Desko v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 18

ORDER denying 11 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; granting 13 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Signed by Hon. H. Kenneth Schroeder Jr. on 1/3/2025. (DLR)Clerk to Follow up

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JASON D.
v.

Plaintiff,

22-CV-06301-HKS

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER
As set forth in the Standing Order of the Court regarding Social Security
Cases subject to the May 21, 2018 Memorandum of Understanding, the parties have
consented to the assignment of this case to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings,
including the entry of final judgment, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Dkt. #17.

BACKGROUND
On July 11, 2019, plaintiff, at the age of 40, protectively filed an application
for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging an onset date of June
1, 2012. Dkt. #7, pp. 238-239. 1 Plaintiff also protectively filed a Title XVI application for
supplemental security income (“SSI”). Dkt. #7, pp. 231-237. Plaintiff alleged he was
disabled due to eight herniated discs; inability to walk or stand for long times; trouble
sleeping; chronic back pain; issues lifting; muscle spasms; disc degeneration; arthritis in
the back; and depression. Dkt. #7, p. 260. Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially, Dkt. #7,
pp. 127-146, and on reconsideration. Dkt. #7, pp. 149-172.
1

Record citations use the page number(s) generated by the Court’s electronic filing system.

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Plaintiff requested a hearing, and a telephonic hearing was held on
December 3, 2020, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Michael W Devlin. Dkt. #7,
pp. 37-71. Plaintiff appeared with counsel.

On examination by his counsel, plaintiff testified that he was unable to work
due to his back problems, including herniated discs, degenerative disc disease,
osteoarthritis, and scoliosis. Dkt. #7, pp. 42-43. He stated that he has shooting pain down
his back, buttocks, legs, and to his feet. Dkt. #7, p. 43.

Plaintiff also testified that he suffers from severe depression, anxiety
disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Dkt. #7, p. 43. Some days, he feels
so depressed that he does not want to get out of bed or cook. Id.

Plaintiff also testified that he experiences many side effects from the
medications he takes. His sleep medicine makes it hard to wake up, and other
medications cause him confusion, memory problems, constipation, irritability, and mood
swings. Dkt. #7, p. 44. When he is out of certain medications, he has physical withdrawal
symptoms and sometimes hallucinations. Id. He also has constant dry mouth, is
sometimes woozy and dizzy, cannot focus, and he finds it difficult to communicate. Id.

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Next, plaintiff testified that he can normally sit comfortably for 15-20 minutes
before he needs to stand up and move around. Dkt. #7, p. 45. He can also stand for 1520 minutes and can walk for 5-10 minutes. Id.

To get around, such as going to the grocery store, plaintiff takes public
transportation or gets a ride from a friend. Dkt. #7, p. 46. He also testified that it is very
difficult for him to go up staircases. Id.

When asked if he could do continuous activity for an eight-hour period,
plaintiff testified that he would need to take breaks every 15-20 minutes. Dkt. #7, pp. 4647. He also stated that he cannot bend to the floor or stoop, crouch, or squat. Dkt. #7,
p. 47.

Plaintiff further testified that he could lift a bag of sugar but not a gallon of
milk. Id. His case manager usually takes him shopping and helps him with his groceries
and his laundry. Dkt. #7, pp. 47-48.

Plaintiff testified that reaching is difficult, and he uses a “grabber” at home
to pick things up and perform other tasks. Dkt. #7, p. 48. He also states that he has no
computer skills, does not know how to type, and would find it difficult to use a computer
due to pain in his neck and legs. Dkt. #7, pp. 48-49.

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Next, plaintiff testified that he can slowly move his head side to side, but it
causes “crunching” sounds. Dkt. #7, p. 49. He also has difficulty rising from the seated
position and every time he does it, he feels pain like a “hot iron” in his back. Id. Similarly,
he testified that getting out of bed in the morning is one of the most painful moments of
his day, and he uses a walking stick to help him get up. Id.

Plaintiff testified that he also has COPD and is on several breathing
medications and an inhaler. Dkt. #7, p. 50. He is also trying to quit smoking cigarettes. Id.

Plaintiff next testified that his short-term memory is “absolutely horrible.” Id.
His back pain also affects his ability to focus and concentrate, and people think he is a
“jerk” because he is snappy and moody due to the constant pain. Dkt. #7, p. 51.

Plaintiff testified that it takes him a very long time to learn new things, and
he gets easily frustrated, has a poor attitude, and gives up due to the pain. Dkt. #7, pp.
51-52. If he is in a stressful situation, he usually has a mild panic attack or lashes out at
other people. Dkt. #7, pp. 52-53.

As to maintaining a schedule, such as a full-time position where he had to
be somewhere at a certain time, plaintiff testified that he “definitely” could not do that. Dkt.
#7, p. 54.

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Plaintiff also testified that he has panic attacks at least twice a week. Dkt.
#7, pp. 54-55. He does not like to go outside, be in large groups of people, go shopping,
or take the bus, and he usually stays at home unless he has an appointment. Dkt. #7,
pp. 55-56. He stated he did not think he could get along very well with supervisors or
coworkers. Dkt. #7, p. 56.

Plaintiff’s counsel next asked him about his daily activities. He testified that
he does not do well with cooking; he makes sandwiches and heats soup in the microwave,
but he finds it difficult to prepare other food. Dkt. #7, pp. 56-57. He also cannot sweep or
mop, so he pays friends to do it for him or his counselor helps him. Dkt. #7, p. 57.

Next, plaintiff testified that his back injury has ruined his whole life, and he
can no longer go hunting, snowboarding, rock climbing, or ride his mountain bike. Dkt.
#7, p. 58. Most days, he listens to audio books because reading gives him headaches,
and he does not get glasses because it would require being in crowds. Dkt. #7, p. 59. His
teeth also hurt because he cannot see a dentist due to fear. Id.

Finally, plaintiff’s counsel asked him about his personal care. Plaintiff
testified that it takes him “almost a day” to get dressed, and he often stays in his pajamas
unless he has somewhere to go. Dkt. #7, pp. 59-61. He uses a very long shoehorn to put
his shoes on, and he usually just sponge bathes because of his limitations. Dt. #7, p. 60.
He also sometimes uses a handicap bathroom at another location. Dkt. #7, p. 60.

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Next, the ALJ questioned plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that he is approximately
6’ 1” tall and weighs approximately 242 pounds, although his weight had previously been
300 pounds. Dkt. #7, p. 62.

Plaintiff graduated from high school and last worked in 2012 through a
temporary service agency. Dkt. #7, pp. 62-63. From 2005 to 2007, plaintiff worked as an
interior and exterior painter. Dkt. #7, p. 63. From 1998 through 2000, plaintiff worked as
a lathe operator and in a ceramic clad position . Dkt. #7, p. 64.

Plaintiff also testified that he had previously been addicted to street drugs
but had been sober since December 11, 2013. Dkt. #7, p. 65. However, he testified that
he uses medical cannabis. Id.

Next, the ALJ heard testimony from Mary Vasishth, a vocational expert
(“VE”). The VE first testified that plaintiff’s past work was classified as skilled, medium
exertional level; semiskilled, medium exertional; and semiskilled, light exertional. Dkt. #7,
p. 67.

The ALJ then asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual aged 33-42
years old with a high school education with plaintiff’s past relevant work 2 who is capable
of performing a range of sedentary exertion, specifically occasionally lifting or carrying 10
pounds; frequently lifting and/or carrying less than 10 pounds; standing and or walking up

The ALJ specified that only the painter position should be used as to plaintiff’s SSI claim. Dkt.
#7, p. 67.
2

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to 2 hours in an 8-hour day; sitting for 6 hours in an 8-hour day; occasionally pushing
and/or pulling 10 pounds; occasionally climbing ramps and/or stairs, balancing, stooping,
kneeling, crouching, and crawling; and occasionally climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.
Dkt. #7, p. 67. The VE stated that this person also should avoid concentrated exposure
to fumes, odors, dust, gases, poor ventilation, and other respiratory irritants. Id.

Further, the ALJ stated that this person is mentally able to understand,
remember, and carry out simple instructions and tasks; occasionally interact with
coworkers and supervisors; have little to no contact with the general public; is able to
work in a low stress work environment, defined as no supervisory duties, no independent
decisionmaking, no strict production quotas, minimal changes in work routine and
processes; and is able to consistently maintain concentration and focus for up to two
hours at a time. Dkt. #7, p. 68.

The VE testified that, under this hypothetical, plaintiff could not perform his
past work. Id.

The ALJ then asked the VE if there were other jobs in the national economy
that could be performed within such limitations. Id. The VE testified that there were two
such positions: addressing clerk and document preparer, which are both unskilled,
sedentary positions. Dkt. #7, pp. 68-69.

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The ALJ then asked the VE if there was an additional limitation that the
person was unable to interact appropriately with coworkers, supervisors, and the general
public, whether there were any jobs in the national economy that he could perform. Dkt.
#7, p. 69. The VE stated there were not. Id.

Plaintiff’s counsel then questioned the VE. She asked if the person was
absent more than a day a month, whether work would be available. Dkt. #7, p. 70. The
VE responded that such absences, in her opinion, would preclude all competitive
employment. Id. The VE gave the same opinion as to the person being off task for more
than 10% of the workday. Id.

On April 27, 2021, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. Dkt. #7, pp. 1932. The Appeals Council denied review on May 13, 2022, Dkt. #7, pp. 5-10, and this action
followed.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Legal Standards
“In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining
whether the SSA’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and
were based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir.
2012). Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 496, 501
(2d Cir. 2009). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the
Commissioner’s determination must be upheld. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d

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Cir. 2014). “Where an administrative decision rests on adequate findings sustained by
evidence having rational probative force, the court should not substitute its judgment for
that of the Commissioner.” Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1998).

To be disabled under the Social Security Act (“Act”), a claimant must
establish an inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months. 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). The Commissioner must follow a five-step sequential
evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a). At step one, the claimant must demonstrate that she is not engaging
in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). At step two, the claimant must
demonstrate that she has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that limits
the claimant’s ability to perform physical or mental work-related activities. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(c). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a disabling
impairment as set forth in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the “Listings”),
and satisfies the durational requirement, the claimant is entitled to disability benefits. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If the impairment does not meet the criteria of a disabling
impairment, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant has sufficient RFC for the
claimant to return to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e)-(f). If the claimant is
unable to return to past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to
demonstrate that the claimant could perform other jobs which exist in significant numbers

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in the national economy, based on claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(g).

Here, as relevant, the ALJ made the following findings with regard to the
five-step sequential evaluation: (1) plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since June 1, 2012, the alleged onset date; (2) plaintiff has the severe impairments of
osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine; obesity; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(“COPD”)/emphysema; major depressive disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”); and heroin use disorder; (3) plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or medically
equal any listed impairment; (4) since June 1, 2012, plaintiff retained the RFC to perform
a range of sedentary work 3, except he can occasionally lift and/or carry 10 pounds and
frequently lift and/or carry less than 10 pounds; stand and/or walk up to two hours in an
eight hour day and sit for six hours [in] and eight hour work [day]; occasionally push and/or
pull 10 pounds; occasionally climb ramps and/or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and
crawl; occasionally climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; avoid concentrated exposure to
fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation, and other respiratory irritants; understand,
remember and carry out simple instructions and tasks; occasionally interact with
coworkers and supervisors; have little to no contact with the general public; able to work
in a low stress work environment (i.e., no supervisory duties, no independent decision-

“Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or
carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as
one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying
out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other
sedentary criteria are met.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a).
3

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making required, no strict production quotas, minimal changes in work routine and
processes, etc.); and is able to consistently maintain concentration and focus for up to
two hours at a time; (5) plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work; and (6)
considering plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, plaintiff is able to
perform the occupations of addressing clerk and document preparer; and (7) plaintiff was
not, therefore, disabled within the meaning of the SSA from June 1, 2012 to the date of
the ALJ’s decision. Dkt. #7, pp. 19-26.

Pursuant to the Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical
Evidence (“Revisions to Rules”), 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867-68 (Jan.
18, 2017), applicable to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the Commissioner is no
longer required to afford any specific evidentiary weight to medical opinions, but is
obligated to consider all medical opinions and evaluate their persuasiveness based on
the following five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the
claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors, with particular importance placed upon
consistency and supportability. Jacqueline L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 515 F. Supp.3d 2,
7 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) & (c)). To allow a reviewing court to
trace the path of an ALJ’s reasoning, an ALJ is required to explain their consideration of
the supportability and consistency factors by pointing to specific evidence in the record to
support the ALJ’s findings regarding medical opinions. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(b)(2)).

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With respect to supportability, the more relevant the objective medical
evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support the
medical opinion, the more persuasive the medical findings will be. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(c)(1)). Similarly, with respect to consistency, the more consistent a medical
opinion is with the evidence from other medical and nonmedical sources, the more
persuasive the medical opinions will be. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2)).
Supportability focuses on the fit between medical opinion offered by the source and the
underlying evidence presented by the source to support that opinion, while consistency
focuses on how well a medical source opinion is supported by the entire record. Rosario
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 20 Civ. 7749, 2022 WL 819810, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2022).
“Even though ALJs are no longer directed to afford controlling weight to treating source
opinions – no matter how well supported and consistent with the record they may be –
the regulations still recognize the ‘foundational nature’ of the observations of treating
sources, and ‘consistency with those observations is a factor in determining the value of
any [treating sources] opinion.’” Id. (quoting Shawn H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civil Action
No. 2:19-cv-113, 2020 WL 3969879, at *6 (D. Vt. July 14, 2020)) (alteration in original).

Challenges to the ALJ’s Decision
The Court first observes that, although plaintiff’s brief discusses in detail his
lengthy medical history and various impairments, his challenges to the ALJ’s decision are
comparatively limited.

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Medical Opinion Evidence and the RFC
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by failing to include in the RFC
psychological limitations to which two experts opined, even though the ALJ found those
opinions persuasive. Dkt. #11-1, pp. 13-20. This argument is not well taken.

In explaining the relationship between plaintiff’s mental impairments and the
RFC, the ALJ first reviewed the consultative examination performed by Dr. Yu-Ying Lin on
October 29, 2019. Dkt. #7, p. 28. Dr. Lin noted that plaintiff had been diagnosed with
PTSD, major depressive disorder, and heroin use disorder. Dkt. #8, pp. 565-566.
However, on examination, plaintiff demonstrated a cooperative demeanor, appropriate
eye contact, and his mood was euthymic. Dkt. #8, pp. 563-564. However, his attention,
concentration, and recent memory were moderately impaired due to nervousness in the
evaluation and distractibility. Dkt. #8, p. 564.

The ALJ then reviewed plaintiff’s therapy and treatment records, noting that
while they documented his depressed mood, they showed generally normal findings, and
that he was cooperative, maintained average eye contact, and his cognitive functioning
appeared within normal limits. Dkt. #7, p. 28.

Turning to the opinions of state agency psychological consultants Drs.
Weitzen and Inman, the ALJ acknowledged that these reviewers opined that plaintiff was
“moderately limited” in several areas, including maintaining concentration for extended
periods; interacting with the general public; accepting instructions from and responding

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appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and regulating emotions, controlling behavior,
and maintaining well-being. Dkt. #7, pp. 29, 90-91, 99. However, the ALJ noted that both
Drs. Weitzen and Inman opined that plaintiff retained the ability to meet the basic
demands of unskilled work in a low contact setting. Dkt. #7, pp. 29, 92, 110.

The ALJ found these opinions to be “persuasive,” noting that they were
supported by treatment records documenting that plaintiff was sometimes anxious,
agitated, and aggressive, but otherwise his examinations were within normal limits. Dkt.
#7, p. 29. The ALJ also addressed consistency, observing that the opinions of Drs.
Weitzen and Inman were consistent with Dr. Lin’s observations and opinions based on
her consultative examination of plaintiff, as discussed above. Id.

The ALJ similarly deemed Dr. Lin’s opinion “persuasive.” Dkt. #7, p. 30. He
noted that the opinion was supported by plaintiff’s substance abuse history followed by
his sobriety from heroin, as well as her clinical findings during her examination. Id. The
ALJ also found Dr. Lin’s opinion consistent with other evidence, citing treatment records
reflecting that, despite a drug relapse in June 2020 and evidence of an ongoing
depressed mood, plaintiff presented with generally normal findings, was cooperative,
maintained average eye contact, and his cognitive abilities appeared within normal limits.
Id.

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Plaintiff argues that the RFC does not properly account for the opinions of
Drs. Lin and Weitzen that plaintiff was “moderately” limited in the areas noted above and
is thus not supported by substantial evidence. This argument is unavailing.

First, it is important to remember that “the RFC is an administrative and not
a medical finding that is to be formed based on an ALJ’s review of the entire record and
not just by following one particular opinion.” Candy R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 6:23-cv06608-EAW, 2024 WL 3886221, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2024). “In fact, the ALJ must
weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the
record as a whole.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, it is well established that a plaintiff’s “moderate” limitation in the
ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors “is
consistent with an RFC limiting plaintiff to unskilled work.” Nathan P. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 19-CV-954Sr, 2021 WL 1139849, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2021) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).

“Moreover, such a moderate limitation can be accommodated by a
restriction to occasional interaction with supervisors.” Id. at *6.

The RFC here comports with this authority because it restricts plaintiff to
performing only unskilled work, occasionally interacting with coworkers and supervisors,
and having little to no contact with the public. Dkt. #7, p. 31. See Washburn v. Colvin, 286

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F. Supp.3d 561, 565-566 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (RFC that limited plaintiff to unskilled work
requiring no interaction with the public and no teamwork was consistent with medical
opinion that plaintiff was capable of unskilled work in a low contact setting; it is “wellsettled that limitation to unskilled work sufficiently accounts for moderate limitations in
work-related functioning”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Candy R., 2024 WL 3886221, at *4 (RFC limiting plaintiff to unskilled work with limitations
on interactions with others adequately accounted for moderate limitation in ability regulate
emotions, control behavior, and maintain well-being).

Therefore, “Plaintiff’s challenges amount to a disagreement with the ALJ’s
findings, and while [he] may disagree with the ALJ’s conclusions, it is ultimately Plaintiff’s
burden to prove a more restrictive RFC than the RFC assessed by the ALJ.” Id. at *7.

The Court concludes that plaintiff has not met that burden.

Plaintiff’s Non-Severe Limitations
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to account in the RFC for plaintiff’s
non-severe impairments of hearing loss and left hand fracture and that remand is thus
required. Dkt. #11-1, pp. 20-21. The Court disagrees.

“The ALJ must consider the impact of all of a claimant’s medically
determinable impairments when assessing the claimant’s RFC, regardless of whether an
impairment qualifies as severe or nonsevere at step two.” Annette A. v. Comm’r of Soc.

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Sec., Case # 23-CV-6087-FPG, 2024 WL 2956906, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 12, 2024)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Remand may be necessary where the
ALJ fails to properly consider the impact of a claimant’s nonsevere impairments on the
RFC.” Id. “Such consideration must be discernible in the decision itself.” Id.

Here, while the ALJ did not discuss plaintiff’s left wrist fracture and hearing
loss during his RFC analysis, “the record as a whole shows that he did evaluate those
impairments and their possible limiting effects and found those limitations to be nonexistent or de minimis, thereby rendering any legal error on his part harmless.” Trombley
v. Colvin, 8:15-CV-00567 (TWD), 2016 WL 5394723, at *17 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2016)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Specifically, at page five of his decision, the ALJ discussed plaintiff’s “history
of left wrist fracture, history of left wrist surgery, history of left-sided carpal tunnel
syndrome release surgery, and decreased hearing of the left ear.” Dkt. #7, p. 23. The ALJ
cited to medical records documenting surgeries plaintiff underwent to correct these
conditions. Id.

The ALJ then noted that, on examination, plaintiff’s “ears appeared normal”;
his strength in his left extremity was only “minimally diminished”; and he was able to zip,
button, and tie with both hands. Id.

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The ALJ concluded this paragraph by stating that he had considered all of
claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe, in
assessing his RFC. Id.

Therefore, “[v]iewed in the context of the record evidence and relevant
medical opinions, the Court can readily ‘glean’ from the ALJ’s decision that he found that
Plaintiff’s [nonsevere] conditions did not cause any functional limitations warranting a
more restrictive RFC.” Annette A., 2024 WL 2956906, at *4. “As a result, remand for a
more detailed assessment would serve no purpose and is not warranted.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). 4

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Dkt. #11) is denied, and the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt.
#13) is granted.

The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

As in Annete A., id., at *4, n.4, plaintiff asserts that his non-severe impairments warranted
additional limitations, but he does not say what such additional limitations would be. Dkt. #14, p.
2.
4

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DATED:

Buffalo, New York
January 3, 2025
s/ H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr.
H. KENNETH SCHROEDER, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge

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