Jackson v. Quantem Aviation Services, LLC et al
Filing
27
DECISION AND ORDER that 9 Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by Matheson Trucking Inc. and Matheson Flight Extenders, Inc. is granted; Matheson Trucking Inc. and Matheson Flight Extenders, Inc. are terminated as defendants; and judgment is entered in their favor. It is further ordered that 21 Joint Motion for Approval of the Proposed Settlement filed by Jeanine Jackson and Quantem Aviation LLC is granted. (The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.) Signed by Hon. Michael A. Telesca on 6/25/19. (JMC)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JEANINE JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
DECISION AND ORDER
No. 6:18-cv-06297(MAT)
-vsQUANTEM AVIATION SERVICES, LLC,
MATHESON TRUCKING, INC., and
MATHESON FLIGHT EXTENDERS, INC.,
Defendant.
I.
Introduction
Represented by counsel, plaintiff Jeanine Jackson (“Jackson”)
instituted this action pursuant to the Equal Pay Act and related
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201,
et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
USC § 2000e, et seq., (Title VII); New York Labor Law, § 190, et
seq.; and the New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law § 296,
et
seq.
against
defendant
Quantem
Aviation
Services,
LLC
(“Quantem”) and defendants Matheson Trucking Inc. and Matheson
Flight Extenders, Inc. (collectively, “Matheson”). For the reasons
discussed below, Matheson’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint
is granted, and Jackson and Quantem’s Joint Motion for Approval of
the Proposed Settlement is granted.
II.
Factual Background and Procedural History
On April 13, 2018, Jackson filed a Complaint (Docket No. 1),
and on May 18, 2018, she filed an Amended Complaint(“Am. Compl.”)
(Docket No. 4). The following factual summary is based on the
Amended Complaint’s allegations, which are taken as true for
purposes of the pending Motion to Dismiss.
Jackson, a 32 year-old African-American woman, was employed by
Quantem from April 2016, until June 25, 2017. She began as a
material handler and was promoted in June 2016, to lead handler by
her supervisor Ronald Shufelt (“Shufelt”) and Quantem’s general
manager, Todd Pennington (“Pennington”). Jackson was the only
female lead handler employed by Quantum. In August of 2016, Jackson
noticed that she was being paid at the lead handler rate of $16.58
per hour for only some hours of her work; she was paid at the rate
of $15.58 for the remainder of the hours she worked.
Jackson complained to Shufelt who said he would take care of
it
but
never
underpaid
did.
Jackson continued
Pennington.
approximately
On
June
9,
once
per
2017,
Jackson
to
month
complain
to
about
Shufelt
complained
being
and
to
directly
to
Jennifer Coombs (“Coombs”), the Quantum Aviation Services Human
Resource Manager, about not being properly compensated for her
work. In response, on June 9, 2017, Quantem made Jackson “the LEAD
in charge of pay issues” at a pay rate of $16.58 per hour. In this
position,
Jackson’s
duties
included
reviewing,
scanning
and
emailing the sign in/out sheet to Shaun Kane, Quantem’s Business
Area Manager, for both shifts before leaving in the morning.
-2-
As part of her new timekeeping responsibilities, Jackson
discovered that despite her own complaints about being underpaid,
another
lead
handler,
Cordell
James
(“James”),
had
been
consistently paid at the lead handler rate of $16.58 per hour for
all his hours of work. James and Shufelt were responsible for
developing the weekly work schedule for Quantem employees. Jackson
discovered that both James and Shufelt were committing time-clock
theft by over-reporting their time on the sign in/out sheets by
coming in early or leaving early. When Jackson brought her concerns
to Shufelt, he became upset and told her “not to do anything
stupid[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 73.
Matheson Flight Extenders, Inc., was selected by the U.S.
Postal Service to take over the work performed by Quantem in
Rochester on June 26, 2017. On June 12, 2017, Jackson applied for
a position as a material handler or lead handler with Matheson and
passed the required drug test. Around the same time, other Quantem
employees, including Shufelt, also applied for positions with
Matheson.
On June 16, 2017, Jackson reported her discoveries about
Shufelt and James’ incorrect time records to Kane.
Also around
that time, Jackson spoke with Twala King (“King”), a Matheson human
resources (“HR”) employee, about her job application. In that
conversation,
Jackson
informed
King
about
Shufelt
and
James’
submission of false time records and expressed fear that Shufelt
-3-
would retaliate against her. On June 16, 2017, King responded by
email stating that “everything is going to be fine” and that John
Miller (“Miller”), Mathesons’s Safety Manger, “spoke highly of you”
and that “the people that count in the process knows [sic] your
worth.” Am. Compl. ¶ 78.
On June 18, 2018, Shufelt threatened Jackson, stating “I know
what you’re trying to do. You’re not going to get away with it.”
Id. ¶ 79. On June 20, 2017, Shufelt contacted Miller and claimed
that
Jackson
had
recently
committed
timeclock
theft
and
insubordination. Id. ¶ 80.
Around that time, Jackson also spoke directly with Miller and
discussed Shufelt’s submission of fraudulent time records and
expressed concerns that her current job and future job prospects
were in jeopardy. Miller proposed mediation and communication
between the Quantem and Matheson HR departments to resolve the
conflict.
On June 21, 2017, frustrated by the lack of progress on
receiving the back pay she believed she was owed, Jackson filed a
discrimination complaint against Quantem with the New York State
Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”) alleging sexual harassment,
sexual discrimination, and racial discrimination. However, she
withdrew her complaint after Kane agreed to resolve her pay issues
and assured her she would not be fired by Quantem because there
were no grounds for her termination.
-4-
On June 26, 2017, Matheson took over operating the facility at
the Airport. Plaintiff reported for work on June 26, 2017, but was
informed by Matheson that she “wasn’t cleared to work.” Am. Compl.
¶ 89. On June 26, 2017, Shufelt began working as a supervisor for
Matheson and James began working as a lead handler.
On June 28, 2017, as part of her paycheck from Quantem,
Jackson received$1,430.03 in back pay to January 2017 for her hours
worked as a lead handler.
On June 29, 2017, Jackson learned that she had not been hired
by Matheson. Matheson had originally intended to include her in the
transfer of Quantem employees on June 26, 2017, but “chose not to
continue with the transfer” based on Shufelt’s reported claims of
insubordination and timeclock theft. Am. Compl. ¶ 94. According to
Quantem,
“no
Quantem
manager
was
authorized
to
provide
any
information about employees to Matheson,” Matheson did not request
or receive any HR files from Quantem regarding its employees, and
never contacted Quantem regarding Jackson or her work record.
Quantem is a defendant in all seven causes of action; the only
claim against Matheson is for alleged gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, on the
basis that they were negligent “in accepting as true the false and
retaliatory
allegations
made
by
[Quantem
supervisor]
Ronald
Shufelt” on June 20, 2017. As to Quantem, Jackson alleges that she
was paid less than her male counterparts for performing the same
-5-
work as a “lead handler” at Quantem. Jackson also alleges that
Quantem paid certain wages late in violation of the FLSA as well as
committed
several
violations
of
State
law
(N.Y.
Labor
Law
§§ 198(1-a) (failure to pay wages when due); N.Y. Labor Law
§ 195(3) (failure to issue accurate wage statements); N.Y. Labor
Law § 190, et seq.; N.Y. Comp. Code. R. & Regs., tit. 12, § 142-2-4
(unpaid spread of hours pay).
On August 30, 2018, Matheson filed a Motion to Dismiss (Docket
No. 9) in lieu of answering the Amended Complaint. Jackson filed a
Memorandum of Law in Opposition, and Matheson filed a Reply.
Beginning in September of 2018, Quantem and Jackson engaged in
settlement negotiations. Based on the records available, Jackson’s
counsel, Peter Dellinger, Esq. (“Attorney Dellinger”), estimates
that she is owed approximately $3,000 in unpaid wages and overtime
wages under the FLSA. Quantem disputes the date on which Jackson
completed her lead handler training and maintains she was eligible
for
lead
handler
pay
for
only
six
months.
Jackson
in
turn
acknowledges in her Amended Complaint that, in response to her
grievances about being unfairly paid, Quantem paid her $1,430.00 in
retroactive pay on June 28, 2017.
In November of 2018, Quantem and Jackson reached agreement on
the terms of a proposed settlement. Principally, Jackson will
receive a total of $3,125.00 in unpaid wages and overtime wages and
a separate check for $3,125.00 which represents damages for her
-6-
remaining
claims.
The
proposed
settlement
permits
Jackson
to
receive the total amount of unpaid and overtime wages owed to her,
as originally calculated by her attorney, and an equal amount in
damages
contains
for
her
mutual
other
claims
release
against
provisions,
Quantem.
does
not
The
agreement
contain
any
confidentiality or waiver provisions or restrictions on employment,
and permits Jackson to make any truthful statement related to or
concerning this lawsuit Action.
As far as attorney’s fees, the proposed settlement provides
that The Empire Justice Center will receive $2,000.00. Attorney
Dellinger indicates that $2,000.00 constitutes reimbursement for
approximately 6.60 hours of his time; however, from September 2018
until the present, he has expended more than twice that amount of
time reaching a settlement with Quantem.
On February 13, 2019, Jackson and Quantem submitted a joint
letter-motion (Docket No. 21) for approval of the settlement
agreement (“Motion for Approval of Proposed Settlement”) reached
between these two parties, pursuant to Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake
House,
Inc.,
796
F.3d
199,
206
(2d
Cir.
2015)
(“Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulated dismissals settling FLSA claims
with prejudice require the approval of the district court or the
[Department of Labor] to take effect.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
824 (2016). On February 27, 2019, Matheson filed a Response (Docket
-7-
No. 23) objecting to the Proposed Settlement1 and asking that the
Court delay approval of the Proposed Settlement pending the Court’s
issuance of a decision on Matheson’s Motion to Dismiss. Jackson
filed a Reply on February 28, 2019 (Docket No. 24). On March 8,
2019, the Court issued an order granting Matheson’s request for an
extension of time to respond to the Amended Complaint until 60 day
days after the Court’s rules on the Motion for Approval of the
Proposed Settlement.
III. Matheson’s Motion to Dismiss
A.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint pleads a claim with facial
plausibility when it sets forth “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
A
complaint
that
consists
merely
of
“labels
and
conclusions[,]” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action[,]” or “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement’” does not meet the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In deciding a
1
The Proposed Settlement was submitted as Exhibit A to the letter-motion
filed by Attorney Dellinger (Docket No. 21).
-8-
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept the
complaint’s well pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. ECA, Local 134 IBEW
Joint Pension Tr. of Chi. v. J.P. Morgan Chase Co., 533 F.3d 187,
196 (2d Cir. 2009).
B.
Title VII
1.
Elements of a Prima Facie Claim
Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). A claim alleging
discriminatory
three-step
denial
burden
of
shifting
employment
framework
is
analyzed
established
by
under
the
McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The Second
Circuit has explained that “while the plaintiff ultimately will
need evidence sufficient to prove discriminatory motivation on the
part of
the
employer-defendant, at
the
initial stage
of
the
litigation—prior to the employer’s coming forward with the claimed
reason for its action—the plaintiff does not need substantial
evidence of discriminatory intent. If she makes a showing (1) that
she is a member of a protected class, (2) that she was qualified
for the position she sought, (3) that she suffered an adverse
-9-
employment action, and (4) can sustain a minimal burden of showing
facts suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation, then
she has satisfied the prima facie requirements and a presumption of
discriminatory intent arises in her favor, at which point the
burden of production shifts to the employer, requiring that the
employer furnish evidence of reasons for the adverse action.”
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015)
(citation
omitted).
Thus,
at
the
pleading
stage,
a
litigant
asserting a claim subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
standard is not required to plead facts sufficient to establish a
prima facie case, and need only allege sufficient facts to give the
defendant “fair notice of the basis for [her] claims.” Boykin v.
KeyCorp., 521 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11, 514 (2002) (holding that a
plaintiff asserting disparate treatment claims under Title VII and
the ADEA need not allege “specific facts establishing a prima facie
case of
discrimination”
to
survive
a
motion
to
dismiss;
the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework “is an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement,” and to require more than
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)’s “simplified notice pleading standard” would
unjustifiedly impose a heightened pleading requirement on the
plaintiff)). Nonetheless, courts in this Circuit have noted that in
evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a cause of action
subject to the McDonnell Douglas framework, the elements of a prima
-10-
facie case of discrimination are relevant in determining whether
the defendant has been given fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims.
Corbett v. Napolitano, 897 F. Supp.2d 96, 111 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(collecting cases).
2.
The “Cat’s Paw” Theory of Title VII Liability
The “cat’s paw” metaphor “refers to a situation in which an
employee is fired or subjected to some other adverse employment
action by a supervisor who himself has no discriminatory motive,
but who has been manipulated by a subordinate who does have such a
motive
and
intended
to
bring
about
the
adverse
employment
action[.]” Cook v. IPC Intern. Corp., 673 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir.
2012). “Because the supervisor, acting as agent of the employer,
has
permitted
himself
to
be
used
‘as
the
conduit
of
[the
subordinate’s] prejudice,’ Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405
(7th Cir. 1990),” Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835
F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2016), “that prejudice may then be imputed
to the employer and used to hold the employer liable for employment
discrimination.” Id. The Second Circuit in Vasquez joined its
sister circuits in holding that the “cat’s paw” theory “may be used
to support recovery for claims of retaliation in violation of Title
VII.” Id. at 272-73. The Vasquez panel noted that the theory
“accords
with
[its]
longstanding
precedent
.
.
.
in
the
employment-discrimination context, that ‘a Title VII plaintiff is
entitled to succeed, “even absent evidence of illegitimate bias on
-11-
the part of the ultimate decision maker, so long as the individual
shown to have the impermissible bias played a meaningful role in
the [decisionmaking] process.”’” Id. (quoting Holcomb v. Iona
Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bickerstaff v.
Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 450 (2d Cir. 1999)).
C.
Analysis of the Parties’ Arguments
In the Motion to Dismiss, Matheson argued that there is no
basis for imputing Title VII liability to a prospective employer
for
its
alleged
investigation
negligence
into
(Docket No. 9-1)
a
in
prospective
conducting
employee.
a
See
due-diligence
Matheson
Mem.
at 5. In opposition, Jackson asserts that the
“cat’s paw” theory of Title VII employer liability applies and
argues that Matheson’s alleged negligence in relying on Shufelt’s
“untrue misconduct allegations” against Jackson in declining to
hire
her
“are
sufficient
to
plausibly
demonstrate
employer
negligence upon which Title VII relief may be granted.” Pl.’s Opp.
Mem.
(Docket
No.
)
at
6-7.
Matheson
replies
that
cat’s
paw
liability does not exist because, on the date Shufelt made his
false statements about Jackson to Matheson, i.e., June 20, 2017,
Shufelt still worked for Quantem Aviation. In other words, Matheson
asserts, it was not Shufelt’s employer on that date; it was his
prospective employer. See Matheson Reply at 2.
The Court agrees that based on Vasquez there must be an
employer-employee relationship in order to rely on the cat’s paw
-12-
theory of liability, for it was derived from agency principles. See
Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 273 (noting that the term “employer” is
defined under Title VII to include “agents,” and “Congress has
directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency
principles”) (quotation omitted; citing Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562
U.S. 411, 418 (2011) (employment discrimination case brought under
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act; deriving
cat’s paw liability from “general principles of . . . agency
law”)).
Jackson argues that “[a]t this early stage of the litigation,
it is highly plausible” that Shufelt was an employee of Matheson
“at the time when [Matheson] chose not to continue the transfer of
Jackson to Matheson’s employ.” Pl.’s Opp. Mem. at 8 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Jackson alleges that she “reported for
work on June 26, 2017, but was informed by Matheson that she
‘wasn’t cleared to work[.]’” Am. Compl. ¶ 89. She further alleges
that Shufelt began working as a supervisor for Matheson on that
same date. Id. ¶ 90. Jackson goes on to assert that “[i]n making
the decision not to hire [her], Defendant Matheson relied on Ronald
Shufelt’s June 20, 2017 allegations of misconduct.” Id. ¶ 95.
Matheson argues that based on Jackson’s own allegations,
Shufelt was not an employee of Matheson at the time that he
“committed [the] discriminatory act that influenced the ultimate
employment decision.” Staub, 562 U.S. at 422 n. 4. Jackson contends
-13-
that the relevant act is Matheson’s decision not to continue with
her employment transfer on June 29, 2017, at which point in time it
was “highly plausible” that Shufelt was an employee of Matheson.
The Court agrees with Matheson that there must have existed an
employee-employer relationship between Shufelt and Matheson at the
time Shufelt committed the discriminatory act that influenced
Matheson’s ultimate employment decision.
See, e.g., Matthews v.
Waukesha Cty., 759 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Liability under
[the cat’s paw] theory can be imposed where a non-decision-making
employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or
input that may have affected the adverse employment action.”)
(emphasis supplied). Indeed, if there is no agency relationship
between the subordinate and the decisionmaker, then there is no
basis for imputing the subordinate’s discriminatory motivation to
the employer.
See Vasquez, 835 F.3d at 275–76 (“Only when an
employer in effect adopts an employee’s unlawful animus by acting
negligently
with
respect
to
the
information
provided
by
the
employee, and thereby affords that biased employee an outsize role
in its own employment decision, can the employee’s motivation be
imputed to the employer and used to support a claim under Title
VII.”).
The Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege that Shufelt
was an employee of Matheson at the time he allegedly provided the
false information about Jackson to Matheson. Rather, the Amended
-14-
Complaint definitively alleges that Shufelt made his discriminatory
statements on June 20, 2017, and thaat he was not hired by Matheson
until June 26, 2017. Jackson does not allege, for example, that
Shufelt made other statements after his hiring to Matheson. Nor has
Jackson
requested
permission
to
further
amend
the
Amended
Complaint. Accordingly, the Court finds that Jackson has not
alleged a plausible Title VII discrimination claim against Matheson
under a cat’s paw theory of liability. The Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint as to Matheson is granted.
IV.
The Joint Motion for Approval of the Proposed Settlement
In most circumstances, under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), litigants
do not need a court order to dismiss, with the consent of all
parties, a plaintiff's claims against all or some defendants. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). The Second Circuit has held,
however, that “Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulated dismissals settling
FLSA claims with prejudice require the approval of the district
court or the [Department of Labor] to take effect.” Cheeks, 796
F.3d at 206. Although Cheeks clearly announced the requirement of
prior court approval of an FLSA settlement, it did not enunciate
the factors to be considered by the court. See id. at 206–07. In
attempting to fill in the blanks left by the Second Circuit in
Cheeks, district courts have imported the multi-factor standard
from Wolinsky v. Scholastic Inc., 900 F. Supp.2d 332, 335 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), to evaluate whether an FLSA wage and hour settlement is
-15-
“fair and reasonable.” Li Rong Gao v. Perfect Team Corp., 249 F.
Supp.3d 636, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing Cortes v. New Creators,
Inc., No. 15 Civ. 5680(PAE), 2016 WL 3455383, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June
20, 2016); Beckert v. Rubinov, No. 15 Civ. 1951(PAE), 2015 WL
6503832, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2015);
Velasquez v. SAFI–G,
Inc., 137 F. Supp.3d 582, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)).
“In determining whether the proposed settlement is fair and
reasonable, a court should consider the totality of circumstances,
including
but not
limited
to
the
following
factors:
(1)
the
plaintiff’s range of possible recovery; (2) the extent to which
‘the settlement will enable the parties to avoid anticipated
burdens and expenses in establishing their respective claims and
defenses’; (3) the seriousness of the litigation risks faced by the
parties; (4) whether ‘the settlement agreement is the product of
arm’s-length bargaining between experienced counsel’; and (5) the
possibility of fraud or collusion.” Wolinsky, 900 F. Supp.2d at 335
(quoting Medley v. Am. Cancer Soc., No. 10 Civ. 3214 (BSJ), 2010 WL
3000028, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2010)).
Taking the fourth factor first, Attorney Dellinger represents,
and the Court sees no reason to believe otherwise, that the
Proposed Settlement is the product of arm’s-length bargaining
between experienced counsel. “The settlement was reached following
the exchange of paper discovery, which surely informed the parties
-16-
as to the strengths and weaknesses of their positions.” Cortes,
2016 WL 3455383, at *4 (citation omitted).
As to the fifth factor, the Court finds no suggestion of fraud
or collusion between Jackson and Quantem. In particular, because
Jackson no longer works for Quantem, “there is little cause for
concern
that
[Quantem]
settlement.” Id.
used
improper
leverage
to
secure
(citing Cisneros v. Schnipper Rest. LLC, No. 13
Civ. 6266(JMF), 2014 WL 67235, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2014)
(concerns about coercion “not as relevant when the plaintiffs no
longer work for the defendant”)).
Turning to the second factor, the settlement allows the
parties to avoid additional litigation expense and to circumvent
the costs of discovery, further motion practice, and potentially
trial. Cortes, Inc., 2016 WL 3455383, at *3. Attorney Dellinger
represents that Jackson is primarily interested in a monetary
settlement that will allow her to quickly receive the amount of
past wages she believes is owed to her; she also wants to avoid the
risks and delays associated with a potential trial. The substance
and structure of the Proposed Settlement accomplish these goals.
With regard to the first factor, the Proposed Settlement
provides that Jackson will receive a total of $3,125.00 in unpaid
wages and overtime wages and a separate check for $3,125.00 which
represents damages for her remaining claims. Thus, the Proposed
Settlement permits Jackson to receive the total amount of unpaid
-17-
and overtime wages owed to her, as originally calculated by her
attorney, and an equal amount in damages for her other claims
against Quantem. Moreover, the Proposed Settlement contains mutual
releases, does not contain any confidentiality or waiver provisions
or restrictions on employment, and permits Jackson to make any
truthful statement related to or concerning this lawsuit Action.
With regard to the third factor, Attorney Dellinger indicates
that Quantem disputes the amount of hours for which Jackson is
entitled to the lead handler pay rate. During negotiations, Quantem
contested the date on which Jackson completed her lead handler
training and asserted that she is only entitled to six months of
payment at the lead handler rate. Jackson acknowledges that if
Quantem is correct about the extended training period and the
calculation of her eligible hours at the lead handler rate, the
damages for her wage-related claims could be significantly reduced.
In
addition,
Jackson
concedes
that
Quantem
already
paid
her
$1,430.00 in back wages she claimed to have been owed. The Proposed
Settlement obviates the substantial risk facing Jackson as to the
amount of damages she can recover. Net of attorney’s fees, she will
recover 68 percent of what she believes her total unpaid damages
are. In other words, Attorney Dellinger’s requested fee represents
32 percent of the total amount of damages ($6,250.00) provided for
by the Proposed Settlement. The Court accordingly does not find
that the Proposed Settlement favors Attorney Dellinger’s interests
-18-
over those of his client. See, e.g., Lliguichuzhca v. Cinema 60,
LLC, 948 F. Supp.2d 362, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that “the
settlement does not favor plaintiffs’ counsel over plaintiffs’
themselves” where “plaintiffs are receiving approximately 50% of
what they would have been entitled to with a judgment while
plaintiff’s
counsel
is
receiving
only
32%
of
the
share
of
attorney’s fees that the Court would have awarded”).
Finally, the Court notes that Wolinsky also identified several
factors which weigh against settlement approval, “includ[ing] the
following: (1) ‘the presence of other employees situated similarly
to
the
claimant’;
(2)
‘a
likelihood
that
the
claimant’s
circumstance will recur’; (3) ‘a history of FLSA non-compliance by
the same employer or others in the same industry or geographic
region’; and (4) the desirability of ‘a mature record’ and ‘a
pointed determination of the governing factual or legal issue to
further the development of the law either in general or in an
industry or in a workplace.’” 900 F. Supp.2d at 336 (quoting Dees
v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp.2d 1227, 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2010)).
None of the foregoing factors are present in this case.
Having found that all of the relevant Wolinsky factors favor
approval of the Proposed Settlement and none of the factors counsel
against approval, the Court will grant the Joint Motion to Approve
the Proposed Settlement.
-19-
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed
by Matheson Trucking Inc. and Matheson Flight Extenders, Inc. is
granted; Matheson Trucking Inc. and Matheson Flight Extenders, Inc.
are terminated as defendants; and judgment is entered in their
favor. It is further
ORDERED that the Joint Motion for Approval of the Proposed
Settlement filed by Jeanine Jackson and Quantem Aviation LLC is
granted.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Michael A. Telesca
HON. MICHAEL A. TELESCA
United States District Judge
Dated:
June 25, 2019
Rochester, New York
-20-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?