Nellis v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision et al

Filing 28

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 18 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) is granted in part and denied in part, as follows: The first and Second Causes of Action are dismissed a gainst DOCCS and the individual defendants in their official capacities; the first cause of action is also dismissed as against Ricciardelli and Northrop in their individual capacities, but may proceed against Moores in her individual capacity; and the second cause of action is dismissed as against Ricciardelli, Northrop, and Moores in their individual capacities. Signed by Hon. Charles J. Siragusa on 1/27/2025. (MJK)Clerk to Follow up

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
__________________________________________________
DANIEL A. NELLIS,
Plaintiff,

-vs-

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION, M. CORYER, Deputy Superintendent
of Medical Health Elmira Correctional Facility,
M.D. JOHN RICCIARDELLI, in is official and
Individual capacity, M.D. CAROL MOORES,
in her official and individual capacity, M.D.
JILL NORTHROP, in her official and individual
capacity,
Defendants.
__________________________________________________

DECISION and
ORDER
22-CV-6429 CJS

INTRODUCTION
Daniel Nellis (“Plaintiff”), an inmate in the custody of the New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) who is represented
by counsel, paid the filing fee and commenced this action purporting to assert claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”). Now before the Court is a motion
for partial dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed.R.Civ.P.”) filed by defendants DOCCS, John
Ricciardelli (“Ricciardelli”), Carol Moores (“Moores”) and Jill Northrop (“Northrop”). 1 For

1 Defendants’ reply contains the following notation: “NOTE: Dr. Coyer has not yet requested a defense or

representation from the Office of the Attorney General. Accordingly, counsel cannot move to dismiss on
behalf of Dr. Coyer.” The Court additionally notes that the Complaint contains reference to a defendant
named Heather Snide, but Snide’s name is not included in the caption, and no summons was issued for
her.

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the reasons explained below, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint,
and are assumed to be true for purposes of this Decision and Order.

Plaintiff is

diagnosed with “Charcot-Marie-Tooth Disease,” “a progressive disease of the nerves that
causes [him] to suffer decreased sensation of bilateral feet and ankles, and a deformity
of his left foot.” The Complaint indicates that prior to September 2019, Plaintiff was
receiving appropriate medical care for this condition at various DOCCS facilities.

In

particular, the pleading indicates that in early September 2019, while at Downstate
Correctional Faciity, he sprained his ankle, and Downstate issued him “a cane to assist
him in walking.”
However, in September 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to Elmira Correctional
Facility (“Elmira”), where he claims medical staff denied him proper treatment. The
Complaint indicates that defendant M. Coryer (“Coryer”) was “Deputy Superintendent of
Medical Health” at Elmira; that John Ricciardelli, M.D. (“Ricciardelli”) was “a physician” at
Elmira; that Carol Moores, M.D. (“Moores”) was a “Deputy Commissioner and Chief
Medical Officer” for DOCCS; and that Jill Northrop, M.D. (“Northrop”) was “a physician”
at Elmira. The Complaint contends that Moores was aware that Plaintiff had “CharcotMarie-Tooth Disease” and indicated that she would refer Plaintiff for various treatments,
but failed to make the referrals until months later, after Plaintiff had filed a grievance. For
example, the Complaint alleges that it took ten months before Plaintiff was allowed to see
an orthopedic specialist.

The pleading further contends that on one occasion, for

unspecified reasons, Northrop directed corrections officers to take Plaintiff’s cane, which

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he needed to ambulate, from his cell. (The cane was returned one week later.) The
Complaint further alleges that even though Plaintiff had difficulty walking, he was initially,
for the first forty days he was at Elmira, placed on the fifth floor, “which required him to
navigate multiple stairs on a daily basis in order to access the mess hall and other
services,” before he was eventually allowed to use a cane. Later, approximately five
months after Plaintiff arrived at Elmira, he was placed in “medical keeplock,” which
required him to stay in his cell 24 hours per day and prevented him from accessing
“appropriate medical care” and “benefits other inmates [were] given,” such as “access to
showers, recreation,” and “human interaction.” Plaintiff subsequently sent a letter to
Moores and Coryer to complain about the fact that Moores was not following through on
her treatment recommendations, and about being in medical keeplock. Plaintiff did not
receive a response from Moores, though he received responses from several DOCCS
officials, including Coryer, who indicated that a review of Plaintiff’s medical chart showed
“no evidence to support any lack of medical care or treatment.” ECF No. 24-12 at p. 2.
The Complaint purports to set out four causes of action: 1) an Eighth Amendment
“deliberate medical indifference” claim; 2) and Eighth Amendment “conditions of
confinement” claim; 3) an ADA claim; and 4) a Section 504 claim. The Complaint seeks
only monetary damages. The first and second claims appear to be asserted against all
defendants, while the third and fourth claims appear to be asserted just against DOCCS.
The first claim contends that Defendants subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unsual
punishment by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, while the
second claim alleges that Defendants subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment
by placing him in medical keeplock for approximately four months.

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On January 27, 2023, movants filed the subject motion for partial dismissal under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 18). The motion is directed at just the
first two causes of action under Section 1983. The grounds for Defendants’ motion are
as follows: 1) the claims against DOCCS and against Ricciardelli, Moores, and Northrop
in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; 2) the
first cause of action fails to state an actionable claim against the movants in their individual
capacities, since it fails to allege that Ricciardelli, Moores or Northrop had the requisite
subjective state of mind (deliberate indifference); 3) the second cause of action fails to
state an actionable claim against the movants in their individual capacities, since it does
not allege that Ricciardelli, Moores or Northrop was personally involved in placing Plaintiff
in medical keeplock, and since placement in medical keeplock is not an atypical or
significant hardship on an inmate in the context of ordinary prison life.
On May 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No.
24).

Plaintiff’s response maintains that he has sufficiently pleaded the subjective and

objective requirements concerning his first two causes of action, but does not address
Defendants’ argument concerning Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
On May 11, 2023, Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 27) that essentially reiterates
the arguments in their opening brief.
The Court has thoroughly considered the parties’ submissions.
DISCUSSION
Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
Defendants first maintain that all claims against DOCCS and against Ricciardelli,
Moores, and Northrop in their official capacities are jurisdictionally barred by the

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Eleventh Amendment. Although Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion in general, he
does not address the sovereign-immunity argument. Consequently, that aspect of
Defendants’ motion is unopposed. In any event, Defendants’ argument is correct.
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity protects states and arms of the state
from being sued for money damages. See, Caruso v. Zugibe, 646 F. App'x 101, 104 (2d
Cir. 2016) (“The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the
states themselves to ‘state agents and state instrumentalities' that are, effectively, arms
of a state.”) (citation omitted). The Eleventh Amendment similarly divests the Court of
subject matter jurisdiction 2 over any claims for money damages against a state official
acting in his or her official capacity unless the state has consented to the suit or waived
this immunity or Congress has abrogated it. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
169, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006).
Because there has been no waiver of immunity or consent to suit in this case,
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against DOCCS and against the individual defendants in
their officials capacities, all of which seek only money damages, must be dismissed.
See, Li v. Lorenzo, 712 F. App'x 21, 22 (2d Cir. 2017) (“The Eleventh Amendment
precludes suits against states unless the state expressly waives its immunity or
Congress abrogates that immunity. This includes suits against state officials in their
official capacities. New York has not waived its immunity, nor has Congress abrogated

2 Vega v. Semple, 963 F.3d 259, 284 (2d Cir. 2020) (“The Eleventh Amendment presents a jurisdictional
bar that deprives federal courts of the power to hear certain claims.”); but see, Ripa v. Stony Brook Univ.,
808 F. App'x 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Whether Eleventh Amendment immunity constitutes a true issue of
subject matter jurisdiction or is more appropriately viewed as an affirmative defense has not yet been
decided by the Supreme Court or this Court.”), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1070, 208 L. Ed.
2d 532 (2021), reh'g denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1530, 209 L. Ed. 2d 262 (2021).

5

it. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars Li's claims against defendants in their
official capacities, and these claims were properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”)
(citations omitted); see also, Jaime v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision, No. 24-CV-4091 (LTS), 2024 WL 4791703, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2024)
(“DOCCS and its facilities are state entities that share in New York's Eleventh
Amendment immunity.”); Mallet v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision,
No. 22-2884, 2025 WL 77230, at *9 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2025) (“We also affirm the
dismissal of all seven Section 1983 claims against the State of New York, DOCCS, and
Annucci acting in his official capacity as commissioner of DOCCS, as the Supreme
Court has held that Section 1983 does not abrogate sovereign immunity.”) (collecting
cases).
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Defendants have also moved to dismiss the first two causes of action pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), and the legal standards applicable to such an application are clear:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead Aenough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.@ Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is
facially plausible Awhen the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937,
173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. May 1, 2018).
In its review, the Court is entitled to consider facts alleged in the complaint
and documents attached to it or incorporated in it by reference, documents
Aintegral@ to the complaint and relied upon in it, and facts of which judicial
notice may properly be taken under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.

6

Heckman v. Town of Hempstead, 568 F. App’x 41, 43 (2d Cir. Jun. 3, 2014) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the
grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964B65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007); see also, ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d
Cir.2007) (ATo survive dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his
claim rests through factual allegations sufficient >to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.=@) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly ) (footnote omitted).
When applying this Aplausibility standard,@ the Court is guided by Atwo working
principles@:
First, although a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint, 3 that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice. Second, only a complaint that states
a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss, and determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). A[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

3
The Court must accept the plausible factual allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir.1999),
cert. den. 531 U.S. 1052, 121 S.Ct. 657 (2000).

7

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has allegedCbut it has not shownCthat the
pleader is entitled to relief.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950
(2009) (citation omitted).
A[A]s Iqbal makes clear, a plausible claim must come before discovery, not the
other way around.@ Angiulo v. Cty. of Westchester, No. 11-CV-7823 CS, 2012 WL
5278523, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2012) (citation omitted); see also, McBeth v. Porges,
171 F. Supp.3d 216, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Observing that pursuant to Iqbal=s pleading
standard, Athe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do >not unlock the doors of discovery for
a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions or speculation.=@) (quoting Iqbal).
As already mentioned, it is clearly settled that, “[i]n ruling on a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint.” McCray v. Lee, 963 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2020) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).

However, it is equally clear that not every

allegation made “upon information and belief” is entitled to be accepted as true:
[W]hile a plaintiff may make allegations on information and belief, those
allegations will be sufficient to support a claim for relief only when the factual
matter pled supports a plausible inference of culpability. . . . A plaintiff may
satisfy the plausibility standard by pleading facts upon information and
belief, but a plaintiff cannot merely plop ‘upon information and belief’ in front
of a conclusory allegation and thereby render it non-conclusory. Those
magic words will only make otherwise unsupported claims plausible when
the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the defendant
or where the belief is based on factual information that makes the inference
of culpability plausible.
Evergreen E. Coop. v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., No. 21-2827-CV, 2023 WL 545075, at *12 (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 2023) (citations omitted); see also, United Prob. Officers Ass'n v. City
of New York, No. 21-CV-0218 (RA), 2022 WL 875864, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2022)
8

(“[T]he bare allegation that women of color are “paid less” than their white male
counterparts in the same titles is a conclusory assertion that the Court need not accept
as true. Again, even if pattern-or-practice plaintiffs cannot allege the precise amount of
their coworkers’ salar[ies], they should at least be able to allege the facts that form the
basis for their belief that the coworkers are paid more.”) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); Bright Kids NYC Inc. v. Kelly, No. 19-CV-1175 (JMF), 2020 WL 6891814,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020) (“The Amended Complaint also alleges, “[u]pon
information and belief,” that Adams “knew that the Proprietary Contact Info was stolen.”
But to pass muster, an allegation upon information and belief must be accompanied by a
statement of the facts upon which the belief is founded, and cannot rest on pure
conjecture and speculation. Here, the allegation of Adams's knowledge falls far short.”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Section 1983 and Eighth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff’s first two causes of action seek relief under Section 1983 for alleged
violations of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States (2) which has taken place under color of state law.” McCloud v. Jackson, 4 F. App'x
7, 9 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
[Section] 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely
provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. ... [For
example, i]n addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983,
analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly
infringed by the challenged application of force. The validity of the claim
must then be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard
which governs that right.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870–71, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443
9

(1989) (citations omitted).
To establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that each defendant
was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. See, Ganek v. Leibowitz,
874 F.3d 73, 92 (2d Cir. 2017) (“As the Supreme Court has instructed, because vicarious
liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff bringing [either type of claim]
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Most cases addressing personal involvement do so in the context of
supervisory defendants. A supervisory official is personally involved if “(1)
[he or she] participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) [he
or she], after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal,
failed to remedy the wrong, (3) [he or she] created a policy or custom under
which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of
such a policy or custom, (4) [he or she] was grossly negligent in supervising
subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) [he or she] exhibited
deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information
indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.”
Brandon v. Kinter, 938 F.3d 21, 36–37 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d
865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995)). As particularly relevant to the instant action,
[t]he fact that a prison official has a supervisory title or role at a prison does
not automatically mean that the official was personally involved with or is
liable for any misconduct by lower-level officers. Raynor v. Maldonado, No.
3:24-CV-1221 (JAM), 2024 WL 4533748, at *4 (D. Conn. Oct. 21, 2024). In
addition, courts generally hold that correspondence from a plaintiff to a
supervisory official is not sufficient to establish the official's personal
involvement.
Jordan v. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:24CV227 (VAB), 2024 WL 5112001, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec.
13, 2024) (collecting cases).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment,
which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. In particular, the Complaint purports to
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assert two different Eighth Amendment claims—a claim that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, and a claim that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement.
The legal principles concerning both types of claim are well settled. Regarding a
medical claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need:
Mallet claims that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment was infringed by Defendants-Appellees’ “deliberate
indifference” to his “serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). “The standard of deliberate
indifference includes both subjective and objective components.” Chance v.
Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998). First, Mallet must show that,
while he was incarcerated, he suffered from a medical condition that is, “in
objective terms, sufficiently serious.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Though there is no single metric, we have previously held that a “sufficiently
serious” medical condition in the Eighth Amendment context refers to a
“condition of urgency that may result in degeneration or extreme pain,” id.,
that “significantly affects daily activities,” or that involves “chronic and
substantial pain.” Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The condition need not be “life-threatening” or “at
the limit of human ability to bear,” but it must be more than simply
“uncomfortable and annoying.” Id. at 163; see also Collymore v. Myers, 74
F.4th 22, 30 (2d Cir. 2023) (noting that Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim will be dismissed unless “a plaintiff plausibly alleges a
condition that produces severe and unmanaged pain”).
Mallet v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 22-2884, 2025 WL
77230, at *4 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2025). Similarly, for a conditions-of-confinement claim, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant was deliberate indifferent to conditions of
confinement that posed an unreasonable risk of serious harm:
Under the Eighth Amendment, a conditions of confinement claim has both
objective and subjective components. First, the plaintiff must show that,
objectively, “the conditions of his confinement result in unquestioned and
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serious deprivations of basic human needs.” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468,
480 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This
prong is satisfied by a showing that the plaintiff's “conditions [of
confinement] ... pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health,”
that is, a deprivation of “basic human needs such as food, clothing, medical
care, and safe and sanitary living conditions.” Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d
119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Second, the plaintiff must establish that, subjectively, the defendant-officials
were deliberately indifferent to the hazardous condition. See Hayes v.
N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Jolly, 76
F.3d at 481 (explaining that deliberate indifference is “the subjective prong
of the Eighth Amendment inquiry”). To establish deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff must show that a prison official had the requisite “culpable intent,”
which is present if the official “has knowledge that an inmate faces a
substantial risk of serious harm and he disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate the harm.” Hayes, 84 F.3d at 620 (emphasis
added). As such, “mere negligence will not suffice.” Id.
Smith v. New York State, No. 23-6601-CV, 2024 WL 4746554, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12,
2024).
Here, the Court finds that while the allegations are thin, at this early stage the
Complaint adequately states the first cause of action against Dr. Moores. Regarding such
claim, the pleading indicates that Moores was aware of Plaintiff’s diagnosis and of his
complaints of pain, but that she failed for many months to make the referrals that she told
him she would make, which delayed his receipt of medical care and may have contributed
to a worsening of his condition.
However, the Court agrees with Defendants that the Complaint fails to state an
actionable medical deliberate indifference claim against Ricciardelli or Northrop. As
Defendants observe, the Complaint contains just a single allegation concerning
Ricciardelli, which, in its entirety, states: “Dr. John Ricciardelli, a prison physician, told the
Plaintiff on several occasions that upon his examination, the Plaintiff should be in a
12

wheelchair. However, no wheelchair was ever provided.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 87. The Court
finds that this bare allegation fails to state an actionable medical-deliberate-indifference
claim against Ricciardelli, particularly since the Complaint elsewhere indicates both that
Plaintiff was able to ambulate effectively using a cane, and that Dr. Moores issued Plaintiff
a “a medical permit for use of wheelchair for long distances.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 39. Nor
does the pleading otherwise plausibly plead Ricciardelli’s personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional violation.
As for Dr. Northrop, the Complaint also contains just a single allegation of
wrongdoing, namely: “On or about March 30, 2020, Plaintiff’s cane was removed from his
cell by a Corrections Officer (“CO”) at the request of Dr. Northrop.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 41.
The pleading indicates that the cane was returned to Plaintiff a week later, after he
complained. The pleading offers no factual support for Plaintiff’s bald assertion that
Northrop ordered a corrections officer to remove Plaintiff’s cane from his cell.
Additionally, the pleading admits that Northrop continued to provide medical treatment to
Plaintiff, and assisted Plaintiff in obtaining orthopedic boots, after Moores allegedly failed
to do so. While it is surely possible that Northrop ordered the removal of Plaintiff’s cane,
the pleading does not contain sufficient facts to make such allegation plausible.
Moreover, even if Northrop did so, the pleading does not plausibly suggest that Northrop
acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, especially
since Northrop had already provided assistance to Plaintiff in obtaining medical
equipment to address his condition. Nor, in any event, does the Court find that the taking
of Plaintiff’s cane for seven days was an injury of constitutional magnitude. For example,
the Complaint indicates that Plaintiff was originally given the cane in September 2019,

13

specifically because he had sprained his ankle. ECF No. 1 at ¶ ¶ 20-22. Presumably, the
sprain had healed by the time the cane was confiscated six months later, but even if it
had not, the Court still does not find that this isolated incident is sufficiently serious to
support an Eighth Amendment claim. Nor does the pleading otherwise plausibly allege
Northrop’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.
In sum, the medical-deliberate-indifference claim may proceed as to Moores in her
individual capacity, but is dismissed as to Ricciardelli and Northrop.
Regarding the second cause of action, the Court finds, preliminarily, that the
pleading does not plausibly allege that Ricciardelli or Northrop were personally involved
in the alleged conditions-of-confinement Eighth Amendment violation. Consequently, the
second cause of action is dismissed as against Ricciardelli and Northrop. As for Moores,
there is no plausible allegation that she was responsible for placing or maintaining Plaintiff
in medical keeplock.

Consequently, insofar as the pleading potentially shows any

personal involvement by Moores in his conditions-of-confinement claim, it is only because
Plaintiff contends that he wrote two letters to Moores. See, Complaint, ECF No. 1 at ¶ ¶
39, 44. More specifically, the Complaint indicates that on or about February 21, 2020,
Plaintiff wrote to Moores, “requesting showers and phone calls on the housing unit,” and
that on February 26, 2020, Moores,
[n]oted that she received [the letter]. She also noted that he was awaiting
MRI and orthopedic appointments, issued a medical permit for use of
wheelchair for long distances, and a new medical permit to try to help limit
his need for walking.
ECF No. 1 at ¶ 39. Plaintiff alleges that Moore’s response was disingenuous, since she
did not actually schedule his MRI and orthopedic appointments until in or about June
2020. However, that allegation goes to Plaintiff’s first cause of action. Regarding his
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second cause of action, the pleading acknowledges that Moores responded favorably to
Plaintiff’s letter by issuing him a medical permit for use of a wheelchair and a “new medical
permit to try to help limit his need for walking.” These facts do not state support a plausible
claim that Moores’ response to Plaintiff’s February 2020 letter is indicative of deliberate
indifference by her toward Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement.
Subsequently, on or about June 8, 2020, Plaintiff wrote another letter, this time to
both Moores and Croyer. See, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 44. According to the Complaint, this letter
complain[ed] that despite being advised by Dr. Moores that she referred him
for an MR[I] and orthopedic appointment, he still ha[d] not received either.
[The letter] also complained that he ha[d] been locke in his cell 24 hours a
day because he was place[d] on medical keeplock and [was] barely able to
walk anymore.
ECF No. 1 at ¶ 44.

The pleading indicates that Plaintiff received responses to this letter

from three different DOCCS employees: A “captain” at Elmira; W. Mack Nurse
Administrator 1; and Croyer. The pleading does not indicate that Plaintiff received a
response from Moores, nor does it otherwise contain any facts suggesting that Moores
had any involvement in deciding whether to retain Plaintiff in medical keeplock. 4 Indeed,
the fact that Plaintiff received responses to that letter from three persons other than
Moores suggests that Moores was not personally involved in that decision.
Consequently, on the particular facts presented here, the Court finds that the mere fact
that Plaintiff sent this letter to Moores is insufficient to support a plausible claim that
Moores was personally involved in the conditions-of-confinement claim. See, Mitchell v.
4 Although the Complaint does not indicate that Moores responded to this letter, it alleges that after

Plaintiff sent the letter, Moores scheduled Plaintiff’s MRI and orthopedic appointments. Complaint, ECF
No. 1 at ¶ 40. If, as the pleading implies, Moores scheduled these tests in response to such letter, this
suggests that she was not deliberately indifference to Plaintiff’s complaints therein. At most, the Court
views this letter, and Moores’ response thereto, as relating to Plaintiff’s first cause of action, not the
second.

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Chappius, No. 6:17-CV-06673 EAW, 2024 WL 4280829, at *20 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2024)
(“[T]he mere fact of having received a letter does not demonstrate deliberate
indifference.”); see also, Thompson v. Renee, No. 21-CV-10371 (VEC), 2023 WL
2575222, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2023) (“[C]ourts have repeatedly held that the mere
fact that a prison official has received letters from an inmate does not establish his or her
personal involvement in action or inaction following receipt of the correspondence.”).
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the Complaint adequately pleaded
personal involvement, the allegations concerning the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement
while in medical keeplock, involving an alleged lack of “access to showers, recreation,”
and “human interaction,” do not support an Eighth Amendment violation. See, Moreland
v. Microgenics Corp., No. 21CV00748ENVLB, 2022 WL 2657287, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June
1, 2022) (“Although the conditions of prison confinement can give rise to a constitutional
claim, see Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2002), courts have consistently
held that—in the absence of facts suggesting extremely harsh and unusual conditions of
confinement—a period of segregated confinement does not establish an Eighth
Amendment claim.”); see also, Lopez v. Annucci, No. 17-CV-6305-EAW, 2018 WL
11325795, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2018) (“In order to demonstrate that the conditions
of a plaintiff's confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment, plaintiff must show
that (1) the conditions of confinement resulted ‘in unquestioned and serious deprivations
of basic human needs ...’ and (2) ‘the defendants imposed those conditions with
deliberate indifference.’ Welch v. Bartlett, 125 F. App'x 340 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Jolly
v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 480 (2d Cir. 1996)). “Only those deprivations denying the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of

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an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991).”).
In sum, the Court finds that the second cause of action must be dismissed as
against Ricciardelli, Northrop and Moores, for failure to state claim.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) is granted in part and denied in part,
as follows: The first and Second Causes of Action are dismissed against DOCCS and
the individual defendants in their official capacities; the first cause of action is also
dismissed as against Ricciardelli and Northrop in their individual capacities, but may
proceed against Moores in her individual capacity; and the second cause of action is
dismissed as against Ricciardelli, Northrop, and Moores in their individual capacities. By
separate order the Court will refer this action to a United States Magistrate Judge who
will oversee discovery and other pretrial matters.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Rochester, New York
January 27, 2025

ENTER:
_____________________
CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA
United States District Judge

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