Cowley v. Colvin
Filing
15
DECISION AND ORDER The plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings 11 is denied, the Commissioner's cross motion for judgment on the pleadings 13 is granted, and the Commissioner's decision that plaintiff is not disabled is affirmed in its entirety. Signed by Hon. David G. Larimer on 5/17/2018. (KAH)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________________
TARA ELAINE COWLEY,
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
16-CV-6811L
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
________________________________________________
Plaintiff appeals from a denial of disability benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security
(“the Commissioner”). The action is one brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the
Commissioner’s final determination.
On March 16, 2013, plaintiff, then twenty-four years old, filed an application for
Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging an
inability to work since January 1, 2003. (Administrative Transcript, Dkt. #8 at 18). 1 Her
application was initially denied. Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held on December 10,
2014 before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Connor O’Brien. The ALJ issued a decision on
May 23, 2015, concluding that plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Dkt. #8
at 18-29). That decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals
Council denied review on October 27, 2016. (Dkt. #8 at 1-3). Plaintiff now appeals from that
decision. The plaintiff has moved (Dkt. #11), and the Commissioner has cross moved (Dkt. #13)
1 Note that the Administrative Transcript portions cited herein are identified using the internal Bates-stamped
pagination utilized by the parties.
for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(c). For the reasons set forth
below, the plaintiff’s motion is denied, the Commissioner’s cross motion is granted, and the
Commissioner’s decision that plaintiff is not disabled is affirmed.
DISCUSSION
Determination of whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act follows a well-known five-step sequential evaluation, familiarity with which is presumed.
See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986). See 20 CFR §§404.1509, 404.1520.
The Commissioner’s decision that a plaintiff is not disabled must be affirmed if it is supported by
substantial evidence, and if the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g);
Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002).
The ALJ’s decision exhaustively summarizes plaintiff’s medical records, particularly her
treatment records for asthma, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder with
panic attacks, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, substance abuse disorder in remission, and
impulse control disorder, which the ALJ concluded together constituted a severe impairment not
meeting or equaling a listed impairment. (Dkt. #8 at 20).
Upon consideration of the record and after careful application of the “special technique”
prescribed for nonexertional impairments (Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008)),
the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full
range of work at all exertional levels, with a number of environmental and nonexertional
limitations. Plaintiff can tolerate no more than occasional exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat,
wetness, humidity and airborne irritants.
She can perform simple, unskilled tasks in an
environment with no more than occasional changes in the work setting. She cannot interact with
the public or perform teamwork.
She can have no more than occasional interaction with
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coworkers and supervisors. She can work to meet daily goals, but cannot maintain an hourly,
machine-driven, assembly line production rate.
She also requires up to three short,
less-than-five-minute breaks in addition to regularly scheduled breaks. (Dkt. #8 at 22).
Given this RFC, vocational expert Peter A. Manzi testified that plaintiff could perform the
positions of mail clerk, photocopy machine operator, and collator operator. (Dkt. #8 at 28).
I believe the evidence supports the ALJ’s findings concerning the nature and extent of
plaintiff’s limitations, and that her finding that the plaintiff was not disabled was supported by
substantial evidence and was not the product of legal error.
I.
The ALJ’s Evaluation of Medical Opinions
On appeal, plaintiff chiefly argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess the medical
opinions of plaintiff’s treating therapist, licensed clinical social worker Debra McKnight, and/or
failed to sufficiently explain her reasoning for giving Ms. McKnight’s opinions only “[s]ome
weight.” (Dkt. #8 at 25). She also alleges that the ALJ erred in purporting to credit the opinion
of consulting psychologist Dr. Yu-Ying Lin, but failing to incorporate into her RFC finding Dr.
Lin’s opinion that plaintiff was “moderately limited in appropriately dealing with stress.” (Dkt.
#8 at 327).
I do not find that the ALJ’s assessment of Ms. McKnight’s opinions was erroneous. First,
licensed clinical social workers are not considered acceptable “medical sources” pursuant to 20
C.F.R. §416.913(a), and their opinions are not entitled to controlling weight. See Conlin v.
Colvin, 111 F. Supp. 3d 376, 386 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). The amount of weight given to such opinions
is based, in part, on the examining and treatment relationship, length and frequency of
examinations, the extent of relevant evidence given to support the opinion, and consistency of the
opinion with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. §416.927(c). However, the ALJ is “free to decide
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that the opinions of “‘other sources’ ... are entitled to no weight or little weight, [though] those
decisions should be explained.”
Oaks v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157161 at *20
(W.D.N.Y. 2014).
Ms. McKnight’s opinions stated that plaintiff is “seriously limited” with respect to working
with others, completing a normal workday without interruptions, performing at a consistent pace,
accepting instructions and responding appropriately to supervisors, getting along with coworkers,
responding to changes in a work setting, dealing with normal work-related stress, carrying out
detailed instructions, and dealing with the stresses of semiskilled or skilled work. (Dkt. #8 at
334). Ms. McKnight further opined that plaintiff’s impairments would cause her to be absent
from work for more than four days per month. (Dkt. #8 at 336, 358).
The ALJ set forth, in detail, her reasons for declining to fully credit Ms. McKnight’s
opinions. These included the fact that the second form completed by Ms. McKnight (the first was
almost entirely blank and incomplete) was based on a brief treatment history, and was largely
comprised of a series of check-box findings that were unsupported by any elaboration (even where
the form requested a narrative explanation for a given finding), treatment notes or other objective
findings. (Dkt. #8 at 25). The dramatic limitations listed by Ms. McKnight also conflict with
other medical opinion evidence of record, including the consultative assessment by Dr. Lin, who
found that plaintiff’s only limitations are mild limitations in maintaining a schedule, learning new
tasks, performing complex tasks independently, making appropriate decisions and dealing with
others, and a moderate limitation in dealing appropriately with stress. (Dkt. #8 at 327). They are
further undermined by the unremarkable Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) scores
assigned by Ms. McKnight to plaintiff, and by plaintiff’s regular attendance at monthly
appointments. (Dkt. #8 at 25). Finally, the ALJ noted that such extensive limitations are not
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supported by plaintiff’s self-reported daily activities, which include caring for herself and her
family.
(Dkt. #8 at 21). 2
I find that the ALJ’s assessment of Ms. McKnight’s opinions
considered the appropriate factors, and that she set forth good reasons for declining to fully credit
them.
With respect to Dr. Lin’s opinion that plaintiff is moderately limited with respect to stress,
I find that the ALJ largely accounted for such a limitation in her RFC finding. The RFC limited
plaintiff to simple, unskilled tasks with no more than occasional changes in the work setting and
without an hourly, machine-driven assembly line production rate. (Dkt. #8 at 22). To the extent
that the ALJ’s failure to include a “low stress” limitation in plaintiff’s RFC in order to fully account
for the limitations opined by Dr. Lin is alleged to be erroneous, any such error is harmless. It is
well settled that the positions identified by the vocational expert, including mail clerk, photocopy
machine operator, and collator operator (Dkt. #8 at 28), are unskilled jobs that are suitable for
claimants with limitations to “low-stress” work. See e.g., Newell v. Colvin, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 116397 at *28-*29 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (claimant limited to low-stress work with no more
than occasional interaction with others can perform positions of photocopy machine operator and
collator operator); Harris v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124620 at *17-*18 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
(claimant limited to low-stress work with no more than occasional interaction with the public and
coworkers can perform the position of photocopy machine operator); Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Colvin,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113069 at *4-*6 (claimant limited to low-stress environment can perform
mail clerk position); Paulino v. Colvin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65665 at *19 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
2 Although plaintiff points out, correctly, that her daily activities were carried out in an isolated, socially “restricted
setting” which required scant interaction with others, the ALJ tacitly recognized plaintiff’s social limitations by finding
that plaintiff has “serious restrictions in social interactions, due to social phobia and distraction,” and determining an
appropriately “restrictive” RFC. (Dkt. #8 at 25). Specifically, the ALJ determined that plaintiff cannot interact with
the public or perform teamwork, and can interact only occasionally with coworkers and supervisors. (Dkt. #8 at 22).
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(claimant restricted to occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors and no interaction with
the public can work as a photocopy machine operator); Gill v. Astrue, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
105646 at *17-*18) (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (individual limited to simple, low-stress work can perform
photocopy machine operator and collator operator positions).
In sum, the ALJ discussed the medical opinion evidence at length, set forth the reasoning
for the weight afforded to each opinion, and cited and discussed specific evidence in the record
that supported her determination. Upon a longitudinal review of the record, I do not find that the
ALJ improperly substituted her “own expertise or view of the medical proof [in place of] any
competent medical opinion,” or that her findings were otherwise unsupported by substantial
evidence. Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015).
I have considered the rest of plaintiff’s arguments, and find them to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, I find that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence, and was not based on legal error. The plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Dkt. #11) is denied, the Commissioner’s cross motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. #13)
is granted, and the Commissioner’s decision that plaintiff is not disabled is affirmed in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________________
DAVID G. LARIMER
United States District Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
May 17, 2018.
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