Pagan v. City of Rochester et al
Filing
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DECISION & ORDER denying 39 Motion to Appoint Counsel; denying 39 Motion to Appoint Interpreter. Signed by Hon. Marian W. Payson on 10/8/2014. (KAH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MIGUEL PAGAN,
DECISION & ORDER
Plaintiff,
13-CV-6150T
v.
CHIEF SHEPPARD, et al.,
Defendants.
Pro se plaintiff Miguel Pagan (“Pagan”) has filed a complaint in the
above-captioned matter asserting constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
various state law claims. (Docket # 1). Pagan’s claims arise out of his arrest. Currently pending
before this Court is Pagan’s motion for appointment of counsel and for an interpreter. (Docket
# 39).
Pagan contends that appointment of counsel is appropriate in this case because he
is indigent and currently incarcerated at the Monroe County Correctional Facility. (Id.). Pagan
also requests that the Court appoint a Spanish-speaking interpreter because his “comprehension
and understanding [of] the [E]nglish language is a little blurry.” (Id.).
DISCUSSION
I.
Plaintiff’s Request for the Appointment of Counsel
It is well-settled that there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil
cases. Although the Court may appoint counsel to assist indigent litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e), see, e.g., Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Charles W. Sears Real Estate, Inc., 865 F.2d 22,
23 (2d Cir. 1988), such assignment of counsel is clearly within the judge’s discretion. In re
Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984). The factors to be considered in deciding whether
or not to assign counsel include the following:
1.
Whether the indigent’s claims seem likely to be of
substance;
2.
Whether the indigent is able to investigate the crucial facts
concerning his claim;
3.
Whether conflicting evidence implicating the need for
cross-examination will be the major proof presented to the
fact finder;
4.
Whether the legal issues involved are complex; and
5.
Whether there are any special reasons why appointment of
counsel would be more likely to lead to a just
determination.
Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Hodge v. Police Officers, 802
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1986).
The Court must consider the issue of appointment carefully, of course, because
“every assignment of a volunteer lawyer to an undeserving client deprives society of a volunteer
lawyer available for a deserving cause.” Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d
Cir. 1989). Therefore, the Court must first look to the “likelihood of merit” of the underlying
dispute, Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d at 392; Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d at
174, and “even though a claim may not be characterized as frivolous, counsel should not be
appointed in a case where the merits of the . . . claim are thin and his chances of prevailing are
therefore poor.” Carmona v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 2001)
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(denying counsel on appeal where petitioner’s appeal was not frivolous but nevertheless appeared
to have little merit).
The Court has reviewed the facts presented herein in light of the factors required
by law and finds, pursuant to the standards promulgated by Hendricks, 114 F.3d at 392, and
Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d at 58, that the appointment of counsel is not necessary at this
time. Pagan previously filed a motion seeking the appointment of counsel, which this Court
denied on October 3, 2013. (Docket # 32). Pagan’s current motion does not provide any basis to
alter the Court’s previous determination. It is therefore the Decision and Order of this Court that
plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel be denied without prejudice at this time. It is
the plaintiff’s responsibility to retain an attorney or press forward with this lawsuit pro se. 28
U.S.C. § 1654.
II.
Plaintiff’s Request for an Interpreter
Pagan’s motion also requests the appointment of an interpreter. (Docket # 39).
“[T]here is no specific statute which authorizes the court to appoint an interpreter in civil in
forma pauperis actions.” Velez v. Burge, 2009 WL 3459744, *2 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting
Mendoza v. Blodgett, 1990 WL 263527, *15 (E.D. Wash. 1990)); Abbas v. Goord, 2007 WL
2891631, *5 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[p]laintiff, as a civil litigant, has no entitlement to an
interpreter”); Pedraza v. Phoenix, 1994 WL 177285, *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“while Fed. R. Civ. P.
43(f) grants the trial judge discretion to appoint an interpreter for trial, there is no federal rule
that gives an indigent non-English speaking civil plaintiff the right to a court-ordered translation
of pre-trial motions”). Pagan contends that an interpreter is necessary because his knowledge of
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the English language is “a little blurry.” (Docket # 39). Even assuming English is not Pagan’s
first language, he has demonstrated his ability to litigate this matter without the assistance of an
interpreter. He has not shown that his ability to prosecute this matter is impeded by any alleged
language deficiencies. Accordingly, Pagan’s request for the appointment of an interpreter is
denied. Velez v. Burge, 2009 WL 3459744 at *2 (denying request for appointment of an
interpreter where record demonstrated that “plaintiff has sufficient proficiency with the English
language to prosecute the claims asserted in the complaint” and where there was “no indication
that plaintiff is unable to understand or communicate with the court or defendant”); Abbas v.
Goord, 2007 WL 2891631 at *5 (denying request for appointment of a interpreter where review
of proceedings established that “[p]laintiff has been able to effectively and aggressively litigate
[the] action”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel
and an interpreter (Docket # 39) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Marian W. Payson
MARIAN W. PAYSON
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
October 8 , 2014
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