Gilliam v. Bertie County Board of Education et al

Filing 41

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 31 Motion for Summary Judgment. The court GRANTS summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's ADEA claim and North Carolina Wage and Hour Act claim. Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claimsurviv es. The parties shall participate in a court-hosted settlement conference with United States Magistrate Judge Jam.es E. Gates. If the case does not settle, the parties shall propose trial dates. Signed by District Judge James C. Dever III on 3/21/2022. (Sellers, N.)

· IN TIIB UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR TIIB EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
NORTIIBRN DMSION
No. 2:20-CV-16-D

MONA GILLIAM,

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Plaintiff,

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)

v.

)

ORDER

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BERTIE COUNTY
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.

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)
)
)

On March 20~ 2020, Mona Gilliam ("Gilliam" or ''plaintiff'') filed a complaint against the

Bertie County Board of Education (the "Board" or "defendant'') and Dr. Catherine Edmonds
(''Edmonds") in her official capacity as former superintendent [D.E. 2]. Gilliam alleges age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et
~ ' as amended, retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e,
et~, as amended ("Title VII"), and a violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, N.C.

Gen. Stat. §§ 95-25.1, et~ See id. ff 72-115. On May 12, 2020, Edmonds and the Board moved
to dismiss Gilliam's complaint [D.E. 10]. See-Fed. R Civ. P.12(b)(6). On July 9, 2020, the court
dismissed the complaint against Edmonds, dismissed Gilliam's request for punitive damages, and
allowed the remainder of Gilliam's claims to proceed [D.E. 14].
On July 12, 2021, the Board moved for summary judgment [D.E. 31] and filed a

memorandum in support [D.E. 34], a statement of material facts [D.E. 32], and an ap~dix to the
statement of material facts [D.E. 33]. On August 18, 2021, Gilliam responded in opposition [D.E.
36, 37, 38]. On September 1, 2021, the Board replied [D.E. 40]. As explained below, the court
grants in part and denies in part the Board's motion for summary judgment.

I.
Gilliam is a:former Board employee. See Def.' s Stat. Mat. Facts ("SMF")[D.E. 32] 1 1; Pl.' s
Resp. to Stat. Mat. Facts("Resp. to SMF") [D.E. 36]11. In2013, at age 41, Gilliam began.working
as an administrator in the Bertie County Schools. See SMF 13; Resp. to SMF 13. In July 2015,
Gilliam executed a four-year administrator contract with the Board that expired on June 30, 2019.
See SMF 14; Resp. to SMF fl 3, 17. In 2016, Gilliam moved from her role as a principal to the
central office to serve as the director of student services. See SMF 1 4; Resp. to SMF 1 4. During
the 2016-17 school year, the Bertie County Schools experienced severe financial challenges and

implemented a reduction in force. See SMF fl 5-6; Resp. to SMF fl 5-6. As a result, in June 2017,
the Bertie County ~chools eliminated Gilliam's director of student services position. See SMF fl
5-6; Resp. to SMF fl 5-7. In June 2017, Gilliam appealed the reduction in force to the Board, but ,

the Board did not change the decision. See [D.E. 33-2] 5-6; [D.E. 37-3, 37-4].
After e1iminating Gilliam's position, the Board offered Gilliam a classroom teacher position

under her 2015 administrator contract. See SMF 1 8; Resp. to SMF

fl

8-9. Gilliam's 2015

admini~ator contract provided that "[d]uring th~ term of this contract, the employee may be
transferred to another position in the school system in the sole discretion of the Board and/or the
Superintendent. Transfer of the employee is not a transfer to a lower paying position, and thus not
a demotion, if the employee's salary is maintained at the previous salary amount." SMF 110; Resp.
to SMF 1 10; [D.E. 37-1] 1 8. Because the Board paid Gilliam for twelve months under her
administrator contract rather than under a ten-month teacher contract, the Board required Gilliam
to work on administrator tasks during the summer months when school was not in session. See SMF
1 11; Resp. to SMF fl 10-11.
In February 2018, Edmonds became the superintendent of the Bertie County Schools. See
'
SMF 1 12; Resp. to SMF 1 12. At the time, Gilliam was serving as a classroom teacher and working

pursuant to her 2015 administrator contract. See SMF 1 12; Resp. to SMF 1 12. On July 9, 2018,
2

Gilliam filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charge of discrimination
alleging her transfer to a classroom teaching position and the assignment of admjnjstrator duties to
her during the summer months were discrim.mation against her based on her race, color, sex, and age
and as retaliation for her alleged protected activity in June 2017. See SMF 1 13; Resp. to S:MF 1 13;
[D.E. 2-10].
In January 2019, the principal position at Bertie Middle School became vacant, and Edmonds
appointed Gilliam as the interim principal of Bertie Middle School. See SMF fl 14-15; Resp. to
S:MF fl 14-15. At that time, Edmonds told Gilliam the Bertie County Schools planned to advertise
the principal position and interview applicants. Edmonds also told Gilliam that being named interim

principal did not guarantee that the Board would select Gilliam for the permanent principal position.
See S:MF 116; Re~p. to SMF 116. Edmonds appointed Gilliam to the interim position, in part,
because Gilliam was a licensed admjnjstrator already employed within the district and receiving
adminiinrator pay. See SMF 115. Thus, Gilliam's appointment saved the district money, when
compared to hiring an interim admjnj~trator from outside the district. See id.
Gilliam's 2015 admjnjstrator contract was set to expll'e on June 30, 2019. See S:MF 1 17;
Resp. to S:MF 1 17,. North Carolina law provides that local school system superintendents must
decide by May 1 •of the last year of a school administrator's contract whether to offer the
admjniinratoranewfour-yearcontract. See S:MF117;N.C. Gen. Stat.§ n5c.2s7.1(d). 1 Edmonds

1

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-287.l(d) provides: ·

If a superintendent intends to recommend to the local board of education that the

school admjnistrator be offered a new, renewed, or extended contract, the
superintendent shall submit the recommendation to the local board for action. The
local board may approve the superintendent's recommendation or decide not to offer
the school admjnjinrator anew, renewed, or extended school administrator's contract.
Ifa superintendent decides not to recommend that the local board of education offer

a new, renewed, or extended school adminjstrator's contract to the school
administrator, the superintendent shall give the school admjnistrator written notice
3

declined to recommend Gilliam for a new four-year contract and chose not to recommend Gilliam's
renewal as an administrator. See SMF ml 18-19. On April 30, 2019, Edmonds informed Gilliam
in writing that she would not recommend that Gilliam receive a renewed four-year admini!;trator

contract but stated that she would recommend Gilliam for a two-year classroom teacher contract.
See SMF 119; Resp. to SMF 119; [D.E. 2-11].
In May 2019, Gilliam appealed Edmonds~s recommendation to the Board. See SMF 120;

Resp. to SMF120. OnMay31,2019, theBoardheldahearing. See SMFm(20--21; Resp. to SMF
120; [D.E. 33-3] 10; [D.E. 33-9] (hearing transcript). At the hearing, Edmonds told the Board that
she was not recommending that Gilliam receive a four-year administrator contract for the five
reasons: (1) Gilliam had not worked as an administrator for the school system for the majority of
the time that Edmonds was superintendent; (2) for the first year of Edmonds's tenure ~
superintendent, Gilliam served as a classroom teacher; (3) Edmonds only had four months to oversee
Gilliam's work as an administrator; (4) Edmonds did not believe that she had enough exposure to

of his or her decision no· later than May 1 of the final year of the contract. The
superintendent's reasons may not be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, personal,
political, or prohibited by State or federal law. No action by the local board or
further notice to the school administrator shall be necessary unless the school
adminimrator files with the superintendent a written request, within 10 days ofreceipt
of the superintendent's decision, for a hearing before the local board. Failure to file
a timely request for a hearing shall result in a waiver of the right to appeal the
superintendent's decision. If a school administrator files a timely request for a
hearing, the local board shall conduct a hearing pursuant to the provisions of G.S.
l 15C-45(c) and make a final decision on whether to offer the school administrator
a new, renewed, or extended school adminirnator's contract.
If the local board decides not to offer the school adminirm-ator a new, renewed, or

extended school adminirm-ator's contract, the local board shall notify the school
administrator of its decision by June 1 of the final year of the contract. A decision
not to offer the school administrator anew, renewed, or extended contract may be for
any cause that is not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, personal, political, or
prohibited by State oi federal law.
4

Gilliam's work as an admini~ator to recommend a four-year contract; and (5) Edmonds advised
Gilliam when Gilliam became interim prinpipal that this position was an interim position. See S:MF
121; [D.E. 33-9] 6--44, 51-55; [D.E. 33-4] 1-2. At the hearing, Gilliam's counsel argued that the
Board should give Gilliam a four-year administrator contract based on her performance in the
district. See S:MF 121; [D.E. 33-9] 44--51, 55-62. After the hearing, the Board unanimously voted
to accept Edmonds's recommendation and not to renew Gilliam's administrator contract, but the
Board offered Gilliam a two-year classroom teacher contract. See S:MF 1 23; Resp. to S:MF 1 23;
[D.E. 33-3] 11; [D.E. 33-4] 2.
On July 29, 2019, Gilliam filed another EEOC charge of discrimination.- See S:MF 1 28;
Compl. [D.E. 2] 12.2 On February 27, 2020, the EEOC issued Gilliam a right to sue letter. ·See
S:MF 1 28; Compl. 1 2. On March 20, 2020, Gilliam filed a complaint against the Board and
Edmonds alleging age discrimination in violation ofthe ADEA, retaliation in violation of Title VII,
and a violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act See Compl.
II.

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record taken as a whole, no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.
See Fed. R. ~iv. P. 56(a); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,378 (2007); Anderson v. Liberf;y Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The party seeking ~nmmary judgment must initially demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue ofmaterial fact or the absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett-477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has
met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleading, see
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, but ''must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Blee. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

2

The record does not contain the 2019 EEOC charge.
5

(1986), (emphasis and quotation omitted). "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient
:

)

evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is insufficient; ''there must be evidence
on which the [factfinder] could reasonably find for the" nonmoving party. Id. at 252.
In making this determination, the court must view the evidence and the inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378.
Nevertheless, the court is not "required to submit a question to a jury merely because some evidence
has been introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a
character that it wo.uld warrant the jury in finding a verdict in favor of that party." Anderson, 477
U.S. at 251 (quotation omitted). "[C]onclusory statements, without specific evidentiary support," do
not create genuine issues ofmaterial fact. Causeyv. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir. 1998). Only
factual disputes that affect the outcome of the case properly preclude summary judgment. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247--48.

m.
A
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Gilliam alleges the Board did not renew her adminim:rator contract because of her age in

violation of the ADEA. See Compl.

~

89--102. The Board responds that Gilliam lacks direct

evidence of age dis~rimination and has not established a prim.a facie case of age discrimination. See
[D.E. 34] 11-13. The Board also argues that it declined to renew Gilliam as an adminimator for
legitimate. nondiscriminatory reasons and that Gilliam lacks evidence that these reasons were
pretextual. See id. at 13.
The ADEA prohibits an employer from "fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminat[ing] against• any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(l ). A plaintiff may establish an ADEA claim in two ways. First, an employee may produce
6

direct evidence showing that age discrimination motivated an employer's adverse' employment
action. See, e..&, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009); Reeves v. Sanderson
_PlumbingProds.,Jnc., 530U.S.133, 141-49(2000); Westmorelandv. TWCAdmin. LLC, 924F.3d
718, 725 (4th Cir. ~019); Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part
on other grounds by Gross, 557 U.S. at 177-80. Second, an employee may proceed under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See, e.g., Westmoreland, 924 F.3d at 725-26;
Mereisb, 359 F.3d at 334; Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066--67 (4th Cir. 1980).
Gilliam has no direct evidence of age discrimination and proceeds under the McDonnell
Douglas framework. To establish a primafacie case ofdisparatetreatmentundertheADEA, Gilliam
must show that (1) she was a member of the protected class, i.e., "individuals who are at least 40
'

years of age," 29 U.S.C. § 631 (a); (2) she was meeting her employer's legitimate expectations at the
time of the adverse employment action; (3) the employer took adverse employment action against
her; and (4) the employer took that adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to
an inference of age discrimination. See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308,
310-13 (1996); Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,285 (4th Cir. 2004)
(en bane}, overruledinpartonother grounds~ Gross, S57U.S. at 177-80; Howard v. Coll. of the
Albemarle, 262 F.. Supp. 3d 322, 335 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd, 697 F. App'x 257 (4th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam) (unpublished); Wood v. Town of Warsaw, 914 F. Supp. 2d 735, 739-40 (E.D.N.C. 2012).
The court assumes without deciding that Gilliam demonstrated a prima facie case of age
discrimination. The Board, in ~ has met its burden of production and articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for declining to offer Gilliam a four-year administrator contract. See, e.g.,
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506--09 (1993); Tex. De_p't of Cmzy. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). As the Board Chair explained in her letter of June 5, 2019, the
Board found that Edmonds' s recommendation was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, personal,
political, or for any other reason prohibited by law. [D.E. 33-4] 1-2. Instead, the Board found that
7

Edmonds based her recommendation on the five reasons Edmonds described in her testimony at the
appeal hearing, and the Board voted unanimously to uphold Edmonds's recommendation. See id.
Thus, the burden shifts to Gilliam to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact about pretext and
that the Board really made its decision because of Gilliam's age. See, e.g.• Gross~ 557 U.S. at 180;
Reeves, 530U.S. at 141--49; Burdine, 450U.S. at253; Westmoreland, 924 F.3dat725-26; Huxv.
City ofNe:wportNews, 451 F.3d 311,315 (4th Cir. 2006); Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d
510,514 (4th Cir. 2006), abrogatedinpartonother grounds~ Gross, 557 U.S. at 177-80; Mereisb,
359 F.3d at 334; King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 150-54 (4th Cir. 2003); Wileman v. Frank, 979
F.2d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1992).
A plaintiff demonstrates pretext by showing that the defendant's proffered "explanation is
;

'unworthy of credence' or by offering other forms of circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative
of age discrimination." Mereisb, 359 F.3dat336(quotingBurdine, 450U.S. at256); see Wood, 914
F. Supp. 2d at 740. In analyzing pretext, the "crucial issue" is whether "an unlawfully discriminatory
motive for a defendant's conduct [exists], not the wisdom or folly of its business judgment."
Jiminez v. Macy Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 383 (4th Cir. 1995). Speculation about pretext is
not enough. See,~ Mereisb, 359 F.3d at 336-39. A plaintiff's view of her own performance or
talent also is not enough. See Smi:tb, 618 F.2d at 1067. Moreover, "[i]t is not ... the function of
this court to second guess the wisdom of business decisions." E.E.O.C. v. Clay Printing Co., 955
F.2d936, 946(4thCir. 1992); seeMereisb, 359F.3dat339. "Duty-bound though we are to examine
employment decisions for unlawful discrimination, we are not cloaked with authority to strip
employers oftheir basic business responsibilities." Hux, 451 F.3d at 315. Rather, to prevail, Gilliam
must demonstrate that "age was the 'but-for' cause ofthe employer's adverse decision." Gross, 557
U.S. at 176.
Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Gilliam, no rational jury could find
that the Board's reasons were pretextual or that the Board declined to offer Gilliam a four-year
8

,

contract because of Gilliam's age. Gilliam cites six colleagues who she claims are in comparable
positions and whose contracts the Board renewed. Specifically, Gilliam cites Tony Hoggard,
William Peele, Danny Perry, Tawanda Smallwood, Daphne Williams, and Tundra Woolard as
adminiinratorsupforrenewalin2019. SeeGilliamDepo. [D.E. 33-2] 10; SMFft30-31; Resp. to
SMF ft 30-31. However, Woolard is six years older than Gilliam, and Perry is seven years older.
See Gilliam Depo. at 11. In 2019, the Board renewed the contracts of these two employees who are
older than Gilliam. See SMF ft 29--30. Thus, by definition, the Board's treatment of Woolard and
)

Perry does not evince age discrimination. Cf. O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 312-13. As for Hoggard,
Peele, Smallwood, and Williams, they were not up for contract renewal at the end ofthe 2019 school
year and are not proper comparators. See Gilliam Depo. at 11; [D.E. 33-5] (Peele's employment
contract); [D.E. 33-8] (Hoggard's, Smallwood's, and William.s's employment contracts).
Accordingly, Gilliam's comparator evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact about
pretext or age discrimination. See,e&,Reeves, 530U.S. at 141-49; O'Connor, 517U.S. at312-13.
Next, Gilliam attempts to recharacterize her age discrimination claim by arguing that her
"allegations of age discrimination do not rest solely on her being over the age of forty'' but instead
that her nomenewal was age discrimination because it was based on years of service and eligibility
for early retirement. [D.E. 38] 13-14. However, seniority or years of service do not equal age and
can constitute a nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action. See Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611-12 (1993) ("When the employer's decision is wholly motivated by
factors other than age, the problem ofinaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears. This is true
even if the motivating factor is correlated with age ...." (emphasis omitted)); Denio v. Asplundh
Tree Em;rtCo., 92 F.3d 1177, 1996 WL423125, at *3 (4th Cir. 1996) (percuriam) (unpublished
table decision); Davenport v. Anne Arundel Cnzy. Bd. of Educ;, 998 F. Supp. 2d 428,434 (D. Md~ ·
2014). Moreover, and in any event, no evidence suggests that Gilliam's seniority or experience
played any role in the Board's nomenewal decision. Even viewing the record in the light most
9

favorable to Gilliam, Gilliam has not created a genuine issue of material fact that "age was the
'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse decision." Gross, S57 U.S. at 176; Reeves, S30 U.S. at
141-49. Thus, the court grants the Board's motion for summary judgment on Gilliam's ADEA
claim and dismisses the claim.

B.
Gilliam alleges that Edmonds did not recommend renewing her four-year administrator
contract in April 2019 and the Board accepted that recommendation in June 2019 in retaliation for
Gilliam's July 2018 EEOC charge. See Compl. ~ 72-88. Gilliam engaged in protected activity in
July 2018 when she filed an EEOC charge. See,~ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Netter v. Barnes, 908
F.3d 932, 937-38 (4th Cir. 2018). Moreover, the Board's June 2019 decision to not offer Gilliam
a four-year administrator contract constitutes adverse action. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v.
White, S48 U.S. S3~ 63--64 (2006); Strothersv. CityofLaurel, 89SF.3d317, 327-28 (4th.Cir. 2018);
Kozlowski v. Hampton Sch. Bd., 77 F. App'x 133, 13S (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished). Thus, the
dispute centers on causation.
To prove a l"itle VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that ''the desire to retaliate was
the but-for cause of the challenged employment action." Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
S70 U.S. 338, 3S2 (2013); see Villa v. CavaMezze Grill, LLC, 8S8 F.3d 896, 900 (4th Cir. 2017);
Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Jnvs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216-17 (4th Cir. 2016); Huckelba v. Deering,
No. S:16-CV-247-p, 2016 WL 6082032, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 2016) (unpublished). "This
but-for causation requirement is stricter than the lessened causation standard for discrimination
claims, under which a plaintiffneed only show that [age], race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for an adverse action by an employer." Netter, 908 F.3d at 938 (quotations
omitted); see Foster v. Univ. ofMd.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243,249 (4th Cir. 201S). This causation
standard ''requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the
alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer." Nassar, S70 U.S. at 360; see Guessous, 828
10

F.3d at 217. As such, "[n]ak:ed allegations of a causal connection between plaintiff's protected
activity and the alleged retaliation do not state a plausible Title VII claim." HuckelbB, 2016 WL
(>082032, at *3.
To survive summary judgment, Gilliam "m.ust have evidence from which a reasonable
factfinder ·could conclude that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the
adverse action." Dowe v. Total Action Against Povetfy in Roanoke Valley. 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th
Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds~ Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 548 U.S. at 68. In some
cases, a plaintiff can establish a sufficient causal link by showing "the alleged adverse action
occurred shortly after the employer became aware of the protected activity." Id.; see Williams v.
Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452,454,457 (4th Cir. 1989) (four days between adverse action and
employer's knowledge ofprotected activity). Generally, however, "[a] lengthy time lapse" between
the protected activity and the adverse action "negates any inference that a causal connection exists
between the two." Dowe, 145 F.3dat657 (three years); Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Gr,p., Inc., 998 F.3d
111, 127 (4th Cir. 2021) (three months); Coleman v. Schneider Elec. USA. Inc., 755 F. App'x 247,
250 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished) (more than a year); Barnes v. Charles Cncy. Pub.
Schs., 747 F. App'x 115, 119 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished) (same); Jones v.
Constellation Energy Proiects & Servs. Grp., Inc., 629 F. App'x 466, 469 (4th Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (unpublished) (nine months); Pascual v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 193 F. App'x 229, 233
(4th Cir. 2006) (percuriam) (unpublished) (three to four months); Causey, 162F.3dat803 (thirteen
months); Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1395 (10th Ch:. 1997) (four months too
long, by itself, to show causation). Where there is a significant temporal gap, "evidence of recurring
retaliatory animus during the intervening period can be sufficient to satisfy the element ofcausation."
Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir. 2007). Moreover, a plaintiff also can rely on
direct evidence of retaliation. See, e.g.• Netter, 908 F.3d at 938; Foster, 787 F.3d at 249.

11

Almost a year passed between Gilliam's July 2018 EEOC charge and Edmonds's April 30,
2019 recommendation ofnomenewal, the May 2019 Board hearing, and the Board's June 5, 2019
decision to not offer Gilliam a four-year adminirnator contract. This timing does not create an
inference of causation. Nonetheless, viewing the evidence in the light ·most favorable to Gilliam,
Gilliam offers direct evidence of retaliation. See [D.E. 33-2] 7-10. According to Gilliam's
deposition testimony, Edmonds told Gilliam sometime between January and April 2019 that
Edmonds had talked to the Board about Gilliam's July 2018 EEOC charge, that Edmonds was ''ready
to move forward and recommend" Gilliam to remain an administrator with a four-year contract, but
the Board would not let Edmonds name Gilliam as the principal at Bertie Middle School due to
Gilliam's EEOC charge. See id. If a jury were to credit this testimony, the jury could find that the
Board retaliated against Gilliam when it declined to renew her four-year administrator contract.
In opposition, the Board notes several serious problems with Gilliam's evidence. See [D.E.
34] 10-11. First, Gilliam never mentioned this alleged conversation at the Board hearing on May
31, 2019, or in her July 2019 EEOC charge. See [D.E. 33-9]. Second, Gilliam never asked
Edmonds about this alleged conversation during Edmonds's deposition. Cf. [D.E. 33-1]. Third,
Gilliam's description of the alleged conversation in her deposition is ambiguous and somewhat
speculative. See [D.E. 33-2] 7-10. Finally, in addition to the Board's arguments, Gilliam pleaded
this alleged conversation in her complaint based on "information and belief," which is an odd way
to describe an alleged direct statement of retaliatory animus. Compl. ,r 64.
The Board's arguments have force. A jury may well find that Gilliam is not being truthful
about her alleged conversation with Edmonds. However, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Gilliam, a genuine issue of materi~ fact exists concerning Gilliam's retaliation claim.
•

I

A jury will have to decide whether Gilliam is telling the truth. A jury also will have to weigh the
credibility of Edmonds and the Board members who made the decision.

12

C.
Finally, Gilliam makes a claim under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act See Compl.

ff 103-15. The claim fails. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9S-2S.14(d). Therefore, the court grants the
Board's motion for summary judgment on Gilliam's North Carolina Wage and Hour Act claim and
dismisses the claim.
IV.
In sum, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendant's motion for

summary judgment [D.E. 31]. The court GRANTS summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's
ADEA claim and North Carolina Wage and Hour Act claim. Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim

survives. The parties shall participate in a court-hosted settlement conference with United States
Magistrate Judge Jam.es E. Gates. If the case does not settle, the parties shall propose trial dates.
SO ORDERED.. This _g_ day of March, 2022.

J SC.DEVERID
United States District Judge

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