Albino v. Global Equipment USA, Ltd.
Filing
76
DECISION AND ORDER denying 45 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 8/18/16. (AFB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ALEXANDER ALBINO,
Plaintiff,
-vs-
DECISION and ORDER
No. 6:14-cv-06519(MAT)
GLOBAL EQUIPMENT USA, LTD.,
Defendant.
GLOBAL EQUIPMENT USA, LTD.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
-vsH. P. NEUN COMPANY, INC., ISOWA
AMERICA, INC. and ISOWA CORPORATION,
Third-Party Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Alexander
Albino
(“Plaintiff”),
represented
by
counsel,
instituted this diversity action against Global Equipment USA, LTD.
(“Global” or “Defendant”), alleging causes of action based on
strict products liability and negligence as the result of injuries
he sustained while he was employed at third-party defendant H.P.
Neun Company, Inc. (“H.P. Neun”). Presently before the Court is
Global’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction (Dkt #45).
-1-
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff,
who
is
presently
a
resident
of the
State of
Florida, was employed at H.P. Neun at all times relevant to this
action.
Prior
to
its
acquisition
by
Jamestown
Container
Corporation, H.P. Neun was a New York corporation, engaged in the
manufacture of packaging materials. Plaintiff was injured while
working at one of H.P. Neun’s production facilities on September 8,
2012, while operating an ISOWA 66" x 125" 2/Color Flexo Rotary Die
Cutter (“the Machine”).
The Machine originally was imported into the United States by
third-party
defendant
ISOWA
Corporation
(“ISOWA
Corp.”)
or
a
predecessor company to third-party defendant ISOWA America, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Japan-based ISOWA Corp.
At some point prior to July 2008, the Machine was owned by
third-party defendant and Michigan domiciliary Arvco Container
Corp. (“Arvco”), which entered into an agreement to have Global
list the Machine and broker any ensuing sale. Global, an Illinois
corporation with a principal place of business in Vernon Hills,
Illinois, is a nationwide and worldwide distributor of new and used
corrugated box making and converting equipment.
On May 20, 2008, Global employee Robert Mages (“Mages”) sent
a letter to Bruce Chilton (“Chilton”) at H.P. Neun stating, “We are
pleased to offer you the following equipment [i.e., the Machine]
for your consideration[.]” The letter provided additional details
-2-
regarding
the
Machine’s
features,
listed
an
asking
price
of
$285,000, and included a series of photographs of the Machine. On
July 21, 2008, Mages noted that he “t/w [talked with] Bruce
[Chilton] - should have a decision made this week. . . . He will
respond back to me.”
On July 30, 2008, Global sent a contract (“the Contract”) to
H.P.
Neun
regarding
the
sale
and
shipment
of
the
Machine,
indicating that it was being “SOLD TO” H.P. Neun for $275,000. See
Contract,
p.
1.
Under
“SHIP
TO”,
the
Contract
states,
“AS
INSTRUCTED.” The Contract further states that Machine is “sold as
is[,] where is[,] as inspected by H.P. Neun.” Id. “Unless otherwise
provided” in the Contract, “delivery shall be made F.O.B. [Free on
Board] place of shipment and Seller shall deliver the machinery to
a common carrier . . . selected by Seller.” Id., p. 2, ¶ 6. H.P.
Neun sent a check in the amount of $101,666.66 to Global on or
about August 8, 2008.
Meanwhile, on August 6, 2008, Jack Secord of Arvco sent a
letter to H.P. Neun indicating that he would release the Machine
upon receipt of a signed contract and a deposit payment. On August
12, 2008, Global sent a Purchase Order to Arvco, indicating a
purchase price of $265,000 for the Machine, and stating that the
Machine was to be shipped to Global as instructed. Also on that
date, Global sent Arvco a check in the amount of $81,666.66.
On August 19, 2008, Mages sent an email to Global employee
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Justin Farrell (“Farrell”) regarding the H.P. Neun contract, and
instructing Farrell to begin dismantling the Machine the week of
September 22, 2008. Mages provided other instructions to Farrell
regarding shipping arrangements for the Machine, which was to be
shipped to H.P. Neun in Fairport, New York.
Approximately four years later, on September 8, 2012, while
operating the Machine at a production facility owned and operated
by H.P. Neun, Plaintiff’s left hand became caught between a set of
nip rollers in the Machine’s feeder mechanism and was crushed. As
a result of his injuries, Plaintiff was required to undergo surgery
to amputate the index, middle, ring, and little fingers on his left
hand.
Plaintiff instituted this action against Global on August 27,
2014, alleging causes of action for strict products liability and
negligence based on the September 8, 2012 incident. On January 18,
2016, Global filed third–party actions against Arvco, H.P. Neun,
ISOWA America and ISOWA Corp., although it voluntarily dismissed
the third-party action against Arvco on March 2, 2016.
Limited jurisdictional discovery ensued. Global filed the
instant Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Dkt #45) and
supporting memorandum of law with exhibits (Dkt ##46-1 to 46-6) on
February 26, 2016. Plaintiff filed papers in opposition (Dkt ##6367), and Global filed reply papers (Dkt ##71-1 to 71-5). H.P. Neun
filed papers in support of Global’s motion to dismiss (Dkt ## 61-
-4-
62). For the reasons discussed below, Global’s motion is denied.
GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant if the defendant “is subject to the jurisdiction of a
court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court
is located.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).1 Personal jurisdiction can
be either general or specific. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese
Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 60 n. 9 (2d Cir. 2012). Under New
York law, Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) sections 301 and
302 provide a basis for general and specific personal jurisdiction,
respectively.
General
jurisdiction
is
proper
where
the
defendant’s
“affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as
to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011) (quotation omitted). Specific jurisdiction, on the other
hand, “depends
on
an
‘affiliation
between
the
forum
and
the
underlying controversy,’” id. (brackets and quotation omitted), and
is “confined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’” Id.
(quotation
omitted).
Here,
Plaintiff
does
not
allege
general
1
The first requirement for the exercise of personal jurisdiction is that the
plaintiff’s service of process upon the defendant was procedurally proper. In re
Kalikow, 602 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Global does not deny
that it was properly served with Plaintiff’s Summons and Complaint.
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jurisdiction over Global, arguing instead that Global is subject to
specific personal jurisdiction under several subsections of CPLR
302(a).
Once general or specific jurisdiction is established, the
court must verify that “the exercise of personal jurisdiction . .
. comport[s] with constitutional due process principles[,]” Licci
ex rel. Licci, 673 F.3d at 60, which “protect[ ] an individual’s
liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of
a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts,
ties, or relations.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
471–72 (1985) (quotation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
argues
that
Defendant
is
subject
to
personal
jurisdiction under CPRL 302(a)(1), CPLR 302(a)(3)(i), and CPLR
302(a)(3)(ii). As discussed further below, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated specific jurisdiction under
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). The Court therefore need not determine whether
specific
jurisdiction
lies
under
CPRL
302(a)(1)
or
302(a)(3)(i).
I.
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii)
CPLR 302(a)(3) provides in pertinent part that
[a]s to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in person
or through an agent: . . .
3. [1] commits a tortious act [2] without the state [3]
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CPLR
causing injury within the state . . . if he . . .
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the
acts to have consequences in the state and
derives substantial revenue from interstate or
international commerce.
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 302(a)(3)(ii). Here, Plaintiff has adequately
alleged the
first
three
elements
set forth
in
the prefatory
language of CPLR 302(a)(3), namely that (1) Global committed a
tortious act (i.e., brokering the sale of an allegedly defective
product) (2) outside of New York (either in Illinois, Global’s
principal place of business, or in Michigan, Arvco’s principal
place of business), (3) that caused injury to Plaintiff in New
York. See Complaint (“Compl.”) (Dkt #1) ¶¶ 5-34. These factual
allegations suffice at the pleading stage. See Gucci Am., Inc. v.
Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 241 (S.D.N.Y.
2010)
(“A
committed
plaintiff
a
tort’
to
‘need
not
satisfy
actually
the
first
prove
that
element
of
defendant
[CPLR]
§
302(a)(3)(ii), ‘but rather need only state a colorable cause of
action.’”) (quoting Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts
Mgmnt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2006); (further quotation
omitted)); see also Levans v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 988 F. Supp.2d
330, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (For purposes of CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii),
“where a manufacturer ships a defective product to New York where
it injures a New York resident, the injury clearly occurs in New
York.”) (citation omitted).
-7-
The first prong of subsection (ii) of CPLR 302(a)(3) is a
foreseeability
requirement.
“The
test
of
whether
a
defendant
expects or should reasonably expect his act to have consequences
within the State is an objective rather than subjective one.”
Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Allen v. Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 357 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550
(3d Dep’t 1974)). New York courts have attempted to apply the
“reasonable expectation” requirement in a manner consistent with
United States Supreme Court precedent on the due process limits of
state-court jurisdiction. Kernan, 175 F.3d at 241 (citing In re DES
Cases,
789
F.
Supp.
552,
570–71
(E.D.N.Y.
1992)
(collecting
cases)). Thus, “the mere likelihood that a defendant’s product will
find its way into New York does not satisfy” the “reasonable
expectation” element; rather, “purposeful availment of the benefits
of the laws of New York such that the defendant may reasonably
anticipate being haled into New York court is required.” In re DES
Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 570–71 (citing, inter alia, Schaadt v. T.W.
Kutter, Inc., 564 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (3d Dep’t 1991) (“[I]t is not
enough that a defendant foresaw the possibility that its product
would find its way here; foreseeability must be coupled with
evidence of a purposeful New York affiliation, for example, a
discernible effort to directly or indirectly serve the New York
market.”).
In interpreting the “reasonable expectation” requirement, New
-8-
York courts “have focused on whether there were concrete facts
known to the nondomiciliary that should have alerted it that its
product would enter the New York market.” Am. Network, Inc. v.
Access Am./Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494, 497 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (citing Darienzo v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 831,
833 (2d Dep’t 1980) (nondomiciliary shoe manufacturer should have
expected New York consequences from its manufacture of shoes
because it was aware that a Tennessee distributor to which its
shoes were shipped would distribute them to New York retailers);
other citation omitted). Here, as discussed further below, the
relevant documentation establishes that Global affirmatively knew
the Machine was destined for New York.
While the section of the Contract headed, “SHIP TO”, states,
“AS INSTRUCTED,” the documentation subsequently exchanged between
Global and H.P. Neun clarified where the Machine was to be shipped
to (Fairport, New York). Moreover, it establishes that Global, in
fact, was involved in making and the shipping arrangements and
coordinating
communications
among
the
companies
involved
in
accomplishing shipment of the Machine. Global employee Mages, who
initially
had contacted
H.P.
Neun
offering
to
sell
them the
Machine, sent an email on August 19, 2008, to fellow Global
employee Justin Farrell (“Farrell”) “[r]egarding the H.P. Neun
contract” and instructing Farrell to “[b]egin dismantling [the
Machine] the week of 9/22/08.” See Ex. 3 to Belanger Decl. (Dkt
-9-
#63). Mages also told Farrell to “[talk with] Doug [Cantrell
(“Cantrell”) of Corrugated Machinery] near to that date to find out
when he would need trucks . . . to be billed to H.P. Neun.” Mages
noted, “[W]e need to relocate unitizer . . . to Arvco to be
reloaded by Doug to go to H.P. Neun for install.” In emails
exchanged
between
Farrell
and
non-party
Synergy
Global
Transportation, Inc. employee Steve Crawford (“Crawford”), Farrell
informed Crawford of the dates and locations of the various pick-up
points, along with the number and type of trucks needed. See Ex. 3
to
Belanger
Decl.
(Dkt
#63).
Thus,
the
logistical
decisions
regarding shipment of the Machine were made by Global.
Finally, an invoice stamped, “PAID,” from Global to H.P. Neun
dated September 29, 2008, indicates that the Machine was sold to
H.P. Neun, and that it was “SHIP[PED] TO” H.P. Neun at an address
in Fairport, New York. It was installed by Cantrell of Corrugated
Machinery, a subcontractor who was paid by H.P. Neun, but procured
by Global for the job. Moreover, Global’s owner and CEO, James
Schiffman (“Schiffman”), testified at his deposition that he knew
the Machine was being shipped to New York. See Schiffman: 144-45.2
The Court finds that the foregoing facts are sufficient to
meet
the
“reasonable
expectation”
requirement
under
CPLR
302(a)(3)(ii). See, e.g., LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 N.Y.2d
2
Citations in the form, “Name: Numeral(s)”, refer to page numbers from the
individual’s deposition transcript.
-10-
210, 215 (2000) (“Pak-Mor’s invoice, including its reference to a
‘New York Light Bar,’ shows that it knew the rear-loader was
destined for use in New York. Clearly, Pak-Mor had reason to expect
that any defects would have direct consequences in this State.”).
Turning next to the “substantial revenue from interstate or
international commerce” element, “one of the statute’s purposes is
to exclude non-domiciliary businesses of a local nature.” Vecchio
v. S & T Mfg. Co., 601 F. Supp. 55, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); see also
David D. Siegel, New York Practice § 88 (5th ed. 2011) (describing
C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) as a “bigness requirement” designed to
assure that the defendant is “economically big enough” to defend
suit in New York). New York courts have analyzed the substantiality
of defendants’ revenues from interstate or international commerce
in both relative and absolute terms. Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F.
Supp. 310, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (comparing cases). However, “neither
approach is binding,” id., and “each case must be decided on its
own facts[.]” Chunky Corp. v. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co., 299
F. Supp. 110, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). There is “no decision” setting
“an absolute number at which interstate commerce is considered to
be ‘substantial.’” Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 32 F. Supp.2d 47, 68
(E.D.N.Y.
1998).
Rather,
courts
have
stressed
the
need
for
flexibility; “the overall nature of the defendant’s business and
the extent to which he can fairly be expected to defend lawsuits in
foreign forums” are “among the most important facts” to consider.
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Ronar, Inc., 649 F. Supp. at 317 (citing Path Instruments Int’l
Corp. v. Asahi Optical Co., 312 F. Supp. 805, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(notwithstanding that defendant’s “small size may render it a
marginal
case,”
“given
the
inherently
and
almost
exclusively
interstate character of its business operations as a sales and
distributional arm of a much larger organization, the revenue it
derives
from
interstate
commerce
is
sufficient
to
meet
the
requirements of 302(a)(3)(ii)”); other citation omitted).
At the outset, the Court notes that Global’s “business can
hardly be characterized as ‘local.’”
LaMarca, 95 N.Y.2d at 215.
Global’s website describes the company as “The World’s Corrugated
Machinery Supplier. . . A Full Service Company. . . Not Just a
Broker[,]”
and
asserts
that
Global
“is
one
of
the
largest
distributors of new and used corrugated box making and converting
equipment in the USA and throughout the world.”3 In addition to
having customers in New York, Global serves customers in “47 other
states
and
62
other
countries.”
See
Schiffman:
163-64.
Significantly, Schiffman testified regarding the international
character of Global’s business as follows:
[W]e have an arsenal of people that we know throughout
the world so if we’re transacting of helping somebody
with a machine in Australia, we know of machinery movers
there and . . . we recommend all these people based on
experience. . . . [W]e help people buy and sell machines
in the process of brokerage with various vendors that can
3
http://www.boxmachine.com/ (last accessed Aug. 15, 2016)
(ellipses in original).
-12-
help with the process.
Schiffman Dep. at 20-21.
Global estimates that in 2016, about 30 to 45 percent of its
business
was
derived
from
international
transactions.
See
Schiffman: 19-20. In the period 2005 to 2015, Global’s gross
revenue from the New York market was not more than $4,000,000,
while its entire domestic gross revenue for the same period was not
more than $48,000,000. See Belanger Decl. (Dkt #63) at 7, ¶ 12
(citing
Schiffman:
51-54;
Global’s
Response
Nos.
6
&
7
to
Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories).
On the present record, Plaintiff has established that Global
derives substantial
revenue
from
interstate
and
international
commerce for purposes of CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). See, e.g., LaMarca, 95
N.Y.2d at
215
(The
defendant,
“[a]
Texas
corporation
with a
manufacturing facility in Virginia[,] is inherently engaged in
interstate
commerce.
Moreover,
the
company
had
a
New
York
distributor and a district representative. Its national advertising
and New York sales figures alone show that the company derives
substantial revenue from interstate commerce.”) (footnote omitted);
Nichols v. Surgitool, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 58, 63 (W.D.N.Y. 1976)
(holding that where defendants’ business was national in scope and
gross sales over a 7-year period totaled over $3.7 million, there
was substantial interstate revenue).
II. Due Process Inquiry
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Having resolved the state-law jurisdictional question, the
Court must determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Global is consistent with the due process protections provided
by the United States Constitution. See Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 489
F.3d 542, 547 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[E]ven if the New York Court of
Appeals concludes that personal jurisdiction is proper under §
302(a)(1) of the New York long-arm statute, this Court must make
the ultimate determination whether this jurisdiction satisfies
constitutional due process.”). “Due process considerations require
that the defendant ‘have certain minimum contacts [with the forum
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Licci ex
rel. Licci, 732 F.3d at 169 (quotation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted in original; brackets in original).
The
evidence
obtained
by
Plaintiff
during
jurisdictional
discovery establishes that Global has purposefully directed a
portion of its business activities toward New York markets. For
instance, from at least 2007 to 2013, Global had a New York sales
territory, with an employee designated to work that territory.
Global also maintained a database of New York customers for use by
its sales representatives. This database identified the Global
employee responsible for each New York customer and included a
“notes” section where the sales representative could record the
sales calls made to each customer and schedule a date for the next
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sales contact. From 2005 to 2015, Global regularly solicited
business in New York from at least 25 companies, sending at least
150 offer letters for the sale of at least 169 box making machines.
H.P. Neun, in particular, has been a Global customer since at least
1998, and has purchased other new and used box making equipment
from Global, in addition to the Machine. See, e.g., Schiffman:
141-56; Exs. 6 & 13 to Belanger Decl. (Dkt #63). On September 25,
2006, for example, Global sold H.P. Neun a used 2-color Piemonte
Flexo Folder Gluer for $40,000. On December 5, 2007, Global sold
H.P. Neun one new Global Easyfeed feed assist unit for $38,000, and
installed the unit at a cost of $4,200. At present, Global is
listing on its website approximately twelve pieces of equipment
located at the former H.P. Neun facility, on behalf of Jamestown
Container Corporation, the company that recently purchased H.P.
Neun. See Schiffman: 156-58; Ex. 10 to Belanger Decl. (Dkt #63).
The foregoing facts are sufficient to establish at this point in
the proceedings that Global “purposefully availed” itself of the
privileges of doing business in New York such that it could foresee
being “haled into court” here. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. at 475.
Next, the Court must consider whether the exercise of long-arm
jurisdiction over Global “is reasonable under the circumstances of
[this]
case.”
Kernan,
175
F.3d
at
244
(quotations
omitted;
alteration in original). The “reasonableness” inquiry looks at the
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following
factors:
“(1)
the
burden
that
the
exercise
of
jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the
forum state in adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiff’s interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate
judicial
system’s
interest
in
obtaining
the
most
efficient
resolution of the controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the
states in furthering substantive social policies.” Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 568 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted).
First, there admittedly would be a “burden . . . impose[d]” on
Global, a nondomiciliary of New York, if it is forced to defend a
lawsuit here. While this factor weighs against the reasonableness
of exercising long-arm jurisdiction, it is less important in this
era
of
computers
and
the
ability
to
communicate
and
send
information almost instantaneously. Indeed, courts in recent years
have declined to find that a corporation headquartered outside of
the United States is sufficiently inconvenienced by being sued in
this country to defeat personal jurisdiction. See Kernan, 175 F.3d
at 244.
Second,
New
York’s
interest
in
the
instant
dispute
is
relatively strong since, at the time of his injury, Plaintiff was
a New York resident. Although Plaintiff has since moved to Florida,
there appears to be no dispute that New York products liability and
negligence law apply in this case. Thus, this factor weighs in
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favor of finding the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction reasonable.
Third, while Plaintiff is no longer a New York resident, his
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief “is furthered
by maintaining [his] choice of venue.” Int’l Healthcare Exch., Inc.
v. Glob. Healthcare Exch., LLC, 470 F. Supp.2d 345, 360 (S.D.N.Y.
2007). See also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780
(1984) (“[A] plaintiff’s residence in the forum State is not a
separate jurisdictional requirement, and lack of residence will not
defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of the defendant’s
contacts.”).
The
fourth
factor—efficient
resolution
of
the
controversy–favors a New York forum, since the allegedly defective
piece of equipment is presently located in New York, the situs of
Plaintiff’s
injury.
See
Kernan,
175
F.3d
at
245.
While
the
Machine’s design and manufacture took place in Japan, evidence
regarding those topics is likely to be documentary in nature and
likely will not necessitate calling witnesses from Japan. See id.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of exercising jurisdiction
over Defendant.
With regard to the fifth “reasonableness” factor, “there is no
indication that any substantive social policy will be advanced or
impeded by the exercise of jurisdiction[,]” In re Methyl Tertiary
Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Products Liab. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 325,
334
(S.D.N.Y.
2005),
over
Global
-17-
by
the
State
of
New
York.
Therefore,
the
shared
interest
of
the
states
in
advancing
substantive social policies is a neutral factor in this case.
Upon
reviewing
the
above
discussion
of
the
due
process
“reasonableness factors,” the Court notes that the first factor
supports Global’s position, while the second, third and fourth
factors weigh in favor of the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction. In
these circumstances, the Court concludes that exercising personal
jurisdiction over Global would not offend “‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice[,]’” Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783, 788 (1984) (quotations omitted). Therefore, the Court denies
Global’s motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. See Kernan, 175 F.3d at 245 (affirming district
court’s denial of motion to dismiss third-party action for lack of
personal jurisdiction where first reasonableness factor tipped in
third-party defendant’s favor, whereas the second, third, and
fourth factors weighed in favor of exercising jurisdiction).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Global’s Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction (Dkt #45) is denied. Plaintiff’s
Complaint against Global may proceed.
SO ORDERED.
S/ Michael A. Telesca
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
DATED:
August 18, 2016
Rochester, New York
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