Farnsworth v. City of Geneva et al

Filing 57

DECISION AND ORDER: Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 51) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED except his § 1983 claim for excessive force against Officers Camacho and Baskin related to his removal from the police vehicle. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the City of Geneva, the City of Geneva Police Department, City of Geneva Chief of Police Michael J. Passalacqua, Police Officer Jack Montesanto, and Sgt. William Belowi cz as defendants. The Court sets a status conference for October 29 at 10:30am to hear from the parties about the progress of this action. SO ORDERED. Signed by Hon. Frank P. Geraci, Jr. on 9/25/2024. (EMC)Clerk to Follow up

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ALEXANDER FARNSWORTH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case # 20-CV-06935-FPG
DECISION AND ORDER

CITY OF GENEVA et al.,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Alexander Farnsworth brings this civil rights action against the City of Geneva,
the City of Geneva Police Department (“GPD”), City of Geneva Chief of Police Michael J.
Passalacqua, Police Officer Jack Montesanto, Police Officer Ryan Camacho, Police Officer
Richard Baskin, and Sgt. William Belowicz (the “Geneva Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges excessive
force, false arrest, deliberate indifference to physical harm, deliberate indifference to
safety/medical needs, negligence, negligent hiring and retention, respondeat superior, and failure
to intervene. ECF No. 18. Defendants move for summary judgment. ECF No. 51. Plaintiff opposes
the motion. ECF No. 55. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is “no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Disputes concerning material
facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether
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genuine issues of material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. See Jeffreys
v. City of N.Y., 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005). However, the non-moving party “may not rely on
conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” F.D.I.C. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d
288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
BACKGROUND
Among the evidence proffered by the parties is video footage—taken from various GPD
officers’ bodycams—of the encounter between Plaintiff and GPD as well as between Karry
Farnsworth, her son, “D.C.”, and GPD. Video footage can, but does not always, conclusively
establish facts for purposes of summary judgment. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379–80
(2007); Hulett v. City of Syracuse, 253 F. Supp. 3d 462, 482 (N.D.N.Y. 2017). Where a videotape
“leaves no doubt as to what occurred,” United States v. Paul, 904 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2018), a
district court need not countenance contrary factual assertions. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380; Heicklen
v. Toala, No. 08-CV-2457, 2010 WL 565426, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2010).
Conversely, if the video evidence is “ambiguous” or otherwise inconclusive, Hicks v. Vill.
of Ossining, No. 12-CV-6874, 2016 WL 345582, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2016), a court must
employ its usual summary judgment standards and construe the evidence in the non-moving party’s
favor. Accord Hulett, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 482 (“[W]hile the video evidence submitted by the parties
will certainly be considered and carefully reviewed at this juncture, ... summary adjudication of a
plaintiff’s civil rights claim [is permitted] only in those exceptional cases where the video evidence
in the record is sufficient to blatantly contradict one party’s version of events.” (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted)).
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The incidents that gave rise to the present action occurred on the night of June 23, 2019.
The bodycam footage begins with GPD officers arriving at 14 Clinton Street in Geneva. Police
were responding to a 911 call by a female screaming help before the line disconnected. ECF No.
55-6 at 1–2. The officers who initially responded to the scene were Camacho, Hickey, and Sgt.
Felice. Id. The bodycam footage shows that upon their arrival, the officers encounter a visibly
distraught Karry Farnsworth and D.C. Defs. Ex. M(4) 00:43-01:33. Karry and D.C. soon begin
explaining what happened leading up to the 911 call. Id. Karry tells police that her son had called
her downstairs because Plaintiff was cutting himself. Id. She also told police that Plaintiff attacked
her, smashed her phone, smashed D.C.’s phone, and smashed D.C.’s Xbox. Id. Specifically, Karry
alleged that Plaintiff put his hands around her throat and jumped on top of her, and then when she
got the Plaintiff off of her, her son tried to help, and Plaintiff began attacking him as well. Id.
While some of the officers continue to talk to Karry and D.C., others look for Plaintiff
around 14 Clinton Street. ECF No. 55-6 at 3. Sometime after leaving 14 Clinton Street, Plaintiff
called 911 and requested to speak with Sgt. Felice. Id. at 6. The 911 dispatcher was able to ping
the cell phone used by Plaintiff to plot Plaintiff’s location to the corner of North Exchange and
Gates Avenue. Id. Officer Montesanto was the first to arrive at North Exchange Street and Gates
Avenue, where Plaintiff was located. Id. at 7. Shortly after arriving, Sgt. Bielowicz identified
Plaintiff as the suspect, and Officer Montesanto placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. Id.
Sgt. Bielowicz’s bodycam shows Plaintiff telling Officer Montesanto that the handcuffs are
cutting into him and asking Officer Montesanto to loosen them shortly after they are applied. Defs.
Ex. M(3) 06:10-06:20. Officer Montesanto responds that he will do so when Plaintiff is taken to
the car. Id. Initially, Plaintiff appeared to accept that response, saying “alright that’s fine,” but after
about a minute, Officer Camacho’s bodycam shows him starting to complain again. Id.; Defs. Ex.
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M(4) 39:20-40:00. Plaintiff repeatedly says “Ow,” and says, “seriously that one is cutting into my
wrist.” Defs. Ex. M(4) 39:20-40:00. Officer Montesanto then adjusts the handcuffs. Id. After the
adjustment is made, Plaintiff stops his verbal complaints about the handcuffs. Id.
Shortly after the handcuffs are readjusted, Officer Montesanto begins to take Plaintiff to
Officer Camacho’s police vehicle. At this point there is a dispute about what occurred. Plaintiff
contends that he was not passively or actively resisting arrest and that Officer Montesanto used
unnecessary physical force causing him “to be thrown to the ground and then dragged on the
ground to a GPD patrol vehicle.” ECF No. 18 at 5. Defendants maintain that Plaintiff was visibly
stalling and that he was never forcibly dragged to the ground. ECF No. 55-6 at 9.
Officers Camacho’s, Baskin’s, and Farmer’s bodycams capture the footage of the alleged
dragging. Each bodycam offers a different angle of the incident. Putting all of the footage together,
it is clear that Plaintiff is never dragged on the ground. See Defs. Ex. M(4) 40:50-41:10; Defs. Ex.
M(5) 01:30-01:36; Defs. Ex. M(9) 35:20-35:40. Indeed, Plaintiff even said in his first deposition
that he was upright during the alleged dragging. See ECF No. 51-3 at 46–47. The bodycam footage
shows that Plaintiff starts to fall down a couple of times, but the officer prevents him from landing
on the ground. See Defs. Ex. M(4) 40:50-41:10; Defs. Ex. M(5) 01:30-01:36; Defs. Ex. M(9)
35:20-35:40. It is unclear from the videos what causes Plaintiff to start to fall, but he maintains
that it was the force of Officer Montesanto pushing him towards the police vehicle. See ECF No.
18 at 5.
Eventually, Plaintiff is placed in Officer Camacho’s police vehicle and driven to the GPD
station. Once they arrive at the station, Officer Baskin and Officer Camacho go to the back of the
vehicle to remove Plaintiff. Defs. Ex. M(4) 46:50-48:00; Defs. Ex. M(9) 41:10-42:25. When they
open the door, Plaintiff asks why he is being detained, and Officer Camacho tells him that he is
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being detained due to a domestic incident. Id. Plaintiff then begins to argue with the officers about
the charges, and Officer Camacho responds to him. Id. Eventually, Officer Camacho says, “we’re
going inside,” and after saying “we’re going inside” four times, Officers Camacho and Baskin
begin to remove Plaintiff from the police vehicle. Id. Plaintiff maintains that at this point, he was
not resisting in any way and that Officers Baskin and Camacho began aggressively pulling him
from the back seat of the car. ECF No. 18 at 6. Defendants deny this characterization and claim
that Plaintiff was verbally and physically resistant to exiting the patrol vehicle, causing the officers
to have to escort him from the vehicle. ECF No. 55-6 at 13.
A few seconds after the officers begin to remove Plaintiff from the vehicle, Plaintiff begins
to complain about his feet being stuck under the seat. Defs. Ex. M(9) 41:10-42:25. Plaintiff
maintains that after he complained about his feet being stuck, the officers continued to pull him
from the vehicle forcefully. ECF No. 18 at 6. Defendants again deny this characterization. They
claim that as soon as Plaintiff complained that his foot was stuck, they stopped assisting him out
of the vehicle. ECF No. 55-6 at 13. Then, once Officer Camacho saw that Plaintiff’s foot was stuck
in the barrier that separates the front and back of the police vehicle, Officer Camacho removed his
foot from the barrier. Id. at 13–14.
After his foot is freed, Plaintiff is removed from the car by the officers, and they all begin
walking towards the door to the police station. See Defs. Ex. M(4) 46:50-48:00; Defs. Ex. M(9)
41:10-42:25. After a few steps, Plaintiff begins to limp. Id. He also begins to complain that he is
in pain. Id. He is taken to a holding cell, and after about ten minutes, he requests to see a doctor.
Defs. Ex. M(9) 51:55-52:00. About five minutes later, officers confirm that he would like an
ambulance, and Plaintiff tells them that he wants the ambulance for his ankle. Defs. Ex. M(9)
55:00-55:20. About ten minutes later, EMTs arrive. Id. at 1:04:50.
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After completing their initial examination, the EMTs recommended taking Plaintiff to the
hospital, and he was transported by ambulance to Geneva General Hospital. ECF No. 55-6 at 16.
Plaintiff was treated at the hospital and then discharged to the Ontario County Jail. ECF No. 18 at
7. On June 24, 2019, Plaintiff was arraigned in the Ontario County Centralized Arraignment court
on charges of criminal mischief in the third degree, robbery in the third degree, criminal possession
of a weapon in the third degree, and strangulation in the second degree. ECF No. 51-29 at 3–6.
On July 1, 2019, while at the Ontario County Jail, Plaintiff complained to staff of severe
pain in his lower left leg. ECF No. 55-6 at 21. He also noticed his leg and foot turning black and
observed a clot moving through his leg. Id. He was immediately rushed to Thompson General
Hospital and then to the University of Rochester Medical Center. Id. While at the University of
Rochester Medical Center, he was diagnosed with a mid-calf occlusion of anterior tibial and
personal arteries. Id.
On July 6, 2023, Plaintiff underwent a physical examination by Dr. Robert E. Todd. ECF
No. 55-5 at 18. Based on his examination and review of the evidence, it is Dr. Todd’s opinion that
Plaintiff’s left leg “developed multiple clots following his arrest, detention in the squad car behind
the PRO-GARD partition followed by the forcible extraction” by GPD. ECF No. 55-5 at 18–19.
Dr. Todd believes the development of the clots resulted in Ischemic Monomelic Neuropathy, which
has caused Plaintiff long-term pain, sensory loss, weakness, muscle atrophy, and abnormal gait.
Id.
On November 4, 2020, Farnsworth brought the present action in this Court. ECF No. 1. He
then amended his complaint on January 3, 2022. ECF No. 18. In his amended complaint,
Farnsworth brought three claims against the Ontario County Sheriff’s Office, Ontario County
Sheriff Kevin M. Henderson, Christian H. Smith, and John Does 1–10 (the “Ontario Defendants”).
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Id. He also brought ten claims against the Geneva Defendants. Id. After motion practice, only the
ten claims against the Geneva Defendants remain.
DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on all ten of Farnsworth’s claims against the
Geneva Defendants. They also move that the request for punitive damages be stricken.
I.

First Claim: Deprivation of Federal Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on Claim One. Defendants contend

that Plaintiff’s first claim fails to state a claim due to its duplicity. They argue that the first claim
is duplicative of Plaintiff’s second, third, fifth, and sixth claims. See ECF No. 51-30 at 3. Plaintiff
did not respond to Defendants’ argument in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 55-7). When a party is counseled, a court may infer from a party’s partial
opposition—i.e., a response that references some claims or defenses but not others—that relevant
claims or defenses not defended in the opposition have been abandoned. See Jackson v. Fed.
Express, 766 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2014).
Here, Plaintiff is counseled and did not defend this claim in his opposition. Consequently,
the Court considers the claim to be abandoned, and Claim One is dismissed.
II.

Second Claim: Excessive Force Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff alleges three separate instances of excessive force. First, when he was arrested by

Officer Montesanto, he was “placed in handcuffs that were extremely tight.” ECF No. 18 at 6.
Second, when he was being taken to the GPD patrol vehicle to be transported to the police station,
Officer Montesanto used “unnecessary physical force” causing Plaintiff “to be thrown to the
ground and then dragged on the ground to a GPD patrol vehicle.” Id. at 5. Third, when he was
removed from the GPD patrol vehicle at the police station, Officers Camacho and Baskin
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“aggressively started to pull” Plaintiff from the rear seat while his “foot and/or feet were still stuck
underneath the barrier” causing Plaintiff severe pain and injury. Id. at 6. Defendants move for
summary judgment on each instance, arguing that the force used was not unreasonable and that
the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages
liability unless “the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established
at the time of the challenged conduct.” Soto v. Gaudett, 862 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). “Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.” Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts ask
whether the facts shown ‘make out a violation of a constitutional right’ and ‘whether the right at
issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” Estate of Devine,
676 F. App’x 61, 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
232 (2009)).
“As it relates to the second step, the focus is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Jones v. Treubig, 963 F.3d
214, 224 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has warned that
the use of excessive force “is an area of the law in which the result depends very much on the facts
of each case,” and general statements of the law “do not by themselves create clearly established
law” outside the obvious cases. Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104–05 (2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (“[I]t does not suffice for a court simply to state that an officer may not use
unreasonable and excessive force, deny qualified immunity, and then remit the case for a trial on
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the question of reasonableness.”). In other words, specificity “is especially important” in these
sorts of cases. Id. at 104. Thus, “[a]lthough a case does not need to be directly on point for a right
to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” Estate of Priolo v. City of N.Y., No. 15-CV-6080, 2019 WL 1428403, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Precedent involving similar facts
can help move a case beyond the otherwise hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,
and thereby provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Each instance of alleged excessive force, and the applicability of qualified immunity, are
discussed below.
a. Handcuffing
With respect to Officer Montesanto’s use of handcuffs, the Court concludes that Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment. The Court does not address whether Plaintiff has made out a
violation of a constitutional right because it concludes that the right was not clearly established at
the time of the challenged conduct.
In Cugini v. City of New York, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against an officer alleging
that he used excessive force when handcuffing her too tightly, which led to permanent nerve
damage. 941 F.3d 604, 607 (2d Cir. 2019). In that case, the Second Circuit concluded that that at
the time of Cugini’s arrest in 2014, excessive force in handcuffing was prohibited by clearly
established constitutional law. Id. at 615. Nevertheless, it held that the defendant was entitled to
qualified immunity because before the decision in that case, it “remained an open question in this
Circuit whether a plaintiff asserting an excessive force claim was required to show evidence that
an officer was made reasonably aware of her pain by means of an explicit verbal complaint.” Id.
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at 616. It cited its limited case law on the subject, which appeared to view the presence or absence
of a complaint as a significant factor, if not a prerequisite to liability. Id. It concluded that after the
day the case was decided, October 25, 2019, officers could no longer rely on qualified immunity
to shield them from liability when “using plainly unreasonable force in handcuffing a person or
using force that they should know is unreasonable based on the arrestee’s manifestation of signs
of distress.” Id. at 617.
In the current case, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Montesanto used excessive force because
he placed Plaintiff in handcuffs that were extremely tight. Shortly after being handcuffed, Plaintiff
told Officer Montesanto that the handcuffs were cutting into him and asked Officer Montesanto to
loosen them. Defs. Ex. M(3) 06:10-06:20. Officer Montesanto responded that he would do so when
Plaintiff was taken to the car. Id. Initially, Plaintiff appeared to accept that response, saying “alright
that’s fine,” but after about a minute, he started to complain again. Id.; Defs. Ex. M(4) 39:20-40:00.
He repeatedly said “Ow,” indicating that he was in pain, and said “seriously that one is cutting into
my wrist,” indicating that the handcuffs were too tight. Defs. Ex. M(4) 39:20-40:00. Officer
Montesanto then adjusted the handcuffs to make them looser. Id. After the adjustment was made,
Plaintiff did not make another verbal complaint to Officer Montesanto about the handcuffs. Id. In
his deposition, Plaintiff claimed that the handcuffs were still too tight after they were readjusted.
ECF No. 51-11 at 134–35.
The Court may assume that, by the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, it was clearly established that
when a suspect has made the officer verbally aware of his pain, the use of unduly tight handcuffs
is a violation of the suspect’s right to be free from excessive force. Cf. Cugini, 941 F.3d at 615.
However, there was no Second Circuit precedent indicating that there is a constitutional violation
if the suspect remains in pain, but does not verbalize that pain, after an officer readjusts the
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handcuffs in response to the suspect’s complaints. See Shen v. City of N.Y., 725 F. App’x. 7, 12 (2d
Cir. 2018) (summary order) (holding that the district court correctly granted summary judgment
on plaintiff’s handcuffing excessive force claim in part because officers handcuffed plaintiff in
manner that accommodated his shoulder injury in response to his complaints); Forbes v. Doe, No.
18-cv-6700, 2024 WL 329080, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2024) (holding that officers did not act
unreasonably where they adjusted the plaintiff’s “handcuffs on at least two occasions after [he]
complained they were too tight”). Thus, Officer Montesanto is entitled to qualified immunity on
the claim related to the tight handcuffs.
b. Dragging
The Court also concludes that Officer Montesanto is entitled to qualified immunity and
therefore summary judgment for the claim related to the alleged dragging. Again, the Court does
not address whether Plaintiff has made out a violation of a constitutional right because it concludes
that the right was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.
Officers Camacho’s, Baskin’s, and Farmer’s bodycams capture the footage of the alleged
dragging. Plaintiff has maintained that he was dragged on the ground. However, the bodycam
footage conclusively contradicts that allegation. Each bodycam offers a different angle of the
incident. Putting all of the footage together, it is clear that Plaintiff is never dragged on the ground.
A couple of different times he starts to fall down, but the officers prevent him from landing on the
ground. See Defs. Ex. M(4) 40:50-41:10; Defs. Ex. M(5) 01:30-01:36; Defs. Ex. M(9) 35:2035:40. It is unclear from the video what causes Plaintiff to start to fall, but he maintains that it was
the force of the officer pushing him towards the police vehicle. See ECF No. 18 at 5. The Court
may assume that Plaintiff is alleging that the manner in which Officer Montesanto escorted him to
the police vehicle was unnecessarily forceful, causing him to lose his balance. Plaintiff maintains
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that at no time was he actively resisting arrest, and the bodycam footage does not contradict this
assertion.
Again, the Court will analyze the applicability of qualified immunity by evaluating whether
Officer Montesanto’s alleged forceful escort to the police vehicle violated clearly established
constitutional law. Prior to 2019, it was clearly established law that an officer’s significant use of
entirely gratuitous force against an arrestee who was no longer resisting and who posed no threat
to the safety of officers or others violated the Fourth Amendment. See Jones, 963 F.3d at 226. The
Second Circuit has said that a significant degree of force is one that has “a variety of incapacitating
and painful effects.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit has
also said that significant use of force includes “pepper spray, taser, or any other similar use of
significant force.” Jones, 963 F.3d at 226. The focus of this analysis is “whether it would be clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 224.
While Plaintiff alleges that Officer Montesanto used entirely gratuitous force against an
arrestee who was not resisting and who posed no threat to the safety of officers, the Court
concludes that it was not clearly established law at the time of arrest that forcefully escorting an
arrestee to a police vehicle was a use of significant force. Moving someone to a car in a forceful
manner is not akin to using pepper spray or a taser. Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege any
specific, significant injury as a result of the incident, so it does not constitute a use of force that
had “incapacitating and painful effects.” See Tracy, 623 F.3d at 98. At the time of the challenged
conduct, it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that forcefully escorting an arrestee
in such a manner was unlawful. As such, Officer Montesanto is entitled to qualified immunity, and
the claim is dismissed.

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c. Removal from the Car
As to Plaintiff’s claim related to his removal from the police vehicle at the station, the
Court concludes that Officers Camacho and Baskin are not entitled to qualified immunity.
Therefore, Defendants are denied summary judgment on this claim.
Again, to “determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts ask
whether the facts shown ‘make out a violation of a constitutional right’ and ‘whether the right at
issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” Estate of Devine,
676 F. App’x at 62 (summary order) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).
First, the Court concludes that the facts, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, could
make out a violation of a constitutional law. The Court reviews a plaintiff’s excessive force claim
under “the Fourth Amendment standard of objective reasonableness to assess whether an officer’s
conduct was appropriate in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him.” Cugini, 941 F.3d
at 608. When determining whether the officer’s use of force was reasonable, the Court uses the
Graham factors, which balance “an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against
countervailing governmental interests, including the severity of the crime and whether the suspect
poses a safety or flight risk or resists arrest.” Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989)). Additionally, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the officer “was made reasonably aware
that the force used was excessive.” Id. (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)). A
plaintiff may satisfy this requirement if “either the unreasonableness of the force used was apparent
under the circumstances, or the plaintiff signaled her distress, verbally or otherwise, such that a
reasonable officer would have been aware of her pain, or both.” Id.
When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Graham
factors weigh in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff maintains that he did not actively or passively resist
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arrest in any way and was not a safety risk. Officer Camacho said a few times “we’re going inside”
and Plaintiff continued to question why he was being arrested/detained. Defendants claim that
while en route to the police station, Plaintiff told Officer Camacho that he would not leave the car
until Camacho told him why he was being detained. ECF No. 55-6 at 10. Plaintiff denies saying
this and no such statement is heard on the bodycam footage. Plaintiff did not move when Officer
Camacho said, “we’re going inside,” but he did not verbally refuse to move. Further, there is no
conclusive video evidence that Plaintiff did anything that would physically prevent the officers
from removing him from the car. As Plaintiff maintains that he was not resisting and nothing on
the video evidence conclusively contradicts this statement, the Court must accept it as true.
After saying “we’re going inside” four times, Officers Camacho and Baskin began to
remove Plaintiff from the police vehicle. Defs. Ex. M(4) 46:50-48:00; Defs. Ex. M(9) 41:10-42:25.
After a few seconds, Plaintiff began to complain that his feet were stuck under the seat. Id. Plaintiff
maintains that after he complained about his feet being stuck and indicated that he was in pain, the
officers continued to pull him from the vehicle forcefully, causing him pain. ECF No. 18 at 6.
Defendants deny this. They claim that once he said his foot was stuck, they immediately stopped
pulling him from the vehicle. ECF No. 55-6 at 13. While it is hard to see exactly what happens
from the bodycam footage, there is nothing in the footage that conclusively shows that Plaintiff’s
account of the interaction is false, so it must be accepted as true. Plaintiff alleges that he was in a
great deal of pain as a result of the officers’ actions, so much so that he needed medical attention.
Defs. Ex. M(9) 51:55-52:00.
While the severity of the crimes alleged, including strangulation and criminal possession
of a weapon, may weigh in favor of the officers, the balance of the Graham factors leans toward
Plaintiff. At no time at the police station did he attempt to evade officers, and therefore he was not
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a flight risk. He was also handcuffed, so there was no safety risk, and he was not actively resisting.
Further, Plaintiff signaled his distress by telling the officers that his foot was stuck, which should
have made the officers aware of his pain or discomfort. Under these circumstances, where officers
are alleged to have continued to forcefully pull a non-resisting arrestee from a vehicle, even after
he told the officers that his foot was stuck, a reasonable juror could conclude that the degree of
force employed, objectively considered, was disproportionate and unwarranted and that Plaintiff
has therefore established a Fourth Amendment violation.
Second, the Court concludes that the constitutional right was clearly established at the time
of arrest. As discussed above, prior to 2019, it was clearly established law that an officer’s
significant use of entirely gratuitous force against an arrestee who was no longer resisting and who
posed no threat to the safety of officers or others violated the Fourth Amendment. See Jones, 963
F.3d at 226. Again, the focus of this analysis is “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 224.
Here, there is a genuine dispute as to the material facts of what happened. However, at this
stage, the Court must accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the
officers pulling him from the police vehicle, his ankle was injured and he required medical
attention. This suggests that the officers’ use of force was significant. If Plaintiff’s allegations are
true, it should have been clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful. As of 2019,
no reasonable police officer could have believed that continuing to use significant force to pull a
non-resisting arrestee, who posed no threat to safety, from a police vehicle after he complained
that his foot was stuck and indicated that he was in pain was lawful conduct. See Robison v. Via,
821 F.2d 913, 923–24 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that allegations that officers yanked an arrestee out
of her car, threw her against it, and twisted her arm behind her back were sufficient to survive
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summary judgment); Graham v. City of N.Y., 928 F. Supp. 2d 610, 618–19 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(holding that a reasonable jury could find that officers used excessive force when an officer
forcibly dragged a plaintiff who was not actively resisting arrest “from his vehicle, shoved him
against it, and handcuffed him behind his back”). Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to
summary judgment.
III.

Third Claim: False Arrest in Violation 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Concerning Plaintiff’s claim for false arrest, the Court concludes that Defendants had

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and thus are entitled to summary judgment on the claim.
The existence of probable cause to arrest “is a complete defense to an action for false
arrest.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, there “can be no federal civil rights claim for false arrest where the arresting officer had
probable cause.” Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995). Probable cause is
established “when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed
by the person to be arrested.” Id. at 119 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Absent circumstances that raise doubts as to a victim’s veracity, it is “well-established that
a law enforcement official has probable cause to arrest if he received his information from some
person, normally the putative victim.” Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, when making probable cause
determinations, law enforcement officials are entitled to rely on both the victims’ allegations that
a crime has been committed as well as allegations of other police officers. Id.; see Singer, 63 F.3d
at 119; Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1994). The Second Circuit has said
that “[o]nce a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not
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required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making
an arrest.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997).
In this case, the Court concludes that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff because
officers relied on Karry Farnsworth’s statements as the basis for their belief that an offense had
been committed by Plaintiff. There is no dispute that a 911 call was made from 14 Clinton Street,
and that Officer Camacho, Officer Hickey, and Sgt. Felice were dispatched to the address. ECF
No. 55-6 at 1–2. Plaintiff maintains that the allegations made by Karry Farnsworth in her
statements are false but does not dispute that she made those statements to police. Id.
Officer Camacho’s bodycam footage shows police arriving at the scene and encountering
a visibly distraught woman, who is later identified as Karry Farnsworth. Defs. Ex. M(4) 00:4301:33. Karry tells police that she was sleeping when her son, D.C., called her from upstairs, saying
that Plaintiff was “shitfaced and cutting himself.” Id. She then tells police that she came
downstairs, and Plaintiff attacked her, smashed her phone, smashed her son’s phone, and smashed
her son’s Xbox. Id. Specifically, she alleged that Plaintiff put his hands around her throat and
jumped on top of her. Id. She then explains that when she got the Plaintiff off of her, her son tried
to help, and Plaintiff began attacking him as well. Id.
At this point, there was probable cause to make an arrest. Plaintiff alleges no circumstances
that would raise doubts as to Karry’s veracity. She told police her account of what had happened
that night, which was information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense had been committed by Plaintiff. Police can rely on victim’s statements in making
a determination of probable cause and need not eliminate every plausible claim of innocence prior
to making that arrest. See Singer, 63 F.3d at 119; Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 128. Thus, even assuming
Plaintiff’s claim that police did not corroborate Karry’s statement and Plaintiff’s claim that the
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arrest was made prior to the domestic incident report being completed, there was still probable
cause. Accord Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 128; Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 69–70 (2d Cir.
2001); Thompson v. Kline, 504 F. Supp. 3d 200, 209 (W.D.N.Y. 2020).
Plaintiff also appears to argue that the officers at the scene of the arrest did not know if or
what criminal charges were being brought against Plaintiff, and therefore they did not have
probable cause to arrest him. Plaintiff cites Officer Baskin’s response to Plaintiff that they were
“still figuring out the charges” as evidence of this. ECF No. 55-6 at 19. However, knowing the
exact charges or knowing if charges are going to be filed is not necessary for probable cause to
exist. The Second Circuit, has said that a “claim for false arrest turns only on whether probable
cause existed to arrest a defendant… it is not relevant whether probable cause existed with respect
to each individual charge, or, indeed, any charge actually invoked by the arresting officer at the
time of arrest.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006). It emphasized that “when faced
with a claim for false arrest, we focus on the validity of the arrest, and not on the validity of each
charge.” Id. Officers are allowed to rely on the allegations of other police officers in making
probable cause determinations. See Bernard, 25 F.3d at 102–03. Further, the Supreme Court has
never held that an officer is constitutionally required to inform a person of the reason for his arrest
at the time he is taken into custody. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155 (2004).
Officer Camacho and other officers at 14 Clinton Street heard Karry Farnsworth’s and
D.C.’s statements earlier that evening. Thus, they had probable cause to make the arrest and other
officers were entitled to rely on their allegations. See Bernard, 25 F.3d at 102–03. It is irrelevant
if the exact charges were known at the time the arrest was made. It is also irrelevant that Officer
Baskin could not or did not tell Plaintiff exactly what he was being arrested for because he was not

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constitutionally required to do so. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 155. Because there was probable
cause to make the arrest, summary judgment is granted to the Defendants on this claim.
IV.

Fourth Claim: Deliberate Indifference to Physical Harm in Violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1983
The Court grants Defendants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate

indifference to physical harm.
While Plaintiff does not explicitly say that he is making this claim under Monell, all of the
caselaw cited in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment relates to Monell. See ECF No. 55-7 at 19 –20. The Court therefore construes
the claim as attempting to establish municipal liability for deliberate indifference under Monell.
For the reasons discussed in Section VI, infra, this claim is dismissed.
V.

Fifth Claim: Deliberate Indifference to Safety/Medical Needs in Violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983
Plaintiff makes two allegations in his claim for deliberate indifference to safety/medical

needs. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants delayed calling for and getting him medical attention.
ECF No. 55-7 at 20. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants told medical staff at the hospital as
well as the EMTs that he was injured running from the police and through the woods and that he
was a suspect in a domestic violence case. Id. Plaintiff alleges that these statements could have
“drastically and adversely affected” Plaintiff’s medical care. Id.
The Court analyzes a pretrial detainee’s deliberate indifference to medical needs claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, there is a two-prong deliberate indifference test, and each prong must be
satisfied to state a claim. Id. First, there is the “objective prong,” which requires a showing that
“the challenged conditions were sufficiently serious to constitute objective deprivations of the right
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to due process.” Id. Second, there is a “subjective prong,” which requires a “showing that the
officer acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions.” Id.
a. Delay In Calling and Receiving Medical Attention
The Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the claim related
to the delay in medical treatment.
First, the Court starts by analyzing the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test.
To meet the objective prong for a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, the
plaintiff must show that he actually did not receive adequate care and that the inadequacy in
medical care was sufficiently serious. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006),
abrogated on other grounds by Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023). When the basis for
a detainee’s claim “is a temporary delay or interruption in the provision of otherwise adequate
medical treatment,” the Court examines whether the delay itself created a risk of harm. Smith v.
Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2003). In considering whether a delay caused a risk of
harm, a court may consider “[t]he absence of adverse medical effects or demonstrable physical
injury.” Id. at 187.
In Valdiviezo v. Boyer, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had acted with deliberate
indifference to his medical needs because they delayed calling for medical help and the medical
help did not arrive for an hour. 752 F.App’x. 29, 32 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). In that case,
the plaintiff alleged that he remained in pain during the hour-long wait, but the Second Circuit said
that pain alone was insufficient to satisfy the objective prong. See id. Instead, it held that the district
court correctly dismissed the claim because the plaintiff did not allege that the delay exacerbated
his injury in any way. Id.

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Here, just like in Valdiviezo, Plaintiff has alleged deliberate indifference to medical needs
due to the approximately fifteen-minute delay in calling for medical treatment and approximately
twenty-five-minute delay in receiving medical treatment. He has also alleged that he was in pain
during the delay. However, he has not alleged that the delay exacerbated his injury in any way.
Therefore, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the objective prong, and the claim is dismissed.
b. Comments Made to Medical Staff
The Court also concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the claim
related to the comments made to medical staff. Again, the Court starts by analyzing the objective
prong of the deliberate indifference test. As a part of this inquiry, the court must “examine how the
offending conduct is inadequate and what harm, if any, the inadequacy has caused or will likely
cause” the plaintiff. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279.
In this case, the alleged inadequacy of conduct is that Defendants made comments to
medical staff. Plaintiff speculates that these comments “could have drastically and adversely
affected” his medical care, but he fails to allege any specific harm that occurred as the result of
these comments. See ECF No. 55-7 at 20. As such, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the objective
prong, and this claim is dismissed. See F.D.I.C., 607 F.3d at 292 (a non-moving party “may not
rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation” at the summary judgment stage
(quotation omitted)).
VI.

Sixth Claim: Monell Municipal and Supervisory Liability
The Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s Monell claims. Under

Monell, a plaintiff may establish municipal liability in several ways, including by presenting
evidence of

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1) an express policy or custom, 2) an authorization of a policymaker of the
unconstitutional practice, 3) failure of the municipality to train its employees, which
exhibits a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of its citizens, or 4) a practice of
the municipal employees that is “so permanent and well settled as to imply the
constructive acquiescence of senior policy-making officials.”
Biswas v. City of N.Y., 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Pangburn v. Culbertson,
200 F.3d 65, 71–72 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff has failed to proffer any evidence that would establish municipal liability under
Monell. The only evidence he cites is: (1) Officer Baskin had been disciplined for taking exception
to a Geneva Councilmember’s protest against GPD in 2020 (after the events of this case); (2)
Officer Montesanto was convicted of a crime in connection to his use of force on another arrestee
that occurred in July 2019 (after the events of this case); (3) Sgt. Bielowicz did nothing while acts
of excessive force and false arrest took place; and (4) neither Officer Camacho nor Officer Baskin
followed their training with respect to use of force when pulling Plaintiff from the police vehicle.
ECF No. 55-7 at 20, 22.
Plaintiff does not point to any specific policy, custom, or inadequacy in training as the basis
for his claim. He also does not indicate that any policymaker authorized an unconstitutional
practice. Plaintiff alleges that there was a practice of denying constitutional rights, but no
reasonable juror could find that the evidence cited by Plaintiff—one instance of discipline that
happened after the events of the case, a use of force that happened after the events of the case, an
unsupported claim for failure to intervene, and one instance of employees not following their
training—supports a finding that the practice of the municipal employees was “so permanent and
well settled as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policymaking officials.” Pangburn,
200 F.3d at 71–72 (2d Cir. 1999); see also City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985)
(“Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under
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Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing,
unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker”);
Missel v. Cnty. of Monroe, 351 F.App’x. 543, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that conclusory and
speculative allegations absent any factual allegations to support them are insufficient to state a
Monell claim) (summary order). Therefore, Plaintiff’s sixth claim is dismissed.
VII.

Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Claims: State Law Negligence, State Law Negligent
Hiring, and State Law Respondeat Superior
The Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on Claims Seven, Eight, and Nine.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s seventh and eighth claims are time barred. See ECF No. 51-30
at 16. They also contend that there is no stated claim for negligence on which to base Plaintiff’s
ninth claim for respondeat superior. See ECF No. 51-30 at 20. In his Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff took no position with respect to Defendants’ motion on
the New York State Law claims. ECF No. 55-7 at 19. Again, when a party is counseled, a court
may infer from a party’s partial opposition that relevant claims or defenses not defended in the
opposition have been abandoned. See Jackson, 766 F.3d at 198.
Here, Plaintiff is counseled and by taking no position on the state law claims, did not defend
these claims. As Plaintiff did not defend these claims, the Court considers them abandoned, and
they are dismissed.
VIII. Tenth Claim: Failure to Intervene
The Court also grants summary judgment to Defendants on the failure to intervene claim.
While it is unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint which Defendants failed to intervene, the Court does
not need to resolve that ambiguity because, as discussed above, Defendants are entitled to qualified

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immunity for the alleged excessive force in handcuffing and dragging to the police car. Thus, there
can be no failure to intervene claim.
As for the failure to intervene claim related to the force used to pull Plaintiff from the
police vehicle at the station, there were no other officers present when Officers Baskin and
Camacho removed Plaintiff from the vehicle. An officer may not be held liable for failure to
intervene unless he had a “realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.”
Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994). As no officers were present when the alleged
excessive force occurred, no officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene, and therefore
Defendants are entitled to summary judgement on Claim Ten.
IX.

Punitive Damages
The Court declines to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. “Generally, the issue

of whether to award punitive damages is an issue for the jury to decide based on an evaluation of
the plaintiff’s proof of ‘sufficiently serious misconduct.’” Phelan ex rel. Phelan v. Torres, No. 04–
CV–3538, 2005 WL 4655382, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30, 56 (1983)). Further, where the plaintiff “has provided sufficient evidence to overcome
summary judgment with respect to excessive force, the Court cannot state as a matter of law that
the [plaintiff] is not entitled to punitive damages.” Lazaratos v. Ruiz, No. 00–CV–2221, 2003 WL
22283832, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003). Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to
strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 51) is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED except his §
1983 claim for excessive force against Officers Camacho and Baskin related to his removal from
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the police vehicle. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the City of Geneva, the City of
Geneva Police Department, City of Geneva Chief of Police Michael J. Passalacqua, Police Officer
Jack Montesanto, and Sgt. William Belowicz as defendants. The Court sets a status conference
for October 29 at 10:30am to hear from the parties about the progress of this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 25, 2024
_______________________________________
HON. FRANK P. GERACI, JR.
United States District Judge
Western District of New York

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