Mejia v. People of the State of New York
Filing
5
DECISION AND ORDER denying 3 Motion to Stay. ORDERED, that Petitioners application [#3] for stay and abeyance is denied; and it is furtherORDERED, that within thirty (30) days of the date of this Decision and Order, Petitioner shall inform the Cou rt in writing whether he would prefer that his entire petition be dismissed without prejudice so that he can pursue remedies in state court, or whether he would prefer to delete his unexhausted ineffective assistance claim and proceed only with the e xhausted claims. If Petitioner elects to have the entire petition dismissed without prejudice, he is advised that the one-year limitations period applicable to habeas petitions will presumably bar him from filing another habeas petition in federal c ourt; and it is furtherORDERED, that if Petitioner fails to respond in writing and affirmatively withdraw his unexhausted claim within thirty (30) days of the date of this Decision and Order, the Court will dismiss the entire petition without prejudice.Signed by Hon. Charles J. Siragusa on 7/20/17. Copy of this decision and order and NEF mailed to pro se plaintiff at Attica. (KAP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________
JOSE MEJIA, 07-B-2418,
Petitioner,
-vs-
DECISION AND ORDER
PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK,
17-CV-6362 CJS
Respondent.
__________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Now before the Court is Jose Mejia’s (“Petitioner” or “Mejia”) application for stay
and abeyance of his mixed § 2254 habeas corpus petition. (Docket No. [#3]). The
application is denied, and within thirty (30) days of the date of this Decision and Order
Petitioner must inform the Court in writing whether he would prefer that his entire petition
be dismissed without prejudice so that he can pursue remedies in state court, or whether
he would prefer to delete his unexhausted ineffective assistance claim and proceed only
with the exhausted claims.
BACKGROUND
Mejia, acting pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that his
convictions in New York State Supreme Court, Erie County, for crimes including murder,
were unconstitutionally obtained. Mejia’s § 2254 petition asserts the following grounds:
1) the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses by admitting testimony from a codefendant; 2) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; 3) prosecutorial
misconduct; and 4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
On June 8, 2017, Mejia filed the § 2254 application, which acknowledges that the
ineffective assistance claim is unexhausted. Shortly thereafter, on June 26, 2017, Mejia
filed the subject motion for stay and abeyance. In support of that application, Mejia
indicates that he is currently preparing a motion, pursuant to New York Criminal
Procedure Law § 440.10, concerning the ineffective assistance claim. Mejia indicates
that there is “good cause” to grant the application for stay and abeyance, because since
March 25, 2015, he has been proceeding pro se. Mejia further indicates that he had
insufficient time to exhaust his claims before filing this action. On this point, it appears
that the U.S. Supreme Court denied Mejia’s petition for certiorari on June 6, 2016. See,
Mejia v. New York, 136 S.Ct. 2416 (2016). Thereafter, Mejia had one year, or until June
6, 2017, in which to file his § 2254 application.1 Mejia states that he “had only 14 days”
to file the petition by June 6, 2017, but fails to explain why he did not attempt to file the
§ 440.10 motion sooner (which would have tolled the statute of limitations on his § 2254
petition), except to make a vague reference to the fact that “investigatory research” took
a long time.2
DISCUSSION
Section 2254(b)(1)(A) of 28 U.S.C. requires a habeas petitioner to first exhaust his
state court remedies with respect to each of the grounds raised in the petition. A district
court may not adjudicate a “mixed petition,” consisting of both exhausted and
unexhausted claims, except that it may deny the entire petition on the merits. See, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
Where the petitioner files a mixed petition containing both
exhausted and unexhausted claims, the Court may, under certain circumstances, dismiss
the unexhausted claims without prejudice and stay the petition, in order to allow the
petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the unexhausted claims:
The Court stamped the § 2254 petition as received on June 8, 2017. The cover letter
transmitting the § 2254 petition to this Court is dated May 22, 2017, and the petition itself was
purportedly signed on May 23, 2017.
1
2
Docket No. [#3] at p. 5. Liberally construing Mejia’s motion, he is contending that by the time
he completed his research, he had only fourteen days remaining on the one-year clock to file a § 2254
action.
2
[S]tay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances.
Because granting a stay effectively excuses a petitioner's failure to present
his claims first to the state courts, stay and abeyance is only appropriate
when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner's
failure to exhaust his claims first in state court. Moreover, even if a
petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district court would abuse its
discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are
plainly meritless.
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 1535 (2005); see also, Woodard v.
Chappius, No. 14-701-PR, 631 Fed. Appx. 65, 2016 WL 276908 at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 22,
2016) (“Under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), a district court abuses its discretion
in denying a stay to exhaust claims in a mixed petition if the unexhausted claims are not
plainly meritless, if the petitioner has good cause for failing to exhaust, and if the
petitioner did not engage in abusive or dilatory litigation tactics. Id. at 277–78.”).
Where the requirements for stay and abeyance are not met, a court is not
permitted to adjudicate a mixed petition, except to deny the entire petition on the merits
(which this Court is not in a position to do at this time). Rather, the Court may either
dismiss the entire petition without prejudice, or allow Petitioner to delete the unexhausted
claims and proceed only with the exhausted claims. See, Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278, 125
S.Ct. at 1535 (“[I]f a petitioner presents a district court with a mixed petition and the court
determines that stay and abeyance is inappropriate, the court should allow the petitioner
to delete the unexhausted claims and to proceed with the exhausted claims if dismissal
of the entire petition would unreasonably impair the petitioner's right to obtain federal
relief.”).
Of course, if a petitioner deletes an unexhausted claim, the effect of such
withdrawal may be that he will not be permitted to raise the withdrawn ground in a
3
second or successive habeas petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).3 Additionally, although
the one-year limitations period for § 2254 petitions is tolled during the pendency of statecourt “post-conviction or other collateral review” proceedings, see, 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(2), it is not tolled during the pendency of the federal habeas lawsuit itself. See,
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. at 274-275 (“[T]he filing of a petition for habeas corpus in
federal court does not toll the statute of limitations.”).
Here the Court finds that Mejia has not shown good cause for failing to exhaust
his ineffective assistance claim in state court before commencing this action.
Although the Supreme Court has not detailed the standard for determining
when good cause has been adequately demonstrated, it has noted, in
dicta, that a “petitioner's reasonable confusion about whether a state filing
would be timely will ordinarily constitute ‘good cause’ for him to file in
federal court.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005). Several
district courts have interpreted Pace to indicate that “good cause” for an
order of stay and abeyance need not be based on any factor external to
petitioner but rather is a broader, more forgiving concept.
Other courts analogize “good cause” under [Rhines v. Weber] to the “cause”
that permits review of procedurally barred claims. They find, therefore, that
good cause must arise from an objective factor external to the petitioner
which cannot fairly be attributed to him or her.
Young v. Great Meadown Corr. Fac. Supt., 16-CV-1420 (PAE) (BCM), 2017 WL 480608
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2017) (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted
3
Petitioner is also cautioned that standard rules for amendment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15,
including the “relation back” rules of Rule 15(c), would be applicable to any later request to amend the
petition to include previously unexhausted claims which he subsequently exhausted. See Zarvela v.
Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 382 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] habeas petitioner, like any civil litigant, is entitled to amend
his petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2242, and an amendment will “relate back” to the date of his original
petition if the added claim “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth” originally.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2).”) (citation omitted).
4
omitted). Mejia has not shown that he meets either of these standards, therefore the
application for stay and abeyance is denied.
The Court is therefore faced with a mixed petition in a circumstance where stay
and abeyance is not appropriate. As mentioned above, in such a case the Court may
either dismiss the entire petition without prejudice, or allow Petitioner to delete the
unexhausted claims and proceed only with the exhausted claims.
In this case, it appears that dismissing the entire action without prejudice would
result in Petitioner being denied habeas review on any of his claims, since the statute of
limitations for the § 2254 petition expired on June 6, 2017. Therefore, if the Court
dismissed the petition without prejudice, and Mejia attempted to refile the petition, it
would be untimely. On the other hand, if Petitioner deletes the unexhausted claim, the
effect of such withdrawal may be that he will not be permitted to raise the withdrawn
ground in a second or successive habeas petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Petitioner’s application [#3] for “stay and abeyance” is denied;
and it is further
ORDERED, that within thirty (30) days of the date of this Decision and Order,
Petitioner shall inform the Court in writing whether he would prefer that his entire petition
be dismissed without prejudice so that he can pursue remedies in state court, or whether
he would prefer to delete his unexhausted ineffective assistance claim and proceed only
with the exhausted claims. If Petitioner elects to have the entire petition dismissed
without prejudice, he is advised that the one-year limitations period applicable to habeas
petitions will presumably bar him from filing another habeas petition in federal court; and
it is further
5
ORDERED, that if Petitioner fails to respond in writing and affirmatively withdraw
his unexhausted claim within thirty (30) days of the date of this Decision and Order, the
Court will dismiss the entire petition without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
Rochester, New York
July 20, 2017
ENTER:
/s/ Charles J. Siragusa
CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA
United States District Judge
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?