Miran et al v. Cuomo et al
Filing
39
DECISION AND ORDER denying 33 Motion to Vacate ; finding as moot 34 Motion. (Copy of Decision and Order sent by first class mail to Plaintiffs.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 11/4/19. (JMC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MICHAEL MIRAN and ESTA MIRAN,
Plaintiffs,
No. 1:15-CV-06133-MAT
DECISION AND ORDER
-vsJERRY SOLOMON and ERIC T.
SCHNEIDERMAN,
Defendants.
I.
Introduction
Michael Miran, Ph.D. and Esta Miran, Ed.D. (“Plaintiffs” or “the
Mirans”) instituted this pro se action alleging that they were
subjected to malicious prosecution and due process violations during
a New York State criminal investigation and prosecution brought
against them for Medicaid and Medicare fraud. Plaintiffs now have
filed
a
motion
pursuant
to
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
60(b)(4)
(“Rule 60(b)(4)”), alleging that their State convictions are void
because the State courts lacked jurisdiction. Defendants filed a
response in which they relied on the arguments in their opposition to
Plaintiffs’ earlier motion to vacate under Rule 60(b)(2). Plaintiffs
filed
a
reply.
For
the
reasons
discussed
below,
relief
under
Rule 60(b)(4) is denied.
II.
Background
Plaintiffs originally were charged in a 31–count indictment
alleging that they committed various crimes relating to their having
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made false statements in the medical records of certain Medicaid and
Medicare patients, as well as having larcenously received payments
through false representations as to services provided to Medicaid and
Medicare participants. After their bids to dismiss the indictment
were denied, Plaintiffs pleaded guilty to one charge each in New York
State, Monroe County Court (Dollinger, A.J.). Michael Miran pleaded
guilty to offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree
(New York Penal Law (“P.L.”) § 175.30), a lesser included offense of
the indicted crime of offering a false instrument for filing in the
first degree (P.L. § 175.35). Esta Miran pleaded guilty to offering
a false instrument for filing in the first degree (P.L. § 175.30).
The respective plea agreements preserved their right to appeal with
regard to the issues of Federal preemption and compliance with New
York Executive Law (“Exec. Law”) § 63(3).
On direct appeal to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
of New York State Supreme Court (“Appellate Division”), the Mirans
raised the preemption and Exec. Law § 63(3) compliance claims. In a
decision dated April 26, 2013, the Appellate Division unanimously
affirmed Plaintiffs’ convictions. People v. Miran, 107 A.D.3d 28, 33,
964 N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 (4th Dep’t 2013), lv. denied, 21 N.Y.3d 1044
(2013), recons. denied, 22 N.Y.3d 957 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct.
2312 (2014). The Appellate Division held that the compliance issue
was
meritless
because,
inter
alia,
the
Attorney
General’s
investigation and prosecution of defendants was authorized by the
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Commissioner of Health’s referral of the issues involving the Mirans.
People v. Miran, 107 A.D.3d at 35 (“Inasmuch as the DOH administers
this state’s Medicaid program, there can be no dispute that the COH
referral permitted the Attorney General to investigate Medicaid
fraud. Moreover, what here was the Attorney General’s concomitant
investigation
of
Medicaid
and
Medicare
fraud
with
respect
to
defendants was permitted by way of the broad ambit of the ‘arising
out of’ language in Executive Law § 63(3), i.e., the clause of that
statute
allowing
the
“prosecut[ion][of]
the
person
or
persons
believed to have committed the same and any crime or offense arising
out
of
such
investigation
or
prosecution[.]”
Id.
(emphases
in
original).
With regard to the Mirans’ argument that Exec. Law § 63(3) is
expressly preempted by the last clause in 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(q)(3)
because the alleged fraud at issue in their case was not “primarily
related”
to
Medicaid,
the
Appellate
Division
rejected
it
as
meritless. People v. Miran, 107 A.D.3d at 37. The Appellate Division
also found that neither the “impossibility form” nor the “impediment
form” of conflict preemption applied to Plaintiffs’ case. Id. at 3839.
In 2015, Plaintiffs filed this pro se action seeking relief
under
42
U.S.C.
§
1983
and
other
statutes
against
a
slew
of
defendants. In essence, Plaintiffs sought to have this Court “void
and overturn” the actions of the New York State Attorney General
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (“MFCU”) and the New York State Courts.
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The Court dismissed the first amended complaint as frivolous and
barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity but permitted Plaintiffs to
file a second amended complaint. On initial screening, the second
amended complaint was dismissed on the basis that the sole claim it
raised was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
In 2017, Plaintiffs filed a pleading styled as a Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Motion to Vacate Judgment (Docket No. 25)
and a Motion for Rule 60 Relief from Judgment (Docket No. 27).
Plaintiffs relied on subsection (2) of Rule 60(b) which
brought
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) on the basis that they have obtained newly
discovered
evidence. Specifically,
Plaintiffs
asserted
they
had
obtained evidence from a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request
“show[ing] that no NYS agency certified or oversaw the Mirans’
treatment and billing. If this information were available during the
original proceedings, the Mirans’ attorneys could have challenged the
use of [Exec. Law] § 63.3 [sic] to authorize prosecution of the
Mirans. New evidence from the FOIA establishes that the Mirans’ case
is entirely HHS/CMS/Medicare and governed by federal law, regulations
and rules.” Docket No. 27, p. 1 of 2.
In opposition to Plaintiffs’
motions, Defendants argued, inter alia, that Rule 60(b)(2) relief was
unavailable because the applications were filed nearly three years
after the Court’s judgment, well beyond the one-year limitations
period in Rule 60(c)(1) that is applicable to motions made pursuant
to subsection (2) of Rule 60(b). Further, because the motion to
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vacate
fell
squarely
within
the
parameters
of
Rule
60(b)(2),
Plaintiffs could not rely on the catch-all clause of subsection (6)
to avoid the one-year time constraint. The Court agreed that the
Rule 60(b)(2) motion was untimely and denied relief.
In their current motion for vacatur, Plaintiffs demand that this
Court “declare the MFCU and [State] courts’ decisions void” under
Rule
60(b)(4).
Docket
No.,
p.
2-3
of
48
(citing
Klapprott
v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949)).
III. Discussion
Rule 60(b)(4) provides that a court may relieve a party of the
effect of a final judgment if “the judgment is void.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(4) The Supreme Court has held that a void judgment is “one so
affected by a fundamental infirmity that the infirmity may be raised
even after the judgment becomes final.” United Student Aid Funds,
Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010). Stated another way, “[a]
void judgment is a legal nullity.” Id. at 270 (citation omitted).
Importantly, “[a] judgment is not considered void . . . ‘simply
because it is or may have been erroneous.’” Id. at 270 (quotation and
citations omitted). Rule 60(b)(4) applies only “in the rare instance
where
a
judgment
is
premised
either
on
a
certain
type
of
jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives
a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 271
(citations omitted). As the Second Circuit has explained, “[u]nder
Rule 60(b)(4), a judgment is void only if the court that rendered it
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lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if
it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” Grace v.
Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y., 443 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2006).
As
an
initial
matter,
Plaintiffs
are
correct
that
the
“reasonable time” “limitation does not apply to a motion under
Rule 60(b)(4) attacking a judgment as void. There is no time limit on
a motion of that kind.” C. Wright, A. Miller, & M.K. Kane, 11 Fed.
Prac. & Proc. Civ. (“Wright & Miller”) § 2866 (3d ed.) (Aug. 2019
Update)(footnote and citations omitted). “[N]o passage of time can
render a void judgment valid, and a court may always take cognizance
of a judgment’s void status” whenever a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is
brought. United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147,
157 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated entitlement to relief under Rule 60(b)(4).
Plaintiffs explicitly seek an order from this Court directing
the New York State courts to void their conviction because the State
courts
allegedly
lacked
jurisdiction
over
their
criminal
prosecutions.1 However, it is well settled that Rule 60(b)(4) provides
for relief from judgment “only when the court that rendered the
judgment lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties.”
1
Plaintiffs also request that the Court void the alleged “decision” or
“judgment” made by the MCFU. The MCFU, which operates in the office of the
Attorney General, commenced the investigation against Plaintiffs at the behest
of the Commissioner of Health. See People v. Miran, 107 A.D.3d at 31-32. It did
not issue a “judgment” against Plaintiffs. Therefore, this aspect of Plaintiffs’
motion is based on an incorrect factual premise and is denied as factually
baseless.
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Reardon v. Leason, 408 F. App’x 551, 553 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished
opn.”) (citing Marshall v. Bd. of Ed., Bergenfield, N.Y., 575 F.2d
417, 422 (3d Cir. 1978) (“A judgment may indeed be void, and
therefore subject to relief under 60(b) (4), if the court that
rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties
or entered ‘a decree which is not within the powers granted to it by
the law.’”) (quoting United States v. Walker, 109 U.S. 258, 265-67
(1883)); emphasis supplied)); see also Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc.,
66 F.3d 105, 108 (6th Cir. 1995) (“A judgment is void under 60(b)(4)
‘if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject
matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent
with due process of law.’”) (quoting In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 644
(7th Cir. 1992); citation omitted in original).
Here, this Court did not “render” judgment in Plaintiffs’
criminal case; a New York State court did. Rule 60(b)(4) does not
permit this Court to declare the judgment of a State court void. See,
e.g., Reardon, 408 F. App’x at 553 (“Reardon essentially sought an
order from the District Court directing the state court to void his
conviction because the state court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over
his case. However, as noted above, Rule 60(b)(4) provides for relief
from judgment only when the court that rendered the judgment lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties. The District
Court did not enter judgment in Reardon’s criminal case.”) (internal
citation omitted); Roggio v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 09-CV-1733
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(TJK), 2018 WL 3838193, at *2 (D.D.C. May 14, 2018) (“[T]he law is
quite clear that Rule 60(b) does not authorize this Court to vacate
or otherwise reconsider a state court judgment.”); Williams v. Apker,
774 F. Supp. 2d 124, 128 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Rule 60(b) . . . only
provides a federal district court with subject matter jurisdiction
over
requests
for
reconsideration
of
federal
district
court
decisions; it does not give the court jurisdiction to relieve a party
from state court judgments.”); Florimonte v. Borough of Dalton,
No. 3:17-cv-1063, 2017 WL 7542619, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2017),
(“Rule 60(b) only authorizes a federal district court to set aside
one of its own judgments or orders—it does not authorize it to vacate
a
state
court
judgment
or
order.”),
report
and
recommendation
adopted, 2018 WL 814004 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2018); Thomason v. Moeller,
No. 4:16-cv-141, 2017 WL 241322, at *17 (D. Idaho Jan. 19, 2017) (“A
state-court action is not subject to being modified or set aside
under the Federal Rules.”); Mather v. First Hawaiian Bank, No. CIV.
14-00091 SOMRLP, 2014 WL 7334880, at *3 (D. Haw. Dec. 19, 2014)
(“Mather cannot come to federal court to raise an untimely argument
that the state-court orders and final judgments are void, essentially
asking this court to sit as an appellate court over those orders and
judgment.
Rule
60(b)(4)
does
not
allow
this
court
to
vacate
state-court orders and judgments as void.”); Schroeder v. Bank of Am.
Corp., No. 3:12-CV-589, 2012 WL 6929272, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19,
2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:CV-12-0589, 2013 WL
-8-
298058 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2013) (“[R]ule [60(b)(4)] does not provide
a general license for federal courts to review state court judgments
to determine whether they are void or voidable. Thus, a litigant
simply cannot rely upon Rule 60(b)(4) to do what the Schroeders wish
to do—seek an order from a federal court vacating some prior state
court order.”). Therefore, the Court must deny Plaintiffs’ request to
declare the judgments of conviction in their New York State criminal
proceedings void under Rule 60(b)(4).
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Vacate (Docket No. 33) as without merit. Plaintiffs’ Motion
Requesting a Decision (Docket No. 34) on their Motion to Vacate is
denied as moot.
SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
HON. MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
November 4, 2019
Rochester, New York.
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