably to the
conclusion that Crouch’s injuries were inflicted by Petitioner with
the broken and bloodied pool cue found at the scene. See United
States v. Sureff, 15 F.3d 225, 228 (2d Cir. 1994) (Defendant’s
“insufficiency challenge, . . . , focuses on the lack of any direct
evidence-such
as
the
seizure
of
cocaine
or
testimony
of
a
coconspirator-of cocaine trafficking. However, crimes may be proven
entirely by circumstantial evidence. . . . So long as, from
inferences reasonably drawn, the jury could fairly have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in the charged
criminal conduct, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence
must
be
sustained.”).
Indeed,
the
evidence
was
patently
inconsistent with any claim that Crouch might have fallen and
sustained his numerous, severe injuries.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the request for a writ of habeas
corpus by Matthew Young is denied, and the petition (Dkt. #1) is
3
In baseball jargon, when someone says, “He tattoed it!”, “[t]his
means a hitter hit a ball exceptionally hard.” Predict Em!, located at
http://www.predictem.com/mlb/jargon.php (last accessed July 9, 2012).
-13-
dismissed. As there has not been a substantial showing of the
denial of constitutional right, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the
Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. The Court
further certified, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that any appeal
from this Decision and Order would not be taken in good faith, and
therefore denies leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
_______________________________
Hon. Michael A. Telesca
United States District Judge
Dated:
Rochester, New York
July 9, 2012
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