Camelio v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al

Filing 47

-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP- ORDER granting defendants' motions to dismiss the amended complaint (as well as the complaint that preceded it) 12 , 14 , 28 , 31 , and 32 , and the amended complaint is dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice. Signed by Hon. David G. Larimer on 7/23/14. (EMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________________
CHRISTOPHER CAMELIO,

Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
13-CV-6034L
v.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERSLOCAL UNION NO. 118,
WEGMANS FOOD MARKETS, INC.,
Defendants.
________________________________________________

Plaintiff Christopher Camelio (“Camelio”), is an employee of Wegmans Food Markets
(“Wegmans”) and a member of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (the “International”),
a labor organization, and its local chapter, International Brotherhood of Teamsters – Local Union
No. 118 (the “Local”). Camelio brings the instant case against Wegmans, the International and
the Local, alleging that the International and the Local failed to provide him with fair
representation, and that Wegmans and the International and/or Local engaged in collusion,
violated a collective bargaining agreement and improperly exchanged a thing of value in
violation of Sections 301 and 302 of the Labor Relations Management Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.
§186.
The Local (Dkt. #14) and International (Dkt. #12) (collectively “the union defendants”)
each moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim, after which Camelio filed an amended complaint. All three defendants now move to

dismiss the amended complaint (Dkt. #31, #32, #38).

For the reasons that follow, the

defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted, and the amended complaint is dismissed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Familiarity with the lengthy and intricate factual history recited by plaintiff in the
amended complaint, and summarized here, is presumed. Plaintiff, a Wegmans employee, is a
member and steward of the Local (itself an affiliate of the International). Plaintiff’s allegations
primarily concern conduct by Local member and former Secretary-Treasurer for the Local,
Christopher Toole (“Toole”). Toole was removed from office in or about April 2012, when the
International was notified of internal conflicts within the Local’s leadership which were
hampering its operation, placed the Local in trusteeship, removed all of its officers and appointed
Ed Keyser to serve as trustee and John Schmitt (“Schmitt”) as assistant trustee.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that the defendants violated the duty of fair
representation in two ways: (1) Toole, while employed as a business agent for the Local – albeit
while unauthorized to negotiate with Wegmans – shared unspecified information concerning the
Local’s strategies concerning grievances and/or collective bargaining, with Wegmans labor
relations representative Trish Vantucci (“Vantucci”); and (2) when made aware that Toole was
accused of such conduct, assistant trustee Schmitt failed to adequately investigate Toole’s
activities or take action against him. Plaintiff also alleges that Wegmans and the Local violated
LMRA Section 301 by engaging in collusion and a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement, and that Wegmans and the union defendants violated LMRA Section 302 by
exchanging a “thing of value.”

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DISCUSSION

I.

Standard on a Motion to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

II.

Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation
Plaintiff alleges that the union defendants violated the duty of fair representation when

Toole, acting as “agent” for the Local, shared confidential information with Wegmans (via
Vantucci). 1
It is well settled that a union breaches the duty of fair representation when it acts towards
a member in a manner that is, “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith” and results in harm to
members. Vaca v. Sipes, 36 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
Initially, even assuming arguendo that plaintiff correctly surmised from Vantucci’s
allegedly “suspicious” level of knowledge of internal union matters that a Local insider had
shared union information with her, plaintiff’s factual allegations fail to plausibly suggest that the
source of that information was Toole, and not some other Local member or employee.

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Although plaintiff describes a number of Toole’s other actions in negative terms, including
Toole’s promotion of a trusteeship, filing of internal charges against DeLorme and other efforts
apparently aimed at unseating DeLorme and electing a new and different slate of officers,
including Toole himself, there is no indication that any of Toole’s elections-related conduct or
speech violated the Local’s rules and policies, or was otherwise harmful to Local members in a
manner that would support a breach of the duty of fair representation claim. To the extent that
Toole was charged with misusing a Local credit card, subjected to internal disciplinary hearings
and fined for failure to maintain accurate records, plaintiff makes no plausible claim that the
Local’s disposition of the charges against Toole was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.
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Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Toole was the source of Vantucci’s inside information,
plaintiff has failed to plausibly state that Toole was acting as the Local’s agent when he
communicated with Vantucci, or that his actions can otherwise be attributed to the union
defendants.
Regardless of Toole’s experience as a representative of Wegmans employees who were
Local members some years prior, the parties agree that at the time plaintiff alleges Toole was
sharing confidential information with Vantucci, Toole was no longer authorized by the Local to
bargain with Wegmans on its behalf, and that Wegmans was aware of Toole’s lack of authority.
Indeed, plaintiff apparently believes that Toole’s motive for sharing confidential information was
to gain some advantageous posture viz a viz Wegmans, with regard to his potential future
advancement within the Local. (Plaintiff does not explain precisely how such an advantage
would have manifested itself.) The fact that Toole is alleged to have done so for the point and
purpose of undermining the Local’s then-leaders further distances from the realm of plausibility
plaintiff’s claim that the union defendants would have implicitly authorized, condoned or
otherwise adopted Toole’s actions in a manner that would render them liable for his conduct.
To the extent plaintiff alleges that the union defendants must have been aware of Toole’s
activities and encouraged, failed to adequately investigate and/or failed to stop them in a manner
that was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith, plaintiff has alleged no facts that would render
such a conclusion plausible. Although plaintiff contends that Schmitt’s investigation into the
collusion charge was inadequate because Schmitt was unwise to accept Toole’s and Vantucci’s
explanations for their conduct at face value, plaintiff fails to allege facts that would support a
finding that in so doing, the defendants acted in a manner that was arbitrary, discriminatory or in
bad faith. “Bad faith” requires a showing that an act was “fraudulent, deceitful or dishonest.”
White v. White Rose Food, 237 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 2001). Discrimination demands a desire
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to act or retaliate based on impermissible classifications, and arbitrariness refers to actions “so
far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ as to be irrational.” Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v.
O’Neil, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991). In contrast, “[m]ere negligence . . . is not enough to constitute a
breach of [the] duty [of fair representation].” Tompkins v. Local 32BJ, SEIU, 2012 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 54018 at *30 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), quoting Pilchman v. Am. Fed. of State, County and Mun.
Emps., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111538 (S.D..Y. 2011).
Plaintiff makes no factual allegation that Schmitt’s investigation of the collusion
allegation against Toole was not candidly, openly and accurately reported to the plaintiff, or that
Schmitt’s conclusion that Toole’s and Vantucci’s versions of events were credible was anything
but insincere. Even assuming the truth of plaintiff’s allegations that Schmitt’s decision to trust
Toole and Vantucci was foolhardy and that a more extensive investigation would have yielded
evidence of rank collusion, there is no plausible suggestion that Schmitt (or, more generally, the
union defendants) conducted the investigation in a manner that was anything more than merely
negligent, let alone so deficient and misguided as to be fraudulent, deceitful, dishonest,
discriminatory or arbitrary.
More importantly, with regard to all of plaintiff’s asserted grounds for a breach of the
duty of fair representation claim, plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that plaintiff or other
Local members were subjected to actual, measurable harm as a result of the actions of any
defendants. A violation of the duty of fair representation cannot be found unless there is “a
causal connection between the union’s wrongful conduct and [the plaintiff’s] injuries.” Spellacy
v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 156 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 1998). Plaintiff fails to allege precisely
how he has been damaged by any of the defendants’ actions. While plaintiff speculates that
Toole’s alleged sharing of information and the Local’s failure to adequately investigate that
conduct might have resulted in a less favorable collective bargaining agreement between
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Wegmans and the Local because Wegmans could exploit the unidentified “inside information”
that was shared in conducting negotiations, plaintiff offers no facts to render that conclusion
plausible: ultimately, collective bargaining agreement negotiations ended in a new agreement
with which both sides were satisfied. Plaintiff identifies no aspects of that agreement which are
unfavorable to Local members in general or to him in particular, and asserts no factual basis by
which a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the agreement was affected in any way by
any confidential union information that Wegmans might have possessed, or that plaintiff or other
Local members were harmed by the alleged exchange of information between Toole and
Vantucci.
Plaintiff’s breach of fair representation claim is accordingly dismissed.

III.

LRMA Section 301 Claim
In order to state a Section 301 “hybrid” claim, a plaintiff must plausibly assert that: (1)

the union breached its duty of fair representation; and (2) the employer violated the applicable
collective bargaining agreement. See e.g., Jones v. SEIU Local 1199, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119035 at *16 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). Failure to adequately plead and prove both elements means
that a hybrid claim cannot succeed. See e.g., Nicholls v. Brookdale Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 204
Fed. Appx. 40, 42 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order).
Initially, the parties disagree concerning whether plaintiff was required to fully exhaust
the collective bargaining agreement’s grievance and arbitration procedures prior to bringing a
federal lawsuit. See generally Vaca, 386 U.S. 171 at 184. Because exhaustion is not required
when the union is alleged to have breached its duty of fair representation with respect to
grievance or arbitration procedures, see DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,

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163-64 (1983), the Court assumes arguendo that plaintiff’s contention that the union defendants
mishandled his grievance against Toole are sufficient to excuse his failure to exhaust.
Nonetheless, as discussed above, plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege, in the first
instance, that the union defendants breached their duty of fair representation. Furthermore,
plaintiff also fails to plausibly allege that Wegmans violated any portion of the applicable
collective bargaining agreement.

Plaintiff does point to the agreement’s union recognition

clause, which requires Wegmans to recognize the Local as the sole collective bargaining agent
for member employees, and contends that Wegmans violated the collective bargaining agreement
by engaging with Toole through Vantucci, because Wegmans knew that Toole was
“unauthorized” to represent the union defendants. In so arguing, plaintiff contradicts his prior
factual allegations, made in connection with the first element of the hybrid claim, that Toole’s
conduct was, in fact, authorized or ratified by the union defendants, such that his conduct can be
imputed to them. While pleading in the alternative is permissible, in the case of plaintiff’s
purported hybrid/Section 301 claim, plaintiff’s factual allegations in support of the second
component – violation of the collective bargaining agreement by Wegmans – contradict and
wholly defeat his factual allegations in support of the first component – breach of the duty of fair
representation claim by the union defendants, and vice versa.

As such, plaintiff’s factual

allegations fail to plausibly suggest that the union defendants could have breached their duty of
fair representation by engaging in collusion with Wegmans through Toole (on the alleged basis
that Toole’s communications with Vantucci were authorized or permitted by the union
defendants), and/or that Wegmans simultaneously breached the collective bargaining agreement
by “negotiating” with Toole (on the alleged basis that Toole’s communications with Vantucci
were not authorized or permitted by the union defendants). Such conclusory and contradictory
allegations simply cannot usher plaintiff’s Section 301 across the threshold of plausibility.
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Furthermore, plaintiff has again failed to plausibly allege that he suffered any harm as a
result of any alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement.

Even if Toole

communicated to Wegmans the matters that plaintiff speculatively alleges he might have
discussed with Vantucci – the Local’s bargaining position concerning grievance processing and
collective bargaining agreement negotiations – plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that union
members’ bargaining position was actually compromised as a result.

IV.

LRMA Section 302 Claim
Plaintiff also claims that Wegmans and the union defendants violated LRMA Section

302, which restricts certain financial transactions between employers and unions by making it
unlawful for an employer or its agent to “pay, lend or deliver . . . any money or other thing of
value” to employees or labor organizations.” See 29 U.S.C. §186. 2
Here, except for speculative and vague allusions to unspecified “favorable treatment” for
Toole, plaintiff makes no allegation that Wegmans paid, loaned or delivered money, services or
any tangible item of value directly to the Local. Indeed, plaintiff alleges the reverse: that Toole
provided Wegmans with an intangible thing of value: confidential union information. Even
assuming arguendo that such information was shared with Wegmans by Toole, plaintiff fails to
explain how the provision of a thing of value to an employer by an unauthorized union employee
acting outside of the scope of his union duties, rather than by an employer (or a person acting on
an employer’s behalf) to an employee or union, is violative of Section 302, or to describe any
particular thing of value Toole might have received from Wegmans in return that would bring his

2

Plaintiff concedes that monetary damages are unavailable under Section 302, and now seeks
only declaratory and injunctive relief on this claim. (Dkt. #38, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law
at 23 n.2). See 29 U.S.C. §186(e).
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alleged communications with Vantucci within the ambit of Section 302. Plaintiff’s Section 302
claims are dismissed.
CONCLUSION

While the Amended Complaint presents a milieu of colorful characters and sordid
disputes within the union on an operatic scale, it simply fails to plausibly allege claims that are
actionable in this forum. What we have here are internal union political squabbles. For the
foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint (as well as the
complaint that preceded it) are (Dkt. #12, #14, #28, #31, and #32) are granted, and the amended
complaint is dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________________________
DAVID G. LARIMER
United States District Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
July 23, 2014.

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