Lotocky v. Elmira City School District

Filing 39

ORDER denying in their entirety the parties' 29 34 Motions for Sanctions, without prejudice. Signed by Hon. David G. Larimer on 4/23/14. (EMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________________
PETER LOTOCKY,

Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
13-CV-6298L
v.
ELMIRA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.
________________________________________________

Plaintiff Peter Lotocky (“plaintiff”) brings this action against his employer, the Elmira
City School District (the “District”), asserting claims of national origin-based discrimination and
retaliation, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.
Familiarity with the factual background of the matter is presumed.
The District now moves for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11 (Dkt. #29),
arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims are frivolous. Plaintiff has opposed the motion and purports to
cross move for sanctions, on the grounds that the District’s sanctions motion is itself frivolous.
(Dkt. #34). For the reasons that follow, both motions are denied.

I.

The District’ Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11 establishes the governing standards for pleading and prosecuting

actions in federal court, and provides for the imposition of sanctions “if a party submits a
pleading or motion for any improper purpose.” Hoyle v. Dimond, 612 F. Supp. 2d 225, 236
(W.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Rule 11 sanctions are an extraordinary
remedy, and a movant must therefore meet a ‘high bar’ before sanctions are imposed on an
adversary.”

Id.

See also Smith v. Lopez-Vazquez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52708 at *17

(S.D.N.Y. 2008). Accordingly, any decision concerning the imposition of sanctions “should be
made with restraint and discretion.” Pannonia Farms, Inc. v. USA Cable, 426 F.3d 650, 652 (2d
Cir. 2005). When determining whether a Rule 11 violation has occurred, courts employ an
objective standard of reasonableness. See Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 65 (2d Cir. 2000); Russo
v. Estee Lauder Corp., 856 F. Supp. 2d 437, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
The crux of the District’s argument is that plaintiff has filed a patently frivolous
complaint, because he does not actually believe that the conduct of which he complains – and in
particular, the discriminatory denials of promotions he alleges – was motivated by discrimination
against his national origin. In support of this conclusion, the District relies on the fact that when
plaintiff was asked during his deposition on December 9, 2014 whether he believed that the three
individuals who made decisions with regard to the promotions were biased against him because
of his national origin, he replied with regard to each one that he did not know, or did not believe,
that they were.

(Dkt. #29-4 at 26-32).

Moreover, plaintiff testified that only one of the

discriminatory comments about which he complains was made by a supervisor, rather than a
coworker, and stated at least once that he did not inform the District about the coworker
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comments. The District also claims that plaintiff’s retaliation claims are implausible, because
the actions of which he complains do not bear sufficient indicia of retaliatory animus.
While plaintiff’s deposition testimony may prove to be harmful to his discriminatory
failure-to-promote claims, it is not fatal to them, as a plaintiff’s subjective beliefs are not an
element of a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Plaintiff claims that he was passed over for
at least one promotion, and that a native-born candidate, who was less qualified than he, was
awarded the position. Plaintiff also claims that the District’s administration was aware of
coworker harassment against him including comments degrading his national origin, and that the
District ultimately retaliated against him for lodging a complaint about coworker harassment by
failing to discipline his harassers, subjecting him to surveillance, denying a Worker’s
Compensation claim and continuing to employ a coworker who had explicitly threatened to kill
the plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s allegations and testimony to this effect, if believed, could form a basis to
conclude that he was subjected to retaliation.

Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission clearly did not view plaintiff’s claims as wholly lacking evidentiary support, and at
the conclusion of its investigation affirmatively found that there was “reasonable cause . . . to
believe that Plaintiff was not promoted because of his national origin [and] was subjected to
retaliatory actions, in violation of Title VII…” (Dkt. #34-4, Exh. C at 3). Such a finding
undercuts defendant’s contention that the complaint is so frivolous as to warrant dismissal and
the imposition of sanctions.
Therefore, at this early stage, it cannot be said that there is any “clear evidence” that they
are implausible, frivolous unsupportable, or improper. See generally Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11(b).
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While sanctions should be utilized when necessary and appropriate to correct the abuses that
Rule 11 was designed to curtail, no such abuse appears to have occurred here.
II.

Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Sanctions Against the District
In opposing the District’s motion for sanctions, plaintiff requests sanctions against the

District, arguing that the District’s motion for sanctions is, itself, meritless and frivolous.
The District argues that plaintiff’s motion is procedurally improper. Even assuming
arguendo that the motion is properly before the Court, I find that although the District’s motion
has been denied, the District’s interpretation of the facts and law presented is not unreasonable,
nor is it so glaringly frivolous or unfounded as to merit an award of sanctions.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the parties’ motions for sanctions (Dkt. #29, #34) are denied in
their entirety, without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________________________
DAVID G. LARIMER
United States District Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
April 23, 2015.

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