Zhang v. Berryhill

Filing 16

DECISION AND ORDER granting 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 12 Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The case is remanded solely for the calculation and payment of benefits. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 6/22/2018. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
SUWEN ZHANG,
Plaintiff,
-v-

6:17-CV-06492(MAT)
DECISION AND ORDER

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner OF Social Security1,
Defendant.
____________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Suwen Zhang (“Plaintiff”), represented by counsel, brings this
action under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”),
seeking review of the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of
Social Security (“the Commissioner” or “Defendant”), denying her
application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). The Court
has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c).

Presently before the Court are the parties’ competing

motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below,
the Commissioner’s decision is reversed, Plaintiff’s motion is
granted to the extent that the matter is remanded solely for
calculation and payment of benefits. Defendant’s motion is denied.

1

Nancy A. Berryhill replaced Carolyn W. Colvin as Acting Commissioner of
Social Security on January 23, 2017. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to
amend the caption of this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)
to reflect the substitution of Acting Commissioner Berryhill as the defendant in
this matter.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 27, 2013, Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB,
alleging
Transcript

disability
(“T.”)

beginning

222-29.

April

The

1,

2013.

Administrative

claim

was

initially

denied

March 26, 2013, and Plaintiff timely requested a hearing.

on

T. 96-

132. An initial hearing was conducted on September 22, 2015, in
Falls Church, Virginia by administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Roxanne
Fuller, for which Plaintiff did not appear. T. 82-85. A second
hearing was conducted on December 10, 2015, in Falls Church,
Virginia by the same ALJ, with Plaintiff appearing via video
conference with her attorney, along with a Mandarin interpreter and
a Cantonese interpreter. T. 59-80.
The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on April 6, 2016.
T. 39-58.

Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ’s decision

by the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review on May 24, 2017, making the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner.

T. 1-6. Plaintiff then timely

commenced this action.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
The

ALJ

applied

the

five-step

sequential

evaluation

promulgated by the Commissioner for adjudicating disability claims.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). At step one, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since
her alleged onset date of April 1, 2012. T. 44. At step two, the

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ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the “severe” impairments of
depression and schizophrenia. Id. At step three, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. T. 45.
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff as
having the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full
range of work at all exertional levels as defined in 20 C.F.R.
404.1567, with the following nonexertional limitations: able to
perform simple, repetitive, routine tasks; no interaction with the
public; and only occasional, superficial interaction with coworkers
and supervisors. T. 46.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to perform
her past relevant work as a hand packager. T. 53. At step five, the
ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony to determine that, in addition to
being

able

to

perform

her

past

relevant

work,

a

person

of

Plaintiff’s age, and with her education, work experience, and RFC,
could perform the requirements of the following representative jobs
that

exist

in

significant

numbers

in

the

national

economy:

Dishwasher (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) No. 318.687010, unskilled, SVP 2, medium exertional level); Salvage laborer
(DOT No. 929.687-022, unskilled, SVP 2, medium exertional level);
and Hospital cleaner (DOT No. 323.687-010, unskilled, SVP 2, medium
exertional level). T. 54. The ALJ accordingly found that Plaintiff

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had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, since the
application date. Id.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
A

district

court

may

set

aside

the

Commissioner’s

determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual
findings are not supported by “substantial evidence” or if the
decision is based on legal error.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also

Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). The
district court must accept the Commissioner’s findings of fact,
provided that such findings are supported by “substantial evidence”
in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (the Commissioner’s findings
“as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive”). “Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence
as

a

reasonable

mind

might

accept

as

adequate

to

support

a

conclusion.’” Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quotation

omitted).

The

reviewing

court

nevertheless

must

scrutinize the whole record and examine evidence that supports or
detracts from both sides. Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 774
(2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “The deferential standard of
review

for

substantial

evidence

Commissioner’s conclusions of law.”

does

not

apply

to

the

Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d

172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109,
112 (2d Cir. 1984)).

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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that remand for calculation and payment of
benefits is warranted because the ALJ failed to properly weigh the
opinions

of

Plaintiff’s

treating

psychiatrist,

Dr.

Cui,

and

Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, Dr. Kwasnik. In particular,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ: (1) failed to give proper weight to
the

disability-supporting

opinions

of

Drs.

Cui

and

Kwasnik;

(2) failed to give good reasons for rejecting the disabilitysupporting opinions; and (3) failed to properly evaluate the
objective evidence in Drs. Cui and Kwasnik’s treatment notes.
Plaintiff further contends the ALJ failed to properly evaluate
Plaintiff’s

testimony

under

the

applicable

regulations.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ: (1) failed to apply
the proper legal standard set forth in SSR 16-3p when she evaluated
Plaintiff’s credibility; and (2) further erred by failing to
provide good reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s statements.
For

the

reasons

discussed

below,

the

Court

agrees

with

Plaintiff that, under the applicable regulations, the ALJ was
required to afford controlling weight to Dr. Cui and Dr. Kwasnik’s
opinions. Moreover, because Dr. Cui and Dr. Kwasnik’s opinions
establish that Plaintiff suffers from disabling limitations, remand
of this matter solely for calculation and payment of benefits is
warranted.

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I.

Evaluation of Treating Physicians’ Opinions
Under the Commissioner’s regulations in place at the time the

ALJ issued her operative decision, a treating physician’s opinion
is

generally

entitled

to

“controlling

weight”

when

it

is

“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other
substantial

evidence

in

[the]

case

record.”

20

C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(c)(2); see also Green-Younger, 335 F.3d at 106. An ALJ
may give less than controlling weight to a treating physician’s
opinion

if

it

does

not

meet

this

standard,

but

must

“comprehensively set forth [his or her] reasons for the weight
assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.” Halloran v. Barnhart,
362 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2004); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)
(“We will always give good reasons in our notice of determination
or decision for the weight we give [the claimant’s] treating
source’s opinion.”).

The ALJ is required to consider “the length

of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; the
nature and extent of the treatment relationship; the relevant
evidence,

particularly medical

signs and

laboratory

findings,

supporting the opinion; the consistency of the opinion with the
record as a whole; and whether the physician is a specialist in the
area covering the particular medical issues” in determining how
much weight to afford a treating physician’s opinion. Burgess v.
Astrue,

537

F.3d

117,

129

(2d
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Cir.

2008)

(quotation

marks,

alterations,

and

citations

omitted);

see

also

20

C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). However, the ALJ need not expressly discuss
each of these factors, so long as his “reasoning and adherence to
the regulation are clear.”

Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 70

(2d Cir. 2013) (unpublished opn.) (citing Halloran, 362 F.3d at
31–32).
A. Disability-Supporting Opinion of Dr. Xingjia Cui
On September 27, 2015, Dr. Cui completed a Mental Impairment
Questionnaire. T. 340-44. Dr. Cui reported he had been treating
Plaintiff on a monthly basis since July 6, 2013. T. 340. He
diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic paranoid schizophrenia, which was
expected to last at least twelve months and was being treated with
Quetiapine.

Id.

To

support

his

diagnosis,

Dr.

Cui

reported

Plaintiff suffered from symptoms of a depressed mood, decreased
energy, easy distractibility, poor immediate memory, paranoia and
suspiciousness, auditory hallucinations, and insomnia. T. 341.
Regarding Plaintiff’s auditory hallucinations, Dr. Cui reported
Plaintiff heard the voice of a stranger several times a day, every
day. T. 341-42. He further reported that Plaintiff experiences
episodes of decompensation or deterioration in a work setting,
noting that she “[c]an’t function well in the social setting as she
tends to talk to herself.” T. 342. Regarding work-related mental
abilities, Dr. Cui opined Plaintiff has marked limitations in
remembering locations and work-like procedures; understanding and

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remembering one-to-two step instructions, as well as detailed
instructions;
attention

carrying

out

and concentration

detailed
for

instructions;

extended

periods;

maintaining
interacting

appropriately with the public; and maintaining socially appropriate
behavior. He opined Plaintiff has moderate-to-marked limitations in
all

other

areas,

including

the

ability

to

carry

out

simple

instructions; perform within a schedule; complete a workday without
interruptions from psychological symptoms; accept instructions and
respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; adhere to
basic standards of neatness; and respond appropriately to workplace
changes. T. 343. Finally, Dr. Cui opined Plaintiff would be absent
from work as a result of her impairments or treatment more than
three times per month, on average. T. 344.
In her decision, the ALJ assigned “little weight” to Dr. Cui’s
treating source statement. T. 52. The ALJ found Dr. Cui’s opinion
to be inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s medical record, including
his treatment notes and Plaintiff’s medication regimen. Id. The ALJ
found that because Dr. Cui never changed Plaintiff’s medication,
Plaintiff was presumably stable during her treatment. She further
found that because Plaintiff had reported to Dr. Cui that she
enjoyed activities such as reading and painting, and that she had
visited friends and family in China, that she was significantly
improving during her treatment. T. 53.

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As

discussed

below,

the

ALJ’s

reasons

for

discounting

Dr. Cui’s well-supported medical opinion are legally erroneous. As
a threshold matter, when analyzing a treating physician’s report,
an

“ALJ

cannot

arbitrarily

substitute

his

own

judgment

for

competent medical opinion.” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79
(2d Cir. 1999) (quoting McBrayer v. Secretary of Health and Human
Servs., 712 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1983)). Here, the ALJ’s finding
that Dr. Cui “generally found that the [Plaintiff’s] mental status
examinations were normal” (T. 52) is a mischaracterization of the
record. At no point in his treatment notes, nor in his source
statement, does Dr. Cui state that Plaintiff’s mental status
examinations were “normal.” See T. 349-83. To the contrary, at
various sessions, Dr. Cui noted Plaintiff exhibited an anxious mood
with congruent affect (T. 375), a depressed mood with congruent
affect (T. 382), a distressed mood with congruent affect (T. 354),
a reserved attitude, auditory hallucinations, distractibility due
to voices, problems with memory, confusion, and sleep problems, and
startle

response

(T.

387).

Subjectively,

he

noted

Plaintiff

reported she was “still distracted by voices . . . doing funny
things in public,” and unable to concentrate (T. 363), talking back
to voices (T. 375), and trying to ignore the voices (T. 351). In
concluding that these findings support her conclusion they are
“normal” symptoms,

the

ALJ

improperly

assumed the

role

of

a

treating physician. See Wilson v. Colvin, 213 F. Supp.3d 478, 490-

-9-

91 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding an ALJ’s reliance on his own lay
opinion

over

multiple

medical

opinions,

as

well

as

his

misconstruction of the medical record served as basis for reversing
the Commissioner’s decision). The fact that Dr. Cui’s treatment
notes described Plaintiff as stable, cooperative, and at times in
a

“good”

mood

does

not

negate

the

severity

of

her

mental

impairments, nor does it warrant the ALJ’s finding that the exams
were “normal”. Individuals with mental illnesses often “adopt a
highly restricted and/or inflexible lifestyle within which they
appear to function well.” Callahan v. Berryhill, No. 6:17-CV-06245
(MAT), 2018 WL 1616058, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. April 4, 2018) (quoting SSR
85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *6). “A claimant’s ability to perform
adequately when she is in structured, supportive settings—such as
medical

or

psychiatric

psychological
necessarily

pressures

predict

appointments,
and

which

interpersonal

performance

and

ability

have

lowered

demands—does
to

cope

in

not
the

competitive work environment.” See id. (“The reaction to the
demands of work (stress) is highly individualized, and mental
illness is characterized by adverse responses to seemingly trivial
circumstances.”).
Furthermore, the Second Circuit has held that an ALJ may not
reject a treating physician’s opinion based solely on the ALJ’s
perceived inconsistencies between the physician’s treatment notes
and his or her medical opinion. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75,

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80 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of
these [treating] physicians solely on the basis that the opinions
allegedly conflicted with the physicians’ own clinical findings.”);
Griffel v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-1772 (MKB), 2017 WL 4286254, at *9
n. 10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2017) (“To the extent the ALJ rejected
[the treating source]’s opinions on the basis that [the treating
source]’s ‘[m]ental status examinations consistently demonstrate[d]
normal to mild cognitive symptoms,’ such rejection was erroneous
because the ALJ may only reject [the treating source]’s opinions
based on contradictory medical opinions, not based on the ALJ’s
interpretation of [the claimaint]’s medical records.”) (citing
Balsamo, 142 F. 3d at 80; Camille v. Colvin, 652 F. App’x 25, 28
(2d Cir. 2016) (unpublished opn.)). The only contradictory medical
opinions of record here are those of reviewing, non-examining State
agency

consultant

E.

Kamin,

Ph.D.

(T.

87-91),

and

one-time

consultative examiner, Christine Ransom, Ph.D. (T. 317-20). As
addressed in detail in section III below, deference should be given
to a treating physician’s medical opinion, which is based on a
Plaintiff’s longitudinal medical history, over that of a one-time
consultative

examiner,

especially

in

the

context

of

mental

disabilities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d), Nasca v.
Colvin, 216 F. Supp.3d 291, 297 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that ALJ
erred in giving great weight to consulting psychiatrist’s opinion

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while

giving

only

“limited

weight”

to

plaintiff’s

treating

psychiatric sources).
B. Disability-Supporting Opinion of Dr. Thomas Kwasnik
On August 25, 2015, Dr. Kwasnik completed a Mental Impairment
Questionnaire in which he reported treating Plaintiff approximately
two-to-three

times

per

month

since

June

2014.

T.

331-36.

He

diagnosed Plaintiff with paranoid-type schizophrenia, noting she
was currently stabilized and in partial remission with medications
and psychotherapy, with a current GAF of fifty. Id. He further
noted

Plaintiff

has

psychosocial

and

environmental

problems,

including a reclusive husband, mentally ill son, social isolation,
and hearing voices. She was taking the medications Quetiapine and
Risperidone.

Dr.

Kwasnik

opined

Plaintiff’s

diagnoses

and

limitations were expected to last at least twelve months. Id. To
support his diagnosis, Dr. Kwasnik reported Plaintiff suffered from
symptoms of decreased energy; speech abnormalities due to her
difficulty
isolation;

with

the

English

difficulty

language;

thinking

or

social

withdrawal

concentrating;

or
easy

distractibility; flight of ideas; poor immediate, recent, and
remote

memory;

paranoia

and

suspiciousness;

auditory

hallucinations; and insomnia. T. 332. He further reported that
Plaintiff experiences episodes of decompensation or deterioration
in a work setting, noting that she “feels overwhelmed, confused,
[and] scared when stressed.” T. 333.

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Regarding work-related

mental

abilities,

Dr.

Kwasnik

opined

Plaintiff

has

marked

limitations in remembering and carrying out detailed instructions;
maintaining

attention

and

concentration

for

extended

periods;

performing activities within a schedule and consistently being
punctual;

sustaining an

ordinary

routine

without

supervision;

making simple work-related decisions; completing a workday without
interruptions from psychological symptoms; and performing at a
consistent pace without rest periods of unreasonable length or
frequency. He opined Plaintiff has moderate-to-marked limitations
working

in

coordination

with

or

near

others

without

being

distracted by them; interacting appropriately with the public;
asking

simple

instructions

questions
and

or

responding

requesting

assistance;

appropriately

to

accepting

criticism

from

supervisors; responding appropriately to workplace changes; and
traveling to unfamiliar places or using public transportation.
T. 334. Dr. Kwasnik also noted Plaintiff is easily fatigued, has
muscle weakness, and would likely be absent from work more than
three times per month as a result of her impairments or treatment.
T. 335. Finally, Dr. Kwasnik opined Plaintiff “is currently totally
unemployable and expected to remain so into the foreseeable future
even with continued pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy.” Id.
In

her

decision,

the

ALJ

assigned

“little

weight”

to

Dr. Kwasnik’s treating source statement. T. 52. The ALJ found
Dr. Kwasnik’s opinion inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s medical

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record, including Dr. Kwasnik’s treatment notes. Id.

The

ALJ

noted in her decision that Dr. Kwasnik had recommended conservative
treatment

involving pharmacotherapy

and psychotherapy

and

had

earlier found Plaintiff’s prognosis to be fair. She further noted
that Dr. Kwasnik pointed to only one instance of the Plaintiff
responding to an auditory hallucination during a treatment session,
and that she appeared engaged during her sessions and showed
significant improvement with treatment. Id.
As previously noted, it is error for an ALJ to reject a
treating source’s opinion solely because it allegedly conflicts
with that source’s treatment notes, particularly in cases of mental
illness. See Balsamo, 142 F. 3d at 80. Dr. Kwasnik’s opinion was
similar in all relevant respects to the opinion of Dr. Cui, which,
as set forth above was well-supported by the evidence of record.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s substitution of her own judgment in place of
Dr. Kwasnik’s well-supported opinion was erroneous for the same
reasons discussed above.
III. Evaluation of One-Time Consultative Examiner’s Opinion
The Court finds the ALJ further erred by granting “great
weight”

to

the

consultative

opinion

psychiatrist, Dr. Christine Ransom.

of

one-time

examining

As several courts in this

Circuit have recognized, the applicable treating physician rule is
“even more relevant in the context of mental disabilities, which by
their nature are best diagnosed over time.” Nasca, 216 F. Supp.3d

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at 297, (quoting Santiago v. Barnhart, 441 F. Supp.2d 620, 629
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)). Indeed, “a physician who has a long treating
history with

a

patient

is

better

positioned

to

evaluate

the

patient’s disability than a doctor who observes the patient once
for the purposes of a disability hearing.” Id. (citing Schisler v.
Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 568 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Dr. Ransom performed a psychological evaluation of Plaintiff
on December 2, 2013. T. 317-20. Dr. Ransom diagnosed Plaintiff with
major depressive disorder, currently mild. In her source statement,
Dr. Ransom opined Plaintiff could follow and understand simple
directions and instructions, perform simple tasks independently,
maintain attention and concentration for simple tasks, maintain a
simple regular schedule, and learn simple new tasks. She further
noted Plaintiff would have mild difficulty performing complex
tasks, relating adequately with others and appropriately dealing
with stress due to her major depressive disorder. T. 319. Notably,
Dr. Ransom made no mention of Plaintiff’s diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia in her report. Despite this omission, the ALJ opted
to give Dr. Ransom’s opinion “great weight”, though the ALJ herself
had found Plaintiff had the severe impairment of schizophrenia.
T. 51, 44.
Furthermore, the ALJ noted in her opinion that Plaintiff is
not fluent in English, making it difficult for her to interact with
others. T. 45. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified in Cantonese and

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two interpreters were provided to aid her understanding of the
proceeding.

T.

61-62.

However,

Dr.

Ransom’s

report

indicates

Plaintiff’s speech was “fluent and intelligible . . . language
skills were adequate to complete the evaluation without difficulty”
at the consultation, despite the apparent lack of an interpreter.
T. 318. The ALJ fails to note or attempt to reconcile this conflict
in her decision.
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ committed error by granting
“great weight” to a consultative opinion that missed the mark on
Plaintiff’s well-documented diagnosis of schizophrenia, ignored
Plaintiff’s language barriers, and conflicted with the opinions of
Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist and psychotherapist.
IV.

Assessment of Plaintiff’s Credibility
Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ failed to apply the

appropriate

standard

when

evaluating

Plaintiff’s

testimony,

requiring remand. The Court sees no reason to evaluate Plaintiff’s
argument at this time, as Plaintiff’s independent argument for
remand based on an improper evaluation of Plaintiff’s treating
physicians prevails.
V.

Remedy
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the district court has the power to

affirm, modify, or reverse the ALJ’s decision with or without
remanding for a rehearing.

Remand solely for calculation and

payment of benefits is appropriate where the record persuasively

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demonstrates the claimant’s disability, Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d
225, 235 (2d Cir. 1980), and there is no reason to conclude that
additional evidence exists that might support the Commissioner’s
claim that the claimant is not disabled, Butts v. Barnhart, 388
F.3d 377, 385–86 (2d Cir. 2004).
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the
ALJ’s decision to give less than controlling weight to the opinions
of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, Dr. Cui and Dr. Kwasnik, was
legally erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence. Had the
ALJ given proper weight to Dr. Cui and Dr. Kwasnik’s medical
opinions, a finding of disability would have necessarily followed.
This conclusion is confirmed by an April 2017 opinion letter from
Dr. Kwasnik in which he indicates, “[Plaintiff] has been totally
unemployable for the past seven years due to her schizophrenic
disorder . . . Based on her severe chronic intractable psychiatric
impairment, it is more likely than not that she will remain totally
and permanently unemployable.” T. 22. Accordingly, the Court finds
that remand solely for the calculation and payment of benefits is
warranted.
CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

Court

finds

that

the

Commissioner’s decision was legally erroneous and is not supported
by substantial evidence. It is therefore reversed. Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket No. 12) is

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denied, and Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Docket No. 8) is granted, and the case is remanded solely for the
calculation and payment of benefits. The Clerk of Court is directed
to close this case.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
Michael A. Telesca
_____________________________
MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated: June 22, 2018
Rochester, New York

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