Beaman v. Minarik et al

Filing 4

DECISION AND ORDER: Plaintiff's in forma pauperis motion 2 is GRANTED, however, his Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and his motion to appoint counsel 3 is DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. SO ORDERED. A copy of this NEF and Decision and Order have been mailed to the pro se Plaintiff. Signed by Hon. Frank P. Geraci, Jr. on 5/10/2018. (AFM)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
THOMAS BEAMAN, SR.,
Plaintiff,
Case # 18-CV-6341-FPG
v.
DECISION AND ORDER
HON. RENEE F. MINARIK, et al.,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
On May 7, 2018, pro se Plaintiff Thomas Beaman, Sr. filed a Complaint against Defendant
Judges Renee F. Minarik, Graig Dorna,1 Ann Taddeo, and Matthew Rosenbaum, an in forma
pauperis motion, and a motion to appoint counsel. ECF Nos. 1-3.
The Court finds that Plaintiff meets the statutory requirements to proceed as a poor person
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and therefore his in forma pauperis motion is GRANTED. The
Court also screened Plaintiff’s Complaint under the 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) criteria. For the reasons
that follow, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and his counsel motion
(ECF No. 3) is DENIED AS MOOT.
DISCUSSION
I.

Legal Standard
Section 1915 “provide[s] an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss

legally insufficient claims.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Shakur v.
Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2004)). Pursuant to Section 1915(e), the Court must dismiss a
complaint in a civil action if it determines at any time that the action (1) is frivolous or malicious;

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The Court believes that Plaintiff likely intended to sue New York State Supreme Court Judge Craig J. Doran.

(2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
A court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, “particularly when they allege civil rights
violations,” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), but pro se pleadings must
still meet the notice requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, Wynder v. McMahon, 360
F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2004). “Specific facts are not necessary,” and the plaintiff “need only give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Generally, the Court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or be heard
before dismissal “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that
an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.” Abbas, 480 F.3d at 639 (internal
quotation marks omitted).

However, leave to amend pleadings is properly denied where

amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
II.

Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff sues four New York State Court judges in what he styles as a civil rights,

conspiracy, and discrimination case. ECF No. 1 at 1. He alleges only one claim for “ableism
discrimination of person with disabilities working pro se.” Id. at 3-4. Specifically, he asserts that
on May 1 at 2:30, Judge Taddeo “discrimination person with disabilities working pro se, civil
rights claims, violations Amendments 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th, violations of civil liberties.” Id. at
4. Plaintiff asks that the Court “prosecute to the full extent of the laws” and conduct a “grand jury
investigation.” Id. Plaintiff’s form Complaint lacks additional clarifying information.
Plaintiff attaches roughly 80 pages to his Complaint, which the Court has considered in
screening his submission. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 698 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting

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that “the court may consider facts set forth in exhibits attached as part of the complaint as well as
those in the formal complaint itself”). These documents reveal that Plaintiff engaged in prior
litigation in New York State Court. Specifically, on September 29, 2014, a default judgment was
entered against him. ECF No. 1 at 14. On February 10, 2016, the State Court denied Plaintiff’s
motion to vacate that judgment. Id. On August 18, 2016, a damages inquest was held before Judge
Minarik, who ordered entry of the judgment in the amount of $123,128.66. Id. On February 24,
2017, Judge Minarik signed an amended judgment reducing the amount to $120,606.86. Id. On
April 3, 2017, Plaintiff moved to renew and reargue and on October 6, 2017, Judge Minarik denied
that motion. Id.
On November 28, 2017, Plaintiff again moved to renew and reargue. Id. When he moved
for leave to proceed as a poor person on January 29, 2018, his case was reassigned to Judge
Taddeo. Id. On February 26, 2018, Judge Taddeo found that the doctrine of res judicata barred
Plaintiff from bringing his motion to renew and reargue. Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for leave
to amend his Answer. On April 13, 2018, Judge Taddeo’s law clerk sent Plaintiff a letter indicating
that his case remained closed based on Judge Taddeo’s February 26, 2018 Order denying his
motion to renew and reargue. Id. at 13.
Judge Taddeo’s law clerk wrote Plaintiff another letter dated April 23, 2018, indicating
that the State Court received his “Notice of Motion for a Franks Hearing” and “Notice of Motion
for Contempt of Court Civil.” Id. at 6. The letter indicates that his Notices of Motion were
scheduled before Judge Taddeo on May 1, 2018 at 2:30 p.m. “on submission, no appearances
required.” Id.

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III.

Analysis
Judges are absolutely immune from suit for actions taken within the scope of their judicial

responsibilities. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991). Allegations that the judge acted in
bad faith or with malice does not pierce the protection of immunity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554 (1967).
The Supreme Court developed a two-part test for determining whether a judge is entitled
to absolute immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). First, “[a] judge will
not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was
in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 356-57 (citation omitted). Second, a judge is immune only for
actions performed in his or her judicial capacity. See, e.g., Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62
(9th Cir. 1974) (finding no immunity where judge assaulted litigant).
Here, Plaintiff has in no way alleged that any of the Defendant Judges “acted in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction.” Moreover, the attachments to his Complaint make clear that Plaintiff
is displeased with actions that these individuals performed in their judicial capacities as New York
State Court judges. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice because these
Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis motion (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED, however, his Complaint
is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and his motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 3) is DENIED
AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and that leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person

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is denied. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). Requests to proceed on appeal as
a poor person should be directed on motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 10, 2018
Rochester, New York

___________________________________
HON. FRANK P. GERACI, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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