Lamb v. Astrue

Filing 37

ORDER denying 31 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and granting 33 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Chief Judge James C. Dever III on 8/18/2012. (Marsh, K)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

NORTHERN DIVISION

No.2:11-CV-40-D

CHRISANNA LAMB,
for J.P., a minor,
Plaintiff,

v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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ORDER

On August 16,2011, Chrisanna Lamb ("Lamb" or "plaintiff'), on behalf of J.P., her minor
child, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of Michael J. Astrue's
("Commissioner" or "defendant") denial of J.P.'s application for supplemental security income
("benefits") [D.E. 1]. On February 16,2012, Lamb filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
[D.E. 31] and a supporting memorandum [D.E. 32]. On April 13, 2012, the Commissioner filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings [D.E. 33] and a supporting memorandum [D.E. 34]. As
explained below, the court grants the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings, denies
Lamb's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and affirms the Commissioner's final decision.
I.
An individual under the age of 18 will be considered disabled under the Social Security Act

ifhe or she suffers from a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in
marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") must follow a three-step process to
determine whether an individual under the age of 18 is disabled. An ALJ must consider whether
the individual (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments; and (3) has an impairment or combination of impainnents that meets,
medically equals, or functionally equals the requirements of a listed impainnent. 20 C.F.R. §
416.924(a). Thus, the ALJ may find an individual under the age of 18 disabled only upon a finding
that the individual has a severe impairment or combination of impainnents that meets, medically
equals, or functionally equals a listed impainnent. Id. § 416.924(d).
In order to determine whether the impairments of an individual under the age of 18
functionally equal a listed impainnent, the ALJ evaluates the individual's functional limitations in
each of six domains: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3)
interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for
yourself; and (6) health and physical well-being. Id. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i}-{vi). An individual under
the age of 18 is disabled ifhe or she has an impairment or impainnents of"listing-level severity" that
result in an "extreme" limitation in one domain or a "marked" limitations in two or more domains.
Id. § 416.926a(a). A "marked" limitation in a domain is found when an impainnent interferes
"seriously" with the individual's ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. Id.

§ 416.926a(e)(2). An "extreme" limitation in a domain is found when the impainnent interferes
"very seriously" with the individual's ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.
Id. § 416.926a(e)(3).
On July 3, 2008, Lamb applied for benefits on behalf of J.P., her minor child, alleging that
J.P. became disabled on July 3, 2008, due to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"),

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speech problems, and sleep disorder. Tr. [D.E. 12-27] 104-06, 116-25. J.P.'s application was
denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Lamb timely requested a hearing. Id. 44-47, 52-63.
On August 19, 2010, an ALJ held a hearing regarding J.P.'s application. Id. 23-41, 64. On
September 14, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision denying J.P. ' s application. Id. 4-22. On September
21, 2010, Lamb timely requested review. Id. 98-99. On July 20, 2011, the Appeals Council denied
Lamb's request for review. Id. at 1-3.
The AU followed the three-step process in J.P.'s case. At step one, the ALJ found that J.P.
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 3,2008. Id. 10. At step two, the ALJ found
that J.P. suffered from severe medically determinable impairments, including ADHD and speech and
language delays. Id. At step three, the ALJ found that J.P.'s impairments did not meet, medically
equal, or functionally equal any of the listings. Id. Accordingly, the ALJ found that J.P. was not
disabled during the relevant period and was thus not entitled to benefits. Id. 18.
In a section 405(g) action, the court "must uphold the factual findings of the [ALJ] if they

are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal
standard." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996), superseded ~ regulation on other
grounds, 20 C.F.R. 416.927(d)(2); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence" is "more than a
mere scintilla ofevidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Laws v. Celebrezze,
368 F.2d 640,642 (4th Cir. 1966), abrogated ~ implication on other grounds ~ Black & Decker
Disabilitr Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003). The court may not "undertake to re-weigh conflicting
evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that ofthe [ALJ]." Craig,
76 F.3d at 589. To determine whether a decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court must
determine whether the Commissioner has considered all relevant evidence and sufficiently explained

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the weight given to probative evidence. See Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438,
439-40 (4th Cir. 1997). "Judicial review of an administrative decision is impossible without an
adequate explanation of that decision by the administrator." DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 148,
150 (4th Cir. 1983).
In support of her motion for judgment on the pleadings, Lamb contends that the ALJ erred

in finding that J.P. has less than marked limitation in the domains "interacting and relating with
others"J and "caring foryourself.,,2 See PL's Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Pleadings [D.E. 32] 12-17. As
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The domain "interacting and relating with others" provides that:
In this domain, we consider how well you initiate and sustain emotional connections

with others, develop and use the language ofyour community, cooperate with others,
comply with rules, respond to criticism, and respect and take care ofthe possessions
of others.
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(i); see also id. § 416.926a(i)(I)(i)--(iv) (further describing terms). For
preschool age children (age 3 to attainment of age 6), such as J.P., the domain provides that:
At this age, you should be able to socialize with children as well as adults. You
should begin to prefer playmates your own age and start to develop friendships with
children who are your age. You should be able to use words instead of actions to
express yourself, and also be better able to share, show affection, and offer to help.
You should be able to relate to caregivers with increasing independence, choose your
own friends, and play cooperatively with other children, one-at-a-time or in a group,
without continual adult supervision. You should be able to initiate and participate
in conversations, using increasingly complex vocabulary and grammar, and speaking
clearly enough that both familiar and unfamiliar listeners can understand what you
say most of the time.
Id. § 416.926a(i)(2)(iii); see also id. § 416.926a(i)(3) (providing examples).
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The domain "caring for yourself' provides that:
In this domain, we consider how well you maintain a healthy emotional and physical

state, including how well you get your physical and emotional wants and needs met
in appropriate ways; how you cope with stress and changes in your environment; and
whether you take care of your own health, possessions, and living area.
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(k); see also id. § 416.926a(k)(1)(i)--(iv) (further describing terms). For
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for the domain "interacting and relating with others," Lamb argues that the ALJ's stated reason for
his finding-that J.P. had exhibited inappropriate behavior only in the home and not also at
school-was both factually and legally incorrect and failed to take into account significant favorable
evidence. See id. 12-14. As for the domain "caring for yourself," Lamb argues that the AU
erroneously relied on a January 2009 report which indicated that J.P. had improved significantly
because such improvement had only been temporary and the ALJ failed to take into account
significant favorable evidence from after that date. See id. 14-17. The Commissioner responds that
the ALJ in fact provided an appropriate general explanation ofwhy he did not find J.P. 's limitations
to be as intractable as alleged, as well as more specific explanations as to why he found J.P.'s
limitations in the domains "interacting and relating with others" and "caring for yourself' to be less
thanmarked. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Pleadings [D.E. 34] 15-25. The Commissioner notes
that the ALJ's narrative discussion shows that he concluded that J.P.'s limitations were less
intractable than alleged because his ADHD was responsive to treatment and, in so rmding, clearly
considered ample evidence in the record. See id.
The court agrees with the Commissioner. The ALJ's conclusions that J.P. had less than
marked limitation in the domains "interacting and relating with others" and "caring for yourself'
preschool age children, the domain provides that:
You should want to take care of many of your physical needs by yourself (e.g.,
putting on your shoes, getting a snack), and also want to try doing some things that
you cannot do fully (e.g., tying your shoes, climbing on a chair to reach something
up high, taking a bath). Early in this age range, it may be easy for you to agree to do
what your caregiver asks. Later, that may be difficult for you because you want to
do things your way or not at all. These changes usually mean that you are more
confident about your ideas and what you are able to do. You should also begin to
understand how to control behaviors that are not good for you (e.g., crossing the
street without an adult).
Id. § 416.926a(k)(2)(iii); see also id. § 416.926a(k)(3) (providing examples).
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were supported by substantial evidence. See Tr. 11-13, 15-18. In finding that l.P. had less than
marked limitation in the domain "interacting and relating with others," the ALl noted that:
The claimant's mother reported that the claimant picks on people and is mean to his
siblings. She said that he was not physical with kids, just did not share and did not
like to play with kids. Debbie Savage noted that it was determined that the claimant
did not exhibit inappropriate behaviors in the preschool environment. The claimant
exhibited severe behavioral issues in the home. He exhibited aggression,
noncompliance and defiance to authority.
Id. 16. In finding that l.P. had less than marked limitation in the domain Hcaring for yourself," the

ALl noted that:
In September 2008, the claimant's neurology examination indicated that he was
extremely wild and violent towards himself and others. In lanuary 2009, it was noted
that he had significant improvements in his behavior with parental training.
Id. 18. In addition, more generally, the ALl concluded that l.P.'s ADHD, although a severe
impairment, was responsive to treatment with medication and psychotherapy and that 1.P.'s
symptoms from his ADHD were not as intractable as alleged. Id. 11-13. In making these findings,
the ALl specifically considered the following: (1) the testimony of Lamb, as l.P.'s mother, id.
28-41; (2) a February 22,2008 evaluation by Donald Lewis, M.D., id. 253-55; (3) the May 8,2008
and December 10,2008 evaluations by Thomas Montgomery, M.D., id. 258--61; (4) alanuary 30,
2009 medical report by Debbie Savage, HSP-PA, id. 270; (5) a February 6, 2009 consultative
evaluation by Richard Bing, Ph.D., id. 273-78; (6) medical records from l.P.'s primary care
physicians at Carolina Pediatrics dating from February 2005 to August 2010, id. 240-50,317-21,
327-38; and (7) an August 11,2009 state agency childhood disability evaluation form completely
by Margaret Parrish, M.D. Id.339-44.
The ALl's findings as to the two domains at issue were based on substantial evidence. The

ALl fully discussed each ofthe foregoing seven pieces ofevidence. As for the evidence that Lamb

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cites,3 the ALJ considered it, but ultimately did not agree with it in light of other evidence. See id.

11-13, 15-16, 17-18. The court may not "undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make
credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that ofthe [ALJ]." Craig, 76 F.3d at 589.
Finally, because the narrative explanation of evidence in his decision makes abundantly clear that
the ALJ considered both favorable and unfavorable evidence with regard to J.P.' s behavior at both
home and school, and dating from the time period both before and after Savage's January 2009
report, the court rejects Lamb's argument that the ALJ erred by limiting the domain "interacting and
relating with others" to J.P. 's behavior at school or by relying on Savage's report. In sum, the ALJ
appropriately found that J.P. has less than marked limitation in the domains "interacting and relating
with others" and "caring for yourself."

Thus, the court rejects Lamb's challenges to the

Commissioner's fmal decision.
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Lamb cites (1) a March 2,2009 teacher questionnaire which indicated that J.P. had a "serious"
problem in four ofthirteen categories related to this domain, id. 145; (2) a form dated April 23, 2007,
from Buckland Elementary School used to evaluate J.P. 's eligibility for special needs education
which answered ''yes'' to a question asking whether he had behaviors which impeded his
performance or that ofothers, id. 131, stated that he often hit others to get attention and used hitting
as a form ofplay, id. 132, and noted that he needed to learn to deal with conflicts without resorting
to bullying, threatening, or being aggressive, id. 134; (3) a sentence from Dr. Montgomery's
December 10, 2008 evaluation which noted that J.P. 's behavior had improved both at home and in
school, id. 294; and (4) a June 10,2009 psychological assessment prepared by G. Evans Heath,
M.A., L.P.A. which indicated that Lamb reported that J.P. had significant temper tantrums, did not
sleep well and resisted bedtime, was aggressive and destructive, did not avoid danger, and had to be
supervised closely, id. 346, and that the practitioner indicated that J.P. put his hands around his neck
to choke himselfwhen angry and slapped himself in the face, that on the day of his initial visit he
was not on his medication and was significantly hyperactive, impulsive, and resistant, that he walked
on his tiptoes, that his speech was loud, monosyllabic and sometimes difficult to understand, that
his affect was irritable, that his frustration tolerance was low and he was oppositional, that he had
problems at home and at school, that he had a GAF of 50, indicating serious symptoms, that he had
behavioral and academic problems at his preschool program for children with special needs, and that
he had constant supervision requirements, id. 346--48. See PI. 's Mem. Supp. Mot. J. Pleadings 13,
15-17.
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n.

Accordingly, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings [D.E. 33] is
GRANTED, Lamb's motion for judgment on the pleadings [D.E. 31] is DENIED, and the
Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED. The clerk shall close the case.
SO ORDERED. This ~ day of August 2012.

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