Valvetech, Inc. v. Aerojet Rocketdyne, Inc.
Filing
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DECISION AND ORDER: For the reasons stated, Aerojet's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 20 , is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Claims one through four, five, and seven are DISMISSED; however, ValveTech's sixth claim survives. By separate order, the Court will refer this case to a United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings. SO ORDERED. Signed by Hon. Frank P. Geraci, Jr. on 9/28/18. (JO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
VALVETECH, INC.,
Plaintiff,
Case # 17-CV-6788-FPG
v.
DECISION AND ORDER
AEROJET ROCKETDYNE, INC.,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2013, Defendant Aerojet Rocketdyne, Inc., entered into a series of
agreements with Plaintiff ValveTech, Inc., under which ValveTech would provide particular
valves for thrusters Aerojet was designing for a spacecraft. See ECF No. 1-3 ¶ 4. After the
business relationship soured, ValveTech demanded the return of its proprietary information
regarding the design and development of the valves. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. When Aerojet seemingly
refused and began to develop the valves internally, ValveTech sued Aerojet in New York State
Supreme Court. See ECF No. 1-3. The Complaint contained seven claims, all centering around
the alleged misuse of ValveTech’s proprietary information: (1) breach of contract, (2) unjust
enrichment, (3) trade secret misappropriation, (4) unfair competition, (5) conversion, (6) replevin,
and (7) a requested accounting. See id. Aerojet removed the case to this Court, see ECF No. 1,
and moved to dismiss all of ValveTech’s claims. See ECF Nos. 20-21. ValveTech does not oppose
Aerojet’s motion as to the fifth and seventh claims, ECF No. 23 at 5 n.1, so the Court considers
Aerojet’s motion as to the remaining five claims and grants it in part.
BACKGROUND
As explained above, ValveTech entered into a series of agreements with Aerojet beginning
in 2013 in which ValveTech agreed it would develop valves for Aerojet. See ECF No. 1-3 ¶¶ 34. The development process entailed designing the valves, testing them, analyzing the test results,
and manufacturing them, among other tasks. See id. ¶ 4.
As part of their business relationship, the parties also signed a series of non-disclosure
agreements (NDAs) in which Aerojet agreed that all proprietary information ValveTech provided
to Aerojet would remain ValveTech’s property and would be returned to it or destroyed at its
request. Id. ¶ 6. The purpose of the NDAs was to facilitate discussion between the parties
regarding ValveTech’s development process for the valves. See id. ¶ 5.
Under the purchase orders signed by both parties, ValveTech was to provide the valves to
Aerojet, but ValveTech’s proprietary information was not purchased by Aerojet. See id. ¶ 8-11.
Moreover, Aerojet never purchased a license from ValveTech to use the proprietary information.
See id. ¶ 16.
ValveTech eventually provided Aerojet with valves and related testing results. See id. ¶
12. In response, however, Aerojet provided written notice to ValveTech on July 17, 2017, that it
was terminating the business relationship and would begin to develop the requisite valves
internally. See id. ¶ 13.
ValveTech thus requested that Aerojet return ValveTech’s proprietary information. See
id. ¶ 15. Aerojet refused, used ValveTech’s proprietary information to begin development of its
own valves internally, and shared the information with third parties. See id. ¶ 15-18. This lawsuit
followed.
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LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) when it states a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). A claim for relief is plausible
when the plaintiff pleads sufficient facts that allow the Court to draw reasonable inferences that
the defendant is liable for the alleged conduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In considering the plausibility of a claim, the Court must accept factual allegations as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d
98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). At the same time, the Court is not required to accord “[l]egal conclusions,
deductions, or opinions couched as factual allegations . . . a presumption of truthfulness.” In re
NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court ordinarily may not rely on matters outside
the complaint unless it treats the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 and gives
the parties a reasonable opportunity to present relevant evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However,
“the complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any
statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.
Even where a document is not
incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint relies
heavily upon its terms and effect, which renders the document ‘integral’ to the complaint.”
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). With respect to documents that are deemed “integral” to the complaint, “it must
be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document”
and that “there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.”
Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2006). To reiterate, “a plaintiff’s reliance on the
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terms and effect of a document in drafting the complaint is a necessary prerequisite to the court’s
consideration of the document on a dismissal motion; mere notice or possession is not enough.”
Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153 (quoting Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48
(2d Cir. 1991)).
DISCUSSION
I.
Choice of Law
The Court must first determine whether to construe ValveTech’s claims under California
or New York law. 1 See Eastern Materials Corp. v. Mitsubishi Plastics Composites Am., Inc., No.
2:17-cv-01034 (ADS)(AYS), 2017 WL 4162309, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017). A federal court
sitting in diversity, as the Court is here, must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which
the court sits. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 672 F.3d 155, 157 (2d Cir.
2012). Consequently, the Court will apply New York choice-of-law rules. See id.
First, if the parties agree that a given jurisdiction’s law controls, even impliedly in a brief,
that is “sufficient to establish choice of law.” Chau v. Lewis, 771 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens Inc., 238 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000)). If there is no
agreement, then the next step under New York’s rules is to determine whether there is an actual
conflict between the laws of the different jurisdictions. See id. (quoting Wall v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
471 F.3d 410, 415 (2d Cir. 2006)). A conflict exists if the pertinent law contains different
substantive rules, those rules are relevant to the germane issue, and “have a significant possible
effect on the outcome of trial.” SourceOne Dental, Inc., v. Patterson Cos., 310 F. Supp. 3d 346,
1
Aerojet points out that some district courts within the Second Circuit have concluded that a court must conduct a
choice-of-law analysis before considering a motion to dismiss, while others have found it inappropriate to conduct the
inquiry at the motion-to-dismiss stage. ECF No. 21 at 4-5 (citing E. Materials Corp. v. Mitsubishi Plastics Composites
Am., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-01034 (ADS)(AYS), 2017 WL 4162309, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017) and West v. eBay,
Inc., No. 1:17-cv-285 (MAD/CFH), 2017 WL 5991749, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2017)). In the interest of judicial
economy, the Court decides to conduct the inquiry here.
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366 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting First Hill Partners, LLC v. BlueCrest Capital Mgmt. Ltd., 52 F.
Supp. 3d 625, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)) (emphasis in original). If no conflict exists, the court applies
New York law. Id.
If there is a conflict, the court must next “conduct an ‘interest analysis’ and apply the law
of the jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the litigation.” Id. (citing Schultz v. Boy Scouts of
Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 197 (1985)). The interest analysis takes a “flexible approach intended
to give controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact
with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the
litigation.” Licci, 672 F.3d at 157-58 (quoting Fin. One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin.,
Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 337 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 904 (2006)) (quotation marks
omitted).
Under New York law, the interest analysis is applied differently depending on whether the
relevant rules are conduct-regulating or loss-allocating. See id. at 158. “Conduct-regulating rules
are those that ‘people use as a guide to governing their primary conduct,’” id. (quoting K.T. v.
Dash, 827 N.Y.S.2d 112, 117 (1st Dep’t 2006), while “[l]oss allocating rules . . . are laws that
prohibit, assign, or limit liability after the tort occurs,” id. (quoting DeMasi v. Rogers, 826
N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (2d Dep’t 2006) (alteration in quotation).
“If conflicting conduct-regulating laws are at issue, the law of the jurisdiction where the
tort occurred will generally apply because that jurisdiction has the greatest interest in regulating
behavior within its borders.” Id. (quoting GlobalNet Financial.Com, Inc. v. Frank Crystal & Co.,
449 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2006)) (quotation marks omitted).
Here, California law applies to all of ValveTech’s claims except one. First, ValveTech
consents to the application of California law, either directly or indirectly, for all of its claims except
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its unfair competition and replevin claims. See ECF No. 23 at 7-11 (declining to argue that New
York law applies to ValveTech’s breach of contract claim); id. at 11-14 (applying California law
and declining to argue that New York law applies to ValveTech’s unjust enrichment claim); id. at
14 (acknowledging that California law applies to ValveTech’s trade secret claim).
Second, California law applies to ValveTech’s unfair competition claim because there is a
conflict between the relevant law in California and New York, the relevant rules are conductregulating, and the tort occurred in California. In New York, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant wrongfully diverted plaintiff’s business to itself to allege unfair competition. See CSI
Grp., LLP v. Harper, 61 N.Y.S.3d 592, 598 (2d Dep’t 2017). In California, there are two sources
of an unfair competition claim: common law and statute. Under the common law, a plaintiff
alleges unfair competition when she shows that the defendant exploited her reputation in the
market by passing off her goods as defendants’ own. Celebrity Chefs Tour, LLC v. Macy’s Inc.,
16 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108
F.3d 1134, 1147 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc., 810 F. Supp.
2d 1013, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“The decisive test of common law unfair competition is whether
the public is likely to be deceived about the source of goods or services by the defendant’s
conduct.”). Under Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 17200, “a plaintiff must show either an (1) unlawful, unfair,
or fraudulent business act or practice, or (2) unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.”
See Irigaray Dairy v. Dairy Emps. Union Local No. 17, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1255-56 (E.D. Cal.
2015) (quoting Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003)).
The substantive rules of unfair competition in New York and California conflict, but only
as to New York’s common law and California’s statutory claims. As mentioned, a plaintiff must
show that a defendant wrongfully diverted plaintiff’s business to itself in New York. The same is
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true under California common law: a plaintiff pleads unfair competition when she shows that a
defendant deceived consumers as to the source of the goods or services plaintiff provides.
The same cannot be said of California’s statutory unfair competition claim, which is
broader in scope. Section 17200 provides “three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices
which are unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent.” Lippitt, 340 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 540 (Cal. 1999)). “Unlawful” practices are
any forbidden by law, “unfair” means “any practice whose harm to the victim outweighs the
benefits,” and “fraudulent” means a practice that is likely to deceive the public. Saunders v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 441 (Ct. App. 1994). Indeed, “the statutory definition of
‘unfair competition’ cannot be equated with the common law definition[.]” Bank of the West v.
Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1992).
Based on that precedent, the substantive rules of New York common law unfair
competition and California statutory unfair competition conflict, they are obviously relevant to the
germane issue—whether Aerojet violated either source of law—and have a significant, possible
effect on the outcome of trial.
The next inquiry is whether California’s statutory unfair competition law is conductregulating or loss-allocating. Based on the law’s language, the Court finds that it is conductregulating. But cf. Padula v. Lilarn Props. Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 519, 522 (1994) (explaining that
charitable immunity statutes, wrongful death statutes, and vicarious liability statutes are examples
of loss-allocating laws). Specifically, the statute makes clear that it influences conduct to prevent
injuries from occurring and not simply to allocate loss after the fact.
Therefore, since the alleged unfair competition occurred in California, see ECF No. 1-3 ¶¶
40-45 (explaining that Aerojet, which is based in California, used ValveTech’s proprietary
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information to design and develop a valve internally), § 17200 applies to ValveTech’s unfair
competition claim.
As for replevin, New York contains a common-law cause of action, while California has a
common-law cause of action and a statutory scheme in which an individual may apply for a writ.
Compare Khoury v. Khoury, 912 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (2d Dep’t 2010) (“To state a cause of action
for replevin, a plaintiff must allege that he or she owns specified property, or is lawfully entitled
to possess it, and that the defendant has unlawfully withheld the property from the plaintiff[.]”),
with Ponvanit v. Superior Court of California, No. CV 17-4054-FMO (JEM), 2018 WL 1135380,
at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2018) (“In California, a secured party wishing to repossess by judicial
action, can bring an action in replevin or proceed under the statutory successor to replevin, an
action of claim and delivery.” (quoting Simms v. NPCK Enters., Inc., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557, 562
(Ct. App. 2003) (alteration and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)). New York and
California common law and California statutory law contain similar requirements for a replevin
claim: the plaintiff must be the lawful owner of personal property and the defendant must
wrongfully possess it. See Khoury, 912 N.Y.S.2d at 237; see also Stockton Morris Plan v.
Mariposa Cty., 221 P.2d 232, 234 (Ct. App. 1950); Cal. Civ. Proc. § 512.010. Because there is no
conflict, New York law applies.
II.
Aerojet’s Motion Is Granted as to ValveTech’s First Claim Since ValveTech Did Not
Allege the Specific Provisions of the Contract that Aerojet Purportedly Breached
Under California law, a court “must ascertain the parties’ intent” from the contract itself,
if possible. Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116-17 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting
Yount v. Acuff Rose-Opryland, 103 F.3d 830, 836 (9th Cir. 1996)). Consequently, a plaintiff “must
allege the specific provisions in the contract” that the defendant allegedly breached. Id. at 1117
(citing Miron v. Herbalife Int’l, Inc., 11 F. App’x 927, 929 (9th Cir. 2001) (memorandum)).
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Here, ValveTech has failed to allege what specific provisions of what contract Aerojet
breached. Indeed, as Aerojet argues, it is unclear to the Court exactly what agreement Aerojet
breached at all. ValveTech mentions, at various points in its Complaint, purchase orders and
NDAs entered into by the parties. See ECF No. 1-3 ¶¶ 4, 5, 8-11, 12-14, 15, 17. None of these
allegations, however, show what provisions of these agreements Aerojet breached. ValveTech
does allege how Aerojet breached the terms of an NDA generally, but it does not explain how the
NDA was breached with sufficient particularity. See id. ¶¶ 15-18. Accordingly, the claim must
be dismissed.
III.
Aerojet’s Motion Is Granted as to ValveTech’s Second Claim Because Unjust
Enrichment Is Not Cognizable Under California Law
ValveTech cites an unpublished decision from the Ninth Circuit stating that unjust
enrichment is a standalone cause of action under California law despite prior case law that was
uncertain and inconsistent as to that point. See Bruton v. Gerber Prods. Co., 703 F. App’x 468,
470 (9th Cir. 2017) (memorandum). That decision in turn cites a 2015 decision from the Supreme
Court of California in which that court found that a standalone claim for unjust enrichment could
proceed in an insurance dispute. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.R. Mktg., L.L.C., 353 P.3d 319,
323-24 (Cal. 2015).
This Court declines to follow the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court of California specifically limited its holding in that case to the facts and procedural
history at bar. See id. at 326 (“We emphasize that our conclusion hinges on the particular facts
and procedural history of this litigation.”); see also Khasin v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., No. 12-cv-02204WHO, 2015 WL 5569161, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015) (“The only aspect of the [Hartford]
opinion that could be portrayed as a ‘change’ of law is narrowly confined to the question of the
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unjust enrichment of insureds’ counsel when counsel’s fees are excessive and not incurred for the
benefit of the insured.”).
Second, intermediate appellate courts in California have not only avoided citation of
Hartford for the principle that unjust enrichment is a standalone claim under California law, but
have held the opposite. See, e.g., De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 646
(Ct. App. 2018) (“Unjust enrichment is not a cause of action.”); Daniel v. Wayans, 213 Cal. Rptr.
3d 865, 891-92 (Ct. App. 2017) (same); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Citibank, N.A., 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d
504, 520 (Ct. App. 2017) (same). Some district court judges have followed suit post-Bruton. See,
e.g., Goldman v. Bayer AG, No. 17-cv-0647-PJH, 2017 WL 3168525, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 26,
2017) (“Not all courts are in accord, but the majority rule in California is that there is no standalone
cause of action for ‘unjust enrichment[.]’”); Fowler v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 17-cv-02092HSG, 2017 WL 3977385, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2017) (“California does not recognize an
independent cause of action for unjust enrichment.”). This Court will go along with the substantial
precedent finding that no cause of action for unjust enrichment exists in California.
IV.
Aerojet’s Motion Is Granted as to ValveTech’s Third Claim Since ValveTech Failed
to Identify the Misappropriated Trade Secrets with Sufficient Particularity
As a preliminary matter, the Court will not consider any documents associated with the
temporary restraining order 2 sought by ValveTech in this case in determining how to rule on
Aerojet’s motion. None of the documents mentioned by Aerojet and ValveTech in their briefs are
attached to the Complaint, incorporated by reference in it, or integral to it. Indeed, ValveTech
2
ValveTech moved for and was granted a temporary restraining order in state court. ECF No. 7-1 at 24-26. It then
moved for another temporary restraining order before this Court after Aerojet removed the case. ECF No. 7. In
support of both motions, ValveTech attached a number of exhibits, which included contracts and invoices at issue in
this action. See ECF Nos. 1-6, 1-7, 7-1.
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could not do so; it sought the temporary restraining order from this Court after it filed its
Complaint. See ECF Nos. 1-3, 1-5, 1-7.
In California, a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets is brought under statute. See
Civ. Proc. § 2019.210. Under the statutory scheme, a plaintiff is required “to identify or designate
the trade secrets at issue with ‘sufficient particularity[.]’” See Loop AI Labs Inc. v. Gatti, 195 F.
Supp. 3d 1107, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2016). There is no “bright-line rule governing the level of
particularity required by § 2019.210.” Id. Courts generally agree, however, that “a party alleging
misappropriation need not define every minute detail of its claimed trade secret at the outset of the
litigation, but nevertheless must make some showing that is reasonable, i.e., fair, proper, just and
rational.” Id. at 1111-12 (quoting Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 901, 908 (Ct. App. 2005)). The level of particularity also depends on the complexity and
level of specialization of the trade secrets. See id. at 1112.
Additionally, while neither is required, publicly identifying trade secrets—in other words,
not identifying them under seal—is an indicator that the trade secrets are not identified with
sufficient particularity, as is the failure to file declarations by expert witnesses “that attempt to
distinguish the alleged trade secrets from information already known in the field.” See Loop AI
Labs, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 1113.
Finally, listing categories of trade secrets in broad terms is insufficient to allege them with
particularity as required by § 2019.210. Compare Loop AI Labs, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 1114 (finding
lists of categories of alleged trade secrets in broad terms insufficient), with Yeiser Research & Dev.
LLC v. Teknor Apex Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1044-45 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (holding the description
of trade secrets was sufficiently particular where plaintiff explained “various attributes of its
concept,” including changes in design of particular parts of its product).
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Here, ValveTech has failed to identify the trade secrets Aerojet allegedly misappropriated
with sufficient particularity. Not only has ValveTech filed its description of the trade secrets
publicly and declined to include a declaration by an expert witness distinguishing its trade secrets
from others known in the field, but it describes them in the broad terms that the Court in Loop AI
Labs found insufficient. See ECF No. 1-3 ¶ 30 (“ValveTech owns the rights to protectable trade
secrets relating to its schematics, research and development information, sketches, prototypes,
data, exemplars, designs, drawings, and other proprietary information developed by ValveTech in
connection with its propellant isolation valve.”). This Court agrees with the Loop AI Labs Court’s
assessment. It may appear to ValveTech that California law requires form over substance, but, in
reality, it requires the substance of ValveTech’s trade secrets so that the Court may analyze the
remaining elements of ValveTech’s claim and frame the scope of discovery, among other benefits.
See Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab. Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 714, 727-28 (Ct. App. 2014).
V.
Aerojet’s Motion Is Granted as to ValveTech’s Fourth Claim Because the California
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA) Preempts All Claims Based on the Same Facts
as Trade Secret Misappropriation
In its memorandum of law in opposition to Aerojet’s Motion, ValveTech asserts that it has
properly alleged both a common law and statutory claim for unfair competition under California
law. See ECF No. 23 at 20. Of course, the claim is buoyed by the same facts as all of ValveTech’s
claims: by using and refusing to return or destroy ValveTech’s proprietary information, Aerojet is
injuring ValveTech. It is precisely because ValveTech’s unfair competition claim is based on
these facts that it must fail. CUTSA demands that a trade secret appropriation claim preempt all
“claims—including [§] 17200 claims—based on the same nucleus of facts as trade secret
misappropriation.” Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1062 (N.D. Cal.
2017); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.7.
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VI.
Aerojet’s Motion Is Denied as to ValveTech’s Sixth Claim Because It Has Plausibly
Alleged a Replevin Claim Under New York Law
As explained above, a plaintiff adequately pleads a replevin claim under New York law
where she alleges that the defendant wrongfully possesses personal property that she owns.
Khoury, 912 N.Y.S.2d at 237. That is exactly what ValveTech has pleaded here: ValveTech owns
its proprietary information, Aerojet wrongfully possess, and—what’s more—Aerojet refused to
return ValveTech’s proprietary information to it upon request. Accordingly, this claim survives.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Aerojet’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 20, is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART. Claims one through four, five, and seven are DISMISSED;
however, ValveTech’s sixth claim—a replevin claim under New York law—survives. By separate
order, the Court will refer this case to a United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 28, 2018
Rochester, New York
______________________________________
HON. FRANK P. GERACI, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
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