Byrd v. Fingerlakes \ Developmental Disabilities Services Office O.P. W.D.D.

Filing 60

DECISION AND ORDER denying 56 Motion to Vacate. The Court certifies that any appeal of this decision and order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore denies Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. (Clerk to send copy of this Decision and Order by first class mail to Plaintiff.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 1/28/19. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
VICKIE DIANNE BYRD,
Plaintiff,

No. 6:14-cv-06470(MAT)
DECISION AND ORDER

-vsNYS FINGERLAKES DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES SERVICES
O.P.W.D.D.,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Proceeding pro se, Vickie Dianne Byrd (“Plaintiff”) instituted
this action by filing a complaint (Dkt #1) dated August 11, 2014,
alleging that “NYS Fingerlakes Developmental Disabilities Services
O.P.W.D.D.”1

discriminated against her in connection with her

application for employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et
seq.; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), Pub. L.
No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327, amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008); and the New York Human
Rights Law (“NYHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq.
In a Decision and Order filed on November 22, 2018, the Court
granted Defendant’s renewed Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 56 in its entirety and

1

This term appears to be a conflation of the New York State Office For
People With Developmental Disabilities (“OPWDD”) and the Finger Lakes
Developmental Disabilities State Operations Office (“FLDDSOO”).

dismissed

Plaintiff’s

Complaint.

See

Dkt

#54.

Judgment

in

Defendant’s favor was entered on November 26, 2018. See Dkt #55.
On December 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate the
Judgment. See Dkt #56. Plaintiff also filed a pleading purporting
to be Response in Opposition, see

Dkt #57, to Defendant’s no-

longer-pending summary judgment motion along with an Opposition to
Statement of Fact, see Dkt #57-1. Defendant filed a Memorandum in
Opposition (Dkt #58) to Plaintiff’s motion for vacatur.
For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate
is denied in its entirety.
LEGAL STANDARD
“[W]here a post-judgment motion is timely filed and ‘calls
into question the correctness of that judgment it should be treated
as a motion under FRCP 59(e), however it may be formally styled.’”
Lyell Theatre Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1982)
(quoting Dove v.Codesco, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978)). “There
are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be
granted. First, the movant may demonstrate that the motion is
necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the
judgment is based. . . . Second, the motion may be granted so that
the

moving

unavailable

party

may

evidence.

present
Third,

newly
the

discovered

motion

will

or
be

previously
granted

if

necessary to prevent manifest injustice. . . . Fourth, a Rule 59(e)
motion may be justified by an intervening change in controlling

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law.”

11

Fed.

Prac.

&

Proc.

Civ.,

Grounds

for

Amendment

or

Alteration of Judgment, § 2810.1 (3d ed.) (footnotes omitted).
The Second Circuit has explained that “[t]he standard for
granting

a

[motion

for

reconsideration]

is

strict,

and

reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party
can

point

to

controlling

overlooked—matters,

in

decisions

other

words,

or

data

that

that

might

the

court

reasonably

be

expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v.
CSX

Transp.,

Inc.,

70

F.3d

255,

257

(2d

Cir.

1995)

(citing

Schonberger v. Serchuk, 742 F. Supp. 108, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Adams v. United States, 686 F. Supp. 417, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts in a conclusory fashion that she did not
receive notice of the consequences of not responding to Defendant’s
renewed Motion for Summary Judgment because someone is “disrupting”
her mail and that mail has been missing from her mailbox. See Dkt
#56. In her Response (Dkt #57) and Opposition to Statement of Facts
(Dkt #57-1), which are largely duplicative of each other, Plaintiff
simply reasserts her disagreement with Defendant’s decision not to
extend an

employment

offer

to

her

and levels

accusations

of

misconduct and discrimination by Defendant and its employees.
Even assuming Plaintiff’s Opposition to Statement was timely
filed, and in compliance with the District’s Local Rules of Civil
Procedure or with FRCP 56—which it is not—it would have had no

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effect on this Court’s decision to grant summary judgment to
Defendant based on Defendant’s properly supported motion.
As the Supreme Court has explained, the court’s inquiry under
FRCP 56 is the inquiry under “whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission 252 to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52
(1986).

A

party’s

“bald

assertion,

completely

unsupported

by

evidence, [does] not satisfy [her] burden; it certainly d[oes] not
‘present[ ] a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury’ as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).” Carey v. Crescenzi,
923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
251–52. “To overcome a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving
party must provide this Court with some basis to believe that his
‘version of relevant events is not fanciful.’” Lee v. Coughlin, 902
F. Supp. 424, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), on reconsideration, 26 F.
Supp.2d 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Christian Dior–New York, Inc.
v.

Koret,

Inc.,

792

F.2d

34,

37–39

(2d

Cir.

1986);

citing

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986) (stating that a party opposing summary judgment
“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts”).
The Court is cognizant of Plaintiff’s pro se status and the
requirement that her submissions be judged by a more lenient
standard

than

that

accorded

to

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“formal

pleadings

drafted

by

lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, this
leniency “is not without limits, and all normal rules of pleading
are not absolutely suspended.” Stinson v. Sheriff’s Dep’t of
Sullivan County, 499 F. Supp. 259, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In other
words, Plaintiff’s pro se status does not relieve her of the usual
prerequisites of opposing a properly supported summary judgment
motion. See Houston v. Teamsters Local 210, Affiliated Health &
Ins. Fund-Vacation

Fringe

Ben.

Fund,

27

F.

Supp.3d

346, 351

(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[P]roceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve a
litigant of the usual requirements of summary judgment, and a pro
se party’s bald assertions unsupported by evidence . . . are
insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.”) (quoting
Rodriguez

v. Hahn,

209

F.

Supp.2d

344, 348

(S.D.N.Y.

2002);

internal quotation marks omitted in original).
Here, Plaintiff’s Response and Opposition to Statement of
Facts consist of nothing more than “bald assertion[s], completely
unsupported by evidence,” Carey, 923 F.2d at 21. They are patently
insufficient to create a “metaphysical doubt” as to the material
facts much less a “genuine issue” requiring resolution by a jury.
The Court adheres to its previous Decision granting Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment because Defendant showed that there is
no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s post-judgment
submissions provide the Court with no basis to deviate from this
ruling.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate is
denied. The Court certifies that any appeal of this decision and
order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore denies
Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca

HON. MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:

January 28, 2019
Rochester, New York.

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