Smalls v. Rathbum et al

Filing 25

DECISION AND ORDER: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 13 is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's official capacity, retaliation, and religious discrimination claims and is DENIED as to his due process claim. Plaintiff must file a written response wi thin 30 days of the date this Order stating that he: (1) withdraws his due process claim; or (2) forever waives any challenge to the disciplinary sanctions affecting the duration of his confinement. If Plaintiff does not respond to this Order within 30 days, his due process claim will be dismissed without prejudice in its entirety.SO ORDERED.A copy of this NEF and Decision and Order have been mailed to the pro se Plaintiff. Signed by Hon. Frank P. Geraci, Jr. on 12/19/2017. (AFM)

PS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
___________________________________
DWIGHT SMALLS,
Plaintiff,
16-CV-6503-FPG
v.
DECISION AND ORDER
SERGEANT DELLIVAN RATHBUN, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Dwight Smalls, an inmate incarcerated at Auburn Correctional Facility,
brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for alleged violations of his constitutional rights while he was
confined at Elmira Correctional Facility. ECF No. 1. Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 13. For the reasons that
follow, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts the following causes of action: (1) excessive force that injured
Plaintiff and led to a false misbehavior report being filed against him; (2) denial of medical
treatment for his injuries after the assault; (3) religious discrimination; and (4) due process
violations during a disciplinary hearing.
When the Court initially screened Plaintiff’s Complaint, it dismissed his false misbehavior
report claim. ECF No. 5. In lieu of answering the Complaint, Defendants moved to dismiss the
official capacity claims against them and Plaintiff’s retaliation, religious discrimination, and due
process claims. Defendants have not moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims, and therefore
the Court will not address them.

DISCUSSION
I.

Legal Standard
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but
it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with
a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Determining whether a complaint meets the
plausibility standard is “context-specific” and requires that the court “draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
II.

Analysis
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s official capacity, retaliation, and racial discrimination

claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff
concedes the dismissal of these claims (ECF No. 21 at 4), and therefore they are dismissed.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s due process claim should be dismissed. They assert
that this claim is prohibited by the rule set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which
bars a Section 1983 due process claim related to a disciplinary hearing unless the hearing officer’s
determination is subsequently invalidated. The disciplinary hearing at issue here resulted in the
loss of 24 months of good time credit.

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Even if a plaintiff does not seek to restore his good-time credits, a favorable ruling on his
due process claim necessarily implies the invalidity of the sanctions imposed. See Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997). Thus, an inmate cannot sue for damages under Section 1983
based on alleged procedural due process violations during a disciplinary hearing that led to the
revocation of good-time credits. See id. at 648. The claim is improper until the prison’s decision
is overturned through administrative channels or a state or federal court in a habeas proceeding.
See id.; Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2006).
Pursuant to the rule in Heck, Plaintiff’s due process claim is not cognizable under Section
1983 unless the hearing officer’s determination is invalidated. Even though Plaintiff does not
challenge the loss of his good time credit, 1 the disciplinary proceeding that he challenges impacts
the overall length of his sentence because it resulted in the loss of good time.
However, Heck’s requirement of a favorable termination does not preclude a Section 1983
claim challenging sanctions that do not affect the length of confinement. See Muhammad v. Close,
540 U.S. 749, 754 (2004); McEachin v. Selsky, 225 F. App’x 36, 37 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary
order). In a case of mixed sanctions, where, as here, a prisoner is subject to some sanctions that
affect the overall length of his confinement and some that do not, he can proceed under Section
1983 and dispute the sanctions affecting the confinement conditions if he is willing to waive any
challenge to sanctions affecting the duration of his confinement. In other words, Plaintiff must
abandon, now and in any future proceeding, challenges to the loss of good time credit that arise
out of the proceeding attacked in his current Section 1983 suit. See Peralta, 467 F.3d at 104.
In Peralta, the Second Circuit remanded to the District Court to (1) determine whether the
inmate had formally agreed or was willing “to waive all his potential claims with respect to the

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Plaintiff asserts that he “did not allege ‘deprivation of good time’ nor ‘mixed sanctions’ but the insufficiency of the
evidence of misconduct to substantiate the charges for which he was found guilty.” ECF No. 21 at 4.

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sanctions affecting the duration of his imprisonment arising out of the proceeding” being
challenged and, once so waived, (2) allow him to proceed under Section 1983 as to sanctions
affecting only the confinement conditions. Peralta, 467 F.3d at 106.
Accordingly, Plaintiff must respond to the Court within 30 days of the date this Order and
(1) withdraw his due process claim challenging all the sanctions imposed; or (2) forever waive any
challenge to sanctions affecting the duration of his confinement, including the loss of his good
time credit.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s official
capacity, retaliation, and religious discrimination claims and is DENIED as to his due process
claim.
Plaintiff must file a written response within 30 days of the date this Order stating that he:
(1) withdraws his due process claim; or (2) forever waives any challenge to the disciplinary
sanctions affecting the duration of his confinement. If Plaintiff does not respond to this Order
within 30 days, his due process claim will be dismissed without prejudice in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 19, 2017
Rochester, New York
______________________________________
HON. FRANK P. GERACI, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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