Jones, Sr. v. Berryhill
Filing
15
DECISION AND ORDER denying 10 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 12 Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Clerk to close case.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 8/13/18. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
RODNEY JONES, SR.,
Plaintiff,
-vs-
No. 6:17-CV-06396 (MAT)
DECISION AND ORDER
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
I.
Introduction
Represented
by
counsel,
plaintiff
Rodney
Jones,
Sr.
(“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to Titles II and XVI of
the Social Security Act (the “Act”), seeking review of the final
decision of defendant the Acting Commissioner of Social Security
(the “Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his applications for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security
income (“SSI”).
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the
parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons
discussed
below,
Plaintiff’s
motion
is
denied
and
the
Commissioner’s motion is granted.
II.
Procedural History
Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI on
December 17, 2013, alleging disability as of September 1, 2012 due
to depression, diverticulitis, gastroesophageal reflux disease
(“GERD”), erectile dysfunction, insomnia, and high blood pressure.
Administrative Transcript (“T.”) 74-75. Plaintiff’s applications
were initially denied.
T. 109-112. At Plaintiff’s request, a
hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) John P.
Costello on January 5, 2016, at which Plaintiff appeared with his
attorney.
T. 35-73.
Prior to the hearing, Plaintiff’s attorney
sent a brief to the ALJ explaining that Plaintiff was claiming the
severe
impairments
schizoaffective
of:
psychosis,
disorder;
left
not
otherwise
rotator
cuff
specified;
tendinitis
with
musculoskeletal stiffness; diverticulosis; headache disorder; and
immaterial, co-occurring cannabis abuse.
T. 285.
On April 28, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision.
T. 15-34. On April 27, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request
for
review,
making
Commissioner’s final decision.
the
ALJ’s
T. 1-6.
determination
the
This action followed.
III. The ALJ’s Decision
In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied
the
five-step
sequential
evaluation
set
forth
in
20
C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. Initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
met the insured status requirements of the Act through September
30,
2015.
T.
20.
At
step
one
of
the
five-step
sequential
evaluation, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since September 1, 2012, the alleged
onset date.
Id.
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the
severe impairments of left shoulder impingement, depression, and
cannabis abuse. Id.
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the
2
non-severe impairments of hypertension, diverticulitis, and GERD.
T. 20-21.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
equaled the severity of any listed impairment. T. 21. The ALJ
particularly considered Listings 12.04 and 12.09 in making that
determination.
T. 21-22.
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c) and
416.967(c), with the following additional limitations: can have
only occasional interaction with coworkers and the general public;
and can only perform simple, routine tasks.
T. 22.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to
perform any past relevant work.
T. 28.
At step five, the ALJ
relied on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) to conclude
that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and
RFC, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national
economy
that
Plaintiff
could
perform,
including
the
representative occupations of hand packager and auto detailer.
T. 28-29.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not
disabled as defined in the Act. T. 29.
IV.
Discussion
A.
A
Scope of Review
district
court
may
set
aside
the
Commissioner’s
determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual
3
findings are not supported by “substantial evidence” or if the
decision is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also
Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003).
“Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Shaw v.
Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
omitted).
Although the reviewing court must scrutinize the whole
record and examine evidence that supports or detracts from both
sides, Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted), “[i]f there is substantial evidence to support the
[Commissioner’s] determination, it must be upheld.” Selian v.
Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013). “The deferential standard
of
review
for
substantial
evidence
Commissioner’s conclusions of law.”
does
not
apply
to
the
Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d
172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003).
Here, Plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ erred at step two by
failing to find that he had a severe impairment of headache
disorder, (2) the ALJ diminished and mischaracterized the mental
health treatment notes of record, resulting in an RFC finding not
based on substantial evidence, and (3) the ALJ failed to provide
good reasons for discounting the opinions of treating physician
Dr. Matthew Thomashefski.
For the reasons set forth below, the
Court finds these arguments to be without merit.
4
B.
Step Two Analysis
Plaintiff’s first argument is that the ALJ erred at step two,
because he did not find that Plaintiff’s headache disorder was a
severe impairment.
Plaintiff further contends that this error
continued at steps four and five, where the ALJ failed to consider
limitations
associated
with
Plaintiff’s
headache
disorder
in
ascertaining his RFC and considering his ability to perform work
available in the national economy.
At
step
two
of
the
analysis,
the
ALJ
must
consider
a
claimant’s medically determinable impairments and decide whether
they
are
“severe.”
A
“severe”
impairment
is
“one
that
significantly limits a claimant’s ability to perform basic work
activities,” such as “walking, standing, sitting, lifting, [etc.],
[c]apacities
for
[u]nderstanding,
seeing,
carrying
hearing,
out,
and
and
speaking,
remembering
and
simple
instructions.” Faison v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-06044(MAT), 2017 WL
3381055, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2017) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
Notably, “[i]t is the claimant's burden to
show at step two that she has a severe impairment.” Rye v. Colvin,
No. 2:14-CV-170, 2016 WL 632242, at *3 (D. Vt. Feb. 17, 2016)
(internal quotation omitted). A step two error is not reversible
and does not necessitate remand where the record is devoid of
evidence that the allegedly omitted impairments were severe.
Id.
at *4 (declining to remand where the plaintiff did not “specify why
each of these impairments [that he contended were omitted at step
two] meets the regulatory definition of a ‘severe’ impairment”).
5
Moreover, “[c]ourts have developed a specialized variant of
harmless-error analysis with respect to Step 2 severity errors in
social security proceedings. . . . [W]hen an administrative law
judge identifies some severe impairments at Step 2, and then
proceeds through [the] sequential evaluation on the basis of [the]
combined effects of all impairments, including those erroneously
found to be non severe, an error in failing to identify all severe
impairments at Step 2 is harmless.” Snyder v. Colvin, No. 5:13-CV585 GLS/ESH, 2014 WL 3107962, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014); see
also Reices-Colon v. Astrue, 523 F. App'x 796, 798 (2d Cir. 2013)
(step two error was harmless where all of the claimant’s conditions
“were considered during the subsequent steps”).
“Specifically,
when functional effects of impairments erroneously determined to be
non-severe
at
Step
2
are,
nonetheless,
fully
considered
and
factored into subsequent residual functional capacity assessments,
a reviewing court can confidently conclude that the same result
would have been reached absent the error.” Snyder, 2014 WL 3107962
at *5.
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his
claimed headache disorder was a severe impairment. While Plaintiff
did complain of headaches at certain points throughout the relevant
time period, neurological examinations were normal.
See T. 367,
375, 378-79. Moreover, Plaintiff declined prescription medication
for his headaches when it was offered by his physicians.
6
T. 374.
Plaintiff’s physicians also noted on multiple occasions that
they believed his headaches were related to his other conditions.
See T. 375, 386-87, 460.
Dr. Thomashefski noted that Plaintiff’s
headaches did not have any “alarming signs” and were likely related
his depression, and treated them by increasing Plaintiff’s antidepressants.
T. 387.
Indeed, the increase in Plaintiff’s Remeron
dosage apparently did improve his headaches, as he did stopped
complaining of them in late 2014.
T. 451, 456.
Dr. Thomashefski
noted in March 2015 that Plaintiff’s headaches had improved due to
medication and had returned when he stopped taking them.
T. 460.
In April 2015, Plaintiff told Dr. Thomashefski that he was not
having headaches.
T. 476.
On March 10, 2016, Plaintiff reported
to social worker Mary MacLeod that his headaches had “disappeared”
when he began taking his medications again.
T. 837.
The medical evidence of record does not show that Plaintiff’s
headaches impacted his ability to perform work-related functions.
To the contrary, the medical evidence shows that Plaintiff’s
headaches are related to his psychiatric condition and that they
“disappear” when he is appropriately medicated. As such, Plaintiff
has not demonstrated that his headache disorder was a severe
impairment.
Plaintiff also has not demonstrated that the ALJ should have
included any additional limitations in his RFC analysis as a result
of Plaintiff’s headaches. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s headaches
ceased when he took his psychiatric medications as prescribed.
Plaintiff has not proffered any explanation for how headaches that
7
are completely controlled by medication might interfere with his
work-related abilities.
As such, any error by the ALJ at step two
in failing to discuss Plaintiff’s headache disorder was harmless
and does not necessitate remand.
C.
Consideration of Psychiatric Records
Plaintiff’s next argument is that the ALJ mischaracterized and
diminished
the
medical
records
regarding
his
mental
health
treatment, which resulted in a failure to include necessary mental
limitations in the RFC finding.
The Court disagrees, and finds no
error in the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s mental health.
The ALJ in this matter thoroughly considered the evidence of
record related to Plaintiff’s mental health.
As the ALJ noted,
Plaintiff’s primary care physician began prescribing him antidepressants in August 2013, but Plaintiff declined counseling at
that
time.
T.
23
(referring
to
T.
372-73).
Upon
physical
examination in November 2013, Plaintiff was negative for any
psychiatric or behavioral symptoms and
had normal mood, affect,
behavior, judgment, and thought content. T. 378-79.
In December 2013, Plaintiff reported auditory and visual
hallucinations of his deceased parents to Dr. Thomashefski. T. 385.
Dr. Thomashefski referred Plaintiff to a psychiatrist, although
Plaintiff was “resistant” to the idea.
T. 386.
In January 2014,
Plaintiff underwent an evaluation by social worker Carle Sue
Boseman,
due
to
a
report
of
suicidal
ideation.
T.
389-90.
Plaintiff told Ms. Boseman that he found his hallucinations of his
parents “comforting.” T. 390.
Ms. Boseman stated that Plaintiff’s
8
symptoms were “mild and controlled.” Id. Plaintiff denied suicidal
thoughts, and indicated that he was open to treatment options
because he wanted to get better.
Id.
A mental status examination
was largely normal, though Plaintiff did have a depressed and
blunted affect and circumstantial thought processes.
T. 391.
It
was noted that Plaintiff had seen a psychiatrist earlier in the
month and that no medications were recommended. T. 393.
refused an offer of voluntary hospital admission.
Plaintiff
T. 395.
In late January 2014, Dr. Thomashefski noted that Plaintiff’s
depression was stable, and that his PHQ-91 score had decreased.
T. 399.
In October 2014, Plaintiff reported an improvement in his
mood, but his PHQ-9 score had increased to 14.
T. 450-51.
Nevertheless, Dr. Thomashefski indicated that he was hesitant to
make any medication changes because Plaintiff was “feel[ing] so
well.” T. 451. Dr. Thomashefski further noted that Plaintiff
continued to be reluctant to see any other providers regarding his
depression.
Id.
Dr. Thomashefski again described Plaintiff’s
depression as “stable” in December 2014.
T. 456.
In April 2015, Plaintiff expressed an interest in mental
health treatment and medication for his hallucinations.
T. 465.
Plaintiff began this treatment on April 23, 2015 (see T. 733-40),
and the record shows that it was generally successful.
Plaintiff
initially
struggled
to
take
his
Although
medications
as
prescribed, by August 2015, Plaintiff reported he was consistently
1
The PHQ-9 is a screening questionnaire use to assess the severity of
depression.
9
compliant with his medication and had only minimal psychiatric
symptoms.
T. 779.
On August 31, 2015, Plaintiff’s mental health
counselor noted that he was in an upbeat mood and reported “no
symptoms to speak of.”
T. 785.
Plaintiff was compliant with his
medication and “future focused and optimistic.”
Id.
Plaintiff
continued to be “optimistic and future focused” at an appointment
in October 2015, and had “no acute symptoms of disordered mood or
thought.”
T.
795.
On
November
3,
2015,
Plaintiff
denied
experiencing any symptoms of psychosis, and continued to take his
medications as prescribed.
T. 809-810.
As of December 2015,
Plaintiff had obtained financial aid and was planning to start
classes at Monroe Community College (“MCC”) in the spring. T. 814.
Plaintiff reported that things were going well and he had no issues
or concerns.
Id.
taking classes.
By February 2016, Plaintiff had indeed begun
T. 819.
As the ALJ in this case correctly found, the medical evidence
of record in this case, as summarized above, shows significant
improvement in Plaintiff’s mental health, particularly from April
2015, when he followed his physician’s recommendation to seek
counseling.
Indeed, Plaintiff himself testified at the hearing in
this matter that he felt better as a result of his therapy and
medication and that he was “okay” and would be “fine” as long as he
continued his treatment.
T. 52.
The ALJ nevertheless included
mental health limitations in his RFC finding, limiting Plaintiff to
simple,
routine
tasks
and
only
coworkers and the general public.
10
occasional
T. 22.
interactions
with
The Court finds no error
in this conclusion, which is fully consistent with the opinion of
psychiatric
consultative
examiner
Dr.
Adam
Brownfeld,
who
thoroughly examined Plaintiff on March 11, 2014, and opined that
his only limitation was a “mild to moderate” limitation in dealing
with stress. T. 360-63. Plaintiff has failed to identify any other
medical evidence supporting additional mental limitations.
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s discussion of his PHQ-9
scores, claiming that the ALJ ignored those occasions on which his
scores were elevated.
This argument lacks support in the record.
The ALJ expressly discussed the fact that there were fluctuations
in Plaintiff’s PHQ-9 score, but noted that Dr. Thomashefski had
nevertheless described his depression as stable and that there was
a correlation with Plaintiff’s failure to take his medications.
T. 25.
Moreover, the medical record in fact shows that, as
Plaintiff sought treatment and was appropriately medicated, his
PHQ-9 scores improved from showing moderate-to-severe depression to
showing
mild-to-moderate
depression.
See
T.
841-43,
892-93
(showing that Plaintiff’s PHQ-9 scores went from being between 14
and 25 in 2013 and 2014 to being between 8 and 11 in 2015).
Court accordingly
finds
no
error
in the
ALJ’s
The
discussion of
Plaintiff’s PHQ-9 scores.
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ ignored records showing
that Plaintiff occasionally had abnormal findings on mental status
examination.
The Court disagrees.
The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s
mental status exams were “generally” normal after he began mental
health treatment.
T. 25.
This is an accurate summary of the
11
medical
evidence,
which
shows
only
sporadic
and
minor
abnormalities. The ALJ was not required to specifically recite the
results of each individual mental status examination. See Barringer
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 358 F. Supp. 2d 67, 78 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (an
ALJ is “not required to mention or discuss every single piece of
evidence in the record”).
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly found that
he had switched care providers because his physicians would not
comply with his demands for specific treatment.
finds no error in this determination.
Again, the Court
While it is true that
Plaintiff’s stated reason for switching providers was that he
wanted someone who focused more on the intersection between mental
and physical health (see T. 749), the record is replete with
references to Plaintiff’s repeated demands that he be provided with
the specific medications he desired. For example, on May 26, 2015,
Dr. Thomashefski reported that Plaintiff had stated that he was
taking
his
sister’s
percocet
and
had
become
angry
when
Dr. Thomashefski would not provide him with his own prescription.
T. 482.
angry
At a therapy session on June 29, 2015, Plaintiff was again
and
refused
to
discuss
anything
other
prescribed the pain medication he wanted.
an
appointment
with
a
nurse
than
T. 765.
practitioner
on
not
being
Similarly, at
June
30,
2015,
Plaintiff was “very focused on obtaining stronger medication.”
T. 769. Plaintiff’s therapist noted that he felt “entitled” to the
specific medications he requested.
the
ALJ
to
conclude,
based
on
12
T. 776.
these
It was reasonable for
repeated
references
to
Plaintiff’s demands and his anger when they were not complied with,
that his decision to switch providers was related thereto.
In sum, the Court does not find that the ALJ mischaracterized
or diminished Plaintiff’s mental health treatment. To the contrary,
the ALJ appropriately considered and discussed the record, and
reached reasonable conclusions based upon it.
Accordingly, remand
of this matter is not warranted.
D.
Assessment of Dr. Thomashefksi’s Opinions
Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ failed to properly
assess Dr. Thomashefski’s opinions regarding his capabilities. The
Court finds, for the reasons set forth below, that the ALJ’s
assessment of Dr. Thomashefski’s opinions was not erroneous.
Under the Commissioner’s regulations in place at the time the
ALJ
issued
his
decision,
a
treating
physician’s
opinion
is
generally entitled to controlling weight when if is well-supported
by
medically
acceptable
clinical
and
laboratory
diagnostic
techniques and not otherwise inconsistent with the substantial
evidence of record. See Green-Younger, 335 F.3d at 106. If, acting
within his discretion, an ALJ assigns less than controlling weight
to a treating physician’s opinion because it does not meet this
standard, the ALJ must “comprehensively set forth [his or her]
reasons for the weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.”
Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2004). The ALJ is
required to consider “the length of the treatment relationship and
the
frequency
of
examination;
the
nature
and
extent
of
the
treatment relationship; the relevant evidence, particularly medical
13
signs
and
laboratory
findings,
supporting
the
opinion;
the
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and whether
the physician is a specialist in the area covering the particular
medical issues” when determining what weight to afford a treating
physician’s opinion. Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir.
2008)
(quotation
marks,
alterations,
and
citations
omitted).
However, the ALJ need not expressly discuss each of these factors,
so long as his “reasoning and adherence to the regulation are
clear.” Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2013)
(citing Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31–32 (2d Cir. 2004)).
In this case, the ALJ considered two opinions authored by
Dr.
Thomashefski.
The
first
was
dated
January
9,
2014
and
indicated that Plaintiff was unable to participate in work-type
activities
for
12
months
due
to
depression.
T.
502-504.
Dr. Thomashefski also noted that Plaintiff “state[d] he can’t be on
his feet or sit for too long.” Id.
Dr. Thomashefski indicated that
Plaintiff had difficulty squatting due to back pain and opined that
he would be very limited in walking, standing, sitting, pushing,
pulling, pending, lifting, and carrying, and moderately limited in
seeing, hearing, and speaking. T. 504.
On February 4, 2015, Dr. Thomashefski issued another opinion.
T. 506-508.
In this opinion, Dr. Thomashefski indicated that
Plaintiff would be very limited (defined as unable to function 25%
or more of the time) in his abilities to maintain attention and
concentration for rote tasks, and to perform low stress and simple
tasks. T. 508.
Dr. Thomashefski further opined that Plaintiff
14
would be moderately limited (defined as unable to function 10-25%
of the time) in his abilities to follow, understand, and remember
simple instructions and directions, to perform simple and complex
tasks independently, to regularly attend to a routine and maintain
a
schedule,
and
to
maintain
basic
standards
of
hygiene
and
grooming. Id.
In his decision, the ALJ gave Dr. Thomashefski’s opinions
little weight.
T. 26-27.
The ALJ explained that the January 2014
opinion was inconsistent with Dr. Thomashefski’s treatment notes
and
based
upon
Plaintiff’s
unreliable
subjective
complaints.
T. 26. With respect to the February 2015 opinion, Dr. Thomashefski
explained that it was internally inconsistent and inconsistent with
Dr. Thomashefski’s treatment notes.
The
Court
finds
no
Dr. Thomashefski’s opinions.
error
in
T. 27.
the
ALJ’s
assessment
of
First, an ALJ is permitted to afford
less than controlling weight to opinions that are inconsistent with
contemporaneous treatment records. See, e.g., Monroe v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 676 F. App’x 5, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding that it is
permissible for an ALJ to afford less than controlling weight to an
treating physician’s opinion where “it was contrary to his own
treatment notes”); Cichocki v. Astrue, 534 F. App’x 71, 75 (2d Cir.
2013) (“Because [the treating physician’s] medical source statement
conflicted with his own treatment notes, the ALJ was not required
to afford his opinion controlling weight.”).
In this case, as the
ALJ noted, Dr. Thomashefski had never treated Plaintiff for any
back-related
problems
before
opining
15
that
he
had
serious
limitations
in
walking,
sitting,
standing,
pushing,
pulling,
lifting, and carrying, nor did the treatment records support these
limitations.
To the contrary, a physical examination of Plaintiff
in November 2013 showed that Plaintiff was in no acute distress and
had no spinal tenderness.
T. 381.
The ALJ also permissibly noted that, because he had not
treated Plaintiff for any back-related complaints, it appeared that
Dr.
Thomashefski
complaints.
was
merely
relating
Plaintiff’s
subjective
An ALJ may reject an opinion that is nothing more than
a provider’s “recording of [the claimant’s] own reports of pain.”
Polynice v. Colvin, 576 F. App’x 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2014).
This is
particularly true where, as in this case, the ALJ has appropriately
found that the claimant is not credible. See Roma v. Astrue, 468 F.
App’x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Harris v. Astrue, No. 10 CIV.
6837 GBD THK, 2012 WL 995269, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012)
(treatment provider’s opinion properly discounted where it was
“based
primarily
on
Plaintiff’s
unreliable
self-reported
symptoms”).
Moreover, an ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion
where it is internally inconsistent.
See
Micheli v. Astrue, 501
F. App’x 26, 28-29 (2d Cir. 2012) (substantial evidence supported
ALJ’s
decision
not
to
accord
controlling
weight
to
treating
physician’s opinion where it was internally inconsistent). In this
case, as the ALJ noted, there was a plain internal inconsistency in
Dr. Thomashefski’s opinion, because he opined that Plaintiff was
very limited in his ability to perform low stress and simple tasks,
16
but only moderately limited in his ability to perform complex tasks
independently.
This inconsistency was a proper basis for the ALJ
to rely on in affording the opinion less than controlling weight.
The ALJ was also not required to recontact Dr. Thomashefski
because of this internal inconsistency.
“The mere fact that
medical evidence is conflicting or internally inconsistent does not
mean that an ALJ is required to re-contact a treating physician.”
Micheli, 501 F. App'x at 29.
Where, as here, the evidence is
sufficient to permit the ALJ to make a well-supported determination
of the claim, the ALJ is not required to recontact the treating
physician.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ
appropriately considered and weighed Dr. Thomashefski’s opinion.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that remand of
this matter is warranted.
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings (Docket No. 10) is denied. The Commissioner’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 12) is granted. The Clerk
of
the
Court
is
directed
enter
judgment
in
favor
of
the
Commissioner and to close this case.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
HON. MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
August 13, 2018
Rochester, New York.
17
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