Lawson-Schojan v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 12

DECISION AND ORDERIT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 6) is DENIED.FURTHER, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 8) is GRANTED.FURTHER, that the Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.SO ORDERED.Signed by William M. Skretny, United States District Judge on 10/23/2024. (JCM)-CLERK TO FOLLOW UP-

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________________
KAYLEA L.-S.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

DECISION AND ORDER
23-CV-6554S

Defendant.
______________________________________
1.

Plaintiff Kaylea L.-S. 1 brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act

(“the Act”), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
that denied her application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act.
(Docket No. 1.) This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2.

Plaintiff protectively filed her application with the Social Security

Administration on October 11, 2016. She alleged disability beginning on January 1, 2015,
due to obesity, seizure disorder, cervicalgia, asthma, attention deficit disorder/attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (or “ADD/ADHD”), impulse control disorder, borderline
personality disorder, schizophrenia spectrum disorder, right ankle cyst, lower back and
shoulder pain, headaches, abdominal pain, left fifth toe fracture, and interstitial cystitis (or
“IC”). Her application was denied and she thereafter requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”).

1 In accordance with this Court’s Standing Order of November 18, 2020, and consistent with
guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, this Decision and Order will identify Plaintiff by first name and last initial.

3.

On September 18, 2019, ALJ Michael Stacchini held a video hearing at

which Plaintiff and a Vocational Expert appeared and testified. (R. 2 at 16, 32-72.) At the
time of the hearing, Plaintiff was a 25-year-old woman with a limited education and no
past relevant work. (R. at 24, 771.)
4.

The ALJ considered the case de novo and, on October 17, 2019, issued a

written decision denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits. (R. at 16.) After the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision (R. at 1), she filed her action
challenging the Commissioner’s decision. This action resulted in a Decision and Order
issued by Hon. Don D. Bush, United States Magistrate Judge, on March 2, 2022, that
remanded the case for further proceedings. Kaylea L. v. Comm’r, No. 6:20-cv-6731-DB.
(R. at 836.) Magistrate Judge Bush remanded because the ALJ failed to rely on Plaintiff’s
mental health treatment notes to assess her mental functioning, instead inappropriately
resting on his own lay interpretation of the record. (R. at 848.) Because the ALJ failed to
obtain competent medical opinions that contained functional limitations on which he could
base the mental residual functional capacity (“RFC”), Magistrate Judge Bush found that
the ALJ left an evidentiary gap warranting remand and ordered the ALJ to “thoroughly
explain his findings regarding Plaintiff’s work-related mental limitations.” (R. at 849.)
5.

On March 25, 2022, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s 2019 decision

and directed further administrative proceedings consistent with Magistrate Judge Bush’s
Decision and Order. (R. at 854.)
6.

On this remand, the ALJ conducted a teleconference hearing due to

COVID-19 pandemic commenced on September 27, 2022, and continued on June 1,
2

Citations to the underlying administrative record are designated as “R.”

2

2023, where Plaintiff (represented by counsel), Vocational Expert Sheri Pruitt, and
Impartial Medical Expert Ashok Khushalani, M.D., appeared and testified. (R. at 755,
769, 782-824, 825-35.) On June 20, 2023, the ALJ issued his decision denying Plaintiff’s
claim for benefits. (R. at 755.)
7.

After this decision, Plaintiff filed this current action challenging the

Commissioner’s final decision. 3 (Docket No. 1.) Both parties moved for judgment on the
pleadings. (Docket Nos. 6, 8.) Plaintiff filed her response to Defendant’s brief and in
support of her Motion on January 26, 2024. (Docket No. 9.) This Court then took the
Motions under advisement without oral argument. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s
Motion will be denied and Defendant’s Motion will be granted.
8.

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo

whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner’s
determination will be reversed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or there
has been a legal error. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v.
Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). Substantial evidence is that which amounts to
“more than a mere scintilla,” and it has been defined as “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 26 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971). Where evidence is
deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s
conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).

The ALJ’s June 20, 2023, decision became the Commissioner’s final decision on this matter by
operation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
3

3

9.

“To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the
evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must
also include that which detracts from its weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen,
859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).

If supported by substantial evidence, the

Commissioner’s finding must be sustained “even where substantial evidence may support
the plaintiff’s position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence
may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner’s determination
considerable deference and will not substitute “its own judgment for that of the
[Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo
review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
10.

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation

process to determine whether an individual is disabled under the Act. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920. The Supreme Court of the United States recognized the validity of this
analysis in Bowen v. Yuckert, and it remains the proper approach for analyzing whether
a claimant is disabled. 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1987).
11.

The five-step process is as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [s]he is not,
the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant has
a “severe impairment” which significantly limits [her] physical
or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant
suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based
solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment
which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant
has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider
[her] disabled without considering vocational factors such as
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age, education, and work experience; the [Commissioner]
presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a “listed”
impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe
impairment, [s]he has the residual functional capacity to
perform [her] past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to
perform [her] past work, the [Commissioner] then determines
whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (quotations in original);
see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).
12.

At Step Two, an impairment is deemed “severe” if it significantly limits a

claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). An impairment
or combination of impairments is found to be “not severe” when medical evidence
establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities which would
have no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work. See SSR 85-28,
1985 SSR LEXIS 19 (1985); 20 C.F.R. § 416.922; Donahue v. Colvin, No. 6:17-CV-06838
(MAT), 2018 WL 2354986, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. May 24, 2018). The claimant bears the burden
of establishing that she has a severe impairment, “which is ‘any impairment or
combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s] ability to do basic
work.” Miller v. Berryhill, No. 16CV6467, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153578, at *20 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 20, 2017); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). This severity requirement, however, is de
minimis “and is meant only to screen out the weakest of claims.” Herman S. v. Comm’r,
577 F. Supp. 3d 190, 195 (W.D.N.Y. 2022); see also Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019,
1030 (2d Cir. 1995).
13.

Although the claimant has the burden of proof at the first four steps, this

burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth and final step. See Yuckert, 482 U.S. at

5

146 n.5; Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1984). The final step is divided
into two parts. First, the Commissioner must assess the claimant’s job qualifications by
considering her physical ability, age, education, and work experience. Second, the
Commissioner must determine whether jobs exist in the national economy that a person
having the claimant’s qualifications could perform.

See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A);

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f); see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460, 103 S. Ct. 1952,
76 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1983).
14.

The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits under the five-step process

set forth above. At Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since the October 11, 2016, application date. (R. at 758.) At Step Two,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

obesity, seizure

disorder, cervicalgia, asthma, ADD/ADHD, impulse control disorder, borderline
personality disorder, and schizophrenia spectrum disorder. (R. at 758.)
15.

Among her claimed ailments, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s interstitial cystitis

was not a severe impairment because an ultrasound showed she had normal kidney
function and minimal postvoid residual volume while a later CT scan generally was
negative. (R. at 760; see also R. at 575, 758-60, 2700.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff
experienced three procedures to ameliorate her pain, urgency, and pressure resulting in
improvement of her symptoms. (R. at 760; see R. at 2915-16, 2918-19, 2923, 2924,
2929.) The ALJ concluded that this ailment did not significantly limit her ability to perform
basic work, thus was not a severe impairment. (R. at 760.)
16.

The ALJ found that the severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments, considered

singly and in combination did not meet the Listings 12.03, 12.04, 12.06, 12.08, and 12.11.

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The ALJ also considered whether “paragraph B” criteria were satisfied, noting that
Plaintiff’s understanding, remembering or applying information, as well as her
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace was mildly limited, while her interaction with
others and her ability to adopt or manage herself was moderately limited. (R. at 763-65.)
Thus, the ALJ determined that she did not have either at least two “marked” or one
“extreme” limitation, the “paragraph B” criteria were not satisfied. (R. at 765.)
17.

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff has been treated for depression, anxiety,

substance use disorder, impulse control disorder, borderline personality disorder,
schizophrenia spectrum disorder, and ADD/ADHD. (R. at 768.) During her examinations,
providers described Plaintiff as attentive, cooperative, without confusion or agitation, with
normal mood and affect, normal speech, behavior, and thought content, normal cognition,
and memory, expressing impulsivity, intact attention and concentration, good insight and
judgment and logical thought process. (R. at 303, 307, 359, 368, 371, 445, 461, 472,
499, 558, 749, 1273-321; see R. at 768.)
18.

At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meet or medical equal any impairment(s) listed in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 760.)
19.

Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work with

exceptions. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but
could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, while occasionally able to balance, stoop,
kneel, crouch, or crawl. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff should avoid unprotected
heights and hazardous machinery and have no concentrated exposure to atmospheric
conditions. The ALJ observed that Plaintiff was limited to understanding, remembering,

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and carrying out simple routine repetitive tasks with regular breaks at approximately twohour intervals while having only occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and
the public. (R. at 765.)
20.

At Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (R. at

771.) At Step Five, the ALJ found that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers
in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (R. at 771-72.) The ALJ did so by
posing hypotheticals to the Vocational Expert of a claimant sharing Plaintiff’s age,
education, work experience, and RFC. The Expert opined that this hypothetical claimant
could perform such jobs as a marker, routing clerk, and assembler.

(R. at 772.)

Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.)
21.

Plaintiff now argues that the RFC determination is not supported by

substantial evidence because the ALJ did not give good reasons for rejecting the opinion
of her treating physician, Stephanie Achilles, M.D., of Finger Lakes Community Health,
who did not recommend that Plaintiff work at a high rate of speed, perform work requiring
responsibility for decisions, working with people, or having public contact, or work parttime, alone, or change her occupation. (R. at 2550.) Plaintiff further contends that the
ALJ did not apply the Burgess factors in overriding this opinion. See Burgess v. Astrue,
537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008); Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff faults the ALJ for improper consideration of her non-severe impairment of
interstitial cystitis in forming her RFC. For the reasons that follow, these arguments are
unavailing.
22.

The Social Security Administration considers medical opinions in the record

with the rest of relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(b). For pre-March 27, 2017,

8

applications, the Social Security Administration recognized a treating physician rule of
deference “to the views of the physician who has engaged in the primary treatment of the
claimant.” Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129. The opinion of the treating source thus should be
given controlling weight where it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and [are] not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2).
23.

Unless controlling weight is given to that medical opinion, the agency must

consider a series of factors in deciding the weight to be given to that opinion. Id.
§ 416.927(c). These factors include the examining relationship with claimant; the length,
nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; relevant evidence which supports the
opinion; consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; acknowledgement of any
specialization of the treating source; and other factors brought to the agency’s attention.
Id.; Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129; Guerra v. Saul, 778 F. App’x 75, 77 n.2 (2d Cir. 2019). The
ALJ then must “explicitly consider” the four Burgess factors with “a failure to ‘explicitly
consider’ these factors is a procedural error warranting remand unless a ‘searching
review of the record assures the reviewing court that the substance of the treating
physician rule is not traversed.’” Guerra, 778 F. App’x at 77 (quoting Estrella v. Berryhill,
925 F.3d 90, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2019)). Thus, this Court should remand for the ALJ to
explicitly consider the Burgess factors “unless a searching review of the record shows
that the ALJ has provided ‘good reasons’ for its weight assessment.” Id. (quoting Estrella,
925 F.3d at 95-96).
24.

Furthermore, the ALJ may choose between properly submitted medical

opinions. McBrayer v Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 712 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir.

9

1983) (citation omitted); Balsamo v Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998). The ALJ is
entitled to weight all the evidence to make the RFC determination consistent with the
record, Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013), and resolve any conflicts in
that record, see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 399. It therefore is for the ALJ, and
not this Court, to weigh any conflicting medical opinions. Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496,
504 (2d Cir. 1998); see Krull v. Colvin, 669 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2016).
25.

While treating Plaintiff, on August 31, 2020, Dr. Achilles completed a Wayne

County Department of Social Services psychiatric assessment report for her employment.
Dr. Achilles diagnosed Plaintiff with dysthymia, anxiety, and PTSD, noting that she was
under the doctor’s care from December 24, 2019, and was last examined on August 31,
2020. (R. at 2550.)
26.

The ALJ collectively gave little weight to this and other opinions, 4 concluding

that they reached the ultimate issue of disability reserved to the Commissioner. (R. at
770.)

The ALJ further found that these opinions were vague, conclusory, and not

supported by or consistent with the evidence in the record including Plaintiff’s otherwise
conservative care.

The ALJ also found that these opinions were inconsistent with

Plaintiff’s “independent activities of living” and “largely intact mental status examinations.”
(Id.)
27.

Instead, the ALJ gave great weight to the testimony of medical expert

Dr. Khushalani, a board-certified psychiatrist who reviewed Plaintiff’s entire record but did
not examine her. (R. at 769-70.) Dr. Khushalani testified that Plaintiff’s stated condition

4

The ALJ also cited as conclusory the notes and county assessment forms from Robert Shelly,
M.D., and FNP-C Corey Meyn from Finger Lakes Community Health. (R. at 2544, 2553-54, 2563-64, 2567,
2580, 2600.)

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was not consistent with her treatment. (R. at 793-94.) From file review, Dr. Khushalani
opined that Plaintiff had mild limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying
information and maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace, and moderate
limitations in interacting with others and self-management. (R. 794, 792-801; see R. at
770.)
28.

The ALJ furthermore relied upon the medical evidence in the record that

showed that Plaintiff was treated for depression, anxiety, and other mental conditions.
(R. at 768.) For example, the ALJ cited the examination on August 14, 2015, performed
by Joan Olschewske, NP, of Rochester General Hospital, who observed that Plaintiff
appeared agitated, with an angry affect, her mood was anxious while she appeared
otherwise normal.

NP Olschewske prescribed therapy with a psychiatrist and

psychologist. (R. at 368; see R. at 768.)
29.

The ALJ also referenced the mental status examination of Plaintiff

conducted on October 22, 2018, by Katelyn King, M.S.W., from Wayne Behavioral Health
Network, who found that Plaintiff was hypoactive, with an anxious mood, excessive
speech, impaired concentration, and limited insight and judgment. Ms. King referred
Plaintiff to weekly or biweekly individual therapy. (R. at 461, 462; see R. at 768.)
30.

This Court concludes that Dr. Achilles’ August 31, 2020, opinion (R. at 2550)

was vague and lacked support from the medical evidence, and that the ALJ thus
appropriately afforded less than controlling weight to it. Specifically, this opinion is a
single page form with minimal discussion identifying functions and activities which Plaintiff
could or could not perform. While stating that Plaintiff could not work in any capacity,
Dr. Achilles merely recommended that Plaintiff change occupations but without stating

11

what that new employment should be or what restrictions Plaintiff would have to perform
this work. (Id.)
31.

Further, the ALJ sufficiently articulated reasons for the weight given for that

opinion despite the ALJ failing to analyze this opinion under the Burgess factors. On this
Court’s searching review of the record, this Court concludes that “the substance of the
treating physician rule is not traversed” here. E.g., Guerra, 778 F. App’x at 77. Although
the ALJ did not discuss Dr. Achilles’ examining and treatment relationship with Plaintiff or
her expertise, the evidence here shows from the Wayne County Department of Social
Services Psychiatric Report that Plaintiff was treated from December 2019 with that report
being based on the doctor’s August 31, 2020, examination. (Id.) The ALJ discussed the
absence of supporting evidence for this opinion and its lack of consistency with the rest
of medical evidence. This record also does not contain Dr. Achilles’ treatment notes prior
to her August 2020 report or the examination record leading to that opinion. (R. at 272628, 2731.)
32.

Although Plaintiff presents Dr. Achilles’ later treatment notes for February 8,

2021 (cf. R. at 2726-31), these cannot support her August 2020 opinion. The August
2020 opinion also is not consistent with those subsequent treatment notes in which
Dr. Achilles observed Plaintiff’s normal mood and thought process. (R. at 2726-38, 2731.)
Nor was this opinion consistent with other examination findings by Letizia Cascio, LMSW,
of Rochester Regional Health, who also found Plaintiff having euthymic mood and linear
or circumstantial thought process during the examination. (R. at 1284, 1288, 2822-23,
2826, 2842, 2850.)

LMSW Cascio had conducted a series of one-on-one therapy

sessions with Plaintiff from June 6, 2022, through March 10, 2023, where she noted that

12

Plaintiff made progress toward her goals and prescribed continued therapy. (R. at 1283,
1284, 1287, 1288, 2821, 2823, 2825, 2827, 2841, 2842-43, 2849, 2851.) Thus, there
was little evidence supporting Dr. Achilles’ August 2020 opinion.
33.

The ALJ did not discuss Dr. Achilles’ specialization because her specialty

is not relevant to assessment of her opinion.
34.

Upon the searching review of this record, this Court finds that the ALJ thus

appropriately weighed this single opinion from Dr. Achilles. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings on the consideration of this opinion is denied.
35.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ inappropriately considered here Interstitial

cystitis (or “IC”) a chronic condition of an inflamed or irritated bladder wall, potentially
leading to scarring and stiffening of the bladder, and reduced urine capacity.
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/interstitialcystitis#:~:text=Interstitital%20(IC)%20is%20an,Its%20is20a%20chronic%20disorder
(last visited October 3, 2024); see Clayton Thomas, ed., Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical
Dictionary 931 (16th ill. ed 1989). This Court finds that, unlike appellant Paul Poupore,
Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009), by so arguing here Plaintiff has not
waived her IC as a physical impairment. (But cf. Docket No. 8, Def. Memo. at 12 n.3.)
36.

The ALJ found at Step Two of the sequential analysis that Plaintiff’s IC was

not severe because the condition improved with treatment and did not significantly limit
Plaintiff’s ability to work. (R. at 760.) The ALJ cites portions of Plaintiff’s medical records,
starting with her ultrasound from March 15, 2018, that showed normal kidney function
and minimal postvoid residual volume. (Id.; see R. at 575.) On March of 2020, Plaintiff

13

had a CT scan for hematuria 5 and abdominal pain which showed hepatomegaly 6 but was
otherwise negative or organs with normal appearance. (R. at 760; see R. at 2700.) On
February 17, 2022, Plaintiff complained during her visit at Rochester Regional Health of
urinary frequency and urgency with dysuria and nocturia 7 every 1-2 hours, as well as
pelvic pain. (R. at 760; see R. at 1728.)
37.

On July 18, 2022, during her pregnancy Plaintiff reported suffering

increased bladder and abdominal pain. (R. at 760; see R. at 2934).
38.

On August 23, 2022, Plaintiff was diagnosed with IC and bladder pain

syndrome. (R. at 760; see R. at 2929.) On September 12, 2022, Alexandria Snow, M.D.,
of Rochester Regional Health performed three weekly bladder instillation procedures on
Plaintiff with some amelioration of her urgency, pain, and pressure. Dr. Snow noted on
September 26, 2022, that Plaintiff was doing well with great improvement following
bladder instillation. (R. at 760; see R. at 2915-16, 2918-19, 2923, 2924.)
39.

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s IC improved with treatment and did not

significantly limit her ability to perform basic work activities, thus determined that IC was
not a severe impairment. (R. at 760.)
40.

Plaintiff now argues that the ALJ committed harmful error by failing to

account for functional limitations from her IC and disregarding her medical record which
demonstrated her suffering from dysuria and urinary urgency and frequency. (Docket
No. 6, Pl. Memo. at 28, citing R. at 1235, 1728, 1946, 2916, 2919, 2923, 2926, 2929,
5

Blood in the urine, Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary, supra, at 800.

6

Enlargement of the liver, id. at 819.

Dysuria is painful or difficult urination that may be indicative of cystitis, while nocturia is excessive
urination especially during the night. Id. at 549, 1217.
7

14

2934.) She faults the ALJ for not making specific findings for the frequency and length of
anticipated bathroom breaks or the percentage of the workday Plaintiff would be off task.
See Lowe v. Colvin, No. 6:15-cv-06077(MAT), 2016 WL 624922, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,
2016).
41.

Plaintiff cites her subjective complaints and treatment from July 2015 before

receiving procedures treating her IC. (Cf. R. at 1235.) While she continued to suffer IC
symptoms during her 2022 pregnancy, her symptoms were treated by weekly bladder
instillations. (R. at 2915-16, 2918-19, 2923-24, 2926, 2929, 2934.) Later records Plaintiff
cites showed these treatments and improvement therefrom, as acknowledged by the ALJ.
(R. at 2916, 2923; see R. at 760.) She sought treatment for IC which worsened during
her 2020 pregnancy, but it was addressed by further treatment.
42.

This Court finds that Plaintiff had not produced objective evidence of

limitations stemming from IC. Moreover, this Court finds that the ALJ implicitly factored
Plaintiff’s IC in the RFC because its restrictions included a schedule of regular breaks
every two hours. (R. at 765.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
on the way the ALJ considered her IC symptoms is denied.
43.

Accordingly, having reviewed the ALJ’s decision and considered Plaintiff’s

argument, this Court finds that the ALJ appropriately considered the opinion of treating
source Dr. Achilles.

Furthermore, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s IC in

establishing her residual functional capacity.

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(Docket No. 6) is DENIED.

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FURTHER, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket No. 8)
is GRANTED.
FURTHER, that the Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

October 23, 2024
Buffalo, New York
s/William M. Skretny
WILLIAM M. SKRETNY
United States District Judge

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