Luther v. Astrue
Filing
12
-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-DECISION AND ORDER granting 6 Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 10 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; and dismissing complaint with prejudice. (Clerk to close case.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 7/22/13. (JMC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JESSICA LYN LUTHER
Plaintiff,
12-CV-6466
DECISION
and ORDER
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY1
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Represented by counsel, Jessica Lyn Luther (“Plaintiff” or
“Luther”), brings this action pursuant to Title XVI of the Social
Security Act (“the Act”), seeking review of the final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying
her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) Benefits.
The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
405(g).
Presently before the Court are the parties’ competing motions
for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
For the reasons set forth below, this
Court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence in the record and is in accordance with the
1
This action was filed on September 4, 2012. Carolyn W. Colvin became
the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013. Pursuant to
Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin, or “the
Commissioner,” is the Defendant in this suit.
applicable legal standards.
Therefore, this Court hereby grants
the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and denies
the Plaintiff’s motion.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 7, 2010, Jessica Lyn Luther protectively filed an
application for SSI, claiming that she was disabled beginning on
September 1, 1996.
Administrative Transcript (“Tr.”) at 152-155.
Luther’s claim was denied on May 28, 2010.
Tr. at 64.
At her
request, an administrative hearing was conducted on July 22, 2011
before
Administrative
presided
via
Law
Judge
videoconference.
(“ALJ”)
Tr.
at
Milagros
33.
Farnes,
Luther,
who
who
was
represented by attorney Kelly Laga, testified at the hearing, as
did vocational expert Alina Kurtanich, (“Kurtanich” or “the VE”).
Tr. at 36-59.
On August 26, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding that
Luther was not disabled during the period from her alleged onset
date. Tr. at 20-28. On July 5, 2012, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. Tr. at 1-6.
This action was filed on
September 4, 2012.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was a 19-year-old
individual with a 10th Grade education.
relevant work was as a cashier.
Tr. at 43-44.
Tr. at 45.
Her past
Luther claims she
became disabled on September 1, 1996, due to alleged borderline and
-2-
bipolar personality disorders, which result in an inability to
“interact with others... violent outbursts,” as well as difficulty
focusing and concentrating. Tr. at 175-176.
Since the 5th Grade, Luther’s educational record was marked by
issues of non-compliance and absenteeism.
recommendations,
she
was
evaluated
in
Pursuant to school
2007
to
determine
a
psychiatric diagnosis and need for treatment and recommendations
for a school program. Luther’s former counselor at Odyssey Academy
provided psychological testing and Individualized Education Program
(“IEP”) reports from June 2009.
Tr. at 195-216.
Luther had been
diagnosed with ADHD with impulse control difficulties and symptoms
of psychiatric disturbance.
Jr.’s reports
refer
to
School psychologist Edward A. Felder,
Dr.
Jeffrey
Alberts,
who
opined
that
Luther’s chronic marijuana use to self-medicate her psychological
distress was the primary cause of her mental health issues.
On February 9, 2009, Plaintiff was recommended for a special
education Day Program at BOCES Monroe 2 Center because her social,
emotional, behavioral, and attentional issues required a “safe,
secure rigid environment with clear expectations and teachers that
[held] all students accountable for their actions.”
Tr. at 201.
Due to absenteeism, Luther was dropped from the Greece Central
School
District’s
rolls
in
September
2009.
Tr.
at
196.
Plaintiff’s mother wanted the Greece School District to pay for
Plaintiff
to
attend
an
out-of-state
-3-
schooling
program
for
adolescents with borderline personality disorder.
Tr. at 264.
However, the record does not reveal that Plaintiff has returned to
school.
Luther has an extensive history of psychiatric care.
On
February 11, 2008, she was admitted into Outpatient hospitalization
at Strong Behavioral Health’s Psychiatry Department, presenting
with dysregulated mood and affect, suicidal ideation, and acting
out behaviors.
Tr. at 301-306.
She was diagnosed with Bipolar
Disorder and Cannabis Dependence.
She used marijuana daily.
On
February 26, 2008, Luther was discharged from these services due to
her nonattendance, oppositional behavior and refusal to adhere to
her recommended medication regimen.
Undated disability reports
completed by Luther’s mother indicate that Plaintiff refused to
take her prescribed medications due to “horrible reactions.” Tr. at
237.
Carla Peracchia, M.D., of Southview Internal Medicine, has
been
Luther’s
primary
care
physician
since
August
2008.
Dr. Peracchia’s notes from Luther’s first visit on August 6, 2008,
indicate that Plaintiff was aggressive toward her parents and
exhibited symptoms of Borderline Personality Disorder, as well as
marijuana addiction.
Additionally, records from Strong Memorial Hospital for the
period August 6, 2008 to November 5, 2009 documented Plaintiff’s
ongoing mental health issues, such as Depression and Borderline
-4-
Personality Disorder (“BPD”).
On August 6, 2008, Plaintiff was
admitted to Strong Behavioral Health’s Outpatient Clinic after a
mental hygiene arrest.
Tr. at 260-289.
On August 28, 2008,
Dr. Peracchia recommended that Luther’s mother administer her
medications and that Luther attend a Chemical Dependency treatment
facility for her THC dependence.
Plaintiff was discharged from
Strong Behavioral Health’s Outpatient Clinic on October 14, 2008,
after she assaulted a member of her group therapy session.
307-311.
Tr. at
She was placed on probation due to this altercation.
In a note dated October 20, 2008, Dr. Peracchia opined that
Plaintiff’s drug abuse problem was secondary to her psychiatric
illness.
Tr. at 299.
On December 1, 2008, Dr. Peracchia observed
that Luther’s interpersonal relationship skills [were] so limited
that she [did] not have any sense of how to act or behave around
adults, let alone her peers.”
Tr. at 298.
A Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (“MRI”) taken on December 15, 2008 was normal and did not
reveal anything that would explain her behavioral issues.
Tr. at
316.
On January 26, 2010, Plaintiff was referred to the Genesee
Mental Health Center.
visit,
therapist
Tr. at 336-355, 389-422.
Trevor
Jones,
Licensed
Master
At her first
Social
Worker
(“LMSW”), assessed Luther’s lethality and noted the following
risks: BPD, history of suicidal ideation, feelings of isolation and
loneliness, drug and alcohol abuse and family conflict.
-5-
She was
diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, Cannabis Abuse and BPD.
Her
Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score was 48.
On March 3, 2010, Luther complained to LMSW Jones that it was
difficult for her to manage her emotions at times of stress.
at 389-422.
Tr.
Luther used marijuana daily to calm herself down and
improve her mood.
She also had a history of alcohol abuse, with
two DWI arrests. She was not taking medication to treat her mental
health issues at the time.
LMSW Jones opined that Plaintiff would
benefit from continued treatment for her BPD and possible mood
disorder as well as a medication evaluation.
On April 9, 2010,
Gregory L. Seeger, M.D., evaluated Plaintiff and noted her history
of rage attacks and poor frustration tolerance.
She continued to
smoke marijuana on a daily basis.
Consultative
Examiner,
Adele
Jones,
Ph.D.,
psychiatric evaluation of Luther on May 20, 2010.
completed
a
Tr. at 362-366.
At the time, Plaintiff had been working between 10 and 20 hours per
week at Dunkin Donuts.
She
reported
supervisors.
being
She had maintained the job for a month.
rude
to
customers,
co-workers
and
her
In the past, she had been fired from several part-
time jobs due to rage and outbursts.
Dr. Jones observed that her
reports of daily “manic episodes” did not appear to be actual
mania.
Luther complained of concentration difficulties due to a
preoccupation with her social life.
-6-
She reported daily marijuana
use, and reported using ecstasy two or three times. She interacted
poorly during the evaluation.
Luther was able to dress, bathe, and groom, cook, and prepare
foods, clean,
launder,
shop,
and
manage money.
Her
hobbies
included socializing with friends, watching TV, and listening to
the radio.
365.
She spent her days “working and smoking pot.” Tr. at
Dr. Jones opined that she was able to follow and understand
simple directions, perform simple tasks independently, maintain
attention and concentration, maintain a regular schedule, learn new
tasks, and perform complex tasks independently. She did not always
exhibit appropriate decision-making.
She could not consistently
relate with others or appropriately deal with stress.
Dr. Jones
diagnosed Plaintiff with Bipolar Disorder not otherwise specified
(“NOS”).
Her prognosis was fair with more consistent medication
and sobriety.
On
May
26,
2010,
State
Agency
Psychologist
A.
Hochberg
completed a Psychiatric Review Technique of Plaintiff’s record and
assessed her mental residual functional capacity (“RFC”).
381-384.
Dr.
Hochberg
observed
that
Luther
had
Tr. at
moderate
difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.
In particular, she was moderately limited in her ability to work in
coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted
by them and with her ability to complete a normal workday and
workweek without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms.
-7-
She
was
also
interaction
moderately
and
limited
adaptation.
in
Dr.
some
Hochberg
allegations were partially credible.
aspects
opined
of
social
that
her
She retained the ability to
maintain attention and concentration, maintain a regular schedule
and learn new tasks.
making
appropriate
stress.
She had difficulty relating with others,
decisions,
and
appropriately
dealing
with
Ultimately, Dr. Hochberg opined that Plaintiff retained
the ability to work a simple job, with limited stress and limited
exposure to others.
On November 3, 2010, Plaintiff was treated at Southview
Internal Medicine. Tr. at 385-388.
Her rage had been improving.
Her new medication, Fluoxetine, was helping her, and she wanted to
increase the dose.
She was working full-time and enjoyed it.
On
February 10, 2011, Plaintiff’s insight appeared to be improving,
and she reported that she was maintaining abstinence from cannabis.
Luther violated her probation and had to serve a one month
jail
sentence
in
March
2011.
Tr.
at
423-426.
After
her
incarceration, she continued her treatment at the Genesee Mental
Health facility.
Tr. at 446-467.
She reported that she was no
longer on probation and had resumed her cannabis use.
451.
Tr. at 446-
She was medically stable and her goal was to maintain this
mood stability and complete one year of college or one year of
sustained gainful employment.
-8-
On May 5, 2011, LMSW Jones counseled Plaintiff on how her
regular cannabis and alcohol use was not likely to help her promote
her own independence and progress toward her goals.
He also told
her
job
that
she
had
the
potential
to
have
a
good
and
an
independent lifestyle if she maintained her focus and commitment to
changing her negative behaviors.
time.
She was not medicated at the
LMWS Jones encourged Plaintiff to address her emotional
distressed tolerance skills and reinforce the negative consequences
of impulsive or reckless decisions.
On June 7, 2011, he noted that
Luther
and
had
been
making
progress
her
manner
of
managing
situations had significantly improved over the course of treatment.
DISCUSSION
I. Scope of Review
When
reviewing
the
appeal
of
the
Social
Security
Administration’s denial of a claimant’s application for benefits,
Title 42 U.S.C., Section 405(g) directs the Court to accept the
Commissioner’s factual findings, provided that such findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial
evidence is defined as, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.”
Consolidated Edison Co. V. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
The
Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner’s findings were supported by substantial evidence in
the record, and whether the Commissioner employed the proper legal
-9-
standards in evaluating the plaintiff’s claim. Mongeur v. Heckler,
722 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983).
Judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be granted where the material
facts are undisputed and where judgment on the merits is possible
merely by considering the content of the pleadings.
Sellers v.
M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1988).
If, after
reviewing the record, the Court is convinced that Plaintiff has not
set forth a plausible claim for relief, judgment on the pleadings
may be appropriate. See generally Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
II.
The Commissioner’s Decision to Deny the Plaintiff benefits is
Supported by Substantial Evidence in the Record
An individual’s physical or mental impairment is not disabling
under the Act unless it is “of such severity that [she] is not only
unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age,
education,
and
work
experience,
engage
in
any
other
kind
of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1383(a)(3)(B). Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d
464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). In her decision denying benefits, the ALJ
adhered to the five-step analysis required to evaluate disability
claims.2
Tr. at 20-28.
2
The five-step analysis requires the ALJ to consider the following:
(1) whether the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity; (2) if
not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment which significantly limits
his or her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities; (3) if the
claimant suffers severe impairment(s), the ALJ considers whether the claimant
-10-
Under step 1 of the process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application
date.
Tr. at 22.
At steps 2 and 3, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff “[had] the following severe impairment[s]: borderline
personality disorder and substance abuse.” Id.
The ALJ found,
however, that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that met or medically equaled any of the listed
impairments
in
Appendix
1,
Subpart
Administration’s regulations.
P
of
the
Social
Security
Id.
At steps 4 and 5, the ALJ concluded that although Plaintiff
was unable to perform her past relevant work, she retained the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of
work at all exertional levels with some nonexertional limitations.
Tr. at 23.
Considering her age, education, work experience, and
RFC, the ALJ found that there were jobs that existed in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform.
Tr. at 27.
Luther argues that the ALJ’s decision finding that she is not
disabled
was
against
the
weight
erroneous as a matter of law.
of
substantial
evidence
and
Specifically, Plaintiff maintains
has impairment(s) that lasted or expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months, and impairment(s) meets or medically equals a listed
impairment in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4; if so, the claimant is
presumed disabled; (4) if not, the ALJ considers whether impairment(s)
prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; (5) if the claimant’s
impairment(s) prevents him or her from doing past relevant work, if other work
exists in significant numbers in the national economy that accommodates the
claimant’s residual functional capacity and vocational factors, the claimant
is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) and 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v).
-11-
that the ALJ did not properly apply the relevant legal principles
in arriving at her RFC finding; the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s
credibility was erroneous as a matter of law; and the ALJ erred in
basing her opinion on insufficient testimony from the Vocational
Expert. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law (“Pl’s Mem.”), Points 13 (Dkt. No. 10).
A.
The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Finding is Proper and
Supported by Substantial Evidence in the Record
In order to make a proper disability finding, the ALJ must
consider all of the relevant medical and other evidence in the case
record to assess the claimant’s ability to meet the physical,
mental,
sensory,
and
other
requirements
of
work.
20
C.F.R.
§ 404.4545(a)(3)-(4); see also SSR 96-8p, SSR LEXIS 5, 1996 WL
374184 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996).
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
retained the RFC to perform “a full range of work at all exertional
levels
but
with
the
following
nonexertional
limitations:
no
production rate or pace work; no contact with the public; limited
interaction
with
supervision;
and
co-workers;
low-stress
isolated
with
with
occasional
only
occasional
decision-making.”
Tr. at 25.
The ALJ properly afforded “some weight” to the examining state
agency psychologist
Dr.
consultant, Dr. Toor.
Jones
and
Tr. at 25-26.
non-examining
psychological
She explicitly considered
Plaintiff’s statements as well as the opinion evidence from the
examining sources in the record.
She noted that none of Luther’s
-12-
treating sources submitted statements regarding her functional
limitations.
Id.
Dr. Jones diagnosed Luther with Bipolar Disorder NOS and
opined
that
she
was
able
to
follow
and
understand
simple
directions, perform simple tasks independently, maintain attention
and concentration, maintain a regular schedule, learn new tasks,
and perform complex tasks independently.
Tr. at 365.
She did not
always exhibit appropriate decision-making, and she could not
consistently relate with others or appropriately deal with stress.
Id.
Her prognosis was fair with more consistent medication and
sobriety.
Tr. at 366.
Dr. Hochberg’s mental RFC assessment was consistent with
Dr. Jones’ statements.
Tr. at 381-384.
Dr. Hochberg also found
that Luther retained the ability to work in a simple job with
limited stress and limited exposure to others.
Tr. at 383.
When evaluated with the medical evidence in the complete
record, the ALJ found that the assessments of Drs. Jones and Toor
were generally consistent. Tr. at 25. However, she disagreed with
the conclusion that Luther had the tolerance required to handle the
stress of complex (semi-skilled to skilled) tasks.
Id.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ incorrectly applied more weight
to
Luther’s
considering
age,
her
education,
work-related
or
work
experience,
functional
rather
limitations,
than
such
as
limitations in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out
-13-
instructions. Pl’s Mem. at 13-14. Plaintiff, however, relies upon
a
misrepresentation
position.
of
the
ALJ’s
conclusion
to
support
her
Dr. Hochberg’s RFC assessment evaluated Plaintiff’s
ability to understand and remember instructions and found that she
was not significantly limited.
Tr. at 381.
As noted above, the
ALJ arrived at her conclusions by weighing conflicting evidence in
the record
and
crediting
that
which
was
more
persuasive
and
consistent with the record as a whole, a decision well within her
discretion to do so.
See, e.g., Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578,
588 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Genuine conflicts in the medical evidence are
for the Commissioner to resolve.”
(Citing Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971))).
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly disregarded
evidence of GAF scores below 50, which indicate moderate to serious
impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.
Mem. at 15.
Pl’s
However, the lowest GAF score Plaintiff cited pre-
dates Plaintiff’s date of application for benefits by two years.
The ALJ explicitly gave no weight to the GAF score of 48 from
within the course of treatment because the score was “merely
reflective
of
the
counselor’s
assessment
of
the
claimant’s
functioning at that particular moment...” and “...[s]ubsequent
treatment records document[ed] a stabilizing and improving mental
state.” Tr. at 26.
The Social Security regulations provide that
“[Plaintiff’s] level of functioning may vary considerably over
-14-
time;” therefore, in order to properly evaluate the severity of
mental impairments, “it is vital to obtain evidence from relevant
sources over a sufficiently long period [of time] prior to the date
of adjudication to establish [Plaintiff’s] impairment severity.”
See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(D)(2) (2011).
Despite Luther’s negative behaviors, LMSW Jones noted on June 7,
2011 that her manner of managing situations had significantly
improved during her course of treatment.
Tr. at 462.
Plaintiff failed to prove limitations beyond those noted in
the ALJ’s RFC finding.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3) (the
claimant is responsible for providing the evidence used in the
residual functional capacity determination); see also Dumas v.
Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553 (2d Cir. 1983).
Where the record
does not contain sufficient clinical findings, laboratory tests, or
a diagnosis or prognosis necessary for a decision to be made, a
consultative examination may be warranted at the discretion of the
ALJ.
248
20 C.F.R. § 416.919a.
(W.D.N.Y.
1997)
See Hughes v. Apfel, 992 F.Supp. 243,
(citing
20
C.F.R.
§
404.1517
(the
SSI
equivalent to § 416.917)).
Here, the complete record indicates that Plaintiff’s prognosis
was fair with more consistent medication and sobriety.
Therefore,
the arguments set forth at point 1 of Plaintiff’s memorandum of law
in support of his motion are rejected.
-15-
B.
The ALJ Properly Assessed Plaintiff’s Credibility
The ALJ found that Luther’s medically determinable impairment
could reasonably be expected to cause her violent mood swings,
difficulty focusing and concentrating, paranoia and impatience;
however, she found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms were
not credible to the extent that they were inconsistent with her RFC
assessment.
Tr. at 24.
credibility
of
a
The ALJ “has discretion to evaluate the
claimant
and
to
arrive
at
an
independent
judgment...[which she must do] in light of medical findings and
other evidence regarding the true extent of the pain alleged by the
claimant.” Mimms v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1984)
(citation omitted).
The ALJ thus is not obligated to accept a
claimant’s testimony about his limitations without question.
Id.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility finding was
improper
because
the
ALJ
found
that
the
inconsistent with her own RFC determination.
statements
were
Pl’s Mem. at 17.
However, this Court finds that the ALJ’s credibility assessment was
proper and consistent with the record as a whole.
Here, the ALJ explicitly stated that she reviewed all of
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.
Tr. at 24.
She properly
considered Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, inconsistent
testimony,
and
how
maintaining a job.
her
symptoms
Tr. at 26.
-16-
affected
her
attempts
at
Specifically, the ALJ found that Luther’s allegations that her
symptoms were disabling lacked credibility in light of inconsistent
statements.
Tr. at 26.
The ALJ refuted Plaintiff’s complaints
that she was unable to keep a job due to her psychiatric issues,
finding that she was unable to maintain jobs she held during the
course of treatment because those jobs required levels of social
interaction
which
exceeded
her
RFC.
Id.
Indeed,
the
jobs
Plaintiff described to the consultative examiner, Dr. Jones, on
May 20, 2010, were in service positions, similar to her past
relevant work, which the ALJ found she was unable to perform.
Tr.
at 362-366, 26.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to
properly assess her subjective complaints is rejected. See Cruz v.
Astrue, No. 12-0953, 2013 WL 1749364, *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,
2013)(credibility analysis is complete where the ALJ found that
claimant’s alleged symptoms were “inconsistent with the above
residual functional capacity,” and where ALJ provided a basis for
this finding by discussing the claimant’s complaints in the context
of a complete medical record).
C.
The ALJ Did Not Err in Crediting the Vocational Expert’s
Testimony
Plaintiff argues that the hypothetical questions posed to the
Vocational Expert at the hearing were based upon an RFC finding
that
did
not
limitations.
accurately
and
completely
describe
Luther’s
Therefore, she argues that the VE’s answers to these
-17-
questions cannot provide substantial evidence to support the denial
of benefits.
Pl’s Mem. at 19-21.
However, as discussed above,
this Court finds the ALJ’s RFC finding to be proper, and therefore,
there was “substantial record evidence to support the assumption
upon which the VE based his opinion.” Dumas, 712 F.2d at 1554.
Plaintiff also argues that the occupations the ALJ found that
Luther could perform required abilities that would appear to exceed
the RFC found by the ALJ.
Tr. at 20-21.
In support of her
argument, she states that the job “Laundry Worker” requires the
ability to carry out detailed instructions. Social Security Ruling
00-4p provides that “if a conflict exists between the evidence
provided by the expert and the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(“DOT”),] the ALJ must determine whether the expert’s explanation
for the conflict is reasonable.”
Brodbeck v. Astrue, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17935, 26-27 (N.D.N.Y. 2008), quoting Massachi v.
Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007). However, and according
to the U.S. Department of Labor’s Selected Characteristics of
Occupations Defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 132
(1993),
a
Laundry
Worker
performs
elemental
work
(Mechanical
[05.12.18 Cleaning and Maintenance]), which requires “performing
routine work repeatedly [and] following simple instructions.”
See
also DOT Job Codes Nos. 361-684-014, 381.687-018, and 229.587-018,
respectively.
(4th ed. Rev. 1991).
These requirements support the
ALJ’s determination that the VE’s testimony is consistent with the
-18-
information contained in the DOT.
Tr. at 28.
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s argument is rejected.
CONCLUSION
Upon review of the entire record, this Court finds that the
Commissioner’s denial of SSI was based on substantial evidence and
was not erroneous as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Court
grants the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Dkt. No. 6). Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is
denied (Dkt. No. 10), and Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is
dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
_____________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
DATED:
July 22, 2013
Rochester, New York
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