Salters v. Hewitt-Young Electric, LLC
Filing
11
ORDER denying 4 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 8/11/115. (JMC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________________
ROBERT SALTERS,
Plaintiff,
15-CV-6040
DECISION
and ORDER
v.
HEWITT-YOUNG ELECTRIC, LLC,
Defendant.
________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Robert Salters (“plaintiff”) commenced this action
against Hewitt-Young Electric, LLC (“defendant” or “Hewitt-Young”),
seeking damages for racial discrimination in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
e-17 (“Title VII”), and Article 15 of the New York State Executive
Law, Human Rights Law § 290 et seq. (“NYSHRL”).
Specifically,
plaintiff, who is African American, claims that he was subjected to
race discrimination by defendant’s failure to hire him based on his
race, leading to plaintiff’s termination by defendant’s subcontractor
and a continued refusal to employ him.
Defendant moves for dismissal for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) contending that
plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a
plausible inference of race discrimination.
Plaintiff responds that
the complaint sufficiently states a causal connection between the
failure to hire and his race.
For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion to dismiss
the complaint is denied.
BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from
plaintiff’s
complaint,
including
incorporated by reference.
documents
and
attachments
Plaintiff, an African American master
electrician, was previously hired by defendant, through plaintiff’s
union, for a three-month project beginning on July 7, 2013 and
concluding on September 27, 2013 and a shorter job from October 1,
2013 to October 3, 2013.
In December 2013, plaintiff was again
referred to defendant by his union, the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local Union #86 (“Local #86”).
On December 6,
2013, plaintiff arrived for work at defendant’s offices.
As he was
waiting in the lobby, Gregory Young, president of Hewitt-Young,
walked into the room, looked at plaintiff, and said: “No, no, this is
not going to work out.” Complaint, ¶ 14.
At this point, “Young
approached [plaintiff], told him that he had to go, and pushed him
out the front door.” Complaint, ¶ 14.
contacted
Local
#86
to
give
an
When plaintiff subsequently
account
of
the
incident,
the
dispatcher informed him that Young had called and reported that
plaintiff had been intoxicated when he arrived to work.
In his
complaint, plaintiff alleges that, “in his 20-plus years of work for
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Local #86, Salters had never been sent home from a job, nor had a
contractor
rejected
him
for
a
referral,
for
being
under
the
influence.” Complaint, ¶ 17.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a charge of discrimination
with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on March 26,
2014, in which he alleged race and color discrimination by defendant.
DISCUSSION
I.
To
Standard of Review Under Rule 12(b)(6)
withstand
a
motion
to
dismiss
under
Rule
12(b)(6),
a
complaint must plead facts sufficient “to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded
factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not
akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Thus, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts
that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is
context specific and such a determination “requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at
679. The pleadings must “permit the court to infer more than the mere
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possibility
of
misconduct”
Id.
Under
the
above
plausibility
standard, the Court assumes the veracity of well-pleaded factual
allegations and draws all reasonable inferences from such allegations
in the plaintiff’s favor. See id. at 679.
II.
Plaintiff's prima facie case.
Title VII forbids an employer to “discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). In order
to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to hire, a
plaintiff must show that: “(1) he is a member of a protected class;
(2) he was qualified for the position for which he applied; (3) he
was denied the job; and (4) the denial occurred under circumstances
giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Coger v. Connecticut
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 143 F.App’x 372, 374 (2d Cir.2005).
Plaintiff alleges that the complaint sufficiently states a
causal connection between his race and Mr. Young’s immediate reaction
based on seeing him ten feet away in the lobby and rejecting
plaintiff for employment, stating “No, no, this is not going to work
out.” Plaintiff’s
memorandum
of
law,
p.
4.
Defendant
argues,
however, that the nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting plaintiff
from the job was his intoxication. Defendant’s memorandum of law,
p. 6.
The prima facie case under the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (411 U.S. 792, 802 [1973]), however,
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“‘is
an
evidentiary
standard,
not
a
pleading
requirement.’”
Vlad-Berindan v. MTA New York City Transit, 2014 WL 6982929, at *8
(S.D.N.Y.2014), quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
510–511(2002).
The Court finds that, at this early stage of the proceedings,
plaintiff
has
satisfied
the
pleading
standard
of
asserting
an
employment discrimination claim that is “facially plausible and”
gives “fair notice to defendant of the basis for the claim.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
It is clear, on the face of the
complaint, that plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient for the Court
to infer all four elements of the prima facie case required under
Title VII.
It is undisputed that plaintiff belongs to a protected
class, that he was qualified for the position in question, and that
he was denied the job.
In support of his allegation of race
discrimination, plaintiff contends that Mr. Young, whom plaintiff had
never met, rejected plaintiff from the job immediately upon seeing
him and without any prior interaction with plaintiff. Based on these
specific
plausible
factual
claim
circumstances
allegations,
that
giving
Mr.
rise
plaintiff
Young’s
to
an
has
stated
rejection
inference
of
a
facially
occurred
under
discrimination.
Accordingly, this Court finds that defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint for failure to allege a plausible inference of
race discrimination must be denied.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to dismiss
is denied.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
s/Michael A. Telesca
MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
Rochester, New York
August 11, 2015
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