Freeman v. Kirisits et al

Filing 165

DECISION AND ORDER finding as moot 117 Motion to Compel; finding as moot 117 Motion for Sanctions; finding as moot 123 Motion ; denying 134 Motion to Vacate ; finding as moot 148 Motion ; finding as moot 155 Motion to Compel; finding as moot 158 Motion ; adopting Report and Recommendations re 159 Report and Recommendations. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 9/24/2018. (Clerk to close case.) (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DWAYNE FREEMAN,
No. 6:16-cv-06668(MAT)(MWP)
DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vsROCHESTER PSYCHIATRIC CENTER,
Defendant.

I.

Introduction
Proceeding pro se, Dwayne Freeman (“Plaintiff”) filed this

action against Rochester Psychiatric Center (“RPC”) asserting a
claim

under

Section

504

of

the

Rehabilitation

Act

of

1973,

29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., arising out of his employment with, and
subsequent termination from, RPC. This case comes before the Court
upon the combined Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 159), dated
September 7, 2018, issued by Magistrate Judge Marian W. Payson
(“the R&R”), with regard to, inter alia, Plaintiff’s Motion to
Vacate the Arbitration Award (Docket No. 134). For the reasons
discussed below, the Court adopts the R&R’s recommendation that
Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award should be
denied.
II.

Discussion
“A decision of an arbitrator . . . is not totally impervious

to

judicial

review[,]”

since

the

Federal

Arbitration

(“FAA”)

“provides four statutory grounds for vacatur in situations that
involve, generally, impropriety on the part of the arbitrators.”

Porzig v. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, N. Am. LLC, 497 F.3d 133,
139 (2d Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted).

“In addition, a court may

vacate an award if it exhibits a ‘manifest disregard of the law.’”
Id. (quoting Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306 F.3d 1214, 1216
(2d Cir. 2002); further quotation omitted)).
Although the FAA provides for the confirmation, modification,
and vacatur of arbitral awards, “it is well-settled that the FAA
does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts.”
Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2000),
overruled on other grounds by Dosher v. Sea Port Grp. Secs., LLC,
823 F.3d 372, 373 (2d Cir. 2016). In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556
U.S. 49 (2009), the Supreme Court articulated a jurisdictional
standard based on “whether the parties’ substantive conflict gives
rise to federal-question jurisdiction.” Id. at 62. It appears that
the Vaden standard is met here because the “parties’ substantive
conflict” under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “gives rise
to

federal-question

jurisdiction[,]”

id.

See,

Hagan

v.

Katz

Commc’ns, Inc., 200 F. Supp.3d 435, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Vaden
standard met where the parties’ “substantive conflict” was under
Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which gives
rise to federal-question jurisdiction) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff here challenges the arbitration award issued by Lise
Gelertner (“Gelertner”) affirming his termination from RPC on the
basis that the decision evidences a “manifest disregard of the
law.” Plaintiff’s Motion (“Pl.’s Mot.”) (Docket No. 134, p. 2 of

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41). A federal court’s review under the doctrine of manifest
disregard of the law is highly deferential and, as such, relief is
rarely granted. See Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness
Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2003)). To secure vacatur
of an arbitral award under this doctrine requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate “both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing
legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether,
and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well-defined,
explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.” Wallace v. Buttar,
378 F.3d 182,

189 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks

omitted); accord, e.g., Porzig, 497 F.3d at 139.
Plaintiff asserts that Gelertner committed “improprieties”
including a “manifest disregard of the evidence evinced at the
February 11, 2016 hearing.” Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 27 (Docket No. 134).
Plaintiff asserts that Gelertner heard testimony establishing that
RPC

improperly

and

knowingly

disregarded

its

insubordination

policy, in violation of “the familiar rule of administrative law
that an agency must abide by its own regulation[,]’” Pl.’s Decl.
¶ 46 (quoting Fort Stewart Sch. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495
U.S.

641.

654

(1990).

Plaintiff’s

argument

amounts

to

a

disagreement with the arbitrator’s weighing of the evidence at the
hearing, which is insufficient as a matter of law to show that
Gelertner “knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply
it or ignored it altogether,” Wallace, 378 F.3d at 189. Indeed, the
remainder

of

Plaintiff’s

arguments,

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while

couched

as

legal

violations allegedly committed by Gelertner, are variations on the
same theme: that Gelertner erred in weighing the evidence and
assessing the credibility of the witnesses. In short, he has failed
to

demonstrate

that

Gelertner

committed

any

improprieties

or

manifestly disregarded the law. There is no basis for vacating the
arbitration award.
III. Conclusion
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

R&R

(Docket

No.

159)

is

adopted, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate the Arbitration Award
(Docket No. 134) is denied with prejudice.
Because Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint has been dismissed
with prejudice, and because Plaintiff’s petition to vacate the
arbitration award under the FAA has been denied with prejudice,
this matter is concluded.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to

Compel and For Sanctions (Docket No. 117), Motion for Miscellaneous
Relief (Docket No. 123), Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (Docket
No. 148), Motion to Compel (Docket No. 155), and Motion for
Miscellaneous Relief (Docket No. 158) are denied as moot.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
DATED:

September 24, 2018
Rochester, New York

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