Local 503 of the Graphic Communications Conference of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Cascades Containerboard Packaging - Lancaster

Filing 16

ORDER denying 11 Motion for Preliminary Injunction without prejudice. (JMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LOCAL NO. 503 OF THE GRAPHIC
COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS,
Plaintiff,
-v-

17-cv-6605 (MAT)
DECISION AND ORDER

CASCADES CONTAINERBOARD PACKAGING LANCASTER, a division of Cascades,
New York, Inc.,
Defendant.

I.

Introduction
Plaintiff Local No. 503 of the Graphic Communications

Conference of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(“Local 503” or “plaintiff”) commenced the instant action
on August 29, 2017, alleging that defendant Cascades
Containerboard
“defendant”)

Packaging
is

-

violating

Lancaster
a

(“Cascades”

collective

or

bargaining

agreement by refusing to arbitrate a grievance related to
the reduction of wages for four bargaining unit members.
Now pending before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for a
preliminary
plaintiff

injunction

asks

the

(Docket

Court

to

No.

compel

11),
the

in

which

parties

to

arbitrate the relevant grievance. For the reasons set

forth

below,

plaintiff’s

request

for

a

preliminary

injunction is denied.
II. Background
The

following

facts

are

taken

from

the

briefs,

affidavits, and exhibits submitted by the parties.
Local 503 is an unincorporated labor organization
located in Rochester, New York.

Cascades is a domestic

corporation that manufactures packaging materials.
On or about October 2, 2016, Cascades entered into a
collective bargaining agreement (the “Agreement”) with a
labor organization known as Local No. 27 of the Graphic
Communications

Conference

of

the

International

Brotherhood of Teamsters (“Local 27").

Article 5 of the

Agreement

procedure

sets

forth

a

grievance

that

ultimately culminates in arbitration.
Local

27

was

associated

Communications

Conference

Brotherhood

Teamsters

international

of

labor

with
the

of
(the

Graphic

International

“International”),

organization

throughout the United States.

the

with

an

affiliates

Before the events that

underlie the instant action, Local 27 was placed into
2

trusteeship while the International decided whether it
could continue as a viable local labor organization.

On

or about March 15, 2017, the International ended the
trusteeship of Local 27 and administratively transferred
its assets and liabilities to Local 503, effective April
1, 2017.

Plaintiff maintains that, as a result of this

administrative

transfer,

“[Local

503]

became

the

exclusive bargaining representative for the bargaining
unit of [Cascades’] employees, and [Local 503] became
responsible for administering grievances related to [the
Agreement].”

Docket No. 11-1 at ¶ 15.

On or about August 3, 2017, Michael Stafford, the
president of Local 503, filed a grievance with Cascades
related to the unilateral reduction of wages for four
bargaining unit members (the “Grievance”).

Cascades

denied the Grievance on or about August 8, 2017.
about

August

18,

2017,

Local

503's

counsel

On or

provided

Cascades’ counsel with a list of proposed arbitrators,
purportedly pursuant to Section 5.04 of the Agreement.
On or about August 25, 2017, Cascades’ counsel sent an
email to Local 503's counsel taking the position that
3

Local 503 was not a party to the Agreement and that
Cascades therefore had no obligation to arbitrate the
Grievance with Local 503.
Plaintiff subsequently commenced the instant action
on August 29, 2017, seeking “an order . . . directing
[Cascades] to proceed to an arbitration of the Grievance
in accordance with the Agreement. . . .”
at 5).

(Docket No. 1

On October 26, 2017 (nearly two months after the

complaint

was

initially

filed),

plaintiff

filed

the

instant motion for a preliminary injunction.
III.

Discussion
A.

Legal Standard

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy
never awarded as of right.”

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24(2008); see also Hanson
Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273
(2d Cir. 1986)(a preliminary injunction is “one of the
most drastic tools in the arsenal of judicial remedies”).
“In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a party
must demonstrate: 1) that it is subject to irreparable
harm; and 2) either a) that it will likely succeed on the
4

merits

or

b)

that

there

are

sufficiently

serious

questions going to the merits of the case to make them a
fair ground for litigation, and that a balancing of the
hardships tips ‘decidedly’ in favor of the moving party.”
Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137,
142 (2d Cir. 1997).
In this case, as defendant points out, plaintiff
seeks a mandatory injunction, which “alter[s] the status
quo

by

commanding

some

positive

act.”

Tom

Doherty

Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 34
(2d Cir. 1995).
to

In particular, plaintiff asks the Court

affirmatively

arbitration.

require

defendant

to

engage

in

“[T]his distinction is important because

[the Second Circuit has] held that a mandatory injunction
should issue “only upon a clear showing that the moving
party is entitled to the relief requested, or where
extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial
of

preliminary

relief.”

Id.;

see

also

Doninger

v.

Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2008) (“When the movant
seeks a ‘mandatory’ injunction — that is, as in this
case, an injunction that will alter rather than maintain
5

the status quo — she must meet the more rigorous standard
of demonstrating a ‘clear’ or ‘substantial’ likelihood of
success on the merits.).
Moreover, the relief sought by plaintiff in the
instant motion is the same as the ultimate relief sought
in the complaint - that is, a court order compelling
defendant

to

arbitrate

well-established

that

the

the

Grievance.

purpose

of

a

“It

is

preliminary

injunction is not to award the movant the ultimate relief
sought in the suit but is only to preserve the status
quo. . . .

This principle weighs against granting

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. . . .”
City of Newburgh v. Sarna, 690 F. Supp. 2d 136, 175
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation omitted); see also
Triebwasser & Katz v. AT & T Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1360
(2d

Cir.

1976)

(reversing

issuance

of

preliminary

injunction that “would in effect give the plaintiffs
substantially the ultimate relief they seek ... before
there has been any trial of the issues” and explaining
that “the normal function of the preliminary injunction

6

is to maintain the status quo pending a full hearing on
the merits”).
B.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiff has not shown, as it must to be granted a
mandatory injunction, a clear likelihood of success on
the

merits.

In

particular,

the

Court

is

unable

to

conclude, based on the record currently before it, that
Local 503 is authorized to enforce the terms of the
Agreement.
Plaintiff relies upon General Teamsters Union Local
No. 439 v. Sunrise Sanitation Services, Inc., 2006 WL
1153577 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2006) for the proposition
that a “new representative” may enforce the terms of a
collective

bargaining

signatory.
course

against

an

original

As a threshold matter, this Court is of

not

district

agreement

bound

court

by
in

an

unpublished

California.

Sanitation is factually inapposite.

decision

Moreover,

from

a

Sunrise

In that case, the

members of the original union voted “to merge their
existing

bargaining

representative

international organization.”
7

with

Id. at *1.

petitioner’s
Moreover, the

National Labor Relations Board had “certified petitioner
as the bargaining agent for all full-time and regular
part-time drivers at [respondent’s] facility. . . .”

Id.

(internal quotation omitted).
This
successor
collective

factual

distinction

union’s

right

bargaining

to

is

crucial,

enforce

agreement

the

arises

because
terms

of

from

a
a

the

proposition that “the representative of the employees is
chosen by the employees and may from time to time be
changed by the employees whether the employer happens to
approve of the choice or not. And . . . the right of the
employees
accordance

to

have

with

their

grievances

procedures

hammered

arbitrated
out

between

in
the

employer and a properly recognized bargaining agent may
not be abrogated by the employer merely because the
employees subsequently see fit to change their agent.”
Cincinnati

Newspaper

Guild,

Local

9

v.

Cincinnati

Enquirer, Inc., 863 F.2d 439, 445–46 (6th Cir. 1988).

In

other words, an employer may not refuse to abide by the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement simply because
the employees subsequently decide to change their agent.
8

This

so

because

a

union

negotiates

a

collective

bargaining agreement as an agent, not as a principal, and
the employees in the bargaining unit are ultimately the
real parties in interest.
In

this

case,

Id. at 445.

however,

the

Court

lacks

any

information regarding the process by which Local 503
allegedly assumed Local 27's assets and liabilities,
including

what

bargaining

unit

plaintiff

has

role,

if

played
not

any,

in

the

that

provided

members

process.

the

Court

of

the

Notably,
with

any

documentation whatsoever from which it could assess and
interpret the scope of the administrative transfer, nor
has it set forth any of the terms and conditions thereof.
Under

these

circumstances,

this

Court

simply

cannot

conclude that plaintiff has met its burden of showing a
clear likelihood of success on the merits of its claims,
as is necessary for issuance of a mandatory injunction.
The Court is not persuaded by plaintiff’s contention
that discovery of additional information related to the
administrative transfer between Local 27 and Local 503
would result in impermissible interference in internal
9

union deliberations by Cascades.

The Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure provide ample avenues for the protection
of sensitive materials, including the possibility of
entry of a protective order or submission of materials
for in camera review by the Court.

Moreover, plaintiff’s

contentions in this regard are circular - it argues that
the Court should enter a preliminary injunction because
Cascades

has

plaintiff’s

not

submitted

characterization

evidence
of

the

contesting

administrative

transfer, but then contends that Cascades is not entitled
to any discovery that would permit it to obtain such
evidence.
To

be

clear,

the

Court

does

not

foreclose

the

possibility that plaintiff may in fact ultimately be able
to demonstrate that it is entitled to enforce the terms
of the Agreement, in connection with a motion for summary
judgment or otherwise.

However, at this stage of the

proceedings, the Court has nothing before it regarding
the circumstances and conditions of the transfer of Local
27's assets and liabilities except for a single, broad
paragraph in Mr. Stafford’s affidavit.
10

The Court cannot

award plaintiff the ultimate relief it seeks without, at
a minimum, a more complete record to substantiate its
request.
C.

Irreparable Harm

Because plaintiff has not shown a clear likelihood of
success on the merits, the Court need not and does not
consider whether plaintiff has made the required showing
of a likelihood of irreparable harm.

The Court notes,

however, that plaintiff delayed and waited two months
after

filing

injunction.
delay

in

the

complaint

to

seek

a

preliminary

“A district court should generally consider
assessing

irreparable

harm,”

Tom

Doherty

Assocs., 60 F.3d at 39, and a months-long delay “runs
counter to plaintiff's insistence that the alleged harm
is actual or imminent.”

T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. Water Auth.

of W. Nassau Cty., 249 F. Supp. 3d 680, 684 (E.D.N.Y.
2017);

see

also

Weight

Watchers

Int'l,

Inc.

v.

Luigino's, Inc., 423 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We
have found delays of as little as ten weeks sufficient to
defeat

the

presumption

of

irreparable

harm

that

is

essential to the issuance of a preliminary injunction.”).
11

Plaintiff has offered no explanation for this delay and
it is therefore unlikely that, even if the Court were to
reach this issue, it could conclude that plaintiff had
established its likelihood of suffering irreparable harm.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s motion
for a preliminary injunction (Docket No. 11) is denied
without prejudice.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.
s/Michael A. Telesca
MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:

December 19, 2017
Rochester, New York

12