Talada v. Cole
DECISION AND ORDER re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Chad Talada. Petitioner's Petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is denied, and this action is dismissed. Signed by Hon. Charles J. Siragusa on 11/9/17. (KAP)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DECISION AND ORDER
DAVID V. COLE, SHERIFF, STEUBEN COUNTY JAIL,
This is an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in which Petitioner seeks an order
vacating his conviction and sentence pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (“SORNA”). Because the Court finds that Petitioner
fails to satisfy the requirements for a § 2241 challenge, the motion is denied and this
action is dismissed.
Petitioner Chad Talada (“Petitioner”) is a prisoner at the Steuben County Jail in
Bath, New York. Petitioner was convicted of Attempted Sexual Abuse in the First Degree
in New York in 2002 and was required to register as a sex offender. On December 9,
2008, Petitioner was charged in a one-count indictment in the Southern District of West
Virginia for failing to register as a sex offender after having moved from New York to West
Virginia sometime after April 18, 2007, and having been employed in West Virginia
beginning on June 26, 2007. In 2009, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the
government and pled guilty to the indictment. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner
was sentenced to 24 months in prison and 70 months of supervised release.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Petitioner contended that the United States Attorney General’s issuance of the Interim
Rule that made the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250
(“SORNA”) retroactive to existing sex offenders was improperly promulgated pursuant to
the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on the basis of precedent stemming from United States
v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2009), which affirmed the Attorney General’s
promulgation of the Interim Rule as valid under the APA. On August 31, 2010, Petitioner
appealed for a Writ of Certiorari. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Writ of Certiorari
on December 13, 2010. Petitioner subsequently failed to bring a challenge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations or December 12,
2011.Petitioner completed his sentence of imprisonment on March 23, 2010. The
Western District of New York received a transfer of jurisdiction for Petitioner’s supervised
release on June 10, 2010.
On September 3, 2015, in the Western District of New York, Petitioner pled guilty
to charges of Knowing Receipt of Child Pornography. On March 21, 2016, Petitioner filed
the subject petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, requesting a writ of habeas corpus to
vacate his prior SORNA conviction.
Vacating the SORNA conviction can have
implications regarding Petitioner’s pending sentence in the case regarding receipt of child
Petitioner brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) & (c)(3), which
authorizes a district court to grant a writ of habeas corpus whenever a petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Petitioner’s
motion is precarious under Second Circuit precedent, which generally requires petitioners
to use § 2255 to challenge convictions and sentences.
A motion pursuant to § 2241 generally challenges the execution of a federal
prisoner's sentence, including such matters as the administration of parole,
computation of a prisoner's sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary
actions, prison transfers, type of detention and prison conditions… In
contrast, § 2255 is generally the proper vehicle for a federal prisoner's
challenge to his conviction and sentence, as it encompasses claims that
“the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ¶ 1
Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2001). Petitioner failed to challenge his
conviction and sentence using § 2255 in the court where he was sentenced in a timely
fashion upon the Supreme Court’s denial of a writ of certiorari in 2010. The statute of
limitations in § 2255 mandates that any challenge to the conviction must occur within one
year upon the finality of the judgment of the conviction, which means that Petitioner had
until December 12, 2011, to file the appropriate challenge. Therefore, Petitioner is out of
time to file a § 2255 challenge to his conviction.
Despite the expiration of the statute of limitations, the Court may permit § 2241
challenges in certain extraordinary conditions as described in the “savings clause” of §
2255(e). The savings clause provides that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by
motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Petitioner contends that this clause permits the Court to rule on the
merits of the § 2241 challenge. In the Second Circuit, governing precedent allows the
savings clause of § 2255 to be invoked to allow § 2241 relief in “cases involving prisoners
who (l) can prove actual innocence on the existing record, and (2) ‘could not have
effectively raised [their] claim[s] of innocence at an earlier time.’” See Cephas v. Nash,
328 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Triestman, l24 F.3d at 363).
In proving actual innocence on the existing record, Petitioner maintains that the
Attorney General failed to promulgate SORNA in accordance with the Administrative
Procedures Act. Petitioner further contends that the sharp divide in Circuit Court decisions
regarding the constitutionality of the “Interim Rule” constitutes the basis for this Court to
lend credence to his argument. As indicated above, the Fourth Circuit previously ruled on
the validity of SORNA under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in United States v.
Gould, 526 F. Supp. 2d 538, 546 (D. Md. 2007), aff’d, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2009). The
APA requires a public notice for any proposed rule change prior to the effective date
unless “good cause” exists. “Good cause” exists when public notice and comment
procedures are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” Id. §
553(b)(3)(B). In Gould, the Fourth Circuit held that the “good cause” exception had been
satisfied by the Attorney General in bypassing certain procedural roadblocks with
SORNA’s promulgation. Petitioner’s conviction was upheld on this precedent in the Fourth
Circuit. Although there has been division among the Circuits on this particular issue, no
subsequent development in the Second Circuit, Fourth Circuit, or the Supreme Court
merit deviation from the precedent as applied to Petitioner’s original conviction. As such,
Petitioner fails to prove actual innocence on the existing record.1
In arguing the inability to effectively raise claims of innocence at an earlier time,
Petitioner is not claiming innocence per se. Petitioner instead contends that failing to
register as a sex offender pursuant to SORNA was not a crime at the time of his
indictment. Petitioner argues that any attempt to raise a § 2255 challenge in the Fourth
Circuit would have been futile due to binding contrary precedent. Petitioner failed to file
a challenge in the Fourth Circuit pursuant to a § 2255 before the one-year statute of
limitations expired. Because of Petitioner’s failure to do so, there is no possible way of
knowing how effective or adequate a § 2255 motion would have been. The Supreme
Court has previously held that, “futility cannot constitute cause [for procedural relief] if it
means simply that a claim was ‘unacceptable to that particular court at that particular
time’” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558 (1982)). It would be unwarranted to say that a § 2255 could not
have been effectively raised in the Fourth Circuit simply because Petitioner disagreed
with the precedents in the Fourth Circuit. As such, Petitioner fails to prove that he could
not have effectively raised claims of innocence at an earlier time.
As an alternative argument, Petitioner also challenges the constitutionality of
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) pursuant to Art. I, Sect. 9, Cl. 2
of the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner contends that § 2255, which was enacted by AEDPA,
Petitioner does not deny the facts surrounding his original conviction. Petitioner
contends that what he did was not illegal at the time due to the failure of the Attorney General to
properly promulgate the Interim Rule.
violates the Suspension Clause for the writ of habeas corpus. AEDPA does not violate
Suspension Clause because it was enacted to “provide in the sentencing court a remedy
exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus
in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S.
424, 471 (1962). Petitioner does not have access to § 2255 due to the statute of limitations
for challenges pursuant to habeas corpus. This limit is not necessarily absolute. As is
obvious by the present motion, it is not impossible to challenge convictions after the
statute of limitations expires. The Petitioner has utilized a § 2241 motion in the present
case, but simply fails to meet the jurisdictional requirements necessary for a successful
motion. As such, AEDPA does not violate Petitioner’s right to habeas corpus.
For the forgoing reasons, Petitioner’s Petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is
denied, and this action is dismissed.
November 9, 2017
Rochester, New York
/s/ Charles J. Siragusa
CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA
United States District Judge
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