Tripathy v. Lockwood et al

Filing 200

DECISION AND ORDER denying 169 Motion for Reconsideration; granting 173 Cross-Motion for Reconsideration. The Court instructs the Clerk of the Court to entered judgment for Defendants and close this case. Signed by Hon. Mark W. Pedersen on 8/29/2024. (JB)Clerk to Follow up

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________
SANJAY TRIPATHY,
Plaintiff,

DECISION & ORDER

v.

19-CV-6614-MJP

CAPTAIN LOCKWOOD, et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On August 21, 2019, plaintiff Sanjay Tripathy (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se,
commenced this civil rights action against numerous defendants alleging that a
laundry policy at Gowanda Correctional Facility violated his religious beliefs as a
Hindu. (Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 1.) Currently pending before the Court is
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 169) and Defendants’ cross-motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) 60(b)(6)
(ECF No. 173) of my decision and order regarding Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF
No. 164). For the reasons explained more fully below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 169) and GRANTS Defendants’ cross-motion for
reconsideration (ECF No. 173).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Relevant to the present motion, on March 24, 2023, Defendants moved to
dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. (ECF No. 138.) On March 28, 2024, I
granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 164.)
More specifically, I granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the
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following: (1) Plaintiff’s claims against the Collins and Fishkill Defendants on the
basis that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to them; (2) as to
DOCCS, as well as to the Gowanda Defendants and Fernandez in their official
capacities, under the immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims (First Amendment); (4) Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and § 1985; (5) Plaintiff’s state law claims; (6) and claims related to emotional
injury. (Decision and Order, Mar. 28, 2024, ECF No. 164.) I further found that the
Gowanda Defendants and Fernandez are entitled to qualified immunity with respect
to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Id. With respect to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims, I granted
Defendants’ motion to dismiss that claim under the Spending Clause basis, but
denied Defendants’ motion under the Commerce Clause basis as to the Gowanda
Defendants and Fernandez. (Id.) The Clerk of the Court entered judgment in favor of
Defendants Sharon Frost, Father George J. Dash, Superintendent Edward Burnett,
Reverend Joel L. Terragnoli, Richard Moffit, Superintendent Leanne Latona, and
DOCCS. (Judgment in a Civil Action, Mar. 29, 2024, ECF No. 166.)
Plaintiff appealed the decision and order on March 28, 2024. (Not. of Appeal,
Mar. 28, 2024, ECF No. 165.) In a mandate issued on June 21, 2024, the Second
Circuit granted Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction because I had not yet issued a final order, dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal,
and denied Plaintiff’s motion as moot. (Mandate of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Cir., Jun. 21, 2024, ECF No. 189.)
On March 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion “seeking reconsideration and
miscellaneous relief.” (ECF No. 169.) On March 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed an addendum
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in which he challenges the constitutionality of New York State’s Correction Law § 24
under state and federal law. (Addendum, Mar. 31, 2024, ECF No. 170.) Plaintiff also
indicates that the addendum relates to “the physical injury component of PLRA for
emotional damages.” (Id.)
Defendants filed a cross-motion for reconsideration pursuant to F.R.C.P.
60(b)(6) seeking reconsideration of their motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims,
asserting that the claims are barred by qualified immunity. (Not. of Cross-Motion for
Reconsideration, Apr. 4, 2024, ECF No. 173.) Defendants further submitted a
memorandum of law opposing Plaintiff’s motion and in support of their cross-motion.
(Defs.’ Mem. of Law, Apr. 4, 2024, ECF No. 173-1.)
DISCUSSION
As explained by the Second Circuit, “[t]he standard for granting [ ] a [motion
for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the
moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—
matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion
reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995).
“The major grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change of
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error
or prevent a manifest injustice.” Virgin Atl. Airways v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d
1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “With respect
to the third of these criteria, to justify review of a decision, the Court must ‘have a
clear conviction of error on a point of law that is certain to recur.’” Turner v. Vill. of
Lakewood, No. 11-CV-211-A, 2013 WL 5437370, at *3–4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013),

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aff’d 594 F. App’x 25 (Feb. 13, 2015) (quoting United States v. Adegbite, 877 F.2d 174,
178 (2d Cir. 1989)). “These criteria are strictly construed against the moving party so
as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the
court.” Boyde v. Osborne, No. 10-CV-6651, 2013 WL 6662862, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec.
16, 2013) (quoting Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Petrojam, Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 365, 368
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Finally, the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration
is within “the sound discretion of the district court.” Aczel v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 61
(2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s Motion
Plaintiff appears to raise four arguments in his present motion: (1) challenging
whether he exhausted his administrative remedies at Fishkill and Collins
Corrections Facilities prior to filing his amended complaint in the Western District
of New York (Pl.’s Mot. for Reconsideration at 1–2, ECF No. 169); (2) asserting that
the question of whether Defendants can be held liable in their individual capacities
under the Spending Clause portion of RLUIPA was before the Second Circuit on
Plaintiff’s appeal in another case (Tripathy v. Feuz, 22-CV-6469-FPG), and asking the
Court to certify this issue to the Second Circuit (Id. at 2); (3) that New York State
Corrections Law § 24 is unconstitutional under both federal and state law statutes
“as it prevents [Plaintiff] from redressal by the Federal Courts to sue Defendants in
their individual capacities, where they cannot be protected by any immunity” and,
further, that the Court should exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims. (Id. at 2–4; Pl.’s Addendum to Mot. for Reconsideration (“Pl.’s Addendum”) at
1–5, ECF No. 170); and (4) that Plaintiff demonstrated the requisite physical injury
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under the PLRA such that he should be permitted to recover damages for emotional
injury. (Pl.’s Addendum at 5–6, ECF No. 170.)
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Plaintiff’s argument regarding exhaustion of remedies is repetitive of an issue
I already fully considered in the Decision and Order. (Pl.’s Mem. in Opposition at 14,
17–19, March 27, 2023, ECF No. 139; Decision and Order at 11–15.) Plaintiff has not
raised any grounds justifying reconsideration. Based on the foregoing, I deny this
part of Plaintiff’s motion.
RLUIPA—Spending Clause
It appears that Plaintiff’s argument in this respect is that the issue of whether
Defendants can be held liable in their individual capacities under the Spending
Clause basis was under review by the Second Circuit and asks that I certify the same
question to the Second Circuit “to expedite the resolution of these cases.” (Pl.’s Mot.
for Reconsideration at 2, ECF No. 169.) A review of the docket sheet for the case that
was before the Second Circuit, Tripathy v. Fuez, et al., 21-CV-6469-FPG, reveals that
the Second Circuit issued a Mandate on June 20, 2024, affirming the District Court’s
judgment. (Mandate of the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Second Cir., June 20, 2024,
ECF No. 89.) The decision and order affirmed by the Second Circuit in turn held that
“Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under RLUIPA are moot
without exception and Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages are not cognizable, all
of Plaintiff’s claims under RLUIPA are dismissed.” (Tripathy v. Fuez, et al., 22-CV6469-FPG, Decision and Order at 3–4, Jun. 15, 2023, ECF No. 85.) Based on the
foregoing, I deny this portion of Plaintiff’s motion.
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Plaintiff’s Assertion that New York State Corrections Law § 24 is
Unconstitutional and the Court’s Exercise of Pendent Jurisdiction.
Plaintiff asserts that New York State Corrections Law § 24 is unconstitutional
and that I must exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
First, Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of § 24 for the first time in his motion
for reconsideration, which is improper. Indeed, a party is
barred from making for the first time in a motion for reconsideration an
argument it could readily have raised when the underlying issue was
being briefed but chose not to do so.” City of Austin Police Ret. Sys. v.
Kinross Gold Corp., 957 F. Supp. 2d 277, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). In other
words, “‘a party may not advance new facts, issues[,] or arguments not
previously presented to the Court’ on a motion for reconsideration.”
Steinberg v. Elkman, 2016 WL 1604764, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2016)
(quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Stroh Cos., 265 F.3d
97, 115 (2d Cir. 2001)); accord Sigmon v. Goldman Sachs Mortg. Co., 229
F. Supp. 3d 254, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Navigators Ins. Co. v. Goyard, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 3d 220, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).
Moreover, even if Plaintiff had challenged the constitutionality of § 24 in
opposition to the motion to dismiss, he does not cite to any case law or other authority
for his unsupported argument that New York State Corrections Law § 24 is, in fact,
unconstitutional. Accordingly, my decision still stands that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to address Plaintiff’s state law claims. (Decision and Order at 36–37, ECF
No. 164.)
Emotional Injury
I find that I properly dismissed Plaintiff’s claim in this respect because he
raised his assertions regarding his physical injuries for the first time in his reply to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Decision and Order at 37–38, ECF No. 164.) Plaintiff
asserts in his addendum that he previously raised facts relating to his alleged
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physical injuries, citing to his “complaint, amended complaint and all other filings on
the docket since April 2019.” (Pl.’s Addendum at 5, ECF No. 170.) However, Plaintiff
is experienced enough in litigation to know that his amended complaint completely
replaced his original complaint. Moreover, in my decision and order I specifically
stated that “Plaintiff did not allege physical injury in his second amended complaint,”
demonstrating that I reviewed the second amended complaint and found no allegations
related to physical injuries. (Decision and Order at 38, ECF No. 164.) Finally, Plaintiff’s
broad assertion that he raised allegations relating to his physical injuries “in all other

filings on the docket since April 2019” is vague and of no merit. For these reasons, I
deny this aspect of Plaintiff’s motion.
Defendants’ Cross-Motion
Defendants concede that they did not raise the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity in connection with Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim and that this was a “mistake.”
(Defs.’ Mem. of Law at 2–3, ECF No. 173-1.) However, case law supports their
assertion that qualified immunity shields them from liability under RLUIPA. See,
e.g., Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d 532, 536 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that the district court
did not err in granting qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim where the
right claimed by the plaintiff was not clearly established at the time the alleged
violation occurred and “it had not been clearly established by either the Supreme
Court or this court that the 1996 Policy, or a substantially equivalent policy, that
such terms are not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest.”); Hall v. Ekpe, 428 F. App'x 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on their individual-capacity
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claims under RLUIPA); Clark v. Levesque, 336 F. App'x 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“[B]ecause the statutory rights [plaintiff alleged were violated] were not wellestablished [at the time of the alleged violation], the defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity whether or not their conduct would in fact have violated
RLUIPA.”). I could not find any Supreme Court or Second Circuit case law
demonstrating that there is a clearly established right to wash clothes separately
from those of inmates who might have consumed beef. Further, Plaintiff cannot point
to any relevant case law declaring (or even foreshadowing) that Gowanda’s laundry
policy, or any substantially similar policy, was not the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling government interest and, thus, invalid under RLUIPA. See
Redd, 597 F.3d at 536.
Based upon the foregoing, I find that Defendants are entitled to dismissal of
Plaintiff’s remaining claim under RLUIPA based on the Commerce Clause. The case
law provides that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim as a
matter of law. If I let that claim stand Defendants could move for a judgment on the
pleadings under F.R.C.P. 12(c) and would be entitled to judgment on the RLUIPA
claim. Alternatively, Defendants could move for summary judgment on the RLUIPA
claim under F.R.C.P. 56 and would be entitled to judgment in their favor. Regardless,
the end result would be the same—that Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity on the RLUIPA claim.
Further, despite the fact that Defendants raised qualified immunity related to
the RLUIPA claim in the motion for reconsideration as opposed to the motion dismiss,
granting Defendants’ cross-motion and dismissing the RLUIPA claim does not run
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afoul of due process because Plaintiff had the opportunity to, and did respond to that
issue in his response to the cross-motion. Indeed, Plaintiff dedicated three pages of
his six-page reply addressing why Defendants should not be able to use qualified
immunity as a shield to liability. (Pl.’s Resp. at 3–5, ECF No. 174.)
Finally, I exercise my “inherent authority to manage [my] docket[ ] . . . with a
view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of [this case]” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579
U.S. 40, 47 (2016). Requiring Defendants to continue with this litigation when the
law is clear that the affirmative defense of qualified immunity bars Plaintiff’s
RLUIPA claim would be a waste of judicial resources and cause both parties to incur
needless additional expenses.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF
No. 169) and GRANTS Defendants’ cross-motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 173).
The Court instructs the Clerk of the Court to entered judgment for Defendants and
close this case.

____________ ________________
MARK W. PEDERSEN
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated:

August 29, 2024
Rochester, New York

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