Boone v. Equifax Information Services LLC

Filing 37

ORDER denying as moot 29 Motion to Compel and granting in part and denying in part 34 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiff's negligence claim, being preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, is DISMISSED. Venue bei ng proper in the Eastern District of North Carolina, Plaintiffs Fair Credit Reporting Act claim may proceed. Signed by District Judge Terrence W. Boyle on 1/3/2025. (Pro se party has consented to receiving electronic service of all motions, notices, orders, and documents in civil cases in the Eastern District of North Carolina.) (Stouch, L.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
NORTHERN DIVISION
No. 2:23-cv-00046-BO-RJ

ANGELA D. BOONE,
Plaintiff,

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V.

EQUIFAX INFORMATION
SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant.

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ORD E R

This cause comes before the Court on Defendant Equifax' s motion to dismiss for improper
venue [DE 34], and Plaintiff Boone' s motion to compel a litigation schedule [DE 29].
BACKGROUND
On April 5, 2022, Plaintiff Boone filed an application for financing the purchase of a 2018
Honda Accord with Land Rover Mt. Kisco, a car dealership located in New York [DE 1 at 5]. A
financing decision was made based on Plaintiffs credit score.
In November 2022, Plaintiff received a communication from Chase Auto Finance, a
Louisiana company, informing her that Equifax, a Georgia company, had misreported her credit
score as 492 when it should in fact have been 600 [DE 1-1]. As a result of this misreporting,
Plaintiff alleges that she suffered damages including additional application fees, a higher down
payment, a higher monthly payment, and the requiring of a co-signer on the financing agreement
[DE 1 at 6].
On August 16, 2023 , Plaintiff Boone filed suit against Defendant Equifax alleging
negligence and a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) [DE 1 at 6]. Defendant Equifax
has moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that Plaintiffs negligence claim is preempted by the
Fair Credit Reporting Act and that venue is improper in the Eastern District of North Carolina.

ANALYSIS

I.

Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue [DE 34)

Proper venue is defined by 28 U.S.C. § l391(b). Venue is appropriate in "a judicial district
in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located," § 1391 (b )(1 ), "a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action
is situated," § 1391 (b )(2), or "if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought
as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court' s
personal jurisdiction with respect to such action," § 139l(b)(3).
Defendant Equifax argues that§ 1391(b)(l) is inapplicable because Chase Auto Financing
is a Louisiana company, Equifax Information Services is a Georgia company, and Land Rover Mt.
Kisco is a New York car dealership. This is correct, as no defendant resides in North Carolina, and
the plaintiff does not contest it [DE 36 at 1].
Defendant Equifax further argues that § 139l(b)(3) is inapplicable because venue would
otherwise be proper in Louisiana, Georgia, or New York. This is correct, and the plaintiff does not
contest it [DE 36 at 1]. Hubbard v. Eitan Grp. N Am., 669 F. Supp. 3d 538, 550 (E.D.N.C. 2023)
("Because venue is proper [elsewhere] under section 1391(b)(l) and (2), venue cannot be proper
[in North Carolina] under subsection (3)").
Finally, Defendant Equifax argues that§ 1391(b)(2) is inapplicable because the events that
took place in North Carolina- here, Plaintiff's application for and agreeing to a financing
agreement- were not a "substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim." 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). This, the plaintiff rightly contests. In particular, the plaintiff argues that she
resides in North Carolina, that " [t]he damages I suffered due to Equifax ' s erroneous credit

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reporting ... all occurred while I resided in North Carolina," and that "the transaction involving the
signing and purchase of the vehicle financing agreement occurred in North Carolina" [DE 36 at
1].
When assessing whether an act or omission substantially gave rise to the claim at issue, the
Court must consider "the entire sequence of events underlying the claim" and "should not focus
only on those matters that are in dispute or that directly led to the filing of the action." Mitrano v.
Hawes , 377 F.3d 402, 405 (4th Cir. 2004). Residence in a state, standing alone, "does not suffice
to conclude that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [her] claims occurred
in North Carolina." Hubbard, 669 F. Supp. 3d at 550.
Here, the act of applying for and agreeing to a financing agreement is not simply a
substantial part of the events that gave rise to the claim- it is the entire event that gave rise to the
claim. Considering the complete sequence of events, Plaintiff has alleged beginning a financing
application inside of North Carolina, an error being made outside of North Carolina, and then
finalizing the financing agreement with a deficient and harmful result inside of North Carolina.
This story begins and ends in North Carolina. The plaintiff must only make aprimafacie showing
of venue, Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., Ltd. , 675 F.3d 355 , 366 (4th Cir. 2012), and that
showing has been made here. Venue is proper in the Eastern District of North Carolina, and
Plaintiff Boone' s complaint will not be dismissed on this ground.

II.

Motion to Dismiss Plaintifrs Negligence Claim [DE 34)

Separately, Defendant Equifax has moved to dismiss Plaintiff Boone's negligence claim as
preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Specifically, 15 U.S .C. § 1681h(e) provides that:
"Except as provided in sections 1681 n and 1681 o of this title, no consumer may
bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or
negligence with respect to the reporting of information against any consumer reporting
agency ... based on information disclosed pursuant to section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of
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this title, or based on information disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a
consumer against whom the user has taken adverse action, based in whole or in part on the
report except as to false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such
consumer."
This section of the FCRA "provides a general bar on [negligence] actions and the only
exception to this bar is a narrow one, requiring proof of 'malice or willful intent to injure the
consumer. "' Sanders v. Bank of America, 2016 WL 4998290, at *4 (N.D. W.Va. 2016) (citing
Ross v. FD.JC, 625 F.3d 808, 814 (4th Cir. 2010)). Here, the plaintiff has not alleged facts tending
to show that Equifax' s inaccurate credit reporting was motivated by malice. When reading the
complaint, the Court is mindful of the fact that "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, ' to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, "' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)), and that "a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, the
plaintiff's complaint does not show malice at all-to the contrary, it indicates that Equifax
appraised its partners of the error once it became aware of it and provided a corrected credit score
[DE 1-1]. As such, plaintiff's negligence claim is preempted by the FCRA and dismissal of the
claim is proper.
III.

Motion to Compel Litigation Schedule [DE 29]

Also pending is Plaintiff Boone' s motion to compel the defendant to answer and to set a
litigation schedule [DE 29], as Defendant Equifax had previously filed six motions requesting an
extension of time to answer [DE 13, 19, 24, 25, 26, 28] . At the time Plaintiff filed her motion to
compel, a motion to transfer this case to the Northern District of Georgia [DE 16], filed by
Defendant Equifax, was pending before the Court.

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On August 22, 2024, this Court denied defendant's motion to transfer [DE 33] and,
accordingly, denied the pending motions requesting an extension of time to answer. After the
motion to transfer was denied, Equifax timely responded [DE 34]. These actions have rendered
plaintiffs present motion to compel the defendant to answer moot. The plaintiff may file a second
motion to compel should improper delays appear during the process of discovery and litigation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant' s motion to dismiss [DE 34] is GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs negligence claim, being preempted by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, is DISMISSED. Venue being proper in the Eastern District of North Carolina,
Plaintiffs Fair Credit Reporting Act claim may proceed.
Plaintiffs motion to compel a litigation schedule [DE 29] is DENIED AS MOOT.

SO ORDERED, this _3 day of January 2025.

TERRENCE W. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT

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