Rodriguez v. Rochester Genesee Regional Transportation Authority et al

Filing 9

-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP- DECISION AND ORDER granting 6 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. (Clerk to close case.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 8/4/14. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________________
JANICE RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
14-CV-6038T
v.
DECISION
and ORDER
ROCHESTER GENESEE REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY AND DR. ELAINE TUNAITIS,
Defendants.
________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Janice Rodriguez, (“Rodriguez”), proceeding pro se,
brings this action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act,
codified at 42 U.S.C. 12181 et. seq., and Section 296 of the New
York State Human Rights Law claiming that she was discriminated
against by the defendants Rochester Genesee Regional Transportation
Authority (“RGRTA” or “defendant”) and Dr. Elaine Tunaitis on the
basis of a disability.

Plaintiff, who claims to suffer from a back

injury and a lifting restriction, claims that RGRTA failed to hire
her as a bus driver because of her disability (or a perceived
disability) or, in the alternative, that RGRTA failed to provide
her with reasonable accommodations so that she could perform the
position of bus driver.

Although plaintiff names Dr. Tunaitis as

defendant in the Complaint, there are no allegations directed
specifically against her.
The defendants deny plaintiff’s allegations, and move to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a cause of

action.

Specifically, the defendants contend that plaintiff was

not hired by RGRTA because she lied to RGRTA and Dr. Tunaitis
regarding her medical history, and therefore was unable to pass a
medical examination required of all bus drivers in the State of
New York. Defendant contends that because plaintiff could not pass
her medical examination, she was not qualified to be hired as a bus
driver.

Plaintiff has not opposed the defendants’ motion.

For the reasons set forth below, I grant defendants’ motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint.
BACKGROUND
The

following

background

information

is

taken

from

the

plaintiff’s Complaint and the unopposed evidence submitted in
support

of

defendants’

motion

to

dismiss.

Plaintiff

Janice

Rodriguez applied for a position as a part-time bus driver with the
RGRTA.

According

to

the

Complaint,

Rodriguez

was

given

a

conditional job offer pending her passing a medical examination.
According to the defendant, all bus drivers must pass a statemandated medical examination prior to being allowed to operate a
bus.
On July 11, 2013, plaintiff completed a medical certification
statement as part of the medical examination process.

On the

statement, plaintiff stated that she had no disabilities that
prevented her from performing work, and stated that she had never
sustained a work-related injury or filed a claim for workers’

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compensation.

During

the

medical

examination

performed

by

Dr. Tunaitis, plaintiff allegedly told Dr. Tunaitis that she had
had back surgery in 2003, and had not seen a doctor since that
time.

According to medical records obtained by Dr. Tunaitis,

however, it became apparent that plaintiff had filed a workers’
compensation claim based on a work-related injury, had a lifting
restriction of 15 pounds, and had last been to the doctor in 2009,
not 2003 or 2004 as she had told Dr. Tunaitis.

According to the

defendant, plaintiff was disqualified from the driver position
because

she

lied

to

RGRTA

on

the

medical

form,

lied

to

Dr. Tunaitis, and did not pass her medical examination.
DISCUSSION
I.

Standard for Motion to Dismiss

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must “accept...all
factual allegations in the complaint and draw...all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” See Ruotolo v. City of
New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In order to withstand dismissal, the complaint must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 1974 (2007) (disavowing the oft-quoted statement from Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), that “a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond

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doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief”).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires

more

than

labels

and

conclusions,

and

a

formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” See
id.

at

1965

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

Moreover,

conclusory allegations are not entitled to any assumption of truth,
and therefore, will not support a finding that the plaintiff has
stated a valid claim.

Hayden v. Patterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161

(2nd Circ., 2010). Thus, “at a bare minimum, the operative standard
requires the ‘plaintiff [to] provide the grounds upon which his
claim rests through factual allegations sufficient to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.’” See Goldstein v. Pataki,
516 F.3d 50, 56-57 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at
1974).
II.

Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for
disability discrimination.

Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against on the
basis of a disability, or a perceived disability. Section 12112 of
the ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with
a disability with respect to conditions of employment including
hiring, advancement, discharge and compensation.
§ 12112(a) (1995).

42 U.S.C.A.

To state a prima facie case of discrimination
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under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is a
handicapped person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is
otherwise qualified to perform the duties of her job; (3) adverse
employment action was taken against her because of her handicap;
and

(4)

her

employer

provisions of the ADA.
(E.D.N.Y.

1996)

is

subject

to

the

anti-discrimination

Joyce v. Suffolk County, 911 F.Supp. 92, 94

(citations

omitted).

A

plaintiff

may

also

establish a claim of disability discrimination by demonstrating
that she was erroneously regarded by her employer as having an
impairment as defined by the ADA. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
In the instant case, I find, that plaintiff has failed to
sufficiently allege that she suffers from a disability under the
ADA or that she was regarded by the defendant as being disabled
under the ADA.

I further find that plaintiff has failed to

establish that she was qualified for the position of part-time bus
driver.

Accordingly, I find that she has failed to state a claim

of discrimination.
A.

Plaintiff has failed to allege or establish that she is
a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.

Plaintiff claims that she suffered a back injury in April of
2008

which

resulted

in

a

lifting

restriction

of

15

pounds.

Plaintiff does not further explain the nature of the injury, nor
has she responded to the defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim.
It is well settled under federal law that the mere presence of

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a medical condition or impairment suffered by a plaintiff does not
establish that the plaintiff is disabled under the ADA. Capobianco
v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 57 (2d Cir.2005) (“Not every
impairment is a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA”);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii)(“not every impairment will constitute a
disability within the meaning of this section.”)
establish

the

existence

of

a

disability,

a

Rather, to

plaintiff

must

demonstrate that he or she suffers from a physical or mental
impairment that “substantially limits one or more major life
activities . . . .”

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

“Major life

activities” are defined in the regulations promulgated by the EEOC
as “functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.”

45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii).

To be “substantially impaired” from performing a major life
activity, a plaintiff must have an impairment that “prevents or
severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of
central importance to most people’s daily lives.”

Toyota Motor

Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-197. Moreover,
“[t]he impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term.”
Id. at 198.

See also Williams v. Salvation Army, 108 F.Supp.2d

303, 312-313 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“temporary, non-chronic impairments of
short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact,
are

usually

not

disabilities”)

(internal

quotation

marks

and

citations omitted); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(I)-(ii)(A major life
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activity is substantially limited when an individual cannot perform
an activity that an average person in the general population could
perform, or faces significant restrictions in the "condition,
manner, or duration under which the individual can ... perform
[the] activity.")
“Although almost any impairment may . . . in some way affect
a major life activity, the ADA clearly does not consider every
impaired person to be disabled.”
867, 871 (2nd Cir. 1998).
plaintiff

has

a

Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, 135 F.3d

In determining whether or not a

disability,

“courts

have

been

careful

to

distinguish impairments which merely affect major life activities
from

those

that

substantially

(emphasis in original).

limit

those

activities.”

Id.

Accordingly, courts that have considered

whether or not a 25 to 30-pound lifting restriction substantially
limits a major life activity have held that such a restriction is
not a significant limitation.

See Gittens v. Garlocks Sealing

Technologies, 19 F.Supp.2d 104, 111 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (Larimer, C.J.)
(30-pound

lifting

does

not

significantly

affect

major

life

activity); Kirkendall v. United Parcel Service, 964 F.Supp. 106
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (Larimer, C.J.) (lifting restriction of 30 pounds
does not significantly affect major life activity); Williams v.
Channel Master

Satellite

Sys.,

Inc.,

101

F.3d

346,

349 (4th

Cir.1996) (25 pound lifting limitation does not significantly
affect major life activity); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America,
Inc.,

85

F.3d

1311,

1319

(8th

Cir.1996)

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(25

pound

lifting

restriction does not significantly affect major life activity).
Based on this authority, I find that plaintiff’s claim that she is
restricted to lifting 15 pounds does not allege the existence of a
disability under the ADA, and therefore, plaintiff has failed to
adequately allege that she is disabled under the ADA.

Because

plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that she is disabled
under the ADA, she has failed to state a prima facie case of
disability discrimination.
B.

Plaintiff has failed to establish that she was Perceived
as Disabled under the ADA by her potential Employer.

Plaintiff claims in the alternative that she is not disabled,
but that because RGRTA regarded her as being disabled, she was not
hired as a bus driver for the defendant. When proceeding under a
theory of perceived disability, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant employer erroneously believed that the plaintiff suffered
from a condition that prevented the plaintiff from working in a
broad class of jobs. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 49293 (1999).
In the instant case, plaintiff has failed to allege that RGRTA
regarded the plaintiff as disabled from a broad class of jobs, or
even that plaintiff was disabled. While the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant believed she was under a work restriction, she has
failed to allege that the defendants regarded her as being disabled
as defined by the ADA.

As stated above, the mere fact that a

person may have a work restriction does not render that person

Page -8-

disabled

under

sufficiently

the

allege

ADA.
that

Because
the

plaintiff

defendant

has

considered

failed
her

to

to
be

disabled, she has failed to state a prima facie case of disability
discrimination.
C.

Plaintiff has failed to establish that she was qualified
for the position of Bus Driver.

The

second

element

of

a

prima

facie

case

of disability

discrimination requires that the plaintiff establish that she was
qualified to perform the essential functions of her job, with or
without accommodation.

Wernick, 91 F.3d 379 (2nd Cir. 1996);

School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n. 17
(1987).

It is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that she is

qualified for the position.

Borkowski v. Valley Central School

District, 63 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1995).
In the instant case, the defendant has asserted, without
objection from the plaintiff, that Rodriguez was required under
New York State Law to be medically certified to be hired as a bus
driver.

Defendant has also demonstrated, without opposition from

the plaintiff, that Rodriguez was not medically certified to
operate a bus.

Because plaintiff did not have the required

certification to operate a bus, she was not qualified to be a bus
driver.

Because she was not qualified for the position of bus

driver, she can not establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Plaintiff alleges that she should have been certified to drive
a bus because driving a bus did not involve any lifting.

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She

claims that she did not mention her lifting restriction because she
felt it was not relevant to her application to become a bus driver.
Despite plaintiff’s personal beliefs regarding the relevancy of her
medical history, however, it is uncontroverted that the plaintiff
withheld information that was asked of her both on her medical
certification and during her medical exam.

It was plaintiff’s

failure to disclose her medical information that caused her to be
disqualified from the position she sought.

III. Remaining Claims.
Plaintiff’s federal claims against Dr. Tunaitis are dismissed
with prejudice on grounds that the ADA does not provide for
personal liability of individual defendants.
Chicago,

194

F.3d

788

(7th

Cir.

1999);

Corporation, 66 F.3d 1295 (2nd Cir. 1995).

Silk v. City of

Tomka

v.

The

Seiler

To the extent that

plaintiff alleges retaliation by the defendants against her, or
that

the

defendants

failed

to

provide

her

with

reasonable

accommodations, I find that such claims lack any plausible basis,
and therefore may be dismissed.

With respect to plaintiff’s State

law claim, where a court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, it may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state-law claims, and may dismiss those claims
without prejudice.

28

U.S.C.A.

1367(c)(3).

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Because

all

of

plaintiff’s federal claims have been dismissed, I hereby dismiss
plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 1367(c)(3).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I grant defendants’ motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety.

ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
s/Michael A. Telesca
Michael A. Telesca
United States District Judge
DATED:

Rochester, New York
August 4, 2014

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