Byrd v. Rochester Housing Authority et al

Filing 25

DECISION AND ORDER granting 14 RHAs motion for summary judgment in its entirety, and Plaintiffs complaint against it is dismissed with prejudice. All H.U.D. Housing Federal Government Contract Project Housing Low Income Citizens, a non-existent ent ity, is dismissed as a party. (Clerk to close case.) (Copy of Decision and Order sent by first class mail to Plaintiff.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 6/7/18. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP- (Main Document 25 replaced on 6/7/2018) (BK).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
VICKIE DIANNE BYRD,
No. 6:17-cv-06248(MAT)
DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vsROCHESTER HOUSING AUTHORITY, ALL H.U.D.
HOUSING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
PROJECT HOUSING LOW INCOME CITIZENS,
Defendants.

I. Introduction
Proceeding pro se, Vickie Dianne Byrd (“Plaintiff”) instituted
this action on April 20, 2017, alleging violations of the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. on the part of Rochester
Housing

Authority

(“RHA”)

and

“All

H.U.D.

Housing

Federal

Government Contract Project Housing Low Income Citizens.” Presently
before the Court is RHA’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim

(Dkt

#14),

which

the

Court,

on

notice

to

the

parties

(Dkt #21), converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff
filed her Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt #24). RHA did not file reply papers. The motion was submitted
without oral argument on June 6, 2018. For the reasons discussed
below, summary judgment in favor of RHA is granted.
II.

Rule 56 Standard
“Summary judgment is required where ‘the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Rodriguez v. Vill.
Green Realty, Inc., 788 F.3d 31, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(a)). “In assessing the record to determine whether
there is a genuine issue to be tried as to any material fact, the
court

is

required

to

resolve

all

ambiguities

and

draw

all

permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought.” Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118
F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 1997). “A fact is ‘material’ for these
purposes if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.’” Rodriguez, 78 F.3d at 39 (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A dispute of fact
is ‘genuine’ if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248).
III.

Discussion
A.

Overview of Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt #1) alleges housing discrimination
in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.
(“FHA”). Her allegations, from what the Court can discern, appear
to assert that on February 2, 2013, she requested that the RHA
place her on a waiting list for public housing. According to
Plaintiff, non-party George Getman, RHA’s “Manager/Director of
Application

Processing,”

(Discriminatory)

Housing

“has

willingley

(practice)(against)
-2-

[sic]
[her]

practice[d]
person

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year’s,” by “refusing to Rent -2- [sic] [her] person[.]” Plaintiff
asserts that she has “documents -2- [sic] prove it spanding [sic]
years of Discriminatory Housing. . . .” (Dkt #1).
B.

Discriminatory Practices Prohibited Under the FHA

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges RHA has “refus[ed] to Rent -2[sic]

[her]

person”

over

the

course

of

several

years

for

discriminatory reasons, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605,
and 3606.
The FHA prohibits discrimination across a spectrum of housingrelated activities, including the provision of brokerage services,
real estate transactions, and housing sales and rentals. See
42

U.S.C.

§§

3604-3606.

Subject

to

certain

exceptions

applicable here, the FHA makes it “unlawful—
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona
fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or
rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities
in connection therewith, because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made,
printed, or published any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an
intention to make any such preference, limitation, or
discrimination.

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not

(d) To represent to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection,
sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so
available.
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person
to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding
the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of
a person or persons of a particular race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin.
(f)(1) To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
buyer or renter because of a handicap of-(A) that buyer or renter,
. . .
(2) To discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities
in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap
of-(A) that person . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 3604. Plaintiff does not specify the subsections of
Section 3604 under which she seeks relief.
Although

Plaintiff

references

Sections

3605

and

3606

of

Title 42 U.S.C. in her Complaint, those sections of the FHA are
inapplicable. Section 3605 pertains to “residential real estaterelated

transactions,”

which

is

defined

as

“[t]he

making

or

purchasing of loans or providing other financial assistance--(A)
for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining
a dwelling; or (B) secured by residential real estate[;]” or “[t]he
selling, brokering, or appraising of residential real property.”

-4-

42 U.S.C. § 3605(b). Section 3606 pertains to “[d]iscrimination in
the provision of brokerage services[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3606.
C.
As

The Burden-Shifting Framework
the

Second

Circuit

has

explained,

claims

of

housing

discrimination are evaluated under the burden-shifting framework
articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d 39,
47 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610
F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1979)). The elements of a prima facie case
of housing discrimination are as follows: (1) the plaintiff is a
member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff sought and was
qualified to rent or purchase the housing; (3) the defendant denied
the plaintiff the opportunity to rent or purchase the housing; and
(4) the housing opportunity remained available to other renters or
purchasers. “[O]nce a plaintiff has established a prima facie case
of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to assert a
legitimate,
decision.”

nondiscriminatory
Id.

(citing

rationale

McDonnell

Douglas

for

the

Corp.,

challenged

411

U.S.

at

802–03). “If the defendant makes such a showing, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that discrimination was the
real reason for the defendant’s action.” Id. (citing Schnabel v.
Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000)). Importantly, “although
the McDonnell Douglas presumption shifts the burden of production
to the defendant, ‘[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
-5-

fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’”

St. Mary’s

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (quoting Texas Dept.
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450.S. 248, 253 (1981); emphasis
U
and brackets in original).
D.

Application to Plaintiff’s Claims

For the sole purpose of resolving the pending summary judgment
motion, the Court assumes arguendo that Plaintiff has established
a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA. The question
then

becomes

whether

nondiscriminatory

RHA

rationale

has

for

the

asserted

a

decision

not

legitimate,
to

rent

to

Plaintiff.
As RHA points out, documents submitted by Plaintiff herself
establish that RHA considered her rental application but, in
reviewing her background information, discovered the existence of
a monetary judgment against her in favor of a prior landlord for
unpaid rent. Plaintiff’s own Exhibits B — F (Dkt #11) confirm that
RHA denied her rental application because RHA’s evaluation of her
application revealed that she had been sued twice by her former
landlord, Grove Street Management/Barbara Manor Apartments, LLC. As
part of Exhibit (“Pl.’s Ex.”) C (Dkt #11-2), Plaintiff submitted a
copy of a judgment dated December 29, 2014, dismissing Grove Street
Management/Barbara Manor Apartments LLC’s landlord/tenant petition
against Plaintiff in light of the parties’ settlement, which
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consisted of a lease renewal through October 31, 2015. Plaintiff
apparently did not meet her rent obligations on the renewed lease,
and Grove Street Management/Barbara Manor Apartments LLC sued
Plaintiff a second time, obtaining a judgment filed on December 2,
2015, for the balance due on the renewed lease ($565.00).
Thus, in a letter dated April 14, 2017, RHA informed Plaintiff
that its review of court records showed landlord/tenant judgments
against her in favor of Grove Street Management/Barbara Manor
Apartments, LLC. RHA notified Plaintiff that she must address those
judgments before she could be admitted to the Public Housing
Program. (See Pl.’s Ex. C).
In a letter dated April 20, 2017, RHA denied Plaintiff’s entry
into the Public Housing Program because of the history of court
actions filed against her, and the existence of a judgment against
her

dated

December

2,

2015

in

favor

of

Grove

Street

Management/Barbara Manor Apartments, LLC in the amount of $565.00.
(See Pl.’s Ex. D (Dkt #11-3)). On May 30, 2017, RHA sent a followup letter to Plaintiff explaining that her documents submitted in
reply to the April 24, 2017 letter failed to address the December
2, 2015 judgment against her. (See Pl.’s Ex. E (Dkt #11-4)).
RHA did not submit a copy of the December 2, 2015 judgment in
this action, but Federal Rule of Evidence 201 “allows a court to
take judicial notice of adjudicative facts.” A.I. Trade Fin., Inc.
v. Centro Internationale Handelsbank AG, 926 F. Supp. 378, 387

-7-

(S.D.N.Y.

1996)

(citing

Sprague

&

Rhodes

Commodity

Corp.

v.

Instituto Mexicano Del Cafe, 566 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (“Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits this
court to take judicial notice of judgments of courts of record even
though the fact is presented for the first time on appeal.”)
(citing 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5110); United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir.
1994) (“[A] court may take notice of another court’s order only for
the limited purpose of recognizing the ‘judicial act’ that the
order represents or the subject matter of the litigation.”); other
citations omitted). The Court therefore may take judicial notice of
Grove Street

Management/Barbara

Manor

Apartments,

LLC’s

court

actions against Plaintiff to recover past-due rent and the award of
a judgment in their favor against her. See, e.g., Colonial Leasing
Co. of New England v. Logistics Control Grp. Int'l, 762 F.2d 454,
459–60 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The district court could properly take
notice, under Rule 201(b), of the judgment for the limited purpose
of taking as true the action of the Oregon court in entering
judgment for Colonial in its action against Old Gulf Ports, the
existence of which was stipulated as being known by all parties at
the time of the transfer. The judicial act itself was not a fact
‘subject
constitute

to

reasonable
‘a

source

dispute’
whose

since

accuracy

Oregon
cannot

court

records

reasonably

be

questioned.’”) (quoting ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 651

-8-

F.2d 343, 345 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1981) (court took notice of settlement
in related proceeding rendering case at bar moot);

21 C. Wright &

K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 5106 (Supp.
1984) (“Insofar as judicial acts recorded by court personnel are
concerned, normally court records are sources of indisputable
accuracy

under

Rule

201(b)(2).”);

other

citations

omitted)).

Moreover, Plaintiff submitted a copy of her Online Rental Exchange
credit report dated April 11, 2017, indicating that a review of
public records disclosed a judgment in the amount of $565.00
reported

against

her

on

December

2,

2015,

in

case

number

2015-12545, in favor of Barbara Manor Apartments, LLC. (See Pl.’s
Ex. D).1
After learning of the monetary judgment against Plaintiff in
favor of her prior landlord, RHA gave her the benefit of the doubt
with regard to her assertion that the judgment was going to be
vacated soon, and it extended her administrative appeal deadlines
so that she could provide proof of vacatur. However, Plaintiff
failed to provide the proof which she promised was forthcoming.
Accordingly, RHA upheld its denial of her rental application.
1

In another lawsuit filed in this Court, Byrd v. Dunn Towers I/Apt’s, et
al., 6:16-cv-06785-MAT (W.D.N.Y.),
one of the defendants filed copies of
documents filed in New York State, Monroe County Court summary proceeding,
Barbara Manor Apartments v. Byrd, Index No. 2015-12545, pursuant to which an
eviction warrant was issued against Plaintiff, and Barbara Manor Apartments was
awarded $1,630.00 in back rent ($565), attorneys’ fees ($500), and costs and
disbursements ($565). That judgment was entered against Plaintiff in the Monroe
County Clerk’s Office on December 2, 2015. See Dunn Towers I’s Motion to Dismiss
(Dkt #7), Exhibit B to the Declaration of Karen Sanders, Esq. (Dkt #7-1), in
6:16-cv-06785-MAT.

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Plaintiff has not proven that the legitimate reason offered by
RHA

was

not

its

true

reason

but

instead

was

a

pretext

for

discrimination. Under the burden-shifting framework applicable to
FHA claims, “the ultimate burden rests with the plaintiff to offer
evidence

sufficient

to

support

a

reasonable

inference

that

prohibited . . . discrimination occurred.” Woodman v. WWOR–TV,
Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). No such
inference is reasonable on the present record. In light of all of
the evidence the Court has reviewed, Plaintiff has failed to show
that a reasonable jury could conclude that unlawful discrimination
was the real reason her rental application was rejected by RHA.
Summary judgment is therefore granted to RHA.
E. Dismissal of Remaining Defendant
Plaintiff also names “All H.U.D. Housing Federal Government
Contract Project Housing Low Income Citizens.” This is not an
actual entity, let alone one that is capable of being sued. Indeed,
no summons ever was issued with regard to it. Plaintiff, moreover,
has included no allegations against this non-existent entity.
Accordingly, it must be dismissed as a party.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, RHA’s motion for summary judgment

is granted in its entirety, and Plaintiff’s complaint against it is
dismissed with prejudice. “All H.U.D. Housing Federal Government

-10-

Contract Project Housing Low Income Citizens,” a non-existent
entity, is dismissed as a party.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
______________________________
HON. MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:

June 7, 2018
Rochester, New York.

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