Morabito et al v. State of New York et al

Filing 35

DECISION AND ORDER denying 28 Motion to Vacate ; denying 29 Motion to Vacate. Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 8/6/2018. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DAVID R. MORABITO and COLETTE M.G.
MORABITO,
Plaintiffs,

No. 6:17-cv-06853-MAT
DECISION AND ORDER

-vsTHE STATE OF NEW YORK, THE NEW
YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION and
BASIL SEGGOS, Commissioner of the
New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation,
Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs David R. Morabito (“Mr. Morabito”) and Collette
M.G. Morabito (“Mrs. Morabito”) (collectively “Plaintiffs” or the
“Morabitos”) commenced this suit against Defendants the State of
New

York

(the

“State”),

the

New

York

State

Department

of

Environmental Conservation (“NYSDEC”), and NYSDEC Commissioner
Basil Seggos (“Commissioner Seggos”) (collectively “Defendants”) on
December 12, 2017, alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
related to the State’s decision to ban high-volume hydraulic
fracturing

on

property

owned

by

Plaintiffs.

Docket

No.

1.

Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint (Docket
No. 7), and Plaintiffs responded with two motions for leave to
amend (Docket Nos. 11 and 14).

On June 18, 2018, the Court entered a Decision and Order (the
“June 18th Decision and Order”) (Docket No. 26) granting Defendants’
motion to dismiss and denying Plaintiffs’ motions for leave to
amend.

In particular, the Court found that Defendants were immune

to Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.

The

Court also found that Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint failed
to allege a plausible claim against Commissioner Seggos in his
individual capacity, because they had not alleged that he was
personally involved in the alleged deprivation of rights. The Court
further found that Plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint to
include

a

claim

for

prospective

relief

was

futile,

because

Plaintiffs had already litigated their due process claim in state
court, and were therefore barred from relitigating it in this Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. Pursuant to the June 18th Decision and Order, judgment was
entered in favor of Defendants on June 19, 2018.

Docket No. 27

(the “Judgment”).
Currently

pending

before

the

Court

are

two

motions

by

Plaintiffs seeking vacatur of the June 18th Decision and Order and
the Judgment.

Docket Nos. 28, 29. For the reasons set forth below,

the motions are denied.

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II.

Discussion
A.

Legal Standard

As set forth above, Plaintiffs have filed two motions for
vacatur in this matter.
pursuant

to

Federal

The first (Docket No. 28) is brought
Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

60(b)(6)

(“Rule 60(b)”), which provides that “[o]n motion and just terms,
the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . any other reason
that justifies relief.”

The second (Docket No. 29) is brought

pursuant to both Rule 60(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) (“Rule 59(e)”), which permits a party to file a motion to
alter or amend a judgment within 28 days of entry.
A party seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) is required
“to show extraordinary circumstances justifying the reopening of a
final judgment.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)
(internal quotation omitted); see also Intellectual Prop. Watch v.
United States Trade Representative, 205 F. Supp. 3d 334, 352
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[Rule 60(b)(6) motions] are disfavored and should
only be granted upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances, or
extreme hardship.”) (internal quotation omitted).
Turning to Rule 59(e), “[t]here are four basic grounds upon
which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted. First, the movant may
demonstrate that the motion is necessary to correct manifest errors
of law or fact upon which the judgment is based.... Second, the
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motion may be granted so that the moving party may present newly
discovered or previously unavailable evidence. Third, the motion
will be granted if necessary to prevent manifest injustice....
Fourth, a Rule 59(e) motion may be justified by an intervening
change in controlling law.”
for

Amendment

or

11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ., Grounds

Alteration

of

Judgment,

§

2810.1

(3d

ed.)

(footnotes omitted). “The standard for granting ... a motion [for
reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be
denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions
or data that the court overlooked – matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 1995).
B.

Plaintiffs have not Shown that Vacatur is Warranted

Here, whether considered under the Rule 59(e) standard or the
Rule 60(b) standard, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that
vacatur is warranted.

Plaintiffs argue that the June 18th Decision

and Order contained “numerous factual inaccuracies” that warrant
reconsideration.
“factual

Docket No. 29 at ¶ 3.

inaccuracies”

are

nothing

However, these so-called

more

than

a

rehashing

of

arguments that the Court has already rejected.
First, Plaintiffs contend that the Court erred in concluding
that their

due

process

claim

had

been

“‘fully

litigated and

dismissed in New York State Court’” (Id. (quoting Docket No. 26 at
11) because their state court claim was dismissed on standing

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grounds.

Plaintiffs argument misapprehends the meaning of “fully

litigated” in this context. The Court is aware that the state
courts did not reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ due process claim,
and discussed at length in the June 18th Decision and Order the fact
that

the

standing.

state

court’s

dismissed

See Docket No. 26 at 12.

the

matter

due

to

lack

of

However, as the Court further

explained, “[c]ollateral estoppel, also sometimes referred to as
issue preclusion, applies to rulings on the issue of standing.”
Id.

Accordingly, the Court had to consider whether Plaintiffs had

“a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the standing issue” in
state court.” Lefkowitz v. McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC,
23 F. Supp. 3d 344, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

The Court concluded that

Plaintiffs did have such an opportunity, and that, as such, the
issue could not be relitigated in front of this Court.

Plaintiffs

have provided no new evidence, overlooked case law, or any other
“extraordinary circumstance” that would change this conclusion.
Second,
determination

Plaintiffs
that

contend

Defendants

that

were

the

immune

Court
under

erred
the

in

its

Eleventh

Amendment, because Plaintiffs sought leave to assert claims against
Commissioner Seggos in his individual capacity.

The Court fully

considered this argument by Plaintiffs in the June 18th Decision and
Order.

As the Court explained therein, although Plaintiffs sought

leave to include an individual capacity claim against Commissioner
Seggos, they had made no factual allegations whatsoever related to

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actions taken by Commissioner Seggos. “To the contrary, Plaintiffs
affirmatively allege that it was the ‘former Commissioner’ of
NYSDEC who denied them the ability ‘to commence the process or
receive a permit to conduct HVHF.’”
Docket No. 14 at ¶ 13)).

Docket No. 26 at 10 (quoting

As the Court explained, the lack of any

allegations of personal involvement by Commissioner Seggos was
fatal

to

an

individual

capacity

claim

against

him.

Again,

Plaintiff has failed to provide any new basis for the Court to
reconsider its prior conclusion and simply reiterates an argument
that this Court has already fully considered.
Finally, Plaintiffs attempt to relitigate their request to add
a claim for prospective injunctive relief.

The Court will not

repeat its analysis of this claim here, having thoroughly discussed
the matter in the June 18th Decision and Order. The Court notes
again that the June 18th Decision and Order fully acknowledged and
considered the fact that the state court proceedings were dismissed
on standing grounds, and nevertheless concluded that collateral
estoppel applied. Plaintiffs’ disagreement with that conclusion is
simply not a basis to reopen this matter or to disturb the
Judgment. See United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158, 177
(2d Cir. 2009)

(“The

agency’s

grounds

for

the

Rule 60(b)(6)

motion - which essentially boil down to a claim that the decision
was wrong - are not sufficiently extraordinary to justify reopening
a closed case....”).

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III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ motions to vacate
the June 18th Decision and Order and the Judgment (Docket Nos. 28,
29) are denied.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.

s/Michael A. Telesca
_____________________________________
MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:

August 6, 2018
Rochester, New York

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