Hughes v. City of Rochester et al

Filing 36

-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-ORDER granting in part and denying in part 20 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Hon. Jonathan W. Feldman on 9/8/2016. (WGC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SUDAN A. HUGHES,
Plaintiff,
DECISION & ORDER

v.

12-CV-6112

CITY OF ROCHESTER, et al.,
Defendants.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On February 29,

2012,

Plaintiff Sudan Hughes

("plaintiff")

filed a complaint for employment discrimination against the City
of

Rochester

and

the
See

("defendants") .

City

of

Docket

Rochester
#

Fire

Department

Plaintiff

1.

claims

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
codified

at

42

Disabilities

Act

12117.

Id.

his race,
provide

of

1990,

2000e,

§

and

codified at

42

with

reasonable

accommodations

he complained about the discrimination,

§

Americans

U.S.C.

§§

with

12112

to

and disability-status resulted in a failure to

perform the essential functions of his job,

employment.

the

According to plaintiff, the discrimination based on

color,
him

U.S.C.

Id.

so

that

he

could

retaliation because

and termination of his

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

636(c), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this

Court for all dispositive matters,

See Docket

including trial.

# 14.

Currently pending before
for summary judgment,
On December
28),

11,

2015,

the

Court

is

filed on October 2,
plaintiff

defendants'

2015.

filed his

and defendants replied on December 23,

motion

Docket # 20.

response
2010.

(Docket

#

Docket # 30.

The Court heard oral argument on defendants' motion on February
9,

2016.

At oral argument,

the parties informed the Court that

they would be interested in appearing before the undersigned for
a settlement conference.

On May 17,

2016,

the Court conducted

extended settlement conferences with both counsel and plaintiff
present.

After good faith negotiations,

were unable to reach an agreement.
the

parties

submissions

1

defendants' motion,
reasons

that

Accordingly,

the

to

however,

Court

and

the parties
and based on
argument

For the

the Court now renders its decision.

follow,

defendants'

motion

for

summary

on

judgment

(Docket # 20) is granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff,
"bipolar
relevant times."

an African-American
depression

and

male,

suffers

from,

episode [s]

of

psychosis

See Docket # 1-4.

inter
at

According to defendants,

plaintiff became a part-time firefighter trainee on September 6,
1995.

On September 8,

See Docket # 22 at 2.

2

1997,

plaintiff

graduated

from

the

firefighter.
Rochester
Id.

trainee
As

Id.

Firefighters

a

program

and

firefighter,

Association,

became

a

plaintiff

Local

1071

full-time
joined

("the

the

Union") .

On May 24, 2007, plaintiff was assigned to the Quint/Midi 3

fire

company,

where

December

7,

suffered

from

protocol

requires

performance

2008,

he

plaintiff

flu-like

of

worked

a

work

fire

called in sick,

symptoms.

duties

to

The

Id.

firefighter

who

report

becomes
the

weekly updates for any extended ailments.
the illness,

Id.

suppression.
claiming

he

Fire Department's
ill

outside

absence
Id.

that

On

the

and provide

After reporting

plaintiff was placed on paid sick leave according

to the Union's Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Id.

In December 2008, however, plaintiff was hospitalized for a
week not

for

treatment.
chief

flu-like

symptoms,

On December

Id.

visited plaintiff's

but

18,

home

to

for

inpatient psychiatric

2008,

plaintiff's

check

on his

battalion

status.

Id.

Without disclosing the specifics of his illness, plaintiff told
his battalion chief that he had been hospitalized and was unable
to return to work.

Id.

at 2-3.

After plaintiff went several

weeks without providing updates to defendants, he was ordered to
appear for a March 2,
provider,
at

3.

At

2009 appointment with a contract medical

Strong Occupational and Environmental Medicine.
the

appointment,

Dr.

Rathin Vora,

M. D.,

Id.

determined

that plaintiff was unfit to work and requested that he return in

3

two months for another evaluation.

Id. at 3; see also Docket #

21-3.

On May 28,

plaintiff's Fire Chief advised him that

2009,

his six months of paid leave would exhaust on June 30, 2009, but
that he could use his vacation time to extend his pay status to
July 1,

Docket # 22 at 3.

2009.

psychiatrist,

Dr.

Khalid

On June 2,

Hubeishy,

2009,

M.D.,

plaintiff's

determined

that

plaintiff was fit to return to work on a part-time basis limited
to

four hours per day.

Id.

Plaintiff

then returned to Dr.

Vora, who referred plaintiff to Dr. R.P. Singh, M.D., a forensic
psychiatrist.

Id.

On July 1,

2009,

after exhausting his paid

leave time, plaintiff was placed on unpaid leave.
On July 14,
with

plaintiff

records,
return

Dr.
to

2009, . after conducting a

and

his

physicians

Singh issued a
work

on

a

Singh

diagnosed

plaintiff

number of interviews
reviewing

basis

with

Docket # 28-7.
with:

a

Psychotic

Disorder with manic and psychotic features
and stress related to the workplace.
that

Adjustment

Disorders.

plaintiff

plaintiff's paranoia -

Id.
and,

Vora's

may
Dr.

Disorder,

not

Bipolar I

from

Dr. Singh also
Delusional

or

Singh expressed concern over

particularly,

4

of

in early remission;

Id. at 4.

suffer

number

In the report, Dr.

otherwise specified and possibly in early remission;

concluded

Dr.

report recommending that plaintiff

part-time

restrictions and conditions.

and

Id.

his paranoia directed

at his work supervisors

-

but

felt

that his

symptoms were not

severe enough to impact his attempt at returning to work.
Indeed,

he

opined

that

plaintiff

and "in fairly good remission,"
the

future

course

assessment,
return

to

mechanism

Dr.
work

to

treatment

and
for

report,

part-time -

on

a

illness.

concluded
part-time

that

he

that

basis

signs
Dr.

In

his

Based on his

plaintiff
so

long

as

was

able

there

compliant

was

behavior

and

Id.

at

5.

Based

Dr.

cleared plaintiff

to

July

27,

2009

return

on
to

recommendation,

Dr.

2)

Mr. Hughes should not be doing active on-line duty
at this time, but may be able to work part-time on
light duty only.
3)
His supervisors should be notified that if they
notice any change in his behavior, he should be reevaluated immediately.

should follow up
three months of

in our clinic approximately
part-time light duty work.

Docket # 28-8.

5

work

with a number of

1) Mr. Sudan Hughes may return to work on a part-time
basis at this time. This should be conditional that he
demonstrates appropriate follow up with his treating
providers in the form of a letter/note regarding his
compliance with treatment.

He
after

a

with his

wrote:

4)

to

his

though not as a line firefighter -

restrictions.

treatment

monitored

of ·relapse.

Vora

with

Id.

remained fully

supervisors

his

compliant

but expressed uncertainty about

plaintiff's

Singh

ensure

functioning
Singh' s

of

was

Id.

Vora

Despite

approval

the

from

Dr.

Singh

and

Dr.

defendants did not permit plaintiff to return to work.
22 at 4.

Vora,

Docket #

According to Fire Chief Salvatore Mitrano ("Mitrano"),

defendants'

representative who made the decision,

there were no

light-duty assignments that plaintiff could perform based on the
restrictions proposed by Dr.
23 at 4.

Singh and Dr. Vora.

See Docket #

In testimony before an Administrative Law Judge with

the New York State Division of Human Rights,

Mitrano said that

he declined to reinstate plaintiff because no position existed
where his supervisors would be able to sufficiently monitor his
behavior for changes related to his mental illness.
Plaintiff
December

15,

was
2009

Docket # 22 at 4;
2010 to March 8,

eventually
pursuant

terminated

to

Civil

from his position on

Service

see also Docket # 28-10.

2010,

Id.

Law

section

73.

From February 2 3 ,

plaintiff was admitted to Buffalo General

Hospital for inpatient psychiatric treatment following a period
of

"paranoid"

21-15 at 3-4.

a

and "bizarre"

behavior.

On November 2,

2010,

Id.;

see also Docket #

Dr. Kavitha Finnity,

Ph.D.,

licensed clinical psychologist who started treating plaintiff

in March or April

2010,

sent

the

Rochester Fire Department a

letter stating that plaintiff's symptoms had improved and that
he would be able to return to active duty work as a firefighter.

1

1

According to a report produced by Dr. Singh, Dr. Finnity was
unaware of the extent of plaintiff's me.ntal health problems and
6

Docket # 28-11;

see also Docket # 21-15 at 4-5.

on November 30,

2010,

Shortly after,

plaintiff requested an additional fitness
Docket

'for duty examination to see if he could return to work.
# 28-12.
On

February

10,

2011,

Dr.

plaintiff unfit to return.
was

produced

girlfriend,

after

Singh issued

Singh

his

appeared

to

interviewed

psychiatric
harbor

history

paranoid

that

delusions

against

his

Id. at 2-5,

plaintiff's

condition was

insight

diagnosed him with:

into

his

Paranoid

plaintiff's

plaintiff

his

was

plaintiff
family

and

Dr. Singh noted that
extremely poor and

Psychotic Disorder, not otherwise specified;
Schizophrenia;

Disorder; and hypertension.
of

which

plaintiff,

notes

and

medical staff, among others.

out

finding

and his therapist and reviewed plaintiff's records,

details

rule

report

The report,

Docket # 21-15.

Dr.

a

mental

unfit

for

rule

Id. at 5.

out

Based on the seriousness

illness,

Dr.

duty

recommended

and

Schizoaffective

Singh

determined
that

he

that

"remain

under comprehensive psychiatric follow up so that his treatment
providers can assess his safety/dangerousness to self and others
on an ongoing basis .. "

Id.

On October 15, 2013, plaintiff sent a letter to the City of
Rochester,

indicating that his physician had certified him fit

believed that he only suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder ( "PTSD") .
She had not seen records of plaintiff's
See Docket# 21-15 at 4.
previous hospitalizations.
7

for

duty

Service

and

Law

plaintiff

requesting

section

included

to

note

plaintiff

continued

with

treatment,

he

work

the

Following his
Singh.

from

Rochester

plaintiff's

2014

Dr.

Fire

Finni ty

a

to

With his
stating

letter,
that,

successful
Docket

#

following his

In this report,

more

understanding

plaintiff's

Dr.

of

Psychotic

interviews
that

Dr.

Singh on

with plaintiff and
Singh

had

examined

fit

for

past

mental

Id. at 5.
to

Procedural History:

21-21.

girlfriend, Mitrano,

described

duty

work,

which

Plaintiff first filed a complaint with

color,
On

line

Id.; see also Docket# 22 at 6.

the New York State Division of

#

and

Accordingly, Dr. Singh found

full-time

plaintiff did on July 21, 2014.

Docket

illness

Disorder and Schizoaffecti ve Disorder as

return

2009,. claiming race,

Id. at

Singh noted that plaintiff appeared

his

in sustained remission.
plaintiff

21-28.

was again interviewed by Dr.

plaintiff several times since his February 2011 report.
3-4.

if

return to

The report produced by Dr.

reveals

Civil

pharmaceutical

and

Department."

plaintiff

physician

pursuant

21-27.

likely have

Docket·# 21-29.

February 28,

#

psychotherapy

"would most

request,

reinstated

Docket

73.
a

with

be

April

Human Rights

on September 29,

and disability discrimination.
29,

2011,

plaintiff,

See

plaintiff's

and a number of other individuals appeared

before an Administrative Law Judge for a hearing on plaintiff's
complaint.

See Docket # 21-20.

8

The Administrative Law Judge

issued a final order on October 24,
failed

to

establish

2011, finding that plaintiff

racially-motivated discrimination and that

his request for accommodations was unreasonable as a matter of
law and fact.

The Equal Employment Opportunity

Docket # 21-23.

Commission issued a letter adopting the findings of the Division
of Human Rights and providing plaintiff notice of his right to
sue.

See

Docket

#

1-5.

Accordingly,

plaintiff

filed

his

Docket # 1.

complaint on February 29, 2012.

DISCUSSION

Presently,

defendants move for summary judgment under Rule

(c)

of

the

Federal

there

is

no

genuine

56

parties.

Rules

of

Civil

dispute

of

Procedure,

material

alleging

fact

between

that
the

First, they argue that plaintiff has failed to present

sufficient

evidence

to

prove

a

prima

facie

case

of

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

Second,

they

present

argue

that

sufficient

plaintiff

evidence

to

has

similarly

prove

prima

a

failed

to

facie

case

discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act
and that,
facie

his accommodation requests were -unreasonable.

Docket # 23.

presented

("ADA")

even if this Court finds that he has proven a prima

case,

arguments

of

from

See

After reviewing the briefs submitted and hearing
both

sufficient

parties,

I

evidence

find
to

9

that

support

plaintiff
an

has

inference

not
of

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,

but that

reasonable minds may differ as to plaintiff's ADA claim.

I. Summary Judgment Standard
As

summary

always,

judgment

is

appropriate

where

"the

movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
Fed.

law."

R.

Civ.

P.

56(c).

"By its very terms,

the standard

provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between

the

parties

will

supported motion for
there

be

Liberty Lobby,
original).

defeat

summary judgment;

genuine

no

not

Inc.,

issue
477

242,

otherwise

the

material

of

U.S.

an

requirement

fact."

247-48

A dispute of fact is material

properly
is

that

Anderson
(emphasis

(1986)

v.
in

"only if it has some

effect on the outcome of the suit."

Eagley v.

State Farm In.s.

Co.,

Sept.

2015)

2015 WL 5714402,

and quotation omitted)
a material fact

at *6

(W.D.N.Y.

Moreover,

29,

a genuine issue exists as to

"if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
U.S.

at

must

resolve

party

248.

against

Gjivoje,
Locks Bd.

896

(citation

When deciding a
all

inferences

whom

summary

F.2d 716,

720

of Fire Comm' rs,

summary

and

(2d Cir.

is

in

favor

sought.

1990);

834 F.2d 54,

10

judgment motion,

ambiguities

judgment

Anderson,

57

(2d Cir.

courts
of

Thompson

Donahue v.

477

the
v.

Windsor

1987).

The

reasonableness

of

those

inferences,

record taken as a whole."

though,

Matsushita Elec.

depends

on

"the

Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The burden of showing the absence of any issue of material
Celotex Corp. v.

fact rests with the movant.
317,

323

prima

Once

(1986)

facie

entitlement

the

moving

party

Catrett,

has

to summary judgment,

477 U.S.

established

its

the burden shifts

to the non-moving party to "go beyond the pleadings and by .
affidavits,
and

or by

admission

there

is

a

the
file,

on

depositions,
designate

genuine

issue

for

answers

to

specific

facts

Id.

trial."

interrogatories,

at

showing

that

(emphasis

324

Put differently,

the non-

moving party must show that materials cited "establish

. the

added)

(internal citations omitted) .

presence of a

genuine dispute,

or that an adverse party cannot

produce admissible evidence to support the
P.

It

56(c)

evidence

that

is
just

not

enough

raises

doubts;

"concrete evidence from which a
verdict

in his

favor."

for

the
the

Anderson,

party's

is

judgment.

non-movant

R.

Civ.

to

present

must

present

to

at 256.

The

"mere

to support the non-moving

defeat

a

motion for

summary

Id. at 252.

In evaluating
the

non-movant

477 U.S.

scintilla of evidence"
insufficient

Fed.

reasonable juror could return a

existence of a
claims

fact."

context of a

the merits

of

a

summary

discrimination claim,

11

judgment motion

in

courts must be cautious

in

granting

relief

where

the

assessment of individuals'

conduct

at

issue

"requires

motivations and state of mind

Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2001).

"

an

These

are "matters that call for a sparing use of the summary judgment
device because of juries' special advantages over judges in this
Id.

area."

(internal

Nevertheless,

"the

quotations

salutary

avoiding protracted,

and

purposes

expensive,

citations

of

summary

omitted).
judgment

and harassing trials - apply no

less to discrimination cases than to commercial or other areas
of

litigation."

1985).

Meiri

Indeed,

discrimination

"summary
claims

material fact."
40

(2d Cir.

1994);

239 F.3d 456,

that

summary

this stage,

of

759

F.2d

989,

remains

available

cases

lacking

genuine

in

466

998

judgment

TRM Copy Ctrs.

Corp. ,

see also Abdu-Brisson v.

judgment

context

Dacon,

Chambers v.

Inc.,

intensive

v.

(2d Cir.
may

be

(2d Cir.
to

reject

issues

of

43 F. 3d 2 9,

Delta Air Lines,

2001) ("It is now beyond cavil

appropriate

even

discrimination cases.") .

in

the

fact-

Ultimately,

at

the trial court is limited to "issue-finding," and

not resolution, while keeping "in mind that only by reference to
the substantive law can it be determined whether a disputed fact
is

material

to

the

resolution

Prudential Residential Serv.,

of

Ltd.

(2d Cir. 1994).

12

the

dispute."

P'ship,

22

Gallo

F.3d 1219,

v.
1224

II. Title VII Discrimination

As a threshold matter,

it is necessary to determine exactly

how the Court should approach allegations of disparate treatment
in

violation

direct

of

federal

evidence.

antidiscrimination

Traditionally,

statutes

plaintiff

" [a]

absent

may

prove

discrimination indirectly either by meeting the requirements of
or by otherwise creating a mosaic of

McDonnell Douglas
intentional
evidence

discrimination

that

by

together

identifying
rise

give

bits

to

and

an

pieces

inference

of
of

discrimination."

Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School Dist., 801

F.3d

Cir.

72,

87

(2d

2015) (internal

quotations

and

citations

omitted); see also Abrams v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244,
251

(2d

Cir.

(adopting

2014)

the

McDonnell

Douglas

test

for

Title VII discrimination claims)
The
Title

VII

part

former,

indirect method calls

discrimination

framework

set

Douglas Corp. v.
764 F. 3d at 251.
the

plaintiff

discrimination
former

forth

Green,

employer.

by

under

the

411 U.S.

the

Supreme
792,

courts

to

"analyze

now-familiar
Court

802-04

in

three-

McDonnell

(1973) ."

Abrams,

The three-part framework requires first that

make
on

claims

for

out

the

a

part

prima
of

In McDonnell

his

case

of

prospective,

Douglas,

consists of four successive showings:

13

facie

the prima

prohibited
current,
facie

or
case

(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802.
While the Court in McDonnell Douglas was concerned with an
employer's

refusal

discrimination,

to

hire

on

the

basis

of

alleged

racial

the holding extends to all "unlawful employment

practice [s]" outlined by Title VII on any prohibited basis.

u.s.c.

§

2000e-2(a)

practice
individual,
with

color,

be

of

can

demonstrating

to

his

compensation,

employment,
sex,

prove
his

because

a

prima

" ( 1)

facie

membership
(3)

employment

position

with

an

individual

protected class."

Farias v.

F.3d

Cir.

98

(2d

such

conditions,

individual's

origin.") .
case
in

a

of

discrimination

(4)

class;

a
by
( 2)

who

the ultimate filling of

is

not

a

member

Instr.uctional Systems,

2001)

race,

Accordingly,

protected

or

termination from employment or

other adverse employment action; and

91,

unlawful

terms,

of

or national

satisfactory job performance;

the

an

or otherwise to discriminate against any individual

religion,

plaintiff

shall

to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

respect

privileges

("It

42

(internal

citations

of

the

Inc.,

259

omitted).

Alternatively, the last prong "may be satisfied if the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the discharge or adverse employment action

14

occurred

under

circumstances

discrimination on
class.

basis

"Showing

Id.

11

the

situated

employees

effective

method

of

that

rise

to

plaintiff's
an

differently

an

inference

membership

employer

treated

is

a

common

a

prima

in

facie

Abrams

v.

Reade,

419

of

that

similarly

and

establishing

of

discrimination."

giving

especially
case

F.

Supp.

2d

476,

the

first

step

of
481

(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Once

the

plaintiff

McDonnell

Douglas

disparate

treatment,

"shift

to

the

nondiscriminatory
411 U.S.

test

has
by

the

making

second

employer
reason"

at 802.

satisfied

to
for

However,

step

a

requires

action.

Hicks,

case,

509

U.S.

502,

507

that
some

fact"

never

of

burden

legitimate,
Douglas,

(1993).

St.

Mary's Honor Ctr.

Unlike

the

prima

facie

preponderance of

"[t] he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
shifts

to

the· defendant.

Affairs v.

Burdine,

offers

a

nondiscriminatory

action,

the

plaintiff,

case

the

McDonnell

which the plaintiff must establish by a

the evidence,

facie

the

second step merely "shifts the

burden of production to the defendant."
v.

prima

articulate

its

this

out

of

450 U.S.

248,

253

Texas
(1981).

explanation

for

Dep' t

of

Cmty.

If the employer
the

challenged

inquiry then shifts back for the third step to the

who must "be afforded a fair opportunity to show that

[the defendant] 's stated reason .
racially-discriminatory decision] . "

15

. was in fact pretext
McDonnell Douglas,

[for a

411 U.S.

at

The Supreme Court has

804.

proved

to be a

pretext

for

"a reason cannot be

discrimination unless

both that the reason was false,
real reason."

held that

it

is

shown

and that discrimination was the

St. Mary's Honor Ctr.,

509 U.S. at 506

(internal

quotations and citations omitted) .
Plaintiff's

Analysis:

VII

of

the

Civil

claim of

Rights

Act

discrimination under Title

fails

at

every

level

of

the

Before delving into the analysis,

McDonnell Douglas framework.
though,

the Court must flesh out the specific adverse employment

actions

here.

significant

An

disadvantage

plaintiff's

employment,
a

benefits,

adverse

less

employment
with

such

as

action

respect

title,

a

of

employment,
loss

significantly diminished material responsibilities,

N.Y. State Dep't of Labor,

minimum,

terms

material

other indices unique to a particular situation."

(internal

"a materially

the

to

termination

distinguished

is

quotations
the adverse

and

326 F. App'x 617,
citations

619

of
a
of
or

Cunningham v.
(2d Cir. 2009)
Thus,

omitted).

employment actions here include:.

at

a

the Fire

Department's decision to place plaintiff on unpaid leave on July
1,

2009;

the

Fire

Department's

accommodations plaintiff requested;
on December 7, 2009.

decision

not

to

make

the

and plaintiff's termination

See Docket # 22.

Applying the McDonnell Douglas. shifting-burden analysis to
the

facts

at bar reveals

that plaintiff

16

is unable

to prove a

Though the first

prima facie case of race-based discrimination.

three factors appear undisputed - plaintiff, an African-American
male,

is

a

member

satisfactorily
action -

his

actions

plaintiff's

job;

and

race.

that

his

sometimes
comments,2

see

See

and

any

he

he

performed

adverse

employment

class;

faced

alleged

Docket. #

co-workers

vaguely,

suggests

protected

there is no reasonable connection between the adverse

employment

alleges

at

a

of

sometimes

Docket

#

28-20

30

at

discrimination
at

the

at

Department

racist

openly
1-3,

the

on

While plaintiff

4-5.

Fire

based

and

made

pejorative

record as

a

whole

that none of the alleged instances of racism had any
In fact,

bearing on the adverse employment actions here.

they

precede the adverse employment actions by. several years or,
some cases, over a decade.
To

be

sure,
actions

defendants'

racial animus.

non-African-American

Id.

plaintiff

employment

that

has

he

identified

believes

He alleges,

firefighters

Docket # 28-23 at 9.

actual

were

adverse

motivated

for example,

with mental

requested light-work accommodations
not.

in

by

that four

disabilities

who

received them while he did

Assuming,

for the sake of argument,

that a reasonable jury finds these facts create an inference of

2

As noted by defendant, only five of the eleven instances of
alleged
race-based
discrimination
identified
by
plaintiff
occurred after the date he indicated the discrimination began in
his complain. Docket # 30 at 5-8; Docket # 28-20 at ~~ 7-17.
17

discriminatory employment practices, the burden would then shift
to defendants "to articulate some legitimate,
reason"
Here,

for

defendants have

the

McDonnell Douglas,

its action.

done that:

recommendations

from

plaintiff's ability to work,

nondiscriminatory
411

they note that,

medical

U.S.

at

802.

according to
regarding

professionals

"[t] here were explicit conditions,
which could not

restrictions and monitoring requirements

be accommodated in any existing light-duty position within the
Fire Department."
the

four

duty

Docket # 23 at 9.

non-African-American firefighters

work

assignments

defendants point out
their

-

because

This

their

mental

conditions,

that

" [n] one of

conditions were at all comparable to [plaintiff's]

at

American,
the

of

who received light-

and plaintiff agrees

psychiatric disability." 3
28-23

Moreover, with respect to

9

("None

of

severe

Docket # 30 at 13; see also Docket #
these

four

firefighters

are

African-

and none of their afflictions were of, or compare to,

severe psychiatric nature of
satisfies

the

defendants'

the Plaintiff's diagnosis.") .
burden

"to

articulate

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its action.

some

McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

3

Three of the individuals were placed on light duty for
unspecified stress-related mental ailments, and one was placed
on
light
duty
for
post-traumatic stress
disorder.
See
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law (Docket# 28-23) at 9.
18

Since defendants have satisfied the second portion of the
McDonnel Douglas analysis,
show that
[for

a

[defendants']

the burden returns to plaintiff "to

racially-discriminatory

Plaintiff

has

was in fact pretext

stated reason .

presented no

Id.

decision] . "

compelling evidence

at

804.

to demonstrate

that defendants made their decisions for reasons other than the
one

provided

unreasonable

this

to

Court

accommodations

maintain his position.

that

for

his

required

plaintiff

mental

impairments

to

The absence of such evidence requires

dismissal of his Title VII claim.

See Holt v. KMI-Continental,

Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Goenaga v. March
of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995)
("The party opposing

summary judgment may not

conclusory

statements

supporting

the

allegations

or

motion

or

on

are

denials

(internal

quotations
has

to

similarly

situated,

light

duty

failed

work,

not

of

and

plaintiff

contentions
credible,

the

citations
identify

does

he

of his race.

simply on

the

affidavits

upon

party's

omitted)).
a

single

the

other

mere

pleading."
Importantly,

instance

employee

demonstrate

unequal adverse employment actions

or

adverse

non-African-American

nor

that

rely

was

where

a

granted

instances

of

leveled against him because

Plaintiff's claim is further belied by his failure

to demonstrate that defendants filled his position with someone

19

outside his protected class -

in fact,

it appears that plaintiff

has returned to his former position.
Accordingly,
regard

to

defendants'

plaintiff's

motion

racial

for

summary

discrimination

judgment

claim

under

with
Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act is granted.

III. Discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act
The

ADA prohibits

an otherwise

employer

from

discriminating against

qualified individual with a

that disability.
statute,

an

See 42 U.S.C.

"the term

§

disability because of

'discriminate against a

on the basis of disability'

According to the

12112 (a).

qualified individual

includes

not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical
or
mental
limitations
of
an
otherwise
qualified individual with a
disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business.
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b) (5) (A).
"A plaintiff
ADA

bears

case."

the

alleging

initial

(2d

Cir.

employer

Fed.

1996))

discrimination under
his

burden

of

Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki,

1998) (citing Wernick v.
383

employment

is

subject

P.C.,

a

135 F.3d 867,

establish

ADA,
to

establishing

Reserve Bank of N.Y.,

To
the

discrimination under

a

prima

plaintiff

the ADA;

20

a

(2)

must

he

is

prima

869

the

facie

(2d Cir.

91 F.3d 379,

facie

case

show that:

of
(1)

disabled within

the meaning of
(3)

he

was

functions
and

( 4)

the ADA or perceived to be so by his employer;
otherwise

of his

qualified

to

perform

the

essential

job with or without reasonable accommodation;

he suffered an adverse employment action because of his

disability.

Ryan,

Proving that a plaintiff

135 F.3d at 869-70.

is capable of performing his job with a reasonable accommodation
the

third

prove a

its

own

separate

the ADA;

(2)

'(1)

[he has]

(3)

"a plaintiff

a disability under the meaning of

an employer covered by the

disability;

To

analysis.

prima facie reasonable accommodation case,

must show that:

[his]

requires

factor

statute had notice of

with reasonable accommodation,

[he]

could

perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4)

the

such accommodations.' "

Young v.

New York City Dep't of Educ.,

2010 WL 2776835,

(S.D.N.Y.

July

v.

employer has

P.C.,

13,

369F.3d113,
a

burden

articulate

118

prima

of

a

pretextual.

Anesthesia

(2dCir. 2004)).

facie

legitimate

reason is offered,
the

Rodal

production

challenged actions."

that

to make

2010) (quoting

established
"the

refused

case

of

shifts

Grp.

disability
to

of

Onondaga,

Once the plaintiff has ·

the

discrimination,

defendant,

nondiscriminatory

See Rodal,

at *7

reason

369 F.3d at 118 n.3.

who

must

for

its

If such a

the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove

defendant's

nondiscriminatory

Id.

21

explanation

is

Analysis:

judgment

on

The

crux

of

defendants'

plaintiff's

ADA

claim

Indeed,

the

parties

accommodations.

defendants are subject to the ADA,
within the meaning of the ADA,
adverse

employment

plaintiff

is

action.

unable

to

motion

centers
do

for

reasonable

on

not

summary

dispute

that

that plaintiff was disabled

and that plaintiff suffered an

Instead,

point

to

defendants

any

assert

that

light

duty

temporary

positions that he could have filled at the time of the alleged
discrimination.

See

#

Docket

23

at

As

8-11.

a

result,

defendants claim that they would have had to create a new lightduty

position

Plaintiff,
light

for

duty

for
his

plaintiff
part,

work

accommodations.

to

argues

had

keep
that

he

defendants

Specifically,

him

employed.

could have performed
reasonable

adopted

Plaintiff focuses on Dr.

third recommended accommodation -

Id.

Vora' s

that "[h] is supervisor should

be notified that if they notice any change in his behavior,

he

should be re-evaluated immediately" - and argues that defendants
intentionally

misinterpreted

plaintiff employment.
was

in charge of

raised

two

plaintiff's

plaintiff's

accommodation

See Docket # 28-23 at 5-8.

deny

to

Mitrano, who

overseeing plaintiff's reapplication process,

concerns
request

supervision would

that

with
to

lead

disability

this

be
to

a

restriction
( 1)

reinstated:
breach in the

status;

22

and

(2)

when

he

that

denied

requiring

confidentiality of

that

there

were

no

positions

that

would

allow

for

"continual

characterization

defendants

order

and

President,

in
As

accommodation.
himself

that

to

contends

support,

James
which

effectively

recommendations and,

issue

accommodations

the
the

a

false

reasonable

Fire

Firefighters

Department

pursuant

from
Union

could

to

have

Vora's

Dr.

provided the accommodations to allow

See Docket ## 28-20, 28-21.
whether

here

that

plaintiff

former

plaintiff

thus,

for plaintiff to work.
The

that

monitored

deny

this

adopted

plaintiff provides affidavits

McTiernan,
aver

guaranteed"

See Docket # 28-23 at 6.

supervision of plaintiff's behavior.
Plaintiff

and

would

have

there

allowed

were

reasonable

plaintiff

to

working - presents a mixed question of law and fact.
v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63,

65

continue

See Carter

(D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Carter v.

Pathfinder Energy Services, Inc., 662 F.3d 1134, 1146 (10th Cir.
2011) ("Whether
under

part-time

the ADA is

a

work

suited

a

reasonable

mixed question of

primarily legal principles."
omitted)).

is

law and

accommodation
fact

involving

(internal citations and quotations

Mixed questions of law and fact are "especially well

for

jury
when

determination

granted

only

reasonable

issue."

Mendell v. Greenberg,

and
minds

summary
could

judgment

not

927 F.2d 667, 673

differ

may

be

on

the

(2d Cir. 1990);

see also Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 907

(2d

Cir. 1997) ("Summary judgment is designed to pierce the pleadings

23

to

flush out

those cases that are predestined to result

in a

directed verdict.").
The

parties

have

presented

two

competing

views

accommodations plaintiff needed to return to work,

of

the

and neither

view is so overwhelmingly persuasive that summary judgment would
be

Indeed,

appropriate.

plaintiff

has

unlike

with

provided declarations

his

from

Title

James

VII

claim,

McTiernan,

the

former president of the Firefighters Union and a former captain
of

the

Rochester

Fire Department,

to suggest

that plaintiff's

requested accommodations were reasonable.

See Docket # 28-21.

In

unequivocally

his

statement,

McTiernan

asserts

that

supervisors within the Fire Department are qualified and capable
of

supervising

Id.

employees

Defendants

for

can

changes

and

in

certainly

their mental

health.

disagree

do

with

McTiernan's assessment, but that does not dissolve this Court of
its obligation to construe the facts presented in a light most
favorable

to plaintiff and weigh the

have on a

jury's determination.·

here focuses on Mitrano' s

impact

Moreover,

these

facts would

the primary inquiry

"motivations and state of mind" when

he denied plaintiff's reapplication for work: plaintiff contends
that

Mitrano

recommended

by

intentionally
Dr.

Vora

plaintiff of his position,
sort of assessment

to

interpreted
be

more

the

restrictive

restrictions
to

deprive

and the defendants disagree.

of Mitrano' s

24

intentions calls

for

This

"sparing

use

of

the

summary

judgment device

because

short,

251

(2d Cir.

based on the

juries'

Brown v.

special

Henderson,

257

(internal quotations omitted).

In

advantages over judges in this area."
F.3d 246,

of

2001)

above and after examining the

record,

the

Court remains unconvinced that reasonable minds would inevitably
reach the same conclusion on this issue.
To

be

sure,

plaintiff

ailments.

Dr.

plaintiff

appeared

relapse.

The

relatedly,

not

lost

delusional
of

accommodations

on

and

Gallo,

multiple

paranoid,

defendants

would

to

allow him

to

evidence

on

the
a

psychiatric

occasions

and

was

have

in

to

and,

finding

employed are

both parties

dispositive

have

points

of

genuine issue of material

Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate.

22 F.3d at 1224

that

prone

impairments

remain

Nevertheless,

argument such that the Court finds
fact remains.

serious

mental

undersigned.

contradictory

from

plaintiff's

difficulty

on the

submitted

observed

severity

the

reasonable

Singh

suffered

See

("[T]he trial court's task at the summary

judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to
discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact
to be tried, not deciding them.")
Accordingly,
regard

to

defendants'

plaintiff's

motion

claim

Disabilities Act is denied.

25

for

under

summary
the

judgment

Americans

with
with

CONCLUSION

For

the

reasons

stated,

defendants'

motion

for

summary

judgment (Docket # 20) is granted in part and denied in part.
SO ORDERED.

W. FELDMAN
Magistrate Judge
Dated: September 8, 2016
Rochester, New York

26