Pierre v. City of Rochester et al
Filing
71
DECISION AND ORDER granting 53 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. County Defendants motion to dismiss [#53] is granted, and this action is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to close this action. Signed by Hon. Charles J. Siragusa on 7/22/19. (KAP)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________
CHARLES PIERRE,
Plaintiff,
DECISION and ORDER
-vs16-CV-6428 CJS
COUNTY OF MONROE, MONROE COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, SANDRA
DOORLEY, in both her individual capacity and
her official capacity as an Assistant District Attorney
then as District Attorney, KELLY C. WOLFORD, in
both her individual capacity and her official capacity
as an Assistant District Attorney, and BRIAN GREEN,
in both his individual capacity and his official
capacity as an Assistant District Attorney,
Defendants.
__________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Charles Pierre (“Plaintiff”) filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that
nine years after he was convicted of murder and arson, defendants obtained exculpatory
information which they did not share with him until eighteen months later.
After
Defendants disclosed the new evidence to Plaintiff, he used it to obtain a new trial, at
which he was acquitted.
Plaintiff maintains, however, that Defendants violated his
federal constitutional rights by failing to disclose the exculpatory information to him
sooner. Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion (Docket No. [#53]) to dismiss the
Amended Complaint [#30-1] for failure to state an actionable claim. The application is
granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The reader is presumed to be familiar with the Court’s two prior Decisions and
Orders [#50][#60] in this action, which discuss the underlying facts of this action in great
1
detail. Accordingly, the Court will only recite the facts necessary to address the pending
application.
On August 2, 2002, two individuals (Clara Sconiers and Thomas Reed) were
murdered in an apartment at 262 First Street in the City of Rochester, New York, and the
apartment was set ablaze by the perpetrator.
Members of the Rochester Police
Department (“RPD”) investigated and found, among other things, that Plaintiff, who had
a criminal record and who had previously dated Ms. Sconiers, had been present at 262
First Street on the day of the murders and had argued with Sconiers. On August 24,
2002, RPD officers arrested Plaintiff and charged him with the aforementioned murders
and arson. The Monroe County Grand Jury later indicted Plaintiff for the crimes, and on
June 16, 2003, Plaintiff was convicted following a jury trial. At trial, numerous witnesses
testified to seeing Plaintiff at or near 262 First Street both before and after the fire started
and to witnessing arguments between Plaintiff and Ms. Sconiers on the day of the
murders. On July 28, 2003, the trial court sentenced Plaintiff to, inter alia, life in prison
without parole. Plaintiff’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. See, People v. Pierre, 37
A.D.3d 1172, 829 N.Y.S.2d 386 (4th Dept. 2007), leave to appeal denied, 8 N.Y.3d 989
(2007). Plaintiff, though, always maintained his innocence.
On September 18, 2005, approximately two years after Plaintiff’s sentencing, RPD
Officer Paul Bushart (“Bushart”) responded to a domestic violence complaint at the
residence of Darrell Boyd and Kathleen Boyd on Merchants Road in the City of Rochester.
Unbeknownst to Bushart, the Boyd’s had lived in an apartment at 262 First Street adjacent
to the apartment of Sconiers and Reed at the time of the murders.
2
Upon Officer
Bushart’s arrival at the Boyd residence, Mrs. Boyd told him that she wanted Mr. Boyd to
vacate the apartment, because he had been beating her. Mrs. Boyd further told Officer
Bushart that her husband had actually committed the murders and arson at 262 First
Street, and that an innocent man had been convicted of the crimes.
In Bushart’s
presence, Mrs. Boyd threatened her husband that she would say more to Bushart if he
did not leave the premises. Mr. Boyd became visibly upset at his wife’s statement and
left the apartment. After Mr. Boyd’s departure, Bushart attempted to talk further with Mrs.
Boyd, but she refused to provide any additional information.
Officer Bushart recorded the incident, including Mrs. Boyd’s statements about the
murders, in a police report which he provided to his supervisor, Sergeant Daniel Beradini
(“Beradini”). Beradini entered the information into the RPD’s files.
Almost seven years later, on May 2, 2012, RPD Investigator Robert Brennan
(“Brennan”) was investigating Darrell Boyd’s involvement in another crime, when he
discovered the report written by Officer Bushart in 2005, in the RPD’s files. Brennan
interviewed Mrs. Boyd, who admitted that her husband had confessed to her that he had
committed the 2002 murders and arson. A few days later, on May 7, 2012, Brennan and
RPD Investigator Gary Galetta (“Galetta”) re-interviewed Mrs. Boyd, who repeated what
she had previously told Brennan.
Later that month, on May 29, 2012, Brennan shared the information obtained from
Mrs. Boyd with members of the Monroe County DA’s Office and, in particular, with DA
Sandra Doorley (“Doorley”), Assistant DA Kelly Wolford (“Wolford”) and Assistant DA
Brian Green (“Green”).
3
The RPD and DA’s Office subsequently investigated the matter.
Such
investigation involved interviewing Plaintiff in prison, and finding and interviewing persons
with whom Darrell Boyd had contact while he was in jail on other charges.
The
investigation revealed, among other things, that Mr. Boyd had told a fellow inmate, Dolph
Sturgis (“Sturgis”), that he had committed the First Street murders. 1
On November 25, 2013, the DA’s Office informed Plaintiff that Darrell Boyd had
confessed to several individuals that he had committed the murders. 2 This was the first
time that Plaintiff was made aware of the exculpatory evidence. Plaintiff then used the
information provided to him by the DA’s Office to file a collateral attack on his conviction
pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) § 440.10(1)(g). At a hearing on
the collateral attack, the trial court heard testimony from Investigator Brennan, Mrs. Boyd
and Sturgis. On July 17, 2014, the Honorable Douglas Randall, Monroe County Court
Judge, granted Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction. 3 Judge Randall
did not dismiss the charges altogether, but instead, found that Plaintiff was entitled to a
new trial, since the newly-discovered evidence “create[d] the probability that had such
evidence been received at trial the verdict would have been more favorable to the
1See, Amended Complaint [#30-1] at & 47 (Asserting that on November 25, 2013, Defendants
told Plaintiff Athat Darrell Boyd had confessed to several individuals that he had murdered Ms. Sconiers
and Mr. Reed.@) (emphasis added).
2Amended
Complaint [#30-1] at & 47.
3Judge Randall wrote, in pertinent part, that, Ait is quite clear to this Court that, no matter what
evidence was produced at the defendant=s trial, this new evidence is of such character as to create a
probability that had such evidence been received at the trial, the verdict would have been more favorable
to the defendant.@ Docket No. [#8-1] at pp. 8-9 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
4
defendant.”4
The DA’s office appealed Judge Randall’s ruling, but on June 12, 2015, the New
York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division Fourth Department, affirmed the ruling.
The DA’s office elected to re-try Plaintiff for the murders and arson. 5
However, on
August 13, 2015, following a jury trial, Plaintiff was acquitted of the charges.
On June 7, 2016, Plaintiff commenced the subject action, suing the City of
Rochester, the RPD, Monroe County, the Monroe County DA’s Office, and the Monroe
County DA, Ms.Doorley. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to add claims against
Bushart, Beradini, Brennan, Galetta, Wolford and Green. Plaintiff maintained that the
defendants violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution by failing to disclose the exculpatory information to him
in a more-timely fashion.
On September 7, 2018, the Court granted the City of Rochester defendants’ motion
to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and dismissed the action as against the
City of Rochester, RPD, Bushart, Beradini, Brennan and Galetta. In a 49-page decision,
the Court explained, inter alia, why the Amended Complaint failed to plausibly allege any
violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments. 6
4Docket
No. [#32], Exhibit C at p. 7.
5Plaintiff implies that it was improper for the DA=s Office to re-try him in light of the newlydiscovered evidence. Plaintiff is entitled to his opinion, but Judge Randall=s ruling did not establish his
innocence. Rather, it merely established his Aentitlement to a new trial.@ Docket No. [#32], Exhibit C at p.
6.
6
Plaintiff had also asserted state-law claims against the City Defendants, which the Court also
dismissed.
5
The action proceeded, however, as to the County Defendants, who did not join in
the City Defendants’ motion. As to the County Defendants, the Amended Complaint
purports to state the following claims: A § 1983 claim against Doorley, Wolford and Green
(Third Cause of Action); a § 1983 Monell claim against Doorley in her capacity as District
Attorney, based on her “policy decision” not to immediately notify Plaintiff about the
exculpatory evidence (Fourth Cause of Action); a conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1985 against Doorley, Wolford and Green (Seventh Cause of Action); a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1986 against Doorley for neglect in preventing a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §
1985 (Eighth Cause of Action); and a § 1983 Monell claim against Monroe County, the
DA’s Office and Doorley based on an alleged municipal policy of withholding exculpatory
evidence from convicted persons (Tenth Cause of Action).
On October 3, 2018, County Defendants filed the subject motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety, for
failure to state a claim. Under the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard, to survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d
929 (2007).
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The Claims against the County Defendants must be dismissed for the same
reasons explained by the Court in its prior Decision and Order 7
As discussed earlier, the Court previously dismissed the Amended Complaint as
against the City Defendants. For reasons that escape the Court, the County Defendants
did not join in the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss, even though the claims asserted
against them (violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution based on untimely disclosure of exculpatory
information obtained post-conviction) are the same as those that were asserted against
the City Defendants. 8 In now moving to dismiss, the County Defendants assert some
additional grounds for dismissal -such as absolute prosecutorial immunity and Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity- but otherwise argue that the Court should dismiss the
claims against them for the same reasons that it dismissed the claims against the City
Defendants. 9 In this regard, movants contend that “[a]ll of the claims against the County
Defendants are based on the same underlying conduct as was alleged against the City
Defendants,” 10 and that “[t]he same reasoning applies to the County Defendants.” 11
7
Docket No. [#50].
See, e.g., Amended Complaint at ¶ ¶ 76, 86, 114, 133, 136.
9 County Defendants also make the following additional arguments: The DA’s Office is not a legal
entity that can be sued; a Monell claim cannot be asserted against Doorley because she is not a
municipal entity;
10 Docket No. [#53-2] at p. 4.
11 Docket No. [#53-2] at p. 9; see also, id. at p. 14 (“[A]ll of Plaintiff’s claims against the Monroe
County Defendants should be dismissed pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) because the amended
complaint fails to state a cause of action against the Defendants, because of the Defendants’ absolute
prosecutorial immunity and Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and for the reasons explained by
this Court’s decision and order granting the City of Rochester Defendants’ motion to dismiss, including
the protection of qualified immunity.”).
8
7
In Plaintiff’s 8-page response, he maintains that absolute prosecutorial immunity
does not apply because movants were “not acting in their capacities as advocates” during
the relevant time, since “[t]here were no adversarial proceedings relating to Plaintiff’s
2003 conviction during the period the County Defendants withheld the exculpatory
evidence from the Plaintiff.” 12 Otherwise, though, Plaintiff makes the same arguments
that he made in opposition to the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss, which this Court
has already rejected.
There is no need for the Court to repeat the detailed analysis of Plaintiff’s claims
that it performed in the earlier Decision and Order [#50].
For the same reasons
discussed therein, the Amended Complaint fails to allege any violation of Plaintiff’s federal
constitutional rights by any of the County Defendants, and therefore fails to state any
actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. § § 1983, 1985 or 1986.
Because of that, it is
unnecessary for the Court to address the alternative arguments offered in support of the
County Defendants’ motion, namely, absolute prosecutorial immunity and Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity.
12
Docket No. [#66] at ¶ 5 and Docket No. [#67] at p. 5.
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CONCLUSION
County Defendants’ motion to dismiss [#53] is granted, and this action is dismissed
with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to close this action.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
Rochester, New York
July 22, 2019
ENTER:
/s/ Charles J. Siragusa
CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA
United States District Judge
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