Snyder v. Colvin

Filing 14

DECISION AND ORDER denying 11 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 12 Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; and dismissing the complaint in its entirety with prejudice. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 3/7/17.(Clerk to close case.) (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOYCE L. SNYDER,
16-cv-6257

Plaintiff,

DECISION AND
ORDER
-vsNANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.

Plaintiff Joyce L. Snyder (“plaintiff”) brings this action
pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act (“The Act”),
seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security

(“defendant”

applications

for

or

“the

disability

Commissioner”)

insurance

benefits

denying

her

(“DIB”)

and

supplemental security income (“SSI”).
Presently before the Court are the parties’ competing motions
for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

For the reasons set forth below,

plaintiff’s motion is denied and defendant’s motion is granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On

November

applications

for

30,
DIB

2012,
and

plaintiff

SSI,

alleging

concurrently
disability

filed
as

of

1

Nancy A. Berryhill replaced Carolyn W. Colvin as Acting Commissioner of Social
Security on January 23, 2017. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to amend the
caption of this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) to reflect
the substitution of Acting Commissioner Berryhill as the defendant in this
matter.

February 15, 2012.

Administrative Transcript (“T.”) 166-178.

Following the denial of those applications, a hearing was held at
plaintiff’s request on August 6, 2014, before administrative law
judge ("ALJ") F. Patrick Flanagan, at which testimony was given by
plaintiff and vocational expert (“VE”) Linda N. Vause. T. 39-83.
The ALJ issued a decision dated December 24, 2014, in which he
determined that plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act.
T. 9-27.
In applying the required five-step sequential analysis, as
contained in the administrative regulations promulgated by the
Social Security Administration ("SSA") (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920; Lynch v. Astrue, 2008 WL 3413899, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 2008)
(detailing the five steps)), the ALJ made the following findings,
among others: (1) plaintiff met the insured status requirements of
the Act through March 31, 2012; (2) plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial

gainful

activity

since

February

15,

2012;

(3) plaintiff’s history of mitral valve prolapse, history of
possible transient ischemic attack, low back pain, carpal tunnel
syndrome, hyperlipidemia, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder
were severe impairments; (4) plaintiff’s impairments did not meet
or medically equal one of the listed impairments set forth in
20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (5) plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform less than the full
range

of

light

work

as

defined

in

20

CFR

404.1576(b)

and

416.967(b)” with the following limitations: lift and carry up to
2

20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; sit for six hours
in an eight-hour workday; stand/walk for six hours in an eight-hour
workday; reach, handle, and finger frequently with both hands;
understand,

remember,

and

carry

out

simple

and

complex

instructions; carry out simple and complex tasks if there are no
more

than

occasional

changes

in

routine;

maintain

a

regular

schedule and accept instructions from supervisors, but would do
best with work not requiring more than occasional interaction with
supervisors, coworkers, or the public; and low-stress work, defined
as that requiring no negotiation, conflict resolution, or more than
occasional decision-making; (6) plaintiff was unable to perform any
past relevant work; and (7) considering plaintiff’s age, education,
work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform.
The ALJ’s decision became the final determination of the
Commission on February 24, 2016, when the Appeals Council denied
plaintiff’s request for review.

T. 1-3.

Plaintiff subsequently

filed the instant action.
DISCUSSION
I.

General Legal Principles
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) grants jurisdiction to district courts to

hear claims based on the denial of Social Security benefits.
Section 405(g) provides that the District Court “shall have the
power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
3

Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.”

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2007).

This section

directs that when considering such a claim, the Court must accept
the findings of fact made by the Commissioner, provided that such
findings are supported by “substantial evidence” in the record. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).

“Substantial evidence means more than a mere

scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue,
569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
When

determining whether

the

Commissioner’s

findings

are

supported by substantial evidence, the Court's task is “‘to examine
the entire record, including contradictory evidence and evidence
from which conflicting inferences can be drawn.’” Brown v. Apfel,
174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999), quoting Mongeur v. Heckler, 722
F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983).

Section 405(g) limits the scope of

the Court’s review to two inquiries: whether the Commissioner’s
findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole and whether the Commissioner’s conclusions were based upon
the correct legal standard. See Green–Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d
99, 105–106 (2d Cir.2003).
A. Relevant medical evidence.
Plaintiff’s sole argument in this action is that the ALJ’s
determination
occasional

that

she

interaction

was
with

limited

to

supervisors,

low-stress
co-workers,

work

and

and

the

general public was based on his own lay opinion and not supported
4

by the record.

Plaintiff has raised no issues related to the

physical limitations set forth in the RFC.

As a result, medical

evidence related to those physical limitations is not summarized
here.
The

record

reveals

that

on

January

17,

2013,

plaintiff

underwent a consultative psychiatric examination with Dr. Kavitha
Finnity, Ph.D. T. 367-370. Dr. Finnity noted current medications
of

diazepam,

pantoprazole,

aspirin,

pravastatin,

ibuprofen, velafaxine, and cyclobenzaprine.

oxycodone,

T. 367.

Plaintiff

reported frequent waking, loss of appetite, depressive symptoms
(including dysphoric mood, crying, loss of energy, and social
withdrawal),

excessive

anxiety,

worrying,

restlessness,

and

cognitive deficits of short-term memory loss and difficulty with
concentration,

word

finding,

and

organization.

Id.

On

examination, plaintiff demonstrated appropriate eye contact, normal
posture and motor behavior, fluent speech intelligibility, adequate
expressive and receptive language, coherent and goal directed
thought processes, depressed affect, neutral mood, clear sensorium,
intact attention and concentration, intact recent and remote memory
skills,

average

judgment.

cognitive

T. 368-69.

functioning,

and

fair

insight

and

Dr. Finnity opined that plaintiff could

follow and understand directions and perform simple tasks, maintain
a

schedule,

learn

new

tasks

and

perform

complex

tasks

with

supervision, and make appropriate decisions.

T. 369.

Dr. Finnity

further opined that plaintiff had difficult with attention and
5

concentration, as well as “difficulty relating with others and
dealing with stress due to psychiatric symptoms.” Id. Dr. Finnity
assessed

plaintiff

with:

depressive

disorder,

NOS;

anxiety

disorder, NOS; heart disease; history of stroke; tendinitis; carpal
tunnel syndrome; migraines; chronic pain; and high cholesterol.
Id.
Also on January 17, 2013, plaintiff underwent a consultative
internal medicine examination by Dr. Donna Miller, D.O. T. 371-75.
Among

other

issues

and

conditions,

Plaintiff

reported

having

migraine headaches on average four to five times per month, and
stated that her migraines were triggered by stress.
On

March

12,

2013,

non-examining

state

T. 372.

agency

reviewing

physician Dr. M. Apacible, M.D., performed both a psychiatric
review technique assessment and a medical residual functional
capacity assessment of plaintiff’s medical record.
101.

T. 95-96; 99-

Dr. Apacible opined that plaintiff had mild limitations with

activities of daily living, moderate limitations with maintaining
social

functioning,

and

mild

limitations

concentration, persistence, or pace.

with

T. 95-96.

maintaining
Dr. Apacible

further opined that plaintiff was moderately limited regarding her
abilities to: understand and remember detailed instructions; carry
out detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for
extended periods; complete a normal workday and workweek without
interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; perform at a
consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest
6

periods; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism
from

supervisors;

distracting

them

get
or

along

with

exhibiting

coworkers
behavioral

or

peers

without

extremes;

respond

appropriately to changes in the work setting; set realistic goals;
and make plans independently of others.

T.

99-101.

Finally,

Dr. Apacible opined that plaintiff was capable of performing simple
work.

T.

101.

On July 19, 2013, plaintiff underwent a psychiatric evaluation
by nurse practitioner (“NP”) Kathe Klein at Wayne Behavioral
Network.

T.

414-15.

Plaintiff

had

been

referred

to

Wayne

Behavioral Network as the result of an incident in which she was
drinking alcohol with her fiancé and her daughter and became angry
and started breaking things, resulting in the police being called.
T. 414.
noted

Plaintiff reported anger issues, mood swings (which she

were

less

intense

when

she

fatigue, and difficulty sleeping.

Id.

stopped

drinking

alcohol),

Plaintiff further reported

having been a victim of childhood abuse and domestic violence, and
stated that she had been told in 2009 that she had post-traumatic
stress disorder (“PTSD”) and bipolar disorder.

Id.

An anger

management group was recommended for plaintiff, put she declined to
attend.

Id.

Plaintiff denied any problems with anxiety or panic.

Id. Plaintiff’s current medications were flexeril, ibuprofen, ASA,
omeprazole, and pravastatin.

Id.

Plaintiff reported that she had

been drinking alcohol daily until one month prior.

T. 415. On

mental status examination, plaintiff was cooperative and exhibited
7

fair eye contact, unremarkable motor activity, normal rate and tone
of speech, angry mood with congruent affect, organized thought
processes, intact cognition, and impaired insight and judgment.
Id.

NP Klein assessed plaintiff with mood disorder NOS, PTSD by

history, and alcohol dependence.
On

January

29,

2014,

Id.

plaintiff’s

treating

physician

Dr. Rebecca Wadsworth, M.D., and treating physician’s assistant
(“PA”) Michael Wittek jointly completed a medical examination for
employability form related to plaintiff. T. 683-84. Dr. Wadsworth
and PA Wittek noted the following medical conditions: TIA, single
episode

with

no

ongoing

problems;

GERD,

well-controlled

on

medication; and hyperlipidemia, “good control” with medication.
Tr. 683.
moderately

Dr. Wadsworth and PA Wittek opined that plaintiff was
limited

as

to:

understanding

and

remembering

instructions; carrying out instructions; maintaining attention and
concentration; and maintaining basic standards of personal hygiene
and grooming.

Tr.

684.

On February 4, 2014, licensed clinical social worker (“LCSW”)
Ellen Ersteniuk of Wayne Behavioral Health Network completed a
psychiatric report for employment regarding plaintiff.

T.

LCSW Ersteniuk

her care

noted

that

plaintiff

had

been

under

686.

starting in December 2013 and assessed plaintiff with depressive
disorder, NOS.

Id.

LCSW Ersteniuk opined that plaintiff was not

capable of working in any capacity at that time.

8

Id.

On February 7, 2014, LCSW Ersteniuk completed a mental health
assessment for plaintiff.

T.

630-638.

Plaintiff’s current

medications were aspirin, protonix, pravastatin, multi-vitamin,
flexeril, and ibuprofen.
“anger

outbursts.”

T.

T.

630.

632.

With

Plaintiff reported having
respect

to

interpersonal

relationships, plaintiff reported having “friends and no problems.”
T. 636.

On mental status examination, plaintiff was cooperative,

her affect was appropriate, her mood was anxious, her speech was
spontaneous, and her thought form was focused. Id.

Plaintiff’s

orientation was intact, her memory and concentration were impaired,
and her insight and judgment were limited.
GAF score of 70.

T.

Id.

Plaintiff had a

637.

B. Non-medical evidence.
During the August 6, 2014 hearing, plaintiff testified that
she was 41 years old and had been married for approximately one
year.

T. 44-45.

Plaintiff had approximately 32 jobs over the

course of 15 years, and testified that she switched jobs frequently
because she “had problems and they were part-time.”

T. 48.

Her

most significant employment history was as a truck driver.

T.

48-

51.

T.

55.

Plaintiff reported suffering from a lack of memory.

She further reported having difficulty talking to other people
without become upset and angry.

T. 60-61.

Plaintiff told the ALJ

that she did not have a good relationship with her daughter and
that the police had told them to “stay away from one another.”
Tr. 66.
9

II.

The Commissioner’s
evidence.

decision

is

supported

by

substantial

In her motion, plaintiff contends that the Commissioner’s
decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

In support of

that contention she makes only one argument - namely, that “the ALJ
relied on his own lay opinion to interpret Dr. Finnity’s vague
opinion that Plaintiff has ‘difficulty relating with others and
dealing with stress.’” (Docket No. 11-1 at 14).

This argument is

without merit.
It is true that an “ALJ cannot arbitrarily substitute his own
judgment for a competent medical opinion.”
F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999).

Rosa v. Callahan, 168

However,

“the ALJ’s RFC finding need

not track any one medical opinion.”

O’Neil v. Colvin, 2014 WL

5500662, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2014).

“Although [an] ALJ’s

conclusion may not perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of
medical sources cited in his decision, he [is] entitled to weigh
all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is]
consistent with the record as a whole.”

Matta v. Astrue, 508 Fed.

Appx. 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013).
In this case, the record as a whole amply supports the ALJ’s
conclusion that plaintiff was best-suited to low-stress work and
occasional
general

interaction

public.

In

with

supervisors,

addition

to

Dr.

co-workers,

Finnity’s

and

opinion

the
that

Plaintiff has difficult relating with others and dealing with
stress,

the

record

also

contains:

10

evidence

that

plaintiff’s

migraines may be exacerbated by stress; Dr. Apacible’s opinion that
plaintiff

is

moderately

instructions

and

supervisors,

to

limited

respond
get

in

her

abilities

appropriately

along

with

to

coworkers

to

accept

criticism

or

peers

from

without

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, and to respond
appropriately to changes in the work setting; Dr. Wadsworth’s and
PA Wittek’s opinion that plaintiff is moderately limited in her
abilities to remember and carry out instructions and to maintain
attention

and

concentration;

plaintiff’s

statements

to

LCSW

Ersteniuk that she has friends and no problems with interpersonal
relationships; and plaintiff’s hearing testimony that she has
difficulty speaking to other people without becoming upset and
angry.

It was the ALJ’s duty to assess this evidence (and the

other evidence in the record) as a whole, and to reconcile any
inconsistencies.

In light of the evidence of record, the Court

finds that the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff would do best in
low-stress

occupations

with

only

occasional

interpersonal

interaction was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff’s

reliance

on

Selian

v.

Astrue,

708

F.3d

409

(2d Cir. 2013) and Curry v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 117(2d Cir. 2000) is
misplaced.

Selian and Curry do not prohibit an ALJ from relying on

a medical opinion simply because it uses terms such as “mild” and
“moderate.”

See, e.g., Lewis v. Colvin, 548 Fed. Appx. 675, 667

(2d Cir. 2013) (medical opinion that the plaintiff had “mild
11

limitations for prolonged sitting, standing, and walking” and
should avoid “heavy lifting and carrying” supported determination
that the plaintiff could perform light work); Collier v. Colvin,
2016 WL 4400313, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016) (medical opinion
imposing “moderate” limitations was not “so vague as to render it
useless”

where

it

was

supported

by

an

examination) (internal quotations omitted).

objective

physical

In this case, as in

Collier, Dr. Finnity’s statement was supported by a physical
examination of plaintiff, during which she was cooperative, had an
adequate manner of relating, and showed fair insight and judgment.
T.

368-69.

In addition, plaintiff told Dr. Finnity that she was

able to socialize and had a good relationship with her family.
T.

369.

The

ALJ

was

entitled

to

consider

the

totality

of

Dr. Finnity’s assessment in determining plaintiff’s RFC.
Plaintiff

has

not

articulated

any

other

reason

for

her

contention that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by
substantial evidence.

Upon its review of the record in its

entirety, this Court finds that the record contains substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s determination.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s cross-motion for
judgment

on

the

pleadings

(Docket

No.

12)

is

granted,

and

plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 11) is
denied. The complaint is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

12

ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
S/ MICHAEL A. TELESCA
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: Rochester, New York
March 7, 2017

13