Callahan v. Colvin
Filing
13
-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP- DECISION AND ORDER granting 7 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to the extent that the matter is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order; and denying 10 Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Clerk to close case.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 9/29/15. (JMC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CRYSTAL A. CALLAHAN,
No. 6:14-cv-06553(MAT)
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
-vsCAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
I.
Introduction
Represented by counsel, Crystal A. Callahan (“Plaintiff”)
brings this action pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act
(“the
Act”),
seeking
review
of
the
final
decision
of
the
Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying her
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The Court
has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure. For the reasons discussed below, the
Commissioner’s decision is reversed and the matter is remanded for
further administrative proceedings.
II.
Background
On April 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB,
alleging disability based on back pain, depression, and anxiety,
with an onset date of October 25, 2010. T.87, 124-28.1 After her
initial DIB application was denied, Plaintiff requested a hearing,
which was held via videoconference before administrative law judge
Joseph L. Brinkley (“the ALJ”) on July 11, 2013. T.41-76. Plaintiff
appeared with her attorney and testified at the hearing, as did a
vocational
expert.
On
August
23,
2013,
the
ALJ
issued
an
unfavorable decision. T.18-35. Plaintiff filed an administrative
appeal, which was denied by the Appeals Council on August 27, 2014,
thereby making
the
ALJ’s
decision
the
final
decision
of
the
Commissioner. This timely action followed.
The parties have filed cross-motions for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure. The Court adopts and incorporates by reference herein
the undisputed and comprehensive factual summaries contained in the
parties’ briefs. The Court will discuss the record evidence further
below, as necessary to the resolution of the parties’ contentions.
III. Scope of Review
When considering a claimant’s challenge to the decision of the
Commissioner denying benefits under the Act, the district court is
limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s findings were
supported
by
substantial
record
evidence
and
whether
the
1
Citations to “T.” refer to pages from the certified transcript
of the administrative record, submitted by the Commissioner in
connection with her answer to the complaint.
-2-
Commissioner employed the proper legal standards. Green-Younger v.
Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). The district court
must accept the Commissioner’s findings of fact, provided that such
findings are supported by “substantial evidence” in the record.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (the Commissioner’s findings “as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive”).
The reviewing court nevertheless must scrutinize the whole record
and examine evidence that supports or detracts from both sides.
Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted). “The deferential standard of review for substantial
evidence does not apply to the Commissioner’s conclusions of law.”
Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley
v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984)).
IV.
The ALJ’s Decision
The
ALJ
applied
the
five-step
sequential
evaluation
promulgated by the Commissioner for adjudicating DIB claims. See
20
C.F.R.
§
404.1520. Plaintiff
last
met
the
insured
status
requirements of the Act on March 31, 2013, and did not engage in
substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged
onset date of October 25, 2010, through her date last insured.
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following
severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,
fibromyalgia, obesity, bipolar disorder, and anxiety disorder/panic
disorder.
-3-
At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have
an
impairment
or
a combination
of
impairments that
meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. In particular, the ALJ
considered Listing 12.04 (Affective Disorders) and Listing 12.06
(Anxiety Disorders. Considering the “Paragraph B” criteria for
these listings, the ALJ found that she has “mild” difficulties with
activities of daily living.
In terms of social functioning, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff had “moderate” difficulties given that
there was “some evidence” in the record that Plaintiff’s mood
disorder and anxiety caused limitations in this area, and she
reported difficulties getting along with her supervisors at work.
In addition, her mental health records showed that Plaintiff
reported being short-tempered with her children and having some
problems with anxiety, including social phobia and panic attacks.
With regard to concentration, persistence and pace, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff would have “moderate” difficulties.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has not experienced any episodes
of decompensation of extended duration, insofar as her medical
records do not indicate exacerbations or temporary increases in
mental
health
symptoms,
accompanied
by
the
loss
of
adaptive
functioning. Therefore, the ALJ concluded, Plaintiff does not meet
or medically equal the criteria for Listing 12.04 or Listing 12.06.
-4-
The
ALJ
then
proceeded
to
assess
Plaintiff’s
residual
functional capacity (“RFC”), and concluded that she retains the
ability
to
perform
“light”
work,
as
defined
in
20
C.F.R.
§ 404.1567(a), with some postural and environmental limitations as
follows:
[Plaintiff] must have a sit and stand at will option; she
must remain at her work station when not on regularly
scheduled breaks. She must elevate both feet to waist
level when sitting. She can occasionally climb ramps and
stairs, balance, kneel, and stoop. She can never crawl,
crouch, and climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. She must
avoid concentrated exposure to wetness, vibration,
extreme temperatures, work place hazards such as
unprotected heights and dangerous machinery. . . .
T.25-26. In regards to the mental aspect of Plaintiff’s RFC, the
ALJ stated as follows:
[Plaintiff] can perform simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks. She can have superficial contact with the general
public, as in exchanging greetings in passing, but cannot
have ongoing direct contact. She can engage in contact
with supervisors and coworkers that is incident to the
position. She can occasionally engage in team or tandem
work. She is limited to low stress jobs that do not
involve high production quotas or fast pace assembly line
jobs.
T.26.
At step four, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff had past relevant
work as a school bus driver and a medical technician performing
electrocardiograms. At the hearing, the vocational expert (“VE”)
testified that a person with the RFC outlined above would not be
able to perform these jobs. Therefore, the ALJ found, Plaintiff was
-5-
unable to perform any past relevant work through the date last
insured.
At the fifth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff, at 42 yearsold, was a “younger individual” for purposes of the Act; had at
least a high school education; and was able to communicate in
English. The ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony that a person of
Plaintiff’s age, and with her education, work experience, and RFC,
would
be
able
to
perform
the
requirements
of
representative
occupations such as assembler, hand packer, and machine tender. The
ALJ specifically found that the VE’s testimony regarding the
availability of the sit/stand option in these occupations was based
on her years of experience in the field. The ALJ accordingly
entered a finding of “not disabled.”
V.
Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his weighing of the
opinions
given
by
her
treating
psychiatrist,
primary
care
physician, and pain management specialist. Plaintiff also argues
that the ALJ’s credibility assessment is flawed.
A.
The ALJ’s Application of the Treating Physician Rule
1.
“Although
deference
to
The Law
the treating
the
medical
physician
opinion
of
rule
a
generally requires
claimant’s
treating
physician, the opinion of the treating physician is not afforded
controlling weight where . . . the treating physician issued
-6-
opinions that are not consistent with other substantial evidence in
the record. . . .” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir.
2004) (per curiam) (internal and other citations omitted). When an
ALJ declines to accord controlling weight to a treating physician’s
opinion, the ALJ “must consider various ‘factors’ to determine how
much weight to give to the opinion[,]” id. (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2)), such as “(i) the frequency of examination and
the length, nature and extent of the treatment relationship;
(ii) the evidence in support of the treating physician’s opinion;
(iii) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole;
(iv) whether the opinion is from a specialist;
and (v) other
factors brought to the Social Security Administration’s attention
that tend to support or contradict the opinion.’” Id. (quoting
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).
A corollary to the treating physician rule is the so-called
“good reasons rule,” which is based on the regulations specifying
that “the Commissioner ‘will always give good reasons’” for the
weight given to a treating source opinion. Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32
(quoting
20
C.F.R.
§
404.1527(d)(2);
citing
20
C.F.R.
§ 416.927(d)(2); Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 503-04 (2d Cir.
1998)). “Those good reasons must be ‘supported by the evidence in
the case record, and must be sufficiently specific . . . .’”
Blakely v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96–2p, 1996 WL 374188, at
-7-
*5 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996)). Because the “good reasons” rule exists
to “ensur[e] that each denied claimant receives fair process,”
Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 243 (6th Cir. 2007),
an
ALJ’s
“‘failure
to
follow
the
procedural
requirement
of
identifying the reasons for discounting the opinions and for
explaining precisely how those reasons affected the weight’ given
‘denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion
of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record.’” Blakely, 581
F.3d at 407 (quoting Rogers, 486 F.3d at 243; emphasis in Blakely).
2.
Treating Psychiatrist’s Opinion
Dr. Ronald Spurling is Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist
who
issued a medical source statement on May 13, 2013. The parties do
not dispute that Dr. Spurling, who began seeing Plaintiff on
January 3, 2012, qualifies as a treating source for purposes of the
treating physician rule. Dr. Spurling completed a form titled,
“Evaluation of the Residual Functional Capacity of the Mentally
Impaired
Patient.”
T.510-13.
In
connection
with
Plaintiff’s
“ability to understand and remember,” Dr. Spurling rated her
ability
to
comprehend
and
carry
out
simple
instructions
as
“[g]ood,” which the form defined as a “limited but satisfactory”
ability to function. T.510. Dr. Spurling rated her ability to
remember work procedures and to remember detailed instructions as
“[f]air,” which the form defined as having a “seriously limited”
ability that “will result in periods of unsatisfactory performance
-8-
at unpredictable times.” Id. In these two areas, Dr. Spurling noted
that Plaintiff’s abilities would be “okay as long as not under
significant stress.” T.510. With regard to “social interactions,”
Dr. Spurling assessed her ability to respond appropriately to
supervisors and ability to respond appropriately to co-workers as
“[p]oor,” T.511, which the form defined as having “[n]o useful
ability to function in this area.” T.510. Dr. Spurling noted she
was “likely to have exacerbation of anxiety or anger/irritability
if she feels accused, singled out by supervisor” and she “has
varying mood with anxiety and irritability.” T.511. With regard to
“sustained
concentration
and persistence,”
Dr.
Spurling
rated
Plaintiff’s ability to complete a normal workday on a sustained
basis and to concentrate and attend to a task over an eight-hour
period as “[p]oor.” T.511. Dr. Spurling opined that her ability to
function independently on a job, exercise appropriate judgment,
abide by occupational rules, and make appropriate judgments was
“fair.” T.511-12. As far as “routine functions” and “stress,”
Dr. Spurling opined that her ability to maintain social functioning
and
to
tolerate
customary
work
pressures
in
a
work
setting
including production requirements and demands was “[p]oor,” T.512,
which, as noted above, the form defined as having “[n]o useful
ability to function in this area.” T.510. Dr. Spurling commented
that “stress leads to extremes of behavior such as agitation,
yelling, or anxiety/panic.” T.512. Dr. Spurling stated that she
-9-
would be absent from work due to her impairments more than 4 days
per month, and he opined that she could not work more than 4 hours
per day or 15 to 20 hours per week. T.513. He stated that these
limitations had been reasonably consistent and continuing since
October 25, 2010. Id.
The ALJ, however, did not acknowledge that Dr. Spurling was
Plaintiff’s
treating
psychiatrist.
The
ALJ,
determined
that
Dr. Spurling’s opinion was entitled to “some weight,” T.32, but the
ALJ did not reference the factors set forth in the regulations that
are to be considered when declining to give a treating source
opinion controlling weight. Instead, the ALJ summarily stated that
Dr. Spurliing’s opinion “is inconsistent with the objective medical
evidentiary record and his own treatment notes, when viewed in its
totality.” Id. This reason, which is vague and conclusory, does not
allow for meaningful judicial review and does not constitute a
“good reason” for purposes of fulfilling the Commissioner’s duty
under the applicable regulations. See Lane v. Astrue, 267 F.R.D.
76, 84 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding reversible error where “[t]he ALJ
did not give controlling weight to the opinions of [treating
physicians] Brubaker and Carstens, and instead relied on the
opinion of Morawski, a non-treating physical therapist who examined
Plaintiff on one occasion, stating merely that such opinions by
Brubaker and Carstens were ‘not well supported’ “; finding “[s]uch
a cursory statement [to be] insufficient”). Furthermore, the “post
-10-
hoc rationalizations” offered by the Commissioner in her brief as
to why the ALJ justifiably rejected Dr. Spurling’s opinion “are not
entitled
to
weight
by
a
reviewing
court.”
Hill
v.
Astrue,
No. 1:11–CV–0505(MAT), 2013 WL 5472036, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2013) (citing, inter alia, Demera v. Astrue, No. 12–CV–432(FB),
2013
WL
391006,
at
*3
n.
3
(E.D.N.Y.
Jan.
24,
2013)
(“The
Commissioner attempts to justify the ALJ’s determinations by noting
that Dr. Karpe’s opinion was inconsistent with the record evidence
and that Dr.
Vosseller’s
opinion
was conclusory
on
an issue
reserved for the Commissioner. The ALJ did not provide these
explanations, however, and post hoc rationalizations for the ALJ’s
decision are not entitled to any weight.”) (citations omitted).
Later in his decision, the ALJ noted that he had considered
Plaintiff’s representative’s hypothetical to the VE regarding a
person who had “no useful ability to function” in certain areas.
T.34.2
The
ALJ
representative’s
residual
explained
hypothetical
functional
capacity
that
he
because
rejected
“Dr.
assessment
does
Plaintiff’s
Spurling’s
not
mental
qualify
the
claimant’s limitations [sic] as having ‘no useful ability to
function’ in certain areas.” T.34. However, that is misstatement of
the record, since the form defined “poor” as having “no useful
ability to function,” and Dr. Spurling assigned a rating of “poor”
2
In response to that hypothetical, the vocational expert
testified that such a limitation would preclude all employment. See
T.72-73.
-11-
to multiple domains of functioning. Because this comment is based
on the ALJ’s misreading of the record, it cannot suffice as a “good
reason” for discounting Dr. Spurling’s opinion. See, e.g., Briscoe
v. Astrue, 892 F. Supp.2d 567, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[I]nsofar as
the ALJ relied on this perceived [but not actual] inconsistency as
a
basis
for
giving
little
weight
to
[treating
physician]
Dr. Contreras’s opinion, this would reflect that the ALJ has not
proffered an acceptable basis for discrediting Dr. Contreras’s
findings.”).
The Court notes that the ALJ determined to afford “great
weight” to
the
opinion
of
Dr.
Yu-Ying
Lin,
the
consultative
psychologist who examined Plaintiff at the Commissioner’s request.
Dr. Lin opined that Plaintiff, due to her mental impairments,
“cannot relate adequately with others” and “cannot appropriately
deal with stress.” T.403. Nonetheless, Dr. Lin opined, Plaintiff’s
psychiatric impairment “does not appear to be significant enough to
interfere with [her] ability to function on a daily basis.” T.403.
Dr.
Lin’s
opinion
thus
contains
a
significant
internal
inconsistency. As Plaintiff points out, the Commissioner’s rulings
indicate
that
severe
deficits
in
interpersonal
relations
and
dealing with stress do have a major impact on a claimant’s ability
to fulfill the mental demands of competitive employment. See, e.g.,
SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *4 (S.S.A. 1985) (“The basic mental
demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work include the
-12-
abilities (on a sustained basis) to . . . respond appropriately to
supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with
changes in a routine work setting. A substantial loss of ability to
meet any of these basic work-related activities would severely
limit the potential occupational base. This, in turn, would justify
a finding of disability because even favorable age, education, or
work
experience
will
not
offset
such
a
severely
limited
occupational base.”). The fact that the ALJ gave greater weight to
the opinion of a consultative psychologist, which contained an
obvious inconsistency that the ALJ did not bother to address,
undermines the rationality of the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Spurling’s
opinion and constitutes an improper cherry-picking of the record.
See Nix v. Astrue, No. 07–CV–344, 2009 WL 3429616, at *6 (W.D.N.Y.
Oct. 22, 2009) (“It is a fundamental tenet of Social Security law
that an ALJ cannot pick and choose only parts of a medical opinion
that support his determination.”) (citing Robinson v. Barnhart, 366
F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2004); other citation omitted).
The Second Circuit has observed that courts “do not hesitate
to remand when the Commissioner has not provided ‘good reasons’ for
the weight given to a treating physician[’]s opinion[,]” and has
instructed that courts “[should] continue remanding when [they]
encounter opinions from ALJ’s that do not comprehensively set forth
reasons for the weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.”
Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2004). Because the
-13-
“[f]ailure to provide ‘good reasons’ for not crediting the opinion
of a claimant’s treating physician is a ground for remand[,]” Snell
v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999), this case must be
remanded so that the ALJ can re-evaluate Dr. Spurling’s treating
source opinion in light of the caselaw and regulatory factors. See,
e.g., Richardson v. Barnhart, 443 F. Supp.2d 411, 424–25 (W.D.N.Y.
2006) (remanding for a second time where the ALJ’s decision “did
not give good reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for
failing to assign controlling weight to the opinion of a treating
source” and the ALJ “failed to follow the treating physician rule
by ignoring substantial evidence of record and by committing legal
error in his analysis of [the treating physician]’s opinions”).
2.
Treating Pain Management Specialist
Donovan Holder, M.D. is Plaintiff’s treating pain management
specialist. The parties do not dispute that Dr. Holder, who began
seeing Plaintiff on March 12, 2012, qualifies as a treating source
for purposes of the treating physician rule. On August 10, 2013,
Dr. Holder completed a form titled, “Evaluation of the Residual
Functional Capacity of the Physically Impaired Patient.” T.505-08.
Dr. Holder diagnosed Plaintiff as follows: “729.1 Myofascial [Pain
Syndrome]-Fibromyalgia” and “Lumbar [Degenerative Disc Disease]
(722.52).” T.505. With regard to climbing, balancing, stooping,
crouching, kneeling, crawling, climbing stairs, reaching, pushing,
and pulling, Dr. Holder opined that Plaintiff could perform these
-14-
actions “[o]ccasionally,” which the form defined as “2-3 hrs/day.”
T.505. Dr. Holder opined that Plaintiff could stand continuously
for 2 hours and for 4 hours total in an 8 hour day; could walk for
2 hours in an 8 hour day; and could sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour
day. Dr. Holder estimated that she would be off task frequently
(34% to 66% of an 8-hour workday) due to her pain and other
symptoms, and that she would miss about 3 days of work per month.
T.506.
The ALJ disregarded Dr. Holder’s specific opinions as to
Plaintiff’s ability to, e.g., reach, push, and pull, since he found
that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform representative jobs that
required “constant” or “frequent” reaching. See, e.g., T.71 (VE
testifying that “[o]n the assembler it’s a constant reach, and on
the hand packer also. The machine tender is a frequent.”). Overall,
the ALJ assigned only “some weight” to Dr. Holder’s opinion, again
stating without explanation that it “is inconsistent with the
objective medical evidentiary record and his own treatment records
discussed above, when viewed in its totality.” T.33. As with
Dr. Spurling’s opinion, the ALJ did not address the factors that
the Commissioner’s regulations specify must be considered when
deciding to afford less than controlling weight to the opinion of
a treating source such as Dr. Holder. His generic statement that
Dr. Holder’s opinion is “inconsistent” with the record does not
allow for meaningful judicial review and does not constitute a
-15-
“good reason” for purposes of fulfilling the Commissioner’s duty
under the applicable regulations. See Lane, 267 F.R.D. at 84.
Moreover, it appears that the ALJ ignored the objective medical
evidence confirming Plaintiff’s disc herniation, insofar as lumbar
x-rays in November 2012 showed a loss of lordosis with L5-S1 disc
space narrowing and facet arthropathy at L5-S1, T.434, and an MRI
showed disc herniation at L5-S1 with nerve root compression at S1,
T.358. The ALJ also apparently discounted Dr. Holder’s opinion
based on his characterization of Plaintiff’s course of treatment as
“conservative.” T.31. However, the Second Circuit has explained
that the opinion of the treating physician is not “to be discounted
merely
because
he
has
recommended
a
conservative
treatment
regimen.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). Dr. Holder performed a series of nine epidural
injections, which did not provide “prolonged benefit,” T.411.
Plaintiff also was prescribed multiple medications to address her
pain, including Lyrica, Neurontin, tramadol, and Zanaflex, in
addition
to
ibuprofen)
speaking,
the
she
Dr.
over-the-counter
took
for
Holder’s
pain
medications
control.
treatment
plan
T.411.
for
(Tylenol
and
Comparatively
Plaintiff
was
not
especially conservative. See Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 134 (2d
Cir. 2000) (district court erred in ruling that the treating
physician’s
therapy,
hot
“recommend[ation
packs,
EMG
of]
only
testing—not
-16-
conservative
surgery
or
physical
prescription
drugs—[w]as
substantial
evidence
that
[the
claimant]
was
not
physically disabled”). Regardless, “[t]he ALJ and the judge may not
‘impose[ ] their [respective] notion[s] that the severity of a
physical impairment directly correlates with the intrusiveness of
the medical treatment ordered . . . .’” Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129
(quoting Shaw, 221 F.3d at 134).
Because the “[f]ailure to provide ‘good reasons’ for not
crediting the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is a
ground for remand[,]” Snell, 177 F.3d at 133, this case must be
remanded so that the ALJ can re-evaluate Dr. Holder’s treating
source opinion in light of the caselaw and regulatory factors.
VI.
Conclusion
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
the
Court
finds
that the
Commissioner’s determination was erroneous as a matter of law, and
that remand is required. Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Dkt #10) is denied, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings (Dkt #7) is granted to the extent that the matter
is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with
this decision. Specifically, the ALJ is directed to (1) re-evaluate
Dr. Spurling’s treating source opinion and, if the ALJ elects not
to accord it controlling weight, give “good reasons” in accordance
with the regulations for the decision not to assign it controlling
weight; and (2) re-evaluate Dr. Holder’s treating source opinion
and, if the ALJ elects not to accord it controlling weight, give
-17-
“good reasons” in accordance with the regulations for the decision
not to assign it controlling weight; and (3) re-assess Plaintiff’s
mental and physical RFC as necessary in light of the foregoing reevaluations.
SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
September 29, 2015
Rochester, New York
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